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ABSTRACT  
 
 
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) are currently used in civil aviation to provide 
aircraft with position and velocity estimates from en-route to Precision Approach (PA) 
operations. GNSSs are also used during surface operations for the position awareness. The 
taxi operation consists in three sub-phases: the taxi on taxiway, the taxi on apron taxiway and 
the taxi on taxi lane (gate phase) sub-phases. The position awareness function requires a 
visual check of the airport environment by pilots. Extending the use of GNSS to the guidance 
function during airport surface operations and under zero-visibility conditions remains a 
challenge. Indeed, during these operations, GNSS measurements may be affected by GNSS 
singular events, such as multipath or ionosphere anomalies. GNSS singular events may lead to 
unacceptable position errors in terms of accuracy and integrity for the zero-visibility guidance 
function. Current GNSS integrity monitoring systems are not designed to totally account for 
the GNSS singular event effects. The assessment of the GNSS singular event effects on the 
accuracy and integrity of GNSS-based airport surface navigation systems and the 
development of GNSS mitigation and integrity monitoring systems designed to properly 
protect users from the singular event effects are thus essential. 
GNSS measurement error and integrity failure models are key inputs in the design of GNSS 
integrity monitoring systems. In this thesis, work has been mainly focused on the modelling 
of GNSS multipath measurement errors, on the assessment of the multipath impact on the 
GNSS-based position error, and on the development of GNSS multipath integrity failure 
models.  
For this matter, the dual frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 and GalileoE1+GalileoE5a multipath 
pseudo-range error model adapted to airport navigation has been proposed, when the aircraft 
is parked or is moving in the airport environment.  Three multipath sources are considered in 
this thesis: the airport surface, the aircraft structure and the airport buildings and gates. The 
multipath ranging error is modelled as the sum of a deterministic bias (induced by the aircraft 
structure itself and the airport surface) and of a stochastic error (induced by the airport 
obstacles).  
Next, the analysis of the impact of multipath on the GNSS-based position error has been 
proposed. The first step consists in choosing a GNSS-based positioning algorithm suitable for 
the zero-visibility airport guidance application. A double constellation Global Positioning 
System (GPS)+Galileo/Inertial Reference System (IRS)/Digital Elevation Map (DEM) tight 
coupling algorithm based on a linearized Kalman filter has been selected. The horizontal 
position error at the output of this positioning algorithm can be over-bounded by a bi-
dimensional Gaussian distribution characterized by a bias vector and by a covariance matrix. 
Secondly, the theoretical analysis of the impact of the GNSS deterministic multipath ranging 
errors on the horizontal position bias and of the GNSS multipath stochastic ranging errors on 
the covariance matrix of the horizontal position error are assessed. The third step is the 
quantification by simulations of the multipath impact on both horizontal position bias and 
Abstract      
 
ii 
 
covariance matrix along with the assessment of the accuracy performance of the positioning 
algorithm in the presence of multipath throughout a given taxi procedure path at Toulouse 
Blagnac airport, France.  
The results associated with the proposed position error models are as follows. The 
deterministic multipath ranging errors are dependent on the elevation mask angles and induce 
a horizontal position bias equal to a few centimeters up to a few decimeters. Moreover, the 
presence of a stochastic multipath error on a single GNSS measurement induces an inflation 
of the covariance matrix of the horizontal position error of a few millimeters up to a few 
centimeters, depending on the stochastic parameters (standard deviation, correlation time) that 
characterize the stochastic multipath ranging error. From the accuracy analysis, the 
positioning algorithm is not suitable for the taxi on taxi lane phase (gate operations). 
Finally, a GNSS multipath integrity failure model has been proposed for both taxiway and 
apron operations along a given procedure path at Blagnac airport. The developed failure 
model describes the characteristics in terms of standard deviation and correlation time of the 
GNSS single multipath ranging failures, the occurrence model of the GNSS single multipath 
ranging failures and their conditions of occurrence. Under the assumptions stated in the thesis, 
and particularly in the absence of mobile obstacles in the scene, such as other parked aircraft, 
GNSS single ranging failures do not occur during both taxiway and apron operations along 
the considered procedure path at Blagnac airport.  
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RESUME  
 
 
Les systèmes de navigation par satellites (GNSS) sont actuellement utilisés en aviation civile 
pour estimer la position et la vitesse des avions pour les opérations en-route jusqu’aux 
approches de précison. Les systèmes GNSS sont également utilisés pendant les opérations de 
surface pour la fonction « position awareness ». Les opérations de surface regroupent trois 
sous-phases, qui sont la phase de  « taxi on taxiway », la phase de « taxi on apron taxiway » et 
la phase de « taxi on taxilane ». La fonction « position awareness » oblige les pilotes à 
effectuer une vérification visuelle de l’environnement aéroportuaire. L’utilisation des 
systèmes GNSS pour guider l’avion pendant les opérations de surface et dans les conditions 
de zéro-visibilité reste un challenge pour la communauté aviation civile. En effet, durant les 
opérations de surface, les mesures GNSS peuvent être affectées par des évènements singuliers 
GNSS, tels que les multi trajets ou les anomalies ionosphériques. Les évènements singuliers 
GNSS peuvent engendrer des erreurs de positionnement jugées inacceptables en termes de 
précision et d’intégrité pour la fonction de guidage de l’avion en environnement aéroportuaire 
et sous les conditions de zéro-visibilité. Les systèmes de contrôle d’intégrité GNSS utilisés 
actuellement ne sont pas conçus pour prendre en compte les effets de tels évènements 
singuliers. L’analyse des effets des évènements singuliers sur la précision et sur l’intégrité des 
systèmes de navigation aéroportuaires basés sur les systèmes GNSS et le développement de 
systèmes de contrôle d’intégrité GNSS conçus pour protéger les utilisateurs des évènements 
singuliers GNSS sont donc essentiels.  
Les modèles d’erreurs de mesures GNSS et les modèles de pannes sont essentiels pour la 
conception de systèmes de contrôle d’intégrité GNSS. Dans cette thèse, les travaux se sont 
principalement focalisés sur la modélisation des erreurs de mesures GNSS dues aux multi 
trajets, sur l’analyse de l’impact des multi trajets sur l’erreur de positionnement, et sur le 
développement d’un modèle de pannes multi trajets. 
Pour cela, les modèles d’erreurs multi trajets sur les  pseudo-distances GNSS bi-fréquence 
GPSL1C+GPSL5 et GalileoE1OS+GalileoE5a sont proposés. Ces modèles sont adaptées au 
cas où l’avion est statique dans l’environnement aéroportuaire, et au cas où l’avion se déplace 
dans l’environnement aéroportuaire. Trois sources de multi trajets sont considérées dans la 
thèse : la surface de l’aéroport, la structure de l’avion sur lequel est monté l’antenne GNSS, et 
les bâtiments de l’aéroport. L’erreur multi trajets est modélisée comme la somme d’un biais 
déterministe (induit par la structure de l’avion et la surface de l’aéroport), et une erreur 
stochastique (induite par les bâtiments de l’aéroport). 
Ensuite, l’analyse de l’impact des multi trajets sur l’erreur de positionnement est proposée. La 
première étape consiste à choisir l’algorithme de positionnement GNSS adapté à la fonction 
de guidage des avions dans un environnement aéroportuaire et sous les conditions de zéro-
visibilité. Un algorithme double constellations Global Positioning System (GPS) + Galileo / 
Inertial Référence System (IRS) / Digital Elevation Map (DEM) basé sur un filtrage de 
Kalman linéarisé a été sélectionné. La deuxième étape consiste à analyser l’impact des multi 
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trajets sur la position horizontale estimée en sortie du filtre de Kalman. L’erreur de position 
horizontale en sortie de filtre de Kalman peut être modélisée comme une distribution 
Gaussienne bidimensionnelle caractérisée par un biais et par une matrice de covariance. 
L’impact des erreurs multi trajets sur le biais et sur la matrice de covariance de l’erreur de 
position horizontale est analysé de manière qualitative. La troisième étape est la quantification 
pas simulations de l’impact des multi trajets sur le biais et sur la matrice de covariance de 
l’erreur de position horizontale, ainsi que l’étude de la performance de l’algorithme de 
positionnement en termes de précision le long d’une procédure de taxi sur l’aéroport de 
Toulouse Blagnac, en France. 
Les résultats associés à l’analyse de l’impact des multi trajets sur l’erreur de positionnement 
sont les suivants. La partie déterministe de l’erreur multi trajets sur les mesures GNSS induit 
un biais sur la position horizontale estimée par le filtre de Kalman. Ce biais dans le domaine 
de la position est de quelques centimètres et peut atteindre quelques décimètres. De plus, la 
partie stochastique de l’erreur multi trajets sur les mesures GNSS induit une inflation de la 
matrice de covariance de l’erreur de position horizontale en sortie de filtre de Kalman. Cette 
inflation peut atteindre quelques centimètres en écart type, et dépendant des caractéristiques 
(écart type, temps de corrélation) de l’erreur stochastique de multi trajets sur les mesures 
GNSS. Concernant les performances de l’algorithme de positionnement en termes de 
précision, l’algorithme sélectionné n’est pas adapté à la phase «  taxi on taxi lane ».  
Finalement, un modèle de pannes multi trajets est proposé pour les sous phase de « taxi on 
taxiway » et de « taxi on apron taxiway ». Le modèle de pannes développé décrit les 
caractéristiques des pannes simples multi trajets en termes d’écart type et de temps de 
corrélation, le modèle d’occurrence des pannes simples multi trajets, ainsi que les conditions 
d’occurrence de telles pannes. En tenant compte des hypothèses décrites dans la thèse, et 
particulièrement en l’absence d’obstacles mobiles dans la scène aéroportuaire, les pannes 
simples multi trajets ne se produisent pas le long des phases de « taxi on taxiway » et de « taxi 
on apron taxiway » sur la procédure de taxi sélectionnée dans l’aéroport de Toulouse Blagnac, 
en France.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1. Motivations 
The constant growth of the traffic density in airports and the complex architecture of some 
airports induce operational errors during airport surface operations. As illustrations of 
operational errors there are runway incursions that may lead to aircraft collisions. The United 
States Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recorded a mean of 20 aircraft collisions a 
year [FAA, 2013], leading to FAA recommendations to mitigate the collision risks. Hence, 
there is a need to make the surface operations safer while maintaining the airport capacity 
under critical conditions that are: 
- low visibility conditions, 
- high traffic density conditions. 
Therefore, advanced capabilities are needed to ensure safety and to maintain aerodrome 
capacity in all weather conditions. In order to provide these advanced capabilities, Surface 
Movement Guidance and Control Systems (SMGCSs) are developed. SMGCSs should be 
capable of assisting aircraft to maneuver safely and efficiently on the airport surface and 
should support four primary functions that are defined as follows [RTCA, 1999]: 
- The guidance function provides guidance necessary for movements through clear and 
continuous indications allowing pilots or autopilots to maintain their positions on the 
intended routes and for situational awareness. 
- The surveillance function captures the information on aircraft, vehicles, and objects within 
the coverage area and updates data needed for guidance and control.  
- The routing function provides assignment of a route to individual aircraft, which provide 
safe and efficient movement for its current position to its intended final position. 
- The control function provides a safe and efficient means of managing movements and 
planning for requested movements, detects conflicts/incursions and provides solutions.  
Estimating the position of aircraft present in airport environments is of primary importance 
for both guidance and surveillance functions. It is thus required to design navigation systems 
that estimate aircraft positions during airport surface operations and that meet the 
performance requirements related to both guidance and surveillance functions in all visibility 
conditions. Since the guidance function requires higher requirements levels than the 
surveillance function, the main challenge for the civil aviation community is to develop a 
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navigation system that meets the performance requirements related to the guidance function in 
all visibility conditions. This thesis focuses on the guidance function.  
Currently, some ASMGCs, such as the Onboard Airport Navigation System (OANS) 
developed by Thales and deployed on A380 Airbus aircraft, make use of GNSS to provide 
pilots with guidance information. The airport moving map and the route to follow are 
displayed on the navigation display during airport surface operations. However, this function, 
commonly called “position awareness”, requires the pilots checking visually the airport 
environment during the surface operations. Hence, one of the main limitations of the position 
awareness is that it cannot be used under zero visibility conditions. There is currently a need 
to extend the use of the guidance function during airport surface operations to zero-visibility 
conditions. Under zero-visibility conditions, the guidance function will enable to perform 
automatic airport surface operations without any visual observations of the airport 
environments by the pilots. The performance requirements levels related to the navigation 
system for the guidance function under zero-visibility conditions are higher than those for the 
position awareness function. Indeed, the guidance function under zero-visibility conditions 
requires sub-meter level accuracy and integrity navigation system performance requirements, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. In comparison, the navigation system accuracy requirement for the 
OANS position awareness function is of the order of 20 meters. No integrity requirements are 
related to the position awareness function since the displayed moving maps will be correlated 
with an outside visual check. Finally, note that only notional values of the navigation system 
performance requirements are provided in this thesis for the position awareness function, 
since these requirements are protected by the Airbus copyrights.  
GNSS is an excellent candidate to be part of the navigation system that will meet the stringent 
performance requirements related to the guidance function under zero-visibility conditions. 
There are two main reasons for this. 
- Firstly, GNSS is currently used in civil aviation from en-route to precision approaches 
(CAT I). GNSS infrastructures to support en-route to CAT I operations can be used for 
airport surface operations. In addition, the civil aviation community has collected feedback 
and information concerning the operations and the performance of Global Positioning 
System (GPS). For both reasons, it is interesting to assess the feasibility of extending the 
use of GNSS to airport surface operations.  
- Secondly, the Air Navigation Conference (ANC) in [ANC, 2003] underlines that one of the 
challenge of the civil aviation community is to use GNSS “from gate to gate”. This implies 
extending the use of GNSS to surface operations. Regarding this guideline, extensive 
efforts concerning the enhancement of GNSS constellations, augmentation systems and 
signals used in civil aviation have been conducted during the last years.  The improved 
constellations, augmentation systems and signals will be available by 2025. These 
improvements are expected to result in significant operational benefits [ANC, 2012]. 
Hence, it is interesting to assess the feasibility of extending the use of current and future 
GNSSs to airport surface operations. 
The use of GNSS during airport surface operations under zero-visibility conditions raises 
issues since GNSS measurements may be affected by GNSS singular events during these 
operations. In this thesis, GNSS singular events are defined as events which effects on the 
GNSS measurements have not been totally taken into account in the design of current GNSS 
augmentation systems and that may lead to unacceptable position errors for the zero-visibility 
guidance function. Two main reasons explain why some singular events present in airport 
environments have not been totally taken into account in the design of current GNSS 
augmentation systems. 
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- Firstly, there is a lack of knowledge concerning some singular events that may affect 
GNSS measurements in airport environments. There are two reasons for this.  
 Some singular events occur rarely. A limited number of available observations 
concerning a singular event have been collected. In addition, the occurrence of some 
events, such as ionosphere anomalies, is difficult to predict since the physical 
phenomena inducing these events are not well-understood.  
 Some singular events, such as multipath inducing large measurement biases, are specific 
to the airport environments and are local phenomena. Their causes, occurrence and 
effects on the GNSS measurements and on the GNSS-based positioning errors have not 
been fully assessed since these singular events do not affect GNSS measurements for 
the operations that are currently covered by GNSS.   
- Secondly, some singular events present in airport environments have not been totally taken 
into account in the design of current GNSS augmentation systems since they induce errors 
that are considered to be sufficiently low not to be considered for phases of flight currently 
covered by GNSS. However, these errors are significant for the guidance function during 
airport surface operations under zero-visibility conditions.  
Six GNSS singular events are identified in airport environments: 
- Space and ground segments failures inducing multiple GNSS ranging failures, 
- Space and ground segments errors inducing nominal biases. Nominal biases on the GNSS 
measurements are nearly constant errors over the duration of the surface operation and are 
systematic errors. These biases are therefore addressed in the fault-free case and are not be 
assimilated to ranging failures.  
- Group delay and phase center variations of the GNSS airborne antenna, 
- Ionosphere anomalies, 
- Intentional and unintentional interference, 
- Multipath.  
Among the singular events listed above, this thesis mainly focuses on multipath. Multipath is 
the reception of reflected or diffracted replicas of the desired signal [Kaplan et al., 2006] by 
the GNSS airborne antenna. For en-route to approach operations, the structure of the aircraft 
itself is the dominant source of multipath error. However, during surface operations, 
additional sources of multipath errors, such as other aircraft and buildings surrounding the 
GNSS airborne antenna, may affect the pseudo-range measurements [Chen, 2010]. This 
results in two main consequences. Firstly multipath replicas are one of the dominant 
contributors of errors for surface operations [Enge et al., 2010]. They may have a significant 
impact on the accuracy of the GNSS-based airport surface navigation system. Indeed, 
multipath may result in horizontal positioning errors of the order of a few meters [Braasch et 
al., 2000]. Secondly the standardized model used in current GNSS integrity monitoring 
algorithms from en-route to approach operations is not valid for taxi and parking operations. 
No multipath error model compliant with airport environments is currently standardized. 
Indeed, multipath errors during surface operations have not been fully assessed since this 
singular event does not affect GNSS measurements for the operations that are currently 
covered by GNSS. Hence, multipath in airport environments may affect the integrity of 
pseudo-range estimates.  
In order to extend the use of GNSS to the guidance function under zero-visibility conditions 
during airport surface operations, it is necessary to assess the effects of multipath on the 
accuracy and integrity of GNSS-based airport surface navigation systems.  
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1.2. Objectives 
The overall objective of this Ph.D. is to address the effects of singular events on the accuracy 
and integrity of GNSS-based airport surface navigation systems through modelling, with a 
special attention to multipath. The following research goals are distinguished: 
1/ To review the causes, the effects and the occurrence of GNSS singular events in airport 
environments. 
2/ To develop GNSS multipath measurement error models in an airport environment.  
- To propose criteria for a representation of the 3D airport model that is suitable for the 
development of the GNSS multipath measurement error models. 
- To assess the influence of the input parameters on the error models. 
3/ To choose a GNSS-based positioning algorithm for the guidance function under zero-
visibility conditions.  
4/ To model the GNSS-based position error in the presence of multipath in airport 
environments. 
- To model the impact of multipath on the GNSS-based position errors by taking into 
account the selected GNSS-based positioning algorithm. 
- To assess the accuracy of the GNSS-based position error. 
5/ To propose a methodology to identify: 
- the GNSS multipath single ranging failures in airport environments, 
- the occurence of such GNSS multipath ranging errors in airport environments. 
1.3. Contributions 
The contributions of this Ph.D. thesis are presented in this subsection.  
1/ The impact of the six GNSS singular events identified in Section 1.1 on the accuracy and 
integrity of the GNSS-based airport surface navigation systems has been reviewed by means 
of a bibliographic study. Based on this study, the following singular events may have a 
significant impact on both accuracy and integrity of GNSS-based navigation systems for the 
zero-visibility airport surface guidance function: 
- The space and ground segments errors inducing nominal biases as well as the group delay 
and phase center variations of the GNSS airborne antenna. Future Aircraft Based 
Augmentation System (ABAS) integrity monitoring systems will be designed to provide 
sufficient protection against these biases. Note that ABAS system is presented in Section 
3.3. 
- The space and ground segments failures inducing multiple GNSS ranging failures when 
Aircraft Based Augmentation System (ABAS) is used as the GNSS augmentation system.  
- The Continuous Wave (CW) unintentional interference and the intentional interference. 
- The ionosphere anomalies in the single frequency mode.  
- The multipath.  
Future multi-frequency GNSS navigation systems will mitigate the effects of the ionosphere 
anomalies. CW interference, intentional interference and multipath represent a threat in terms 
of accuracy and integrity for the application, regardless of the frequency mode and of the 
GNSS augmentation system. Multipath effects are further investigated in this Ph.D. thesis.  
2/ GNSS multipath measurement error models have been developed for airport surface 
operations considering that the multipath sources in the airport environments are the airport 
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buildings and gates, the ground and the structure of the aircraft on which the GNSS antenna 
and receiver are mounted. The GNSS multipath measurement error can be modelled as the 
sum of: 
- A deterministic error induced by multipath from the ground and from the aircraft structure. 
- A zero-mean stochastic error induced by multipath from the airport buildings and gates. 
The stochastic nature of this error term comes from the uncertainties in the true aircraft 
positions along the procedure path followed by the aircraft during the surface operation. 
Simplifications can be done when representing the 3D model of the airport buildings and 
gates for the estimation of the stochastic error model parameters: 
 Isolated objects of size below 0.8m can be neglected [Chen, 2010].  
 Details in the range of the wavelength do not have to be represented [Ait Ighli, 2013]. 
 Concrete sub-meter recesses and overhangs on concrete facades do not have to be 
represented. 
3/ GNSS position error models have been developed for airport surface operations in the 
presence of multipath. For this analysis: 
- A positioning algorithm based on a GNSS/IRS/DEM tight coupling linearized Kalman 
filter has been chosen to support the zero-visibility guidance function during surface 
operations. 
- The analytical expressions of the impact of multipath on the bias and covariance matrix of 
the horizontal position error at the output of the positioning algorithm have been derived. 
4/ The accuracy performance of the GNSS/IRS/DEM positioning algorithm during the taxi on 
taxiway, taxi on apron taxiway, and taxi on taxi lane sub-phases of a specific procedure path 
at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France, has been assessed. More specifically, taxi on taxi lane 
sub-phases is performed when the aircraft is moving under its own power in the gate area. At 
this occasion, it has been shown that: 
- GPS/Galileo elevation mask angle of 15°/15° improves the accuracy performance 
compared to the standard elevation mask angle of 5°/10°  
- The positioning algorithm does not meet the accuracy performance requirement for the 
zero-visibility guidance function during the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase.  
- A positioning algorithm based on a GNSS/IRS/DEM/Wheel Speed Sensor (WSS) tight 
coupling Kalman filter has been implemented to test if this implementation enables 
meeting the accuracy requirements of the taxi lane sub-phase. This implementation does 
not account for the WSS correlation modes in the time domain and between the wheels. 
The aid of WSS measurements reduces the standard deviation of the horizontal position 
error in the longitudinal direction. However, this aid is insufficient to reach the accuracy 
requirements of the taxi lane sub-phase. 
5/ A methodology to model the characteristics (standard deviation, correlation time) and the 
occurrence of GNSS single multipath ranging failures in a given airport environments and 
over a given procedure path has been developed.  
1.4. Thesis outline 
This sub-section presents the general organization of this thesis. 
Chapter 2 is an overview of the different navigation performance requirements developed in 
civil aviation. Firstly, it defines the different phases of flight with a special attention to the 
taxi operation. The taxi operation consists in several sub-phases. Each taxi sub-phase is 
presented and defined. Secondly, the navigation performance requirements allocation is 
described. Thirdly, the navigation system performance requirements for the guidance function 
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under zero-visibility conditions and for the taxi sub-phases are presented and discussed. These 
requirements are compared to the Signal-In-Space (SIS) navigation performance requirements 
that have been standardized for en-route to PA operations. 
Chapter 3 presents the current and future GNSS constellations, signals and augmentation 
systems as well as the different GNSS measurements errors in both nominal and faulty 
conditions. GNSS signals and constellations are firstly reviewed. The GNSS constellations 
and signals suitable for the application are selected by taken into account the civil aviation 
context and the performance requirements for the application. Next, the GNSS nominal and 
faulty measurement error models are presented and discussed. The choice to treat multipath as 
a priority is justified. Finally, GNSS augmentation systems are reviewed. The choice of 
ABAS as the augmentation system that will support the guidance function is also justified.  
Chapter 4 presents the impact of multipath on the GNSS measurements. Firstly, the different 
stages of the transmission channel model are defined and described. The impact of multipath 
on the GNSS signals received by the GNSS airborne antenna is analyzed. Secondly, the 
impact of multipath on the code tracking loops of the GNSS receiver and on the GNSS code 
measurements are assessed.  
Chapter 5 proposes GNSS multipath measurement error models for the taxi on taxiway, taxi 
on apron taxiway and taxi on taxi lane sub-phases. Firstly, the GNSS multipath ranging error 
simulator used to derive the error models is presented. The assumptions and simplifications 
that have been done when developing the GNSS multipath error models are presented and 
discussed. Secondly, the static and dynamic configurations concepts are defined. Thirdly, the 
GNSS multipath error models are developed in both static and dynamic configurations. The 
impact of the input parameters on the error models is discussed.  
Chapter 6 proposes a GNSS-based positioning algorithm suitable for the guidance function 
application during surface operations. Firstly, the Position Velocity Time (PVT) estimation 
techniques are reviewed. A PVT technique based on the integration of GNSS with other 
sensors is chosen based on the performance requirements for the application. Drawbacks and 
advantages of several navigation sensors and signals of opportunity are discussed. The 
navigation sensors that are integrated with GNSS are identified. After that, the coupling 
strategies are briefly reviewed and the open-loop GNSS/IRS/DEM tight coupling linearized 
Kalman filter architecture is selected. Finally, the architecture of the software that simulates 
the GNSS-based position error at the output of this tight coupling Kalman filter is presented. 
Limitations of this software are underlined. 
Chapter 7 analyses the impact of multipath on the GNSS-based position error and assesses 
the accuracy performance of the positioning algorithm during surface operations. Firstly, the 
impact of the GNSS multipath measurement errors on the bias and on the covariance matrix 
of the horizontal GNSS-based positioning error at the output of the positioning algorithm 
described in Chapter 6 is assessed through a theoretical analysis. Next, the position bias 
induced by multipath and the increase of the covariance matrix induced by multipath are 
quantified by simulations. Finally, the horizontal position error model adapted to surface 
operations is proposed and the accuracy of the positioning algorithm presented in Chapter 6 is 
assessed. The impact of the satellite elevation mask angle on the accuracy performance is 
discussed. 
Chapter 8 proposes a methodology to develop a GNSS multipath integrity failure model in 
airport environments. Firstly, the importance to develop integrity failure models for the design 
of a GNSS integrity monitoring system is shown. Secondly, GNSS multipath single ranging 
failures are defined. A methodology to identify the characteristics (standard deviation, 
CHAPTER 1: Introduction  
 
7 
 
correlation time) of the GNSS multipath single ranging failures in a given airport is 
developed. Thirdly, a methodology to model the occurrence of such failures is proposed.  
Chapter 9 presents the main results and the conclusions of this thesis. Recommendations for 
future work are also presented.  
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CHAPTER 2 
2. Civil aviation requirements 
 
 
GNSS can be used as a Navigation aid (Navaid) if GNSS can support the operational 
requirements established by the standardization bodies for both in-flight and surface 
operations. The highest global authority on aviation standardization is the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), an agency of the United Nations, whose aim is to develop a 
global civil aviation system that consistently and uniformly operates at peak efficiency and 
provides optimum safety, security and sustainability [ICAO, 2013]. ICAO is responsible for 
establishing the Standards And Recommended Practices (SARPs) concerning air navigation. 
In particular, Volume 1 of Annex 10 defines the standards and the SIS navigation 
performance requirements for radio-navigation aids, including GNSS [ICAO, 2006].  
The Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPSs) for GPS and Galileo airborne 
receivers are developed by the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) and by 
the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment (EUROCAE) bodies, respectively. 
RTCA and EUROCAE gather together administrations, aircraft manufacturers, equipment 
manufacturers and service providers. The RTCA SC-159 working group develops minimum 
standards that form the basis for FAA approval of equipment using GPS as a primary means 
of civil aircraft navigation. In Europe, EUROCAE WG-62 working group is responsible for 
the preparation of minimum standards for the first generation of Galileo airborne receivers. 
The use of dual constellation (Galileo+GPS) receivers will be standardized jointly by 
EUROCAE and RTCA in a future MOPS. 
The main intent of this chapter is to present and to discuss the navigation system performance 
criteria for the zero-visibility guidance function during taxi operations. This chapter firstly 
defines the different phases of flight with a special attention to taxi phases, the navigation 
system performance concept and the navigation system performance criteria. Next, the 
chapter presents and discusses the navigation system performance requirements for the taxi 
operations proposed in [Schuster et al., 2011]. It also compares the requirements to the signal-
in-space performance requirements for En-route to CAT I operations established in the ICAO 
SARPs. Finally, the accuracy and integrity requirements proposed in [Schuster et al., 2011] 
are modified and relaxed to account for les flight technical error budget guaranteed by Airbus. 
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2.1. Phases of flight definitions 
A flight begins when any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and continues 
until such time as all such persons have disembarked [ICAO, 2001]. A flight consists of 
several phases of flight. In this document, a phase of flight refers to a period within a flight. 
This section presents and defines the different phases of flight.  
2.1.1. Definitions 
The ICAO and the Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) have jointly defined the 
different phases of flight [ICAO-CAST, 2010]. The CAST body is independent of ICAO and 
includes experts from several air carriers, aircraft manufacturers, engine manufacturers, pilot 
associations, regulatory authorities, transportation safety boards. The different phases of flight 
are listed and defined below: 
- Standing: “Prior to pushback or taxi, or after arrival, at the gate, ramp, or parking area, 
while the aircraft is stationary”. 
- Pushback/Towing:  “Aircraft is moving in the gate, ramp, or parking area, assisted by a 
tow vehicle”. 
- Taxi:  “The aircraft is moving on the aerodrome surface under its own power prior to 
takeoff or after landing”. The taxi phase includes the following sub-phases: 
 Power Back (for departure): “Takes place when the aircraft, under its own power, 
reverses from the stand or parking position”.  
 Taxi to Runway (for departure): “Commences when the aircraft begins to move under 
its own power leaving the gate, ramp, apron, or parking area, and terminates upon 
reaching the runway”.  
 Taxi to Takeoff Position (for departure): “From entering the runway until reaching the 
takeoff position”.  
 Taxi from Runway (for arrival): “Begins upon exiting the landing runway and 
terminates upon arrival at the gate, ramp, apron, or parking area, when the aircraft 
ceases to move under its own power”.  
- Takeoff: “From the application of takeoff power, through rotation and to an altitude of 35 
feet above runway elevation”. 
- Departure (or initial climb): “From the end of the takeoff sub-phase to the first 
prescribed power reduction, or until reaching 1000 feet above runway elevation or the 
Visual Flight Rules (VFR) pattern, whichever comes first”. 
- En-route. En-route operations are classified as follows: 
 The oceanic en-route phase covers operations over ocean areas generally characterized 
by low traffic density.  
 The continental en-route phase covers operations typically characterized by moderate to 
high traffic densities.  
- Approach. The instrument approach phase includes the following sub-phases:  
 Initial approach: “That part of an instrument approach procedure between the initial 
approach fix and the intermediate approach fix”, 
 Intermediate approach: “That part of an approach procedure between the intermediate 
approach fix and the final approach fix or point”, 
 Final approach: “from the final approach fix to the beginning of the landing flare”.  
- Landing: “From the beginning of the landing flare until aircraft exits the landing runway, 
comes to a stop on the runway, or when power is applied for takeoff in the case of a touch-
and-go landing”. 
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Further details about approaches categories and taxi operations phases are presented in the 
next two sections. 
2.1.2. Approach and landing operations categories 
Instrument approach and landing operations are classified as follows [ICAO, 2010]: 
- Non-Precision Approach (NPA) and landing operations: “An instrument approach and 
landing which utilizes lateral guidance but does not utilize vertical guidance”. 
- Precision Approach (PA) and landing operations: “An instrument approach and landing 
using precision lateral and vertical guidance with minima as determined by the category of 
operation”. Three categories of precision approach and landing operations have been 
defined by the ICAO in [ICAO, 2010] and are denoted by CAT I, CAT II and CAT III 
operations.  
- Approach and landing Procedures with Vertical guidance (APV): “An instrument 
approach and landing which utilizes lateral and vertical guidance but does not meet the 
requirements established for precision approach and landing operations”. Two different 
classes of APV approaches can be identified depending on the method utilized to provide 
the vertical guidance [Escher, 2003]: 
 The first class is characterized by a GNSS lateral guidance and by a barometric vertical 
guidance. This approach is called APV Barometric Vertical Navigation (BARO-
VNAV). 
 The second class is characterized by a GNSS lateral and vertical guidance. This class 
was introduced to avoid the limitations presented by the barometric vertical guidance in 
terms of accuracy and integrity failures. The terms APV-I and APV-II refer to two 
levels of GNSS approach and landing operations with vertical guidance [ICAO, 2006]. 
Categories of approach and landing operations are defined according to the level of 
confidence that can be placed by the pilot into the system he is using to help him land the 
plane safely. Approach and landing operations are divided in two main segments: the aircraft 
first follows the indication provided by the landing system, and then secondly the pilot takes 
over in the final part and controls the aircraft using visual outside information. When the 
reliability of the landing system increases, the height of the aircraft over the ground at which 
the pilot takes over the final part of the landing can be decreased [Macabiau, 1997]. Approach 
and landing operations are specified by a decision height and two visual requirements, the 
visibility and the runway visual range. The decision height, the visibility and the runway 
visual range are defined as follows: 
- Decision Height (DH): A specified height in the precision approach or approach with 
vertical guidance at which a missed approach must be initiated if the required visual 
reference to continue the approach has not been established [ICAO, 2010b]. 
- Visibility: Visibility for aeronautical purposes is the greater of [ICAO, 2005]: 
 the greatest distance at which a black object of suitable dimensions, situated near the 
ground, can be seen and recognized when observed against a bright background, 
 the greatest distance at which lights of approximately 1000 candelas can be seen and 
identified against an unlit background.  
- Runway visual range (RVR): The range over which the pilot of an aircraft on the centre 
line of a runway can see the runway surface markings or the lights delineating the runway 
or identifying its center line [ICAO, 2010b]. 
Table 2-1 presents the minimum values of the DH, the visibility and the RVR required for 
each type of approach and landing operations.  
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The DH for APV operations is set to 76m (250ft), except for Localizer Performance with 
Vertical Guidance – 200 (LPV-200) operations. LPV-200 is an instrument approach 
procedure in which guidance is provided down to a minimum DH as low as 200ft height 
above touchdown [Lee et al., 2007]. 
 
Operation DH requirement Visual requirement 
NPA DH > 107m Depending on the 
airport equipment APV DH > 76m (except for LPV-200) 
CAT I DH > 60m Visibility > 800m or RVR > 550m 
CAT II 30m < DH < 60m RVR > 300m 
CAT 
III 
CAT IIIA 0m < DH < 30m RVR > 175m 
CAT IIIB 0m < DH < 15m 175m > RVR > 50m 
CAT IIIC DH = 0m RVR = 0m 
 
Table 2-1: Minimum values of DH, visibility and RVR for approach and landing 
operations [ICAO, 2006] 
 
2.1.3. Taxi operation and related functions 
This section provides further details about the different phases of a taxi operation and presents 
the different functions that have been elaborated in order to help pilots maneuvering on the 
airport surface.  
2.1.3.1. Airport areas, taxiways and runway 
The different areas of an airport are detailed in this section. Taxi operations take place in the 
movement area of the aerodrome. The movement area is the part of an aerodrome to be used 
for the take-off, landing and taxiing of aircraft, consisting of [ICAO, 2009]: 
- The apron(s) are the areas intended to accommodate aircraft for purposes of loading or 
unloading passengers, mail or cargo, fuelling, parking or maintenance. The gate is a 
designated area on an apron intended to be used for parking an aircraft. 
- The maneuvering area is the part of an aerodrome to be used for the take-off, landing and 
taxiing of aircraft, excluding aprons. 
During the push back, taxi to runway and taxi from runway sub-phases defined in Section 
2.1.1, the aircraft is moving on taxiways. The taxiway is a defined path on a land aerodrome 
established for the taxiing of aircraft and intended to provide a link between one part of the 
aerodrome and another, including: 
- The taxi lane is a portion of an apron intended to provide access to gates only [ICAO, 
2009]. 
- The apron taxiway is a portion of a taxiway system located on an apron [ICAO, 2009]. 
- The rapid exit taxiway is a taxiway connected to a runway and designed to allow landing 
aeroplanes to turn off at higher speeds than are achieved on other exit taxiways thereby 
minimizing runway occupancy times [ICAO, 2009]. 
- The normal taxiway, also called taxiway in the following, is a portion of a taxiway 
system located in the maneuvering area and provides a link between the rapid exit taxiway 
or the runway and the apron taxiway.  
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During the taxi to takeoff position sub-phase defined in Section 2.1.1, the aircraft is moving 
on the runway. The runway a defined rectangular area on a land aerodrome prepared for the 
landing and take-off of aircraft [ICAO, 2009]. Parts of the aprons and the maneuvering area at 
Toulouse Blagnac airport, France, are depicted in Figure 2-1.  
 
 
 
Figure 2-1 : Apron and maneuvering areas at Toulouse Blagnac airport [SIA, 2013] 
2.1.3.2. Sub-phases 
The taxi operation consists of the following sub-phases: 
- The push back defined in Section 2.1.1, 
- The taxi on taxi lane is performed when the aircraft is moving under its own power in the 
gate area on taxi lanes. 
- The taxi on apron taxiway is performed when the aircraft is moving under its own power 
in the apron area on apron taxiways. 
- The taxi on taxiway is performed when the aircraft is moving in the maneuvering area on 
taxiways. 
- The taxi on runway is performed when the aircraft is moving in the maneuvering area on 
the runway. 
Figure 2-2 represents the departure and arrival scenarios.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Departure and arrival taxi sub-phases 
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2.1.3.3. Functions 
The different functions elaborated in order to help pilots maneuvering during surface 
movements are presented in this section. The number of accidents and incidents during taxi 
operations, including runway incursions, is increasing [ICAO, 2004]. Contributing factors 
include the increasing number of operations that take place in low visibility conditions and the 
progressive increase in traffic [ICAO, 2004]. Therefore, advanced capabilities are needed to 
ensure safety and to maintain aerodrome capacity in all weather conditions. In order to 
provide these advanced capabilities, SMGCSs are being developed. SMGCSs should be 
capable of assisting aircraft to maneuver safely and efficiently on the airport surface and 
should support four primary functions that are defined in Chapter 1. 
In their simplest form, current SMGCSs rely on the “see and be seen” principle for supporting 
the surveillance and guidance functions. It means that the information necessary for the 
surveillance and the guidance functions are provided by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) based 
on a visual observation of the aircraft, vehicles and objects on the airport maneuvering and 
apron areas. The routing and control functions are facilitated through voice and data 
communications [RTCA, 1999].  
Visual means are not adequate to maintain aerodrome capacity in low visibility conditions. 
Similarly, in high traffic density conditions, visual means lead to low capacity and delays 
since they require a human intervention to support the surveillance, routing, guidance and 
control functions. Since SMGCSs based on visual means are poor operationally, Advanced-
SMGCSs (A-SMGCSs) are under development. As justified in Chapter 1, such advanced 
systems are intended to use technologies, such as GNSS, that will enable to maintain the 
aerodrome capacity in all visibility conditions. In addition, A-SMGCSs will limit the human 
intervention and will enable to limit the low capacity and delay issues encountered with 
SMGCSs based on visual means. 
 
2.2. Requirements presentation  
This section provides an overview of the different types of civil aviation requirements.  
2.2.1. Total system performance requirements  
In order to present the concept of total system performance requirements, it is firstly 
necessary to present the concepts of Area Navigation (RNAV) and of Performance Based 
Navigation (PBN). 
The concept of Area Navigation (RNAV) is a method of navigation which permits aircraft 
operation on any desired flight path within the coverage of station-referenced navigation aids 
or within the limits of the capability of self-contained navigation aids, or a combination of 
these [RTCA, 2003]. RNAV procedures are not restricted to the location of ground-based 
navigation aids. RNAV operations are specified using one of the following approaches 
[Azoulai, 2009]: 
- The sensor based approach. In this case, RNAV operations are based on a particular means 
of navigation, and it is mandatory to use this one. 
- The performance based approach. In this case, RNAV operations are based on a set of 
performance requirements to be met. These requirements have not been developed for a 
specific navigation means. This approach refers to the Performance Based Navigation 
(PBN) concept. The PBN concept represents a shift from sensor-based to performance-
based navigation. 
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PBN offers a number of advantages over sensor based approach [ICAO, 2008]. As an 
illustration, performance based approach avoids the need for developing sensor-specific 
operations with each new evolution of navigation systems, which would be cost-prohibitive.  
According to [ICAO, 2008], the navigation performance requirements for RNAV operations 
specified by a performance based approach are defined in terms of accuracy, integrity, 
availability and continuity.  These total system navigation requirements are specified for the 
Total System Error (TSE). TSE is represented in Figure 2-3.   
 
Figure 2-3 : Total System Error [ICAO, 2008] 
 
The TSE is the difference between the true position and the desired position. This error is 
equal to the vector sum of [ICAO, 2008]: 
- The Path Definition Error (PDE) PDE occurs when the path defined in the system does 
not correspond to the desired path, that is the path expected to be flown over the ground. 
- The Fight Technical Error (FTE) relates to the air crew or autopilot’s ability (steering 
system) to follow the defined path or track, including any display error. 
- The Navigation System Error (NSE) refers to the difference between the aircraft’s 
estimated position and actual position. 
2.2.2. Navigation system performance requirements 
The total system performance requirements on the TSE are allocated to the path definition 
unit, to the navigation system, and to the steering system. The overall strategy for this 
allocation is depicted in Figure 2-4. The navigation system performance requirements are 
defined as the total system performance requirements allocated to the navigation system and 
are expressed in terms of NSE. These requirements are defined by means of four criteria that 
are the accuracy, integrity, availability and continuity. Section 2.2.4 defines these four 
criteria. 
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Figure 2-4: TSE requirements allocation 
2.2.3. SIS navigation performance requirements 
The navigation system used to support the operations that are currently standardized, that are 
the en-route to CAT I operations, may consist solely of a radio navigation system, or it may 
also include other aircraft sensors. The navigation system performance requirement is 
allocated to the radio-navigation system and to the other navigation sensors. As depicted in 
Figure 2-4, the radio-navigation system contribution to the NSE performance depends on: 
- the airborne radio-navigation receiver, 
- the other elements, defined in the case of GNSS as the GNSS constellation(s), the GNSS 
ground sub-system and augmentation system(s) used to estimate the aircraft position. 
In the case of GNSS, the MOPS for GPS and Galileo airborne receivers are developed by the 
RTCA and by EUROCAE bodies, respectively.  
ICAO develops SARPs for the other elements. More specifically, Volume 1 of ICAO Annex 
10 [ICAO, 2006] defines the SIS navigation performance requirements for the radio-
navigation aids, including GNSS. In the case of GNSS, GNSS can be used during a given 
operation if the GNSS constellation(s), the GNSS ground sub-system(s) and the augmentation 
system(s) combined with a fault-free receiver meets the SIS navigation performance 
requirements for that operation. The fault-free receiver is assumed to be a receiver with 
nominal accuracy and time-to-alert performance. Such a receiver is assumed to have no 
failures that affect the integrity, availability and continuity performance [ICAO, 2006]. 
Navigation system performance requirements and SIS navigation performance requirements 
are defined by means of four criteria that are the accuracy, integrity, availability and 
continuity. In the next section, the position error is the difference between the aircraft’s 
estimated position and actual position. 
2.2.4. Criteria  
2.2.4.1. Accuracy 
Accuracy characterizes the degree of conformance between the estimated or measured 
position and/or velocity of a platform at a given time and its true position and/or velocity 
[RTCA, 1991]. ICAO defines a 95% confidence level in order to characterize the accuracy of 
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the system. For an estimated position at a specific location, the probability that the position 
error is within the 95% confidence level should be at least 95% [ICAO, 2006]. 
Note that the accuracy of the position estimated by means of GNSS is impacted by the 
constellation configuration. Hence, this accuracy cannot be correctly assessed by averaging 
the position errors over different constellation configurations.  In comparison, if the 
considered navigation system is the Instrument Landing System (ILS), the distribution of the 
position error can be considered to be the same over the time.    
2.2.4.2. Integrity  
Integrity is a measure of the trust that can be placed in the correctness of the information 
supplied by the total system. Integrity includes the ability of a system to provide timely and 
valid warnings to the user (alerts) when the system must not be used for the intended 
operation [ICAO, 2006]. Integrity is defined by three parameters: 
- The Integrity Risk (IR) is the allowed probability of providing a position that is out of 
tolerance without warning the user within the time-to-alert [ICAO, 2006]. 
- The Alert Limit (AL) has been defined to ensure that the GNSS position error is 
acceptable and represents the largest position error allowable for a safe operation [ICAO, 
2006]:  
 The Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane (the 
local plane tangent to the WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the true position, 
that describes the region that is required to contain the indicated horizontal position with 
the required probability for a particular navigation mode,  
 The Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) is half the length of a segment on the vertical axis 
(perpendicular to the horizontal plane of WGS-84 ellipsoid), with its center being at the 
true position, that describes the region that is required to contain the indicated vertical 
position with the required probability for a particular navigation mode. Note that VALs 
are only defined for PA and APV operations. 
- The Time-To-Alert (TTA) is the maximum allowable elapsed time from the onset of a 
positioning failure until the equipment annunciates the alert [RTCA, 2006].  
In order to fully define the TTA, the definition of positioning failure is required. If the 
equipment is aware of the navigation mode/alert limit, a positioning failure is defined to 
occur whenever the difference between the true position and the estimated position exceeds 
the applicable AL (HAL Lateral Alert Limit (LAL) or VAL). Note that the concept of LAL is 
not detailed in this thesis. This concept is further developed in [RTCA, 2008c]. If the 
equipment is not aware of the navigation mode/alert limit, a positioning failure is defined to 
occur whenever the difference between the true position and the estimated position exceeds 
the applicable protection limit [RTCA, 2006].  
2.2.4.3. Continuity  
Continuity is defined as the ability of the total system (comprising all elements necessary to 
maintain aircraft position within the defined airspace) to perform its function without 
interruption during the intended operation. More specifically, continuity is the probability that 
the specified system performance will be maintained for the duration of a phase of operation, 
presuming that the system was available at the beginning of that phase of operation and was 
predicted to operate throughout the operation [RTCA, 2009]. 
2.2.4.4. Availability 
The availability of a navigation system is defined as the ability of the system to provide the 
required function and performance at the initiation of the intended operation [RTCA, 2009]. 
The availability of GNSS is characterized by the portion of time the system is to be used for 
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navigation during which reliable navigation information is presented to the crew, autopilot, or 
other system managing the flight of the aircraft. 
2.3. Navigation performance requirements 
Section 2.2.2 has defined the concept of navigation system performance requirements and of 
SIS navigation performance requirement. This section provides the SIS navigation 
performance requirements that have been standardized by ICAO and the navigation system 
performance requirements that are currently under development. 
2.3.1. ICAO SIS navigation performance requirements 
Even if GNSS is expected to be used for all phases of flight, current SARPs established by 
ICAO provide SIS navigation performance requirements only for en-route, terminal, 
departure as well as for approach and landing operations down to Category I precision 
approach. In addition: 
- GNSS SIS performance requirements for CAT II and III precision approach operations are 
under standardization. These requirements are not included in this document. 
- Navigation system performance requirements for taxi operations are under review. Parts of 
the requirements that have been proposed in the literature are presented in Section 2.3.2. 
Standardized GNSS SIS performance requirements are provided in Table 2-2. 
From the Table 2-2, ranges of values are given for the continuity requirement for en-route, 
terminal, initial approach, NPA and departure operations. This requirement is dependent upon 
several factors including the intended operation, traffic density, complexity of airspace 
[ICAO, 2006]. The lower value is the minimum requirement for areas with low traffic density 
and airspace complexity. The higher value given is appropriate for areas with high traffic 
density and airspace complexity. A range of values is also given for the availability 
requirements as these requirements are dependent upon the operational need which is based 
upon several factors including the frequency of operations, weather environments, the size 
and duration of the outages. Further details about the use of availability requirements are 
developed in [ICAO, 2006]. 
 
 
Table 2-2: SIS performance requirements [ICAO, 2006] 
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(*) for oceanic en-route or continental low density en-route 
(**) for continental en-route 
2.3.2. Navigation system performance requirements for taxi operation  
As stated in Chapter 1, one of the objectives of this thesis is to define a navigation algorithm 
capable to provide an aircraft position estimate that is used by the aircraft infrastructure for 
the guidance purpose in all visibility conditions. Hence, this section focuses on the navigation 
performance requirements for the guidance function. 
2.3.2.1. Existing requirements  
Navigation system performance requirements for taxi operation and for the guidance function 
are under review. Among the publications dealing with these requirements, [RTCA, 1999] 
develops total system performance requirements in terms of accuracy, continuity, availability 
and integrity under all visibility conditions. This document also provides the navigation 
system performance requirements in terms of integrity, continuity and availability for the 
guidance function. The performance requirements in terms of accuracy for the taxi on taxiway 
and for the taxi on apron taxiway are also provided. However, the performance requirements 
in terms of accuracy for the taxi on the taxi lane sub-phase are to be determined.  [Guilloton et 
al., 2011] provides navigation system performance requirements for the guidance function 
using the Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) method [Wilkinson et al., 1998].  
Schuster in [Schuster et al., 2011] uses the methodology developed in [RTCA, 1999] to 
elaborate the tolerable TSE for the guidance function and for the taxi on the taxiway, taxi on 
the apron taxiway and taxi on the taxi lane sub-phases. Next, Schuster in [Schuster et al., 
2011] presents a complete set of navigation system performance requirements for each sub-
phase in terms of accuracy, continuity, availability and integrity. Requirements proposed in 
this publication are adapted to the zero visibility conditions. The methodology to develop 
such requirements is presented in the next section. 
2.3.2.2. Navigation system performance requirements for guidance  
In this section, a requirements derivation methodology for the guidance function’s NSE 
performance is presented [Schuster et al., 2011]. Requirements derived using this 
methodology and proposed in [Schuster et al., 2011] are also provided. 
Navigation system performance requirements for taxi operation and for the guidance function 
requirements are derived for each airport category. Indeed, navigation performance 
requirements depend on the airport layouts [RTCA, 2009] [Schuster et al., 2011], such as the 
taxiway width or the distance between taxiway centerlines and any obstacle. Airports are 
classified into six categories, namely categories A to F [ICAO, 2009]. Airport categories are 
defined according to the size of the aircraft allowed to circulate on the airport. In this 
document, requirements for category F airports are presented. Category F airports corresponds 
to commercial airports and can support all types of aircraft, including A380 and B747. 
Figure 2-5 depicts the general approach used for the derivation of the navigation system 
performance requirements in terms of accuracy and integrity. Further details about the 
derivation of continuity and availability requirements are provided in [Schuster et al., 2011]. 
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Figure 2-5 : Derivation of the navigation system performance requirements [Schuster et 
al., 2011] 
The approach used to develop accuracy and integrity navigation system performance 
requirements is based on basic safety considerations that are extrapolated from those for CAT 
IIIC precision approaches. From Section 2.1.2, both RVR and DH for CAT IIIC are set to 0m, 
corresponding to zero visibility conditions. For taxi phases, safety is expressed as the 
probability that the aircraft will accidently exceed the airport surface boundaries and/or 
collide with an airport obstacle. The safety requirement is set to      for each sub-phase, 
which corresponds to the maximum allowed probability of exceeding the lateral limits of the 
runway for the CAT IIIC operation [FAA, 1999].  
The safety requirement is used in combination with the airport layout and aircraft dimensions 
to derive the tolerable TSE, which is considered as a Gaussian error with a standard deviation 
    . The TSE is composed of the NSE, the PDE and the FTE which are considered as 
Gaussian errors in [Schuster et al., 2011]. The tolerable NSE standard deviation      is 
isolated based on: 
- Assumptions on the PDE standard deviation denoted as     . It is assumed that the overall 
system includes a map relating the position from the navigation unit to the physical 
position on the airport. The map uncertainties induce the PDE which is characterized by a 
standard deviation             [ICAO, 2009].  
- Assumptions on the FTE standard deviation denoted as      . The FTE relates to the air 
crew or autopilot’s ability to follow the defined path or track, including any display error. 
An analysis based on real data during sub-phases leads to the      values provided in 
Table 2-3. 
 
 
 Taxi on taxiway Taxi on apron taxiway Taxi on taxi lane 
                    
 
Table 2-3: FTE standard deviation values [Schuster et al., 2011] 
 
The IR for the specific sub-phase is then computed from the Target Level of Safety (TLS), 
which is the risk of fatal accident during the entire operation of an aircraft from the point it 
leaves the gate until it arrives at its destination. [Schuster et al., 2011] allocates the total TLS 
attributed to the taxi operation to each taxi sub-phase. This allocation is made proportionally 
to the exposure time of each sub-phase. The exposure time is defined as the duration of a 
particular operation over which the integrity and continuity requirements are evaluated. These 
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are determined by computing the typical time the aircraft spent in each phase over several 
airports (see Table 2-5). This approach leads to an integrity risk for each sub-phase that is 
proportional to the exposure time of that sub-phase. Another approach would be to allocate 
the TLS regarding the statistics on the number of fatal accidents per sub-phase. Such statistics 
are provided by some organisms, such as the Flight Safety Foundation. Finally, the AL is 
computed based on the IR and on the tolerable NSE. In line with the most stringent 
requirements for Cat IIIC operations, a TTA of    is adopted.  
The navigation system performance requirements for the guidance function under zero-
visibility conditions for category F airports and during the taxi on taxiway, the taxi on apron 
taxiway and the taxi on taxi lane are provided in Table 2-4. 
 
 
Horizontal 
accuracy 95% 
confidence 
level 
Integrity 
Continuity 
[/op] 
Availability 
TTA IR [/op] HAL 
Taxi on 
taxiway 
     
          
                 
         
       
 
Taxi on 
apron 
     
           
                  
         
       
 
Taxi on taxi 
lane                
                  
         
       
 
 
Table 2-4: Navigation system performance requirements – guidance function – category 
F airports [Schuster et al., 2011] 
 
In Table 2-4, the risk of integrity or of continuity failure is evaluated over the duration of a 
particular operation. Exposure times for each sub-phase are provided in Table 2-5. 
 
 Taxi on taxi lane Taxi on apron taxiway Taxi on taxiway 
Exposure time  360s 90s 90s 
 
Table 2-5: Surface exposure times [Schuster et al., 2011] 
2.3.2.3. Performance requirements analysis 
This section analyses the navigation system performance requirements presented in Section 
2.3.2.2. These requirements are firstly compared to the most stringent requirements which are 
currently standardized, that are the requirements for CAT I operation. Secondly, the 
navigation system performance requirements related to the taxi operation are discussed and 
modifications concerning these requirements are proposed.  
Firstly, the navigation system performance requirements for the guidance function under zero 
visibility are compared to SIS navigation performance requirements for CAT I operation 
presented in Section 2.3.1. In terms of accuracy, the horizontal 95% confidence levels range 
from a few decimeters to a few meters during the taxi operation, while confidence levels are 
few tens of meters during CAT I operation. In terms of integrity, the same conclusion can be 
made for HAL. The IR is roughly 100 times lower for taxi operation phases than for CAT I 
operation. To conclude, surface movement operations are much more stringent in terms of 
accuracy and integrity than CAT I operation. In terms of continuity, the requirements are 
relaxed compared to the CAT I approach. The requirement for the taxi phases is roughly 10 
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times less stringent for the taxi phases than for CAT I approach. Indeed, and unlike in 
precision approaches, there is a reduced safety risk associated by a loss of continuity in taxi 
operations. If a loss of continuity occurs, the aircraft will stop in the airport, and the collision 
risk can be mitigated by the Air Traffic Control (ATC). Even is a loss of continuity does not 
lead to a safety issue, it has been chosen to conserve a relatively stringent continuity 
requirement for taxi operations, since a loss of continuity can lead to Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) issues, such as a limitation of the airport capacity during several hours. 
Secondly, assumptions made to derive performance requirements for the guidance function 
under zero visibility are discussed. The FTE values used in the computation of the accuracy 
requirements and of the HAL seem to be conservative. Indeed, under low visibility 
conditions, the autopilot is likely to be used to pilot the aircraft. When the autopilot is used to 
pilot the aircraft, the FTE can be neglected during straight lines and            during 
turns for taxi and taxiway and taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases [Airbus, 2014]. In order to be 
conservative, a value of           is assumed for taxi and taxiway and taxi on apron 
taxiway sub-phases. This value is adopted in this thesis since it is assumed that the autopilot is 
used for the taxi operation. Note that, if the pilot is assumed to drive the aircraft, the FTE shall 
be increased, leading to reduce the HAL and the accuracy confidence level related to the 
navigation system performance requirements. The FTE value of the taxi on taxi lane is 
retained. It appears also likely that the FTE value is reduced when the aircraft speed is 
reduced. The methodology presented in Section 2.3.2.2 is reused in Table 2-6 to derive the 
accuracy navigation system performance requirements and the HAL for both taxi on taxiway 
and taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases with the updated values of     . 
 
 
Horizontal accuracy 95% 
confidence level 
HAL 
Taxi on taxiway           
Taxi on apron           
 
Table 2-6: Updated navigation system performance requirements – guidance function – 
category F airports 
 
From Table 2-6, using a slightly less conservative value of FTE compared to the values 
presented in Section 2.3.2.2 allows increasing the horizontal 95% confidence level and the 
HAL. This is because the maximal allowable      value is increased when      is decreased. 
As an example, for the apron sub-phase, both accuracy level and HAL are multiplied by a 
factor 2 with the reduced     .  
Other requirement parameters are not modified by adopting a reduced     . The TTA and the 
IR are stringent compared to the TTA and IR standardized for the other in-flight operations. 
The IR is of the order of         for every sub-phase. Considering this values, the produced 
effect of an integrity loss (undetected positioning failure within the TTA) is considered as 
catastrophic regardless of the sub-phase. This means that the integrity loss may lead to the 
aircraft loss. Some modifications can be suggested in order to review, and possibly to 
decrease, the proposed IR values. Indeed, the IR values stated in Table 2-4 have not been 
designed to take into account the produced effects of an integrity loss during each sub-phase. 
The produced effects of a loss of integrity depend on the aircraft speed, on the type of 
obstacles in which the aircraft may collide [Guilloton et al., 2011]. Hence, the effects depend 
on the sub-phase. Approaches, such as the FHA based approaches, allows deriving IR that 
depends on the safety criticality (minor, major, hazardous, and catastrophic) associated to 
CHAPTER 2: Civil aviation requirements  
 
23 
 
each integrity loss. Hence, it can be suggested to review the IR level by taken into account the 
produced effects of the integrity loss for each sub-phase. Nevertheless, in this thesis, the 
requirements stated in Table 2-4 (values in brackets for the accuracy requirements and for the 
HAL values) are adopted. They appear to be stringent compared to the values that would have 
been obtained with the FHA approach. 
 
2.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has provided the definition of each in-flight and surface operation. More 
specifically, this chapter has focused on taxi operations that include three sub-phases as 
defined by ICAO [ICAO, 2009]: the taxi on taxiway, the taxi on apron taxiway and the taxi on 
taxi lane. In order to ensure safety and to maintain aerodrome capacity in all weather 
conditions, A-SMGCSs are developed to support four primary functions that are surveillance, 
routing, guidance and control. Publications presenting the guidance navigation performance 
requirements under zero-visibility conditions for taxi on taxiway, taxi on apron taxiway and 
taxi on taxi lane have been reviewed. New accuracy and integrity performance requirements 
for taxi on taxiway and taxi on apron taxiway have been derived by accounting for less 
conservative assumptions on the FTE than the values used in the existing publications. 
Finally, further modifications that have not been done in this thesis concerning these new 
requirements are advised.     
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  CHAPTER 3 
3. GNSS signals, measurement 
models and augmentation systems 
 
 
As described in Chapter 1, one of the challenges for the civil aviation community is to support 
the guidance function navigation system performance requirements during the taxi operation 
under low visibility conditions. In this context, A-SMGCSs are under development and are 
intended to use technologies that enable to maintain aerodrome capacity under high traffic 
density conditions and/or under low visibility conditions. GNSS appears to be an adequate 
technology to be used in A-SMGCSs.  
One objective of the thesis is to develop a GNSS-based navigation algorithm capable of 
supporting the guidance function navigation system performance requirements during the taxi 
operation under low visibility conditions. The structure of this algorithm is presented in 
Chapter 6. In order to develop such an algorithm and to assess the performance of the 
algorithm, it is firstly essential to: 
- select the GNSS constellation(s), the GNSS signal(s) and the GNSS augmentation system 
that will be considered for the design of the algorithm.  
- review the models of the GNSS errors that may affect GNSS pseudo-range measurements 
during taxi operations in both nominal and degraded conditions.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 reviews the GNSS constellations and the 
GNSS signals and selects the constellations and signals retained for the application. Section 
3.2 presents the GNSS measurement error models in both nominal and degraded conditions. 
Section 3.3 reviews the GNSS augmentation systems and selects the augmentation system 
retained for the application. 
3.1. GNSS constellations and GNSS signals 
3.1.1. GNSS constellations  
3.1.1.1. GNSS constellations review 
This section reviews the different GNSS constellations that are currently operational or under 
development. Next, the GNSS constellations considered in this project are selected.  
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For each GNSS constellation, Table 3-1 provides the status, the number of GNSS satellites 
that have been already launched and that are currently operational, the targeted number of 
GNSS satellites, and the coverage of the GNSS constellation.  
 
GNSS 
constellation 
Status  
Number of 
operational 
satellites 
Targeted number 
of operational 
satellites 
Coverage 
GPS (American 
system) 
Operational  
31 (US Air Force 
ensures 
availability of at 
least 24 satellites 
95% of the time) 
[GPS, 2013] 
At least 24 satellites 
95% of the time 
Worldwide 
Galileo 
(European 
system) 
Under 
development 
4 [EC, 2013] 
27 by 2020 [EC, 
2013] 
Worldwide 
GLONASS 
(Russian 
system) 
Operational 24 [FSA, 2013] 24 [FSA, 2013] Worldwide 
BeiDou/Com-
pass (Chinese 
system) 
Under 
development 
15 (geostationary 
and non-
geostationary 
satellites) [IGS, 
2013] 
35 (geostationary 
and non-
geostationary 
satellites) by 2020 
[BeiDou, 2013] 
China and the 
neighboring 
regions in 
2012, 
worldwide by 
2020 
QZSS 
(Japanese 
system) 
Under 
development 
4 (geostationary 
and quasi-zenith 
orbit satellites) 
7 (geostationary and 
quasi-zenith orbit 
satellites) by 2018 
[JAXA, 2012] 
East Asia, 
and Oceania 
IRNSS (Indian 
system) 
Under 
development 
1 [GPS world, 
2013] 
7 (geostationary and 
non-geostationary 
satellites) by 2015 
[Navipedia, 2013] 
India and the 
neighboring 
areas 
 
Table 3-1: Current and future GNSS constellations 
 
In Table 3-1, QZSS stands for Quasi Zenith Satellite System. IRNSS stands for Indian 
Regional Navigation Satellite System. Unlike GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, Beidou and IRNSS, 
QZSS cannot operate independently and is developed to enhance the availability of GNSS 
over Japan. 
3.1.1.2. Case of study  
The GNSS constellation choice has been based on four criteria that are: 
- The system coverage. The GNSS(s) chosen in this project must have a global coverage at 
any time. Since QZSS and IRNSS do not have a global coverage, these systems are not 
considered in this project.  
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- The current and future use of the system in civil aviation. The GNSS(s) chosen in this 
project must be currently used in civil aviation or will be most likely used in civil aviation 
in the coming years. Information concerning the use of the global coverage systems in civil 
aviation are provided as follows: 
 GPS is currently used in civil aviation and in Airbus aircraft,  
 Galileo is likely to be used in civil aviation when Galileo will be fully operational. More 
precisely, MOPSs for airborne double constellation GPS/Galileo receivers have been 
elaborated [EUROCAE, 2010]. These MOPSs have not been finalized and are not 
currently mature enough to be certified.  
 GLONASS is not currently used in Airbus aircraft and no GLONASS MOPSs have 
been elaborated. However, GLONASS MOPSs might be developed in the coming years. 
 BeiDou is not currently used in Airbus aircraft. Beidou MOPSs have not been finalized 
and no formal plans to develop such MOPSs have been established. For this reason, 
BeiDou system is not considered in this project. 
At this stage of the selection, it can be envisaged to use GPS, Galileo and/or GLONASS in 
this project.  
- The number of operational satellites in the system. The number of satellites will 
determine if a single GNSS constellation can be used in the navigation algorithm or if a 
multi-constellation navigation system has to be envisaged for the intended application. 
According to the development plans, GPS, Galileo and GLONASS will have up to 27 
operational satellites by 2020.  From Section 2.3.2.3, the accuracy and integrity GNSS SIS 
requirements for the guidance function during the taxi operation under low visibility 
conditions are stringent. The horizontal accuracy 95% confidence levels and the HALs are 
few meters. Hence, in order to improve the GNSS performance in terms of accuracy and 
integrity, GNSS pseudo range redundancy is needed and at least two GNSS constellations 
are considered in this thesis. More specifically, in order to limit the avionics complexity it 
is proposed to consider two GNSS constellations in the thesis. 
- The available information concerning the SIS errors. The SIS error is the error of the 
SIS in the range domain caused by the satellite, the satellite payload, and the navigation 
message (ephemeris data, clock, ect.) [ESA, 2005]. In this project, qualitative analyses of 
the nominal SIS errors for each selected GNSS are required. As an example, they are 
needed to assess the GNSS-based navigation algorithm performance in terms of accuracy.  
As explained herein, two GNSS constellations are considered in this project in order to meet 
the stringent SIS performance requirements in terms of accuracy and integrity. One of the 
selected systems is GPS. Indeed, GPS is already fully operational and used in civil aviation. 
In addition, GPS ground and space segments performances, such as nominal SIS error 
accuracy, have been evaluated in the literature [Kovach, 2008] [Lee et al., 2007]. The other 
selected system is Galileo as a result of the advanced civil aviation MOPS standardization 
development [EUROCAE, 2010]. Even if Galileo is not yet fully operational, preliminary 
assumptions concerning the Galileo ground and space segments performances, such as 
nominal SIS error accuracy, are available [EUROCAE, 2010]. These assumptions have not be 
validated. Finally, public information on the accuracy and integrity of GLONASS ground and 
space segments induced errors is limited. GLONASS is thus not considered in this thesis.  
3.1.2. GNSS signals  
This section identifies the current and future GPS and Galileo signals that will be available for 
civil aviation applications with the GPS modernization and the Galileo development.  
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GPS and Galileo signals are located in the Radio Navigation Satellite Services (RNSS) 
frequency bands. The current and future GPS and Galileo signals that will be available for 
civil aviation applications are located in the Aeronautical Radio Navigation Services (ARNS) 
frequency bands. ARNS bands are reserved for aeronautical systems and are protected from 
in-band interference by regulation authorities. RNSS frequency bands, ARNS frequency 
bands and GPS and Galileo frequency bands are represented in Figure 3-1.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-1: GPS and Galileo frequency bands [ICD, 2010] 
 
The current and future GPS and Galileo signals that will be available for civil aviation 
applications are: 
- GPSL1 signals. There are two types of GPSL1 signals: GPSL1C/A and GPSL1C signals, 
- GalileoE1 signal, 
- GPSL5 signal, 
- GalileoE5a signal, 
- GalileoE5b signal. 
These GNSS signals are described in the next section.  
3.1.2.1. Modulations and structure 
GPS and Galileo signals are the sum of a data and a pilot component, except for GPSL1C/A. 
On each component, waveforms are combined and the resulting signal is multiplied by a 
Radio Frequency (RF) carrier. The combination of the waveforms is a baseband signal. The 
modulation of the waveforms by the RF carrier leads to center the signal about the carrier 
frequency. On the data component, the waveforms that are multiplied by the RF carrier are: 
- the navigation waveform. The navigation message, which is a binary signal. It contains the 
different types of data needed to perform positioning [ICD, 2010]. Included in the 
navigation message are ephemeris parameters, ionosphere model parameters, time and 
clock correction parameters, satellite health status, navigation data validity and SIS 
accuracy information.  
- a spreading waveform, also called  PseudoRandom Noise (PRN) waveform or primary 
code waveform, which is similar to the data waveform, but with a much higher symbol 
rate. The symbol rate of the spreading waveform is called chip rate and is referred to as    
in the following. The duration of each chip is    
 
  
, where    is called chip period. The 
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spreading waveform is periodic and the finite sequence of bits needed to generate the 
spreading waveform is referred to the PRN code.   
- For GPSL5, GalileoE5a and GalileoE5b, a secondary code waveform. 
On the pilot component, the waveforms that are multiplied by the RF carrier are: 
- a PRN waveform, 
- a secondary code waveform. 
Omitting the noise term, the expression of the GPS or Galileo signal broadcast by a satellite   
at time t is:  
  ( )          ( )    (          )          ( )    (          ) Eq -  3-1 
where: 
      is the amplitude of the data component, 
      is the amplitude of the pilot component.      is null for GPSL1C/A. 
     ( ) is the baseband signal that modulates the carrier component on the data channel, 
     ( ) is the baseband signal that modulates the carrier component on the pilot channel, 
    is the carrier frequency, 
      is the  phase of the data carrier, 
       is the  phase of the pilot carrier. Some of the considered signals, such as GalileoE1, 
are characterized by a data component that is in-phase with the pilot component. In this 
case,          . Other GNSS signals, such as GalileoE5a, are characterized by a data 
component that is in-quadrature with the pilot component. In this case,           
 
 
. 
Table 3-2 provides the carrier frequency and the modulation technique relating to each GPS 
and Galileo signal. The code length and the chip rate of the PRN codes on each data and pilot 
component are indicated in Table 3-2. The code length and the chip rate of the secondary 
codes on each data and pilot component are also indicated. Table 3-2 also provides the 
navigation data rate.  
In the Table 3-2, “cps” stands for chip per second and “bps” stands for bit per second. GPS 
and Galileo signals use four types of modulation techniques: Binary Phase Shift Keying 
(BPSK), Time Multiplexed Binary Offset Carrier (TMBOC), Quadrature Phase Shift Keying 
(QPSK) and Composite Binary Offset Carrier (CBOC). The next section provides a brief 
background on the BOC modulation.  
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GNSS signal 
Central 
frequen-
cy [MHz] 
Data/ 
pilot 
power 
sharing  
Modulation 
PRN code 
length / chip 
rate     
Naviga-
tion 
data 
rate 
Secondary 
code 
length / 
Secondary 
code rate 
GPSL1C/A 1575.42 NA BPSK(1) 
1ms  
1.023Mcps 
50bps NA 
GPSL1C-I 
(data) 
1575.42 
25% BOC(1,1) 
10ms  
1.023Mcps 
100bps NA 
GPSL1C-Q 
(pilot) 
75% TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 
10ms 
1.023Mcps 
NA 
18s  
100bps 
GPSL5-I  
1176.45 
50% BPSK(10) 
1ms  
10.23Mcps 
 1000bps 
10ms  
1Mbps 
GPSL5-Q 50% BPSK(10) 
1ms  
10.23Mcps 
NA 
20ms  
1Mbps 
GalileoE1-B 
(data) 
1575.42 
50% CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) 
4ms  
1.023Mcps 
250bps NA 
GalileoE1-C 
(pilot) 
50% CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
4ms  
1.023Mcps 
NA 
100ms  
 250bps 
GalileoE5a-I 
1176.45 
50% BPSK(10) 
1ms  
1.023Mcps 
50bps 
20ms  
1Mbps 
GalileoE5a-Q 50% BPSK(10) 
1ms  
10.23Mcps 
NA 
100ms  
1Mbps 
GalileoE5b-I 1207.14 50% BPSK(10) 
1ms  
10.23Mcps 
250bps 
4ms  
1Mbps 
 
Table 3-2: Characteristics of the GPS and Galileo signals [GPS Wing, 2008] [ICD, 2010] 
Note that the different modulation techniques and code rates are detailed in the next section.  
3.1.2.2. GPS and Galileo autocorrelations and power spectral densities 
This section provides the models of the GPS and Galileo autocorrelation functions and Power 
Spectral Densities (PSD) functions. 
3.1.2.2.1. GPSL1C/A signal 
GPS satellites currently broadcast the GPSL1 signal. The GPSL1 signal consists of two 
carrier components which are in phase quadrature with each other. One carrier component is 
multiplied by the modulo-2 sum of the civilian spreading code, referred to as 
Coarse/Acquisition (C/A) code, and the GPS navigation message. The other carrier 
component is multiplied by the modulo-2 sum of the military Precise (P(Y)) code and the 
GPS navigation message. Civilian users have no access to the military code. In the following, 
GPSL1C/A denotes the C/A component of the GPSL1 signal.  
GPSL1C/A is a BPSK(1) signal. The notation BPSK(n) is used to denote a BPSK signal with 
a chip rate equal to:            . Further details on the BPSK modulation are provided in 
[Kaplan et al., 2006]. Without considering the repetition of the spreading code, and assuming 
an infinite front-end bandwidth and to autocorrelation side lobes, the expression of the 
autocorrelation of the GPSL1C/A spreading waveform is: 
 
     ( )  {
  
   
  
       
           
 
 
Eq -  3-2 
 
 
where     is the PRN chip duration of the spreading code. 
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The PSD function is defined as the Fourier transform of the autocorrelation function. The 
normalized PSD function (specified without the effect of band-limiting filters and payload 
imperfections) of the spreading waveform is: 
   
     ( )        
 (    ) Eq -  3-3 
 
where     ( ) denotes the sinc function.  
3.1.2.2.2. GPSL1C signal 
The modernization program of the GPS constellation will allow the emission of a new civil 
GPS signal on the L1 frequency band, which is GPSL1C. The first launch of a modernized 
GPS block-III satellite is planned for 2014 [Lockheed Martin, 2012]. The full operation of 
GPSL1C signal is planned by the International Committee GNSS to occur in 2021 [ICGNSS, 
2010].   
The data bit stream is modulated using BOC(1,1) modulation [GPS Wing, 2008].  The pilot 
bit stream is envisaged to be modulated using a TMBOC(6,1,4/33) modulation technique. 
TMBOC(6,1,4/33)  technique uses a mixture of BOC(1,1) symbols and BOC(6,1) symbols. 
All the bits of the pilot component are modulated using BOC(1,1) modulation, except 4 bits 
every 33 bit sequences which are modulated using BOC(6,1) modulation technique. Further 
details about the BOC modulation are provided in [Kaplan et al., 2006]. The model of the 
autocorrelation of the baseband signals of the GPSL1C data component and pilot component 
are given by, respectively: 
 
      ( )      (   )    ( ) 
      ( )  
  
  
    (   )    ( )  
 
  
    (   )    ( ) 
 
Eq -  3-4 
 
where     (   )     is the autocorrelation function of a spreading waveform modulated by a 
BOC(1,1) sine-phased signal and     (   )     is the autocorrelation function of a spreading 
waveform modulated by a BOC(6,1) sine-phased signal. 
The normalized PSD function of the total (data+pilot) GPSL1C signal (specified without the 
effect of band-limiting filters and payload imperfections) is: 
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    (   )    ( ) Eq -  3-5 
 
 
where: 
        is the PSD function of the baseband signal of the GPSL1C data component, 
        is the PSD function of the baseband signal of the GPSL1C pilot component, 
     (   )     is the PSD function of a spreading waveform modulated by a BOC(1,1) sine-
phased signal and     (   )      is the PSD function of a spreading waveform modulated by 
a BOC(6,1) sine-phased signal. The analytical expressions of both functions are provided 
in [Avila Rodriguez, 2008]. 
3.1.2.2.3. GalileoE1 signal 
The GalileoE1 data bit stream is modulated using CBOC(6,1,1/11,+) modulation.  The pilot 
bit stream is modulated using CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) modulation. CBOC(6,1,1/11) linearly 
combines BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) sub-carriers [ICD, 2010][Macabiau et al., 2007]. Further 
details about the combination of BOC(1,1) and BOC(6,1) sub-carriers in the CBOC 
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modulation technique are provided in [ICD, 2010][Foucras et al., 2013][Julien et al., 2007]. 
The model of the autocorrelation of the baseband signals of the GalileoE1 data component 
and pilot component are given by, respectively: 
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Eq -  3-6 
 
where     (   )   (   )     is the cross correlation function between     (   )     and 
    (   )    .  
The normalized PSD (specified without the effect of band-limiting filters and payload 
imperfections) of the GalileoE1 baseband signal has the same expression as the normalized 
PSD of GPSL1C baseband signal. This PSD is called the Multiplexed BOC (MBOC) PSD in 
the following [Julien et al., 2007]. 
3.1.2.2.4. GPSL5 and GalileoE5 signals 
For civil aviation users, L5 is the second ARNS frequency band. The utilization of two 
frequency bands, L1 and L5 bands, will enable airborne estimation of the dispersive 
ionospheric delay. The ionosphere is one of the main error sources that affect the pseudo-
range measurements [Enge, 2003]. GPS-L5 should be fully operational by 2020 [Gruber, 
2011]. 
GPSL5 and GalileoE5a share the same frequency band. Consequently, the same GNSS 
airborne antenna can be implemented to process both GPSL5 and GalileoE5a signals. The use 
of GPSL5 and GalileoE5b signals would increase the complexity of the GNSS antenna to be 
used since these signals do not share the same frequency band. For this reason, GalileoE5b is 
not further studied. 
Both GPSL5 and GalileoE5a data and pilot bit streams are modulated using a BPSK(10) 
modulation. The expressions of the autocorrelations of the baseband signals on the data 
component and on the pilot component are given by Eq -3-4. Similarly, the normalized PSD 
functions (specified without the effect of band-limiting filters and payload imperfections) of 
the GPSL5 and GalileoE5a baseband signals on the data component and on the pilot 
component are given by Table 3-2. 
3.1.2.2.5. Autocorrelation functions and PSD functions representation 
In this section, the GPS and Galileo autocorrelation functions and PSD functions are 
represented and compared.  
Future typical airborne GNSS receivers will use the pilot components of GPSL1C, GPSL5, 
GalileoE1 and/or GalileoE5a to estimate the pseudo range measurements between airborne 
GNSS antenna and visible GNSS satellites. For this reason, the autocorrelation functions 
(Figure 3-2) of the baseband signals of the pilot components of GPSL1C, GPSL5, GalileoE1 
and GalileoE5a are depicted. The autocorrelation function of the baseband signal of 
GPSL1C/A is also represented. In this Figure, the effects of band-limiting filters are not taken 
into account.  
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Figure 3-2: Autocorrelation functions of GPS and Galileo signals  
 
GPSL1C/A, GPSL1C and GalileoE1 autocorrelation functions are null for a time delay higher 
than 1 chip duration, corresponding to            from Table 3-2. Note also that the 
similarities in the autocorrelation of the GPSL1C and GalieloE1 are discussed later in this 
thesis (see Chapter 4).  GPSL5 and GalileoE5a autocorrelation functions are null for a time 
delay higher than 1 chip duration, corresponding to           , that is 10 times lower than 
for signals on the L1 frequency band.  
Figure 3-3 presents the PDFs of the baseband signals of the GPS and Galileo signals. In this 
Figure, the effects of band-limiting filters are not taken into account. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-3: PSD functions of GPS and Galileo signals  
 
The GPSL1C and GalieoE1C spectrum is split on each side of the central frequency. This 
allows putting a fraction of the power away from the central frequency and improving the 
tracking performance in the presence of thermal noise and multipath [Julien et al., 2007]. The 
main lobes of the BPSK are placed in between the lobes of the BOC, allowing a good spectral 
separation. The PSD functions of the baseband signals of the pilot components of GPSL5 and 
GalileoE5a have the shape of the BPSK spectrum represented in Figure 3-3. The width of the 
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main lobe of the GPSL5 and GalileoE5a PDFs is ten times higher for GPSL5 than for 
GPSL1C/A, leading to improve the noise performance of the GPS receiver and to reduce the 
tracking error.  
 
3.2. GNSS pseudo-range measurement model 
This section presents the error models affecting GNSS code pseudo-range measurements in 
airport environments. The pseudo-range errors can be classified as follows: 
- The nominal ranging errors affect GNSS measurements when all GNSS segments are 
working according to their specifications and the magnitudes of other external error 
sources are within their typical range [Salos, 2012].  
- The ranging failures are due to an anomaly of the satellite itself or to environmental 
effects on the GNSS ranging signal [Lee, 2004]. 
Nominal ranging errors are systematic errors which are always present while ranging failures 
affect punctually GNSS measurements. Assuming that   (    ) GNSS pseudo-range 
measurements are used by the GNSS receiver to estimate the aircraft position at a given time 
 , the GNSS code pseudo-range measurement error vector at time   is: 
 
 ( )   ( )   ( ) Eq -  3-7 
 
where: 
  ( ) is the nominal ranging error vector at time  , 
  ( ) is the ranging failure vector at time  . 
The nominal ranging errors are presented in 3.2.1. The GNSS ranging failures are described in 
section 3.2.2. 
3.2.1. GNSS nominal ranging errors 
3.2.1.1. Identification 
The nominal ranging error vector is the result of various error sources. The error sources can 
be considered as independent [RTCA, 2006] and they cause nominal ranging errors that can 
be analyzed separately. Seven error sources have been identified in airport environments: 
- Control and space segments, 
- Ionosphere delay, 
- Troposphere delay, 
- Multipath, 
- GNSS airborne antenna group delay and phase center variations, 
- GNSS receiver thermal noise. 
Among the nominal errors induced by the control and space segments there are the errors 
induced by the inaccuracy of the broadcast satellite clock corrections and ephemeris and the 
nominal biases induced by other error sources, such as GNSS ground antenna group delay and 
phase center variations.  
The effects of the inaccuracy of the broadcast satellite clock corrections and ephemeris, of the 
ionosphere delay and of the troposphere delay on the GNSS raw code measurements during 
taxi operations may be modeled as zero-mean Gaussian distributions. These models have been 
standardized [RTCA, 2009] and are used as inputs in civil aviation integrity monitoring 
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systems. The standardized GNSS nominal ranging error models presented in this chapter are 
residual error models after correction of the GNSS measurements by airborne mitigation 
techniques recommended in [RTCA, 2009] [EUROCAE, 2010]. Standardized residual error 
models after Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) and Satellite Based Augmentation 
System (SBAS) corrections are not presented in this chapter. The effects of the GNSS 
receiver thermal noise on the GNSS raw code measurements during taxi operations have also 
been modeled as zero-mean Gaussian distributions [Betz et al., 2009]. 
The models of the multipath errors adapted in in flight-operations have also been standardized 
[RTCA, 2009]. However, the multipath error models adapted to surface operation has not 
been standardized.  Similarly, models of the GNSS airborne antenna group delay and phase 
center variations errors and of the nominal biases induced by the control and space segments 
are not standardized for airport environments. Current civil aviation integrity monitoring 
systems do not provide sufficient protection against these effects in airport environments. 
However, future integrity monitoring systems are proposed to protect users from parts of 
these effects, and more specifically from nominal biases induced by GNSS antenna group 
delay and phase center variations and by the control and space segments [GEAS, 2010] [WG-
C ARAIM, 2012]. In this thesis, the GNSS error sources, such as multipath in airport 
environments, that are not taken into account as part of the error model assumed for the 
existing integrity monitoring applications and that may lead to positioning failures for the 
guidance function under zero-visibility conditions are referred to as “GNSS singular events”. 
3.2.1.2. Time correlation of GNSS nominal ranging errors 
The nominal code ranging errors induced by the inaccuracy of the broadcast satellite clock 
corrections and ephemeris errors, the ionosphere delay, the troposphere delay and the GNSS 
receiver thermal noise are correlated in time. These errors are modelled in the time domain 
with an autoregressive model derived from a first-order Gauss-Markov process [RTCA, 
2009]. In the GNSS receiver, the code pseudo-range measurement estimated with a sampling 
period   . The nominal code ranging error due to an error source “err source” at a given 
epoch time    is given by: 
 
           (  )              (    )  √               (  ) 
Eq -  3-8 
 
where: 
             represents the satellite clock and ephemeris nominal code ranging error         , 
the ionosphere nominal code ranging error      , the troposphere nominal code ranging 
error         or the thermal noise nominal code ranging error       , 
    
  
  
           , 
             is the nominal raw code ranging error correlation time, 
           , 
            (  ) is modeled as a stationary, zero-mean Normal distribution, 
           (  )  (             
 ). 
             is the standard deviation of the nominal raw code ranging error Gauss-Markov 
process. 
 
 
The standard deviations and correlation times related to the Gauss-Markov processes 
modelling the satellite clock and ephemeris nominal code ranging error         , the 
ionosphere nominal code ranging error      , the troposphere nominal code ranging error 
         and the thermal noise nominal code ranging error        are provided in the four next 
sections. 
CHAPTER 3: GNSS signals, measurement models and augmentation systems  
 
36 
 
3.2.1.3. Satellite clock and ephemeris error 
Inaccuracies in the data broadcast in the navigation message induce nominal ranging errors. 
The inaccuracies include inaccurate ephemeris data used to compute the GNSS satellite 
trajectories. Moreover, satellite clock corrections for clock drifts are inexact. Both ephemeris 
data inaccuracies and satellite clock correction inaccuracies generate a residual nominal 
ranging error         . Furthermore,          depends on the performance of the GNSS 
ground segment and space segment that compute the ephemeris and satellite clock 
corrections.  
For GPS, the standard deviation of          is included in the User Range Accuracy (URA). 
URA is a statistical measure (1 sigma value) of the GPS range errors for which the space and 
control segments are responsible, excluding errors due to the user equipment and transmission 
media [ARINC, 2006]. Several URA values are proposed in the literature. The modernized 
GPS III program (including the emission of GPSL5 and GPSL1C signals) will allow reaching 
a URA value of 0.3m to 1.0m [Lee et al., 2007]. 
For Galileo, the standard deviation of          is included in the Galileo Signal In Space 
Accuracy (SISA). The SISA is the predicted minimum standard deviation of the normal 
distribution that overbounds the faut-free SIS error. The SISA nominal value is set to 0.85m 
in [EUROCAE, 2010].  
In this thesis, it is assumed that modernized GPS and Galileo performance will be equivalent. 
Hence, the standard deviation of both GPS and Galileo raw code ranging errors due to 
satellite clock and ephemeris inaccuracies is given by: 
 
               
 
Eq -  3-9 
The correlation time of the raw code ranging errors due to satellite clock and ephemeris 
inaccuracies is set to 2 hours [RTCA, 2009] [EUROCAE, 2010]. The correlation time is 
relatively long. This mainly because the orbital errors as well as the ranging errors due to 
inaccuracies in the clock drift corrections are re-initialized via uploads every few hours 
[RTCA, 2009] and vary slowly between resets via uploads.  In the following, a correlation 
time of                , based on the average period of time satellites are visible to the 
user, will be used [Martineau, 2008]. 
3.2.1.4. Ionosphere error 
The ionosphere covers the region between approximately 50 and 1500 km above the earth and 
is characterized by the presence of free (negatively charged) electrons and positively charged 
ions. The free electrons induce a delay on GNSS code sequence and a phase advance on the 
carrier phase. The ionosphere is a dispersive medium, meaning that the ionosphere code delay 
and phase advance are function of the carrier frequency [Leick, 1995]. In addition, the code 
delay and phase advance are function of the Total Electron Content (TEC) [     ] that 
represents the number of free electrons in a 1-square meter column along the path satellite-
receiver. The ionosphere code delay generates an error on the raw code pseudo-range 
measurement between the satellite and the receiver that is a function of the central frequency 
   of the GNSS signal and of the TEC [Leick, 1995]: 
 
      
     
   
    Eq -  3-10 
 
In nominal conditions, and in the time domain, the TEC presents strong diurnal variations. 
The TEC also depends on the season and on the solar cycle. In nominal conditions, and in the 
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spatial domain, the TEC presents strong spatial variations. Indeed, the world can be divided 
into three regions: the low-latitude regions which include the equatorial regions, the mid-
latitude regions and the high-latitude regions which include the polar cap regions. The 
ionization of a region may be stronger than others [Eurocontrol, 2010]. Hence, electron 
content differences can be observed between regions.  
Under nominal conditions, both temporal and spatial TEC variations induce temporal and 
spatial regular TEC gradients, respectively: 
- The regular temporal TEC gradients refer to variations of the TEC in the time domain 
and under nominal ionosphere conditions. More precisely, temporal TEC gradients refer to 
the variation of the TEC value (and thus of the ionospheric code delay) that is observed by 
a single static receiver which processes the signal coming from a single satellite during a 
period of time   .  
- The spatial TEC gradients refer to variations of the TEC in the horizontal space domain 
and under nominal ionosphere conditions. More precisely, spatial TEC gradient refers to 
the difference of the TEC values (and thus of the ionospheric code delays) that are 
observed by different receivers having different positions in the horizontal domain and 
processing the signals coming from a single satellite at the same time.  
3.2.1.4.1. GPS single frequency mode 
GPS civil receivers apply the Klobuchar ionospheric model to correct the ionospheric code 
delay, which is estimated to reduce at least 50% of the root-mean-square raw code ranging 
error due to the ionosphere delay [Klobuchar, 1987]. The standardized model of the standard 
deviation of the residual raw code ionosphere ranging error for GPSL1C/A and GPSL1C 
signals and is given by [RTCA, 2009]: 
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Eq -  3-11 
 
where: 
      is the Klobuchar ionosphere code delay corrections [s], 
   is the speed of light in vacuum [m/s], 
   is the obliquity factor: 
              , 
             , 
    is the satellite elevation angle, 
    {
                
                   
              
 
    is the geomagnitude latitude [°]. 
Simulations proposed in [Salos, 2012] compare the term     to 20% of the Klobuchar 
ionosphere correction term between 1994 and 2009. Simulations results found that, during the 
studied time period,     always exceeded 
      
 
.  Hence, it is reasonable to set: 
 
            Eq -  3-12 
 
The ionospheric residual error of GPSL5 signals is obtained as follows: 
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         (
   
   
)
 
        Eq -  3-13 
 
3.2.1.4.2.  Galileo single frequency mode 
Galileo civil receivers apply the NeQuick ionospheric model to correct at least 70% of the 
ionospheric code delay [Arbesser, 2006]. The raw code ionospheric residual error model for 
single-frequency Galileo receivers is not yet standardized. [Arbesser, 2006] specifies that the 
residual error standard deviation of single-frequency receivers must not exceed 30% of the 
correction magnitude, or the equivalent first order delay of a 20-TECu slant TEC, whichever 
is larger [Arbesser, 2006]. Based on this specification and on the IGS (International GNSS 
Service) TEC database, [Salos, 2012] proposes a model of the residual error standard 
deviation that would have been obtained in the previous years. More specifically, the 
historical data used to set up the model have been taken from 1998 to 2010 because this 
period covers the 11-year solar period. The model of the residual error standard deviation on 
the L1 frequency band is as follows: 
 
                 
 
Eq -  3-14 
where: 
   is defined in the previous paragraph, 
         is the standard deviation of the GalileoE1 residual ionosphere ranging error at 
zenith.         decreases when the geomagnetic latitude of the receiver (  ) increases. 
        is in the range  
 7.5m ; 3.9m], where 7.5m corresponds to       and  3.9m corresponds to       . 
The value of         at the geomagnetic latitude of Toulouse airport, France, is 4.5m. 
The ionospheric residual error of GalieoE5a signals is obtained using Eq -  3-13. The 
correlation time of the raw code residual ionospheric ranging errors is set to             in 
[RTCA, 2009] [EUROCAE, 2010]. 
3.2.1.4.3. GPS and Galileo dual frequency mode 
Since the ionosphere is a dispersive medium, the residual raw code ionosphere ranging errors 
after Klobuchar and NeQuick corrections are carrier frequency-dependent. Hence, dual 
frequency civil receivers can measure the pseudo-range to each satellite at two different 
frequencies and may combine them to form an iono-free pseudo-range measurement 
unaffected by the first order ionospheric delay. 
By denoting          the first-order residual raw code ionosphere ranging error on L1 GNSS 
signals, the first-order residual raw code ionosphere ranging error on L5 GNSS signals 
        is given by: 
 
 
         (
   
   
)
 
         Eq -  3-15 
 
 
The iono-free GPSL1C/A-GPSL5 or GPSL1C-GPSL5 and GalileoE1-GalileE5a code pseudo-
range measurements are given by, respectively: 
 
                       
                       
Eq -  3-16 
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where: 
      and      are the code pseudo-range measurements on GPSL1C/A or GPSL1C and 
GPSL5, respectively, 
     and       are the code pseudo-range measurements on GalileoE1and GalileE5a, 
respectively, 
    
    
         
       
    
    
         
        
     is the L1 central frequency and     is the L5 central frequency.  
Iono-free pseudorange combinations remove the first order ionospheric delay, but higher 
order errors remain. Nevertheless, their magnitude is insignificant compared to other error 
sources [Salos, 2012]. Thus, the standard deviations of the GPS and Galileo iono-free residual 
raw code ionosphere ranging error are assumed to be: 
 
               
               
Eq -  3-17 
3.2.1.5. Troposphere error 
The troposphere covers the region between the Earth surface and approximately 40 km above 
the earth and is characterized by the presence of neutral atoms and molecules. The 
troposphere induces a delay on GNSS code sequence and a phase delay on the carrier phase. 
The troposphere is a non-dispersive medium, meaning that the code and phase delays are 
carrier frequency-independent [Leick, 1995].  
The tropospheric model to correct the troposphere code delay in aviation receivers is specified 
in [RTCA, 2006]. The standardized model of the standard deviation of the residual raw code 
troposphere ranging error after troposphere error correction is given by [RTCA, 2009] 
[EUROCAE, 2010]: 
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Eq -  3-18 
 
 
The anomalous troposphere ranging errors induced by the troposphere storms are as part of 
the nominal troposphere error model. There are two reasons for this: 
- troposphere storms, are considered to occur often enough to be part of the nominal 
operation [ICAO, 2009b], 
- the residual anomalous troposphere errors have a low magnitude and can be considered to 
be part of the nominal error model.  
The correlation time of the raw code residual troposphere ranging errors is set to        
      in [RTCA, 2009] [EUROCAE, 2010]. A correlation time of 30 minutes is applied to 
represent the correlation time of the residual troposphere error when the system passes a 
troposphere storm [RTCA, 2009]. 
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3.2.1.6. GNSS receiver thermal noise error 
In order to precisely estimate the code pseudo-range measurements, the GNSS receiver first 
filters, pre-amplifies down-converts and samples the incoming GNSS signals in the front-end 
block. The code delays of each incoming signal are thus roughly estimated in the acquisition 
block. The signal tracking block and more precisely the Delay Locked Loop (DLL) refines the 
estimation of the code delay and provides a dynamic estimation of this parameter. A DLL is a 
feedback system that synchronizes its own local PRN replica with the incoming PRN signal, 
so that code delay estimate can be derived from estimate of the local PRN code. For the 
synchronization process, the DLL uses a discriminator that compares the Early, Late and 
Prompt correlator outputs. A detailed presentation of the DLL operation is presented later in 
this thesis (Chapter 4). The code delay estimate is then converted in meters to provide the 
code pseudo-range measurement estimate. 
Thermal noise present at the receiver front-end perturbs the tracking process and causes 
nominal thermal noise errors on the code pseudo-range measurement estimates [Kaplan et al., 
2006].  The standard deviation of the nominal thermal noise code ranging errors depends on 
the DLL discriminator. The Early Minus late Power (EMLP) discriminator is widely used in 
civil aviation applications. Assuming: 
- the EMLP DLL discriminator is used, 
- the receiver’s front end filter is approximated by a rectangular band-pass filter centered at 
zero frequency and having two-sided bandwidth.     is the two-sided front-end bandwidth 
[Hz], 
- the thermal noise is white with power spectral density.    is the constant noise PSD of the 
thermal noise [W/Hz], 
the standard deviation of the nominal thermal noise code ranging error is given by [Betz et al., 
2009]: 
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Eq -  3-19 
where: 
   ( ) is the normalized signal power spectral density [/Hz],  
   is the signal carrier power [W], 
    is the loop bandwidth [Hz], 
    is the integration time [s]  
   is the two-sided early-late spacing [s]  
Typical values of DLL parameters used in civil aviation applications are provided in the next 
Table. A 1-Hz loop bandwidth is typically chosen for aviation applications [Chen, 2010] 
[Neri, 2011]. With higher values of loop bandwidths, the DLL could follow higher level of 
dynamics. A narrower loop bandwidth enables decreasing the noise error magnitude.     is set 
to 20MHz for GPSL1C/A and GPSL5 and GalileoE5a in order to process the main and 
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secondary lobes (for L1C/A) and the main lobe of L5 and E5a signals.     is set to 14MHz for 
GPSL1C and GalileoE1 to process up to the main lobe of the BOC(6,1) component of the 
received pilot component. The chip spacing is set to 1/12 for GPSL1C and GalileoE1 since it 
is the maximal possible value for an EMLP discriminator, as fully explained in [Julien, 2007]. 
Other values of chip spacing are recommended in [Salos, 2012] and [Chen, 2010]. The 
presence of the secondary code on the pilot component for Galileo signals and for the 
GPSL1C signals allows increasing the integration time up to 100ms. 
 
GNSS signal Modulation    [ms]   [chip]     [MHz]    [Hz] 
GPSL1C/A BPSK-R(1) 20 1/2 20 1 
GPSL1C-P TMBOC(6,1,4/33) 20 to 100 1/12 14 1 
GPSL5-P BPSK(10) 20 1/4 20 1 
GalileoE1-C  CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 20 to 100 1/12 14 1 
GalileoE5a -P  BPSK(10) 20 to 100 1/4 20 1 
 
Table 3-3: GNSS receiver parameters 
 
3.2.1.6.1. GPS and Galileo single frequency mode 
Figure 3-4 shows the values of the standard deviations of the GPS and Galileo raw code 
ranging errors due to receiver thermal noise as a function of the C/N0 ratio. Curves are plotted 
based on Eq -  3-19 with the DLL parameters indicated in Table 3-3.  
 
 
Figure 3-4: Standard deviation of the code thermal noise ranging error -         
 
BPSK(10) signals are the most robust against thermal noise effects since part of their power is 
spread away from the central frequency. Then, TMBOC and CBOC signal standard deviations 
are roughly 30% higher than BPSK(10) standard deviations. Finally, BPSK(1) signals have 
the poorest robustness in terms of noise effects. Note that the results provided in Figure 3-4 
have been obtained for an integration time of 20ms for GPSL1C, GalileoE1 and GalileoE5a. 
If an integration time of 100ms is adopted for these signals, simulations show that the receiver 
noise standard deviations are decreased of roughly 10cm at low C/N0 ratios (25dB-Hz to 
30dB-Hz), and are roughly equal to the values obtained with an integration time of 20ms at 
higher C/N0 ratios. As justified in Section 6.2.2, the C/N0 ratios for the application are likely 
to be higher than 30dB-Hz. Hence, increasing the integration time to 100ms does not provide 
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a significant benefit in terms of thermal noise reduction. It has been chosen to set the value of 
    to 20ms in the rest of the thesis.  
3.2.1.6.2. GPS and Galileo dual frequency mode 
Iono-free pseudorange combinations increase the standard deviation of the code thermal noise 
ranging error. Indeed, the standard deviation of the GPS and Galileo iono-free residual raw 
code thermal noise ranging error is: 
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Eq -  3-20 
 
where: 
           and            are the thermal noise error standard deviations on GPSL1C/A or 
GPSL1C and GPSL5, respectively.  
          and            are the thermal noise error standard deviations on GalileoE1 and 
GalileoE5a, respectively, 
    and    are detailed in section 3.2.1.4.3.  
The receiver noise error correlation time is driven by the DLL bandwidth [Martineau, 2008]. 
Hence, the correlation time of the single-frequency and iono-free raw code ranging errors due 
to receiver noise is               .  
3.2.1.7. Multipath error 
In an airport environment, signal transmission follows not only the direct path, but also a 
number of distinct propagation paths [Pagani et al., 2008]. At the output of the GNSS 
airborne antenna, the observed signal corresponds to the combination of different signals, 
each of them presenting a different attenuation, a different phase rotation, and a different code 
delay. These signal distortions may cause significant errors on the GNSS code pseudo-range 
measurements. The main phenomena responsible for the multipath propagation are as follows 
[Pagani et al., 2008][Kaplan et al., 2006]: 
- Reflection takes place on obstacles of large dimensions with respect to the wavelength.  
- Transmission occurs when the medium where the reflection takes place is not perfectly 
opaque. This causes part of the incident wave travelling through the material. 
- Diffraction takes place on the edges of large sized obstacles with respect to the 
wavelength.  
- Diffusion occurs when an ElectroMagnetic (EM) wave travels towards a group of 
obstacles of small dimensions with respect to the wavelength.  
- Shadowing is excess attenuation of the direct path, typically introduced when the direct 
path propagates through a structure. 
In the following, all these phenomena are included in the electromagnetic (EM) scattering 
phenomenon. Scattering is the re-radiation of EM field on an obstacle that is illuminated by 
an incoming EM field. Few models can be proposed to predict raw code multipath ranging 
errors in airport environments: 
- Statistical models (either purely or partially) which are based on extensive measurement 
campaigns in urban environments. [Park et al., 2010] uses the Jahn statistical 
transmission channel model [Jahn et al., 1996] to over-bound the multipath ranging errors 
in urban environments by a zero-mean Normal distribution. The main advantage of this 
kind of models is that they are independent of the considered airport. They are thus easy to 
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embed since they do not require an airport database on-board. However, some 
characteristics of the urban and airport environments are different. As an example, 
terminals are generally located on one side of the taxiways in airports while buildings are 
present in both sides of the roads in urban environments. Hence urban statistical multipath 
ranging errors models are not well-adapted to precisely model the multipath errors 
affecting the pseudo-range measurements in airport environments. 
- Statistical models (either purely or partially) which are based on extensive measurement 
campaigns during in-flight operations. As an example, the “high resolution aeronautical 
multipath navigation Channel” developed for European Space Agency (ESA) statistically 
predicts the characteristics of the multipath signals that are scattered or reflected by the 
aircraft structure (aircraft fuselage) or by the ground during aircraft approaches [Steingass 
et al., 2004]. This publication shows that the multipath error is mainly induced by the 
aircraft fuselage during the approach phase. This model has been set up by means of a 
measurement campaign carried out in 2002 by DLR, Joanneum Research, and the 
University of Vigo for ESA. This model has been coupled to a generic receiver simulator 
in [Macabiau et al., 2006] to present the estimated standard deviation of a zero-mean 
Normal distribution that over bounds the 100s smoothed GNSS code ranging error due to 
multipath for a landing aircraft on the GPSL1C/A, GPSL5, GalileoE5a GalileoE5b signals. 
These error models are also compared to the 100s smoothed GPSL1C/A error model 
standardized for en-route to CAT I operations [ICAO, 2006] and validated in [Murphy et 
al., 2000]. The standard model appears to be conservative regarding to the error model for 
GPSL1C/A developed based on the “high resolution aeronautical multipath navigation 
Channel”. However, these models are not adapted to surface operations. Firstly, they do 
not take into account the effects of scattered signals from airport obstacles, such as 
terminals, on the raw code multipath ranging errors. Secondly, the ground echo signals that 
affect the GNSS signals during in-flight operations may have larger code delays and larger 
attenuation regarding to the ground echo signals affecting the GNSS signals during taxi 
operations. 
- Mainly or purely deterministic models which are based on an electromagnetic 
description of multipath. [Chen, 2010] provides a prediction of the multipath ranging error 
knowing a description of the 3D airport environment, the GNSS airborne antenna position 
and the satellite position. The main advantage of these models is the precision of the error 
prediction. The main limitation being the complexity of implementation requiring a 
realistic 3D representation of the airport environment. 
No raw code multipath ranging error model is currently standardized. However, EM 
prediction tools and real data analyses allow quantifying the raw code multipath ranging 
errors and the errors in the GNSS-based position estimates in airport environments. Causes of 
multipath errors and order of magnitudes of multipath errors in airport environments are 
presented in Table 3-4.  
From Table 3-4, multipath may lead to code ranging errors of up to few meters, which is high 
relative to the magnitude of code ranging errors caused by the other sources of errors. 
Multipath is considered to be one of the dominant sources of errors for GNSS during surface 
movements [Park et al., 2010]. 
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Singular event Multipath 
Cause 
EM scattering phenomenon, including reflection, transmission, diffraction, 
diffusion, shadowing, of the incoming EM wave on the aircraft structure 
itself, on the airport surface and on other obstacles on the airport such as 
terminals or other aircraft.  
Magnitude of 
code ranging 
errors 
Up to few dozens of meters close to (few meters from) large metallic 
terminals or to another aircraft on GPSL1C/A [Chen, 2010]. 
 
Note: for in-flight operations, the smoothed multipath ranging errors are 
over-bounded by a zero-mean Normal distribution which standard 
deviation is up to few dozens of decimeters for GPSL1C/A signal [RTCA, 
2009] and for Galileo signals [EUROCAE, 2010]. 
Magnitude of 
positioning 
errors 
Up to few meters for a GPSL1C/A mono-constellation [Braasch et al., 
2000], assuming that GNSS measurements estimates are corrected by 
Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) corrections.  
 
Table 3-4: Causes and magnitude of GNSS multipath induced errors 
 
3.2.1.8. Control and space segment induced biases and GNSS airborne antenna 
induced biases 
As shown in the previous paragraphs, most of the GNSS nominal code ranging errors can be 
modeled by a zero-mean Gaussian distribution. However, some phenomena induce nominal 
biases on the code pseudo-range measurements. Nominal biases on the GNSS measurements 
account for both near-constant uncorrected errors and non-Gaussian behavior. Nominal biases 
include errors that remain essentially constant throughout the duration of an approach and 
therefore cannot be treated as purely random [GEAS, 2010]. Among the contributors there are 
mainly the GNSS airborne antenna and both control and space segments.  The causes of the 
nominal biases are further detailed in sections 3.2.1.8.1 and 3.2.1.8.2.  
3.2.1.8.1. GNSS airborne antenna induced bias 
The GNSS airborne antenna introduces three main effects on the processed GNSS signals. It 
modifies the received power of the GNSS signals, it introduces an antenna phase offset on the 
GNSS signals and it introduces an antenna group delay on the GNSS signals. Since airborne 
antennas are not isotropic, these effects depend on the angle of arrival of the incoming EM 
waves.  
Antenna phase center variations as a function of the EM wave angles of arrival can be a 
source of error on the GNSS phase measurements [Kunysz, 2010]. Since this chapter focuses 
on raw code error sources, antenna phase variation induced errors are not detailed in this 
chapter.   
Group delay variations as a function of the EM wave angle of arrival can be a source of error 
on the GNSS raw code pseudo-range measurements. Indeed, group delays initiated by the 
GNSS antenna on the processed signals are different toward each satellite, since each satellite 
is characterized by its own angle of arrival with respect to the GNSS airborne antenna. These 
antenna group delays induce biases on the GNSS raw code pseudo-range measurements. 
Since these biases are different for each satellite, they cannot be removed by the user clock 
bias estimate. In addition, no correction algorithm is currently standardized to remove the 
effects of such biases. No raw code ranging error model representing the effects of GNSS 
antenna group delay variations is currently standardized. The causes of multipath errors and 
order of magnitude of GNSS airborne antenna group delay variations and antenna group delay 
variations induced errors are presented in Table 3-5.  
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Singular event GNSS airborne antenna group delay variations 
Cause 
Antenna group delays on processed GNSS signals which depend on 
the angle of arrival of the processed GNSS signals 
Magnitude of antenna 
group delay 
variations 
Group delay variations as a function of the angle of arrival are up to 
2 nanoseconds [Murphy et al., 2007]. Highest variations are for 
different satellite azimuth angles at low satellite elevation angles. 
Magnitude of code 
ranging errors 
From a few millimeters up to a few decimeters on GPSL1C/A 
[Murphy et al., 2007]. Few decimeters errors occur at low satellite 
elevation angles for particular satellite azimuth angles. 
The bias due to the antenna group delay variations has a variation of 
up  to       around the average value [Macabiau et al., 2014]. 
 
Table 3-5: Causes and magnitude of errors induced by GNSS airborne antenna group 
delay variations  
Differentiating the contribution of the antenna and the contribution of multipath to the group 
delay estimate is complex since multipath from the ground plane on which the antenna is 
located influences the antenna transfer function estimate. Group delay estimates presented in 
Table 3-5 are initiated by the antenna group delays and by the multipath from the ground 
plane on which the antenna is located. The ground plane is generally modeled as an infinite 
metallic plane or by a finite plane with curved edges to avoid the edge diffraction 
phenomenon [Murphy et al., 2007].  
3.2.1.8.2. Control and space segments induced bias 
GPS ground station antennae present phase center variations and group delay variations as a 
function of the angle of arrival. These variations induce nominal biases on the GPS code 
pseudo-range measurements [Shallberg et al., 2002]. GPS nominal deformations also induce 
nominal biases on the GPS code pseudo-range measurements [Mitelman et al., 2004] [Phelts, 
2001].  
3.2.1.8.3. Conclusion 
Future GNSS integrity monitoring systems will be designed to protect users from the effects 
of nominal biases. [GEAS, 2010] assumes that the magnitude of nominal biases is between 
10cm and 75cm. The nominal biases proposed in [Murphy et al., 2007] and in [Mitelman et 
al., 2004] [Phelts, 2001] are of the order of a few centimeters up to a few decimeters. Hence, 
the magnitude of the nominal biases used in [GEAS, 2010] is reasonable. 
3.2.1.9. Conclusion 
The multipath GNSS code ranging error model is not available for surface operations. In the 
absence of multipath, the GNSS nominal code pseudo-range measurement error vector at time 
  is: 
 
 ( )          ( )       ( )        ( )        ( )   ( ) Eq -  3-21 
 
where: 
  ( ) is the ranging nominal bias vector at time  , 
         ( )       ( )        ( )        ( )  is the stochastic nominal ranging error 
vector at time  . The standard deviation of the stochastic nominal ranging error in the 
absence of multipath is given by: 
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       √                                 
Eq -  3-22 
 
       is plotted as a function of the satellite elevation angle in the single frequency mode 
and in the dual frequency mode in Figure 3-5. For this Figure, the DLL discriminator is 
assumed to be a EMLP discriminator, regardless of the tracked signal. The DLL chip spacing 
and the other DLL characteristics are stated in Table 3-3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3-5 : Standard deviation of the nominal code ranging error in the absence of 
multipath,             , Toulouse (France) latitude 
 
In single frequency mode, the code ranging error standard deviation is lower for GPSL1C and 
GalileoE1 signals than for GPSL1C/A. This is due to the poor robustness of GPSL1C/A 
against thermal noise. The dual frequency mode allows eliminating the ionosphere error 
component. Thanks to this elimination, the code ranging error standard deviation is lower for 
the dual-frequency mode GPSL1C+GPSL5 signals than for the single-frequency mode 
GPSL1C. The dual-frequency mode also induces an inflation of the thermal noise code 
ranging error standard deviation compared to the single-frequency mode. This explains why, 
at high elevation angle, the code ranging error standard deviation is higher for the dual-
frequency mode GPSL1C/A+GPSL5 signals than for the single-frequency mode GPSL1C/A. 
Due to the poor robustness of GPSL1C/A against thermal noise, and considering the sub-
meter level navigation system performance requirements in terms of accuracy and integrity 
for the application (guidance function under low visibility conditions during taxi operations), 
the GPSL1C/A signal is not considered in the rest of this thesis.  
 
3.2.2. GNSS ranging failures 
3.2.2.1. Identification 
Four sources of GNSS ranging failures have been identified for airport environments: 
- Control and space segment events, 
- Ionosphere anomalies, 
- Unintentional and intentional interference, 
- Multipath. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.1.5, the anomalous troposphere ranging errors induced by the 
troposphere storms are as part of the nominal troposphere error model. For this reason, 
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anomalous troposphere ranging errors induced by troposphere anomalies are not presented in 
this section.  
In order to properly identify which failure sources may represent a threat in terms integrity for 
taxi operations, the magnitude and the probability of occurrence of each failure mode must be 
assessed.  This is the goal of the following sub-sections.  
3.2.2.2. Control and space segment events generating GNSS satellite ranging failures 
3.2.2.2.1. Major Service Failure 
A Major Service Failure (MSF) is defined to occur whenever a healthy SIS's instantaneous 
User Ranging Error (URE) exceeds the SIS not-to-exceed tolerance without a timely alert 
(alarm or warning) being provided. The not-to-exceed tolerance is defined to be 4.42 times 
the upper bound of the currently transmitted URA. This definition is valid for the GPS 
constellation [GPS SPS, 2008] and can be extended to the Galileo constellation [EUROCAE, 
2010]. The instantaneous URE includes only the pseudo-range set error budget components 
assigned to the control and space segments.  
[GPS SPS, 2008] contains the assurance that the probability of occurrence an individual GPS 
major service failure does not exceed: 
 
              
         
 
Eq -  3-23 
[GPS SPS, 2008] assumes a maximum duration of the MSFs of 6 hours, but this duration is 
expected to be shortened to 1 hour for Galileo and for the modernized GPS constellation 
[Martineau, 2008].  
[EUROCAE, 2010] contains the assurance that the probability of occurrence an individual 
Galileo major service failure will be on average 3 major failures per year for a 27 Galileo 
satellites constellation. This corresponds to a probability of occurrence an individual Galileo 
major service failure of:  
 
                  
         Eq -  3-24 
 
GPS MSF events are sufficiently characterized and some current integrity monitoring systems 
implemented onboard, such as Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) systems, 
are designed to detect MSF with a probability of missed detection that depends on the targeted 
operation. However, some control and space segments events may generate smaller single 
ranging failures not considered as MSF. Current RAIM systems are not designed to protect 
users from these smaller single ranging failures which are presented in the next paragraph.                                         
3.2.2.2.2. Other GNSS single satellite ranging failures  
Some of the control and space segment ranging failures characterized by a size below the not-
to-exceed tolerance bound defined in the previous paragraph are currently not fully 
characterized in terms of magnitude, error shape and probability of occurrence. Elements 
extracted from the literature to characterize these GNSS single satellite ranging failures are 
recapped in Table 3-6. 
From Table 3-6, control and space segment events induced failures are due to several ranging 
failure sources. The effects of each failure source on the ranging measurements in terms of 
magnitude, error shape and probability of occurrence have not been fully characterized. The 
magnitude, error shape and probability of occurrence of GNSS single ranging failures highly 
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depend on their cause(s). In addition, no information on the duration of control and space 
segments failures inducing small ranging errors has been found. 
Singular event 
Control and space segment events inducing GNSS single 
ranging failures 
Causes 
Mainly failures in the space segment (i.e. clock frequency shift, 
navigation message aberration, modulation imperfections, ect) 
Magnitude of ranging 
failures 
Example 1: errors induced by clock frequency shift: slow ramp 
errors [1.0m/hr ; 2.0m/hr] 
Example 2: errors induced by navigation message aberration: 
magnitude to be determined  
Probability of 
occurrence of ranging 
failures 
Example 1: Clock frequency shift:                  
Example 2: Navigation message aberration: occurrence to be 
determined 
 
Table 3-6: Causes and magnitude of single ranging failures caused by control and space 
segment events [GPS SPS, 2008] [Boeing, 2005] 
 
3.2.2.2.3. GNSS multiple satellite ranging failures  
On-board integrity monitoring systems implemented onboard (such as RAIM), are not 
designed to detect satellite ranging failures occurring simultaneously on multiple satellite with 
a sufficiently high probability [Lee, 2004]. However, some control and space segment events 
may generate multiple satellite ranging failures and are classified as follows: 
- Multiple independent control and space segment failure modes may occur 
simultaneously and generate ranging failures on multiple pseudo-range measurements at 
the same time. An independent control and space segment failure mode represents a failure 
in the control or space segment that induces a satellite ranging failure on a single pseudo-
range measurement. Independent control and space segment failure modes mainly 
originate from anomalies in the space segment and are presented in Section 3.2.2.2.2. The 
computation of the probability of occurrence of simultaneous multiple independent control 
and space segment failures requires knowing the probabilities of occurrence each 
independent control and space segment failure [Martineau, 2008]. From Section 3.2.2.2.2, 
the probability of occurrence of the MSF is known. The probability of occurrence of two 
MSFs on two visible satellites at the same time is 1.3 × 10−8/150s given 12 satellites in 
view. However, the probability of occurrence of multiple control and space failures 
inducing small ranging errors occurring simultaneously is complex to determine since the 
occurrence of control and space failures inducing small ranging errors is not sufficiently 
characterized.  
- A common control and space segment failure mode generates ranging failures on 
multiple pseudo-range measurements at the same time when they occur. These faults are 
called “correlated faults” in the literature [WG-C ARAIM, 2012]. Elements extracted from 
the literature to characterize the GNSS multiple satellite ranging failures caused by the 
common control and space segment failure modes are recapped in Table 3-7. 
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Singular 
event 
Control and space segment events inducing GNSS multiple ranging 
failures 
 
Causes 
Failures in the control segment:  
- Curve fit errors in the ground 
segment,  
- Wrong data used in MCS:: 
 Erroneous values of various 
constants used by the GPS 
MCS to estimate satellite orbits 
and clocks could.  
 Biased satellite tracking data 
into MCS. 
- Software or hardware errors in the 
MCS or in one or more ground 
stations which perform 
measurements to estimate satellite 
orbits and clocks. 
 
 
 
Anomalies in the information 
supplied to the control segment by 
an external source: 
- Bad Earth Orientation Parameters 
(EOPs) and Earth Rotation Rate 
Parameters (EOPPs) predictions 
upload due to two types of events: 
 Change in Earth motion since 
the upload of EOPs and 
EOPPs predictions because of 
geological phenomena, such as 
earthquakes.  
 Faulty process to generate 
EOPs and EOPPs. 
- Bad solar flux observations which 
imply bad ionospheric correction 
data upload.   
- Bad reference orbit used, 
- Bad UTC offset data. 
Magnitude 
of ranging 
failures 
Bad upload from control segment 
caused by wrong data used ion the 
MCS: ramp error of 
[                 ]  
Bad upload from erroneous EOPs or 
ERRPs upload:  ramp error of up to 
            
Bad upload from MCS hardware or 
software failure: to be determined 
Bad upload from erroneous solar 
flux observations: to be determined 
Probability 
of 
occurrence 
of ranging 
failures 
Bad upload from control segment 
caused by wrong data used in the 
MCS:                  
 
 
Bad upload from erroneous EOPs or 
ERRPs upload:                
[Boeing, 2005]. However, GPS wing 
claims values of              
           for GPS II and 
               for GPS III  
 
Bad upload from MCS hardware or 
software failure: to be determined  
Bad upload from erroneous solar 
flux observations: to be determined 
 
Table 3-7: Causes and magnitude of multiple ranging failures caused by common 
control and space segment failure modes [GPS SPS, 2008] [Boeing, 2005] [Pervan, 2011] 
[GEAS, 2010] [WG-C ARAIM, 2012] 
 
Among the threats listed in Table 3-7, erroneous EOP and EOPP parameters are explicitly 
listed as a potential integrity fault mode in the current GPS Standard Positioning Service 
Performance Standard [GPS SPS, 2008]. For multiple satellite ranging failures due to 
erroneous EOPs and ERPPs, the predicted induced ranging error is a ramp error of a few 
centimeters per hour [Boeing, 2005] while other publications predict that the induced 
horizontal positioning error will grow to a few tens of meters per seconds [Pervan, 2011] 
[GEAS, 2010]. Similarly, different publications propose different values of probability of 
occurrence of erroneous EOPs and ERPPs [Boeing, 2005] [Pervan, 2011]. In addition, no 
information on the duration of control and space segments failures inducing small ranging 
errors has been found.  
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From Table 3-7, the effects of other common control and space segment failure modes on the 
ranging measurements in terms of magnitude, error shape and probability of occurrence have 
not been fully characterized.  
The assumed probability of occurrence of common failure modes causing multiple satellite 
ranging failures is 1.3 × 10−8/150s for RAIM LPV-200 approaches [Lee et al., 2007] for the 
modernized GPS constellation. It appears to be comparable to the probability of two 
simultaneous independent GPS ranging failures, given that about 12 satellites are in view, and 
that the mean duration of a single anomaly is 1 hour [Fernow, 2011]. 
3.2.2.3. Ionosphere anomalies 
Observations have shown that the ionosphere electron content can be temporally and locally 
strongly modified compared to the ionosphere electron content in nominal conditions 
[Jakowski]. These strong modifications in the nominal ionosphere electron content are 
designated as “ionosphere anomalies” in this thesis and are listed below. Note that ionosphere 
anomalies are induced by causes called “ionosphere events” in this thesis. Both ionosphere 
anomalies and ionosphere events concepts are thus distinct in the following.  Some current 
integrity monitoring systems, such as RAIM, are not designed to detect the ranging failures 
induced by the ionosphere anomalies with the related and targeted level of detection 
performance.                               
3.2.2.3.1. Scintillations  
The scintillations are dynamic effects due to irregularities in the electron concentration 
causing fast variations in the ionized particles concentration. Irregular zones in the ionosphere 
produce diffraction of the GNSS signals going through these zones [Humphreys et al., 2009]. 
Diffraction of the radio signals causes fluctuations in the signal amplitude and phase. Hence, 
scintillations are characterized as a rapid change in the amplitude (amplitude scintillation) and 
phase (phase scintillation). Phase scintillation effects on the code tracking are negligible and 
can be ignored [Hegarty et al., 2000]. Hence, this section focuses on amplitude scintillations. 
Elements extracted from the literature to characterize the GNSS raw code ranging errors 
caused by the amplitude scintillations are recapped in Table 3-8. 
The ionosphere events causing the ionosphere anomalies are fully described in the literature 
[Eurcontrol, 2010]. The effects of scintillations in a region can last from 30 minutes up to 
several hours. The probability of occurrence of strong amplitude scintillations has been 
evaluated in some low latitude regions [Béniguel, 2005]. In mid-latitude regions, the 
occurrence has been sufficiently characterized to consider that scintillations have a minimal 
impact in terms of integrity, continuity and availability.  
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Singular event Amplitude scintillations  
 
Causes (ionosphere 
events) 
- Auroras 
- Ionosphere storms 
- Plume effects 
- Travelling Ionosphere Disturbances (TIDs) 
- Sporadic E-layers 
- Ionosphere blobs 
- Ionosphere bubbles 
- Ionosphere bays 
Magnitude of 
ranging failures 
 
Impact of amplitude scintillations on code ranging errors equivalent 
to an increase of the standard deviation of the GNSS receiver thermal 
noise ranging error         [Hegarty et al., 2000] 
       is increased from a few decimeters to a few meters at low 
C/N0 ratio  
 
Note: amplitude scintillations may result in a complete loss of lock of 
GNSS signals, leading to a reduced number of available satellites of 
at most 4 satellites in low latitude regions  
Occurrence of 
singular event 
Daily in equatorial regions  
 
 
Table 3-8: Causes and magnitude of ranging failures caused by amplitude scintillations 
[Hegarty et al., 2000] [Groves, 2004] [Eurocontrol, 2010] [ICAO, 2006b] 
 
3.2.2.3.2. Irregular TEC values 
The TEC [el/m²] represents the number of free electrons in a 1-square meter column along the 
path satellite-receiver. Elements extracted from the literature to characterize the GNSS raw 
code ranging errors caused by the irregular TEC values are recapped in the next Table. 
 
Singular event Irregular TEC values  
Causes (ionosphere 
events) 
Ionosphere storms 
 
Magnitude of 
ranging failures 
Large ionospheric raw code ranging errors up to few dozen of meters 
observed in October 2003 over North America. 
Occurrence of 
singular event 
 
0.00442/day over North America. This value is obtained from 
geomagnetic activity observation over the half solar cycle duration 
following the solar peak of 1999 and is likely to be conservative since 
ionosphere anomalies occur more likely in the years following the 
solar peaks.  
 
Table 3-9: Causes and magnitude of ranging failures caused by irregular TEC values 
[Pullen et al., 2006] [Datta-Barua, 2008] 
 
A conservative bound of the probability of occurrence of extreme ionosphere storms has been 
evaluated over North America [Pullen et al., 2006]. Such a bound is not publically known 
over Europe.  
3.2.2.3.3. Irregular TEC gradients 
The concept of spatial and temporal TEC gradients under nominal conditions has been 
introduced in Section 3.2.1.4. Let’s introduce the concept of irregular TEC gradients. 
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Irregularities in the ionosphere composition induced by ionosphere events may generate 
irregular values of spatial and temporal TEC gradients that are not modeled by the Klobuchar 
and NeQuick models. Elements extracted from the literature to characterize the GNSS raw 
code ranging errors caused by the irregular TEC gradients are recapped in Table 3-10. 
 
Singular event Irregular TEC gradients  
 
Causes (ionosphere 
events) 
- Ionosphere storms 
- TIDs 
- Ionosphere blobs 
- Ionosphere bubbles  
Magnitude of 
ranging failures 
Large ionospheric raw code ranging error variations in the time 
domain.  Error variations up to 150mm/s on L1 GNSS signals 
observed in October 2003 over North America for a static receiver.  
 
Large ionospheric raw code ranging error variations in the horizontal 
space domain.  Error variations up to 425mm/km on L1 GNSS 
signals observed in October 2003 over North America. 
Occurrence of 
singular event 
0.00442/day over North America. This value is obtained from 
geomagnetic activity observation over the half solar cycle duration 
following the solar peak of 1999 and is likely to be conservative since 
ionosphere anomalies occur more likely in the years following the 
solar peaks.  
 
Table 3-10: Causes and magnitude of ranging failures caused by irregular TEC 
gradients [Datta-Barua et al., 2010] [Pullen et al., 2006] 
 
A conservative bound of the probability of occurrence of severe ionosphere storms inducing 
irregular spatial and temporal TEC gradients has been evaluated over North America [Pullen 
et al, 2006]. Such a bound is not publically known over Europe.  
3.2.2.4. Interferences 
3.2.2.4.1. Unintentional interference 
Radio-frequency signals may interfere unintentionally with GNSS signals. Radio-frequency 
signals are generated by: 
- Equipment that intentionally generates and emits radio-frequency signals in the GNSS 
frequency bands to operate and not for hostile purpose. As an example, Distance 
Measurement Equipment (DME) station transponders emit radio-frequency signals in the 
GNSS L5 frequency band.  
- Equipment that unintentionally emits RF signals. Unintentional emissions in the GNSS 
frequency bands are essentially due to the non-linearity of some RF emitters that generates 
harmonics in the GNSS frequency bands.  
Radio-frequency interfering signals can be classified as follows: 
- Pulsed signals are concentrated in the temporal domain. Examples of these signals are 
Ultra Wide Band (UWB) [Pagani et al., 2008] signals that are used for indoor localization 
and for short range communications are DME, TACtical Air Navigation (TACAN), Joint 
Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS) signals [Raimondi, 2008] [Bastide, 
2004].  
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- Carrier Wave (CW) signals that are characterized in the frequency domain as a single tone 
in the GNSS frequency bands and that are modeled in the temporal domain as a pure 
sinusoid [Borio, 2008]. 
- Wideband signals that are characterized in the frequency domain by a wide bandwidth 
relative to the GNSS signal bandwidths and narrowband signals that are characterized in 
the frequency domain by a narrow bandwidth relative to the GNSS signal bandwidths 
[Kaplan et al., 2006].  
Elements extracted from the literature to characterize the GNSS raw code ranging errors 
caused by unintentional interference are recapped in Table 3-11, in Table 3-12 and in Table 
3-13. 
The effects of unintentional pulsed, narrowband and wideband interferences on a particular 
GNSS signal can be modelled as the effect of additional white noise at the receiver input on 
this signal, or, equivalently, as a decrease of the C/N0 ratio related to the affected signal. The 
effects of these interferences on the code ranging errors can be included in the GNSS receiver 
thermal noise ranging error model that is a function of the C/N0 ratio. Hence, any positioning 
failure due to the combination of nominal errors and pulsed, narrowband or wideband 
interferences is detected by the current integrity monitoring systems with the same level of 
integrity performance as the detection performance level related to the detection of 
positioning failures induced by the GNSS receiver thermal noise errors.  
Unintentional CW interferences may generate biases on one or several code pseudo-range 
measurements that may not be properly detected by GNSS integrity monitoring systems.  
Some current integrity monitoring systems, such as RAIM, are not designed to detect the 
ranging failures induced by the CW interference with the related and targeted level of 
detection performance.                               
 
Singular event Unintentional interference with pulsed signals  
Cause 
Unintentional and intentional emission of  pulsed interfering signals 
in the GNSS frequency bands  
Magnitude of 
ranging failures 
Civil aviation receivers are equipped with pulsed interference 
mitigation techniques, such as pulse blanker [Bastide, 2004] in order 
to comply with civil aviation performance requirements under strong 
pulsed interference conditions [Tran et al., 2001]. 
 
Equivalent to a decrease of the C/N0 ratio. Impact of pulsed 
interference on code ranging errors equivalent to an increase of the 
standard deviation of the GNSS receiver thermal noise ranging error 
       . 
 
       is increased a few decimeters on GPSL5 under the worst case 
DME/TACAN/JTIDS scenario in the United States and in the 
presence of a pulse blanker [Tran et al., 2001].  
Occurrence of 
singular event 
Unknown in airport environments 
 
 
Table 3-11: Causes and magnitude of ranging failures caused by pulsed interfering 
signals   
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Singular event Unintentional interference with CW signals  
Cause 
Unintentional emission of  CW interfering signals in the GNSS 
frequency bands  
Magnitude of 
ranging failures 
Impact of CW interference on code ranging errors: 
- Introduction of biases on one or several raw code pseudo-range 
estimates. Interference biases mainly depend on Early-Late 
correlator spacing of the DLL, the power, the phase, the frequency 
and the Doppler frequency rate of the interfering signal with 
respect to the GNSS signal spectrum [RTCA, 2008]. The bias 
magnitude on GPSL1C/A is up to 20m in the presence of a CW 
interfering signal 5dBm below the GPSL1C/A RFI mask [Ouzeau, 
2009]. 
- Increase of the standard deviation of the GNSS raw code ranging 
error on one or several raw code pseudo-range estimates. Standard 
deviation increase of few decimeters up to few meters for 
powerful CW interfering signals. This augmentation has not a 
significant impact on the positioning error since only few pseudo-
ranges measurements are affected by CW interference [Martineau, 
2008]. 
Occurrence of 
singular event 
Unknown in airport environments 
 
 
Table 3-12: Causes and magnitude of ranging failures caused by CW interfering signals   
 
Singular event Unintentional interference with wideband and narrowband 
signals  
Cause Unintentional emission of  wideband and narrowband interfering 
signals in the GNSS frequency bands  
 
Magnitude of 
ranging failures 
Equivalent to a decrease of the C/N0 ratio  
 
Impact of narrowband and wideband interference on code ranging 
errors equivalent to an increase of the standard deviation of the GNSS 
receiver thermal noise ranging error        . 
Occurrence of 
singular event 
Unknown in airport environments 
 
 
Table 3-13: Causes and magnitude of ranging failures caused by wideband and 
narrowband interfering signals [Betz et al., 2009] 
 
3.2.2.4.2. Intentional interference 
The intentional interference threat models may be classified as follows: 
- Jamming is the most likely form of intentional attack and is defined as the broadcast of 
radio-frequency power that interferes with a receiver's ability to track the GNSS genuine 
signals, resulting in denial of service [Lo et al., 2009]. A GNSS jammer is a device that 
emits powerful signals in the GNSS frequency bands [Papadimitratos et al., 2008]. 
Examples of jamming events are described in the literature [Ochieng] [PNT, 2010]. GNSS 
signals are particularly vulnerable to jamming mainly because of the relative low power of 
GNSS signals at the surface of the Earth.  
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- Spoofing is the more anecdotal form of intentional attack and is defined as the broadcast of 
competing signals that make the position estimated by the user receiver incorrect [Lo et al., 
2009].  GNSS signals used tracked by GNSS airborne receivers are particularly vulnerable 
to spoofing mainly because of the absence of encryption on these open-service GNSS 
signals. Competing signals may be generated [Papadimitratos et al., 2008]: 
 Based on previously received GNSS signals: the spoofer records navigation messages 
and re-transmits them. This is called “replay” attacks. 
 Based on signal generators that are able to generate GNSS signals with falsified 
navigation parameters with respect to the parameters contained in the genuine GNSS 
signals [Motella et al., 2010] [Enge et al., 2009] [Humphreys et al., 2008]. 
Elements extracted from the literature to characterize the GNSS raw code ranging errors 
caused by intentional interference are recapped in Table 3-14. 
 
Singular event Intentional interference  
Causes Jamming attack Spoofing attack 
Magnitude of 
ranging failures 
Impact of jamming on code ranging 
errors: 
- Complete loss of lock of a GNSS 
signals and deny of service  
- Same effects as a CW unintentional 
interference if the jamming attack is the 
emission of a CW signal. 
 
Note: a 100W jammer source can make 
an airborne receiver lose track of the 
GPSL1C/A signals in a zone of up to 
several hundreds of kilometers around the 
jamming source.  
Raw code ranging error 
depends on the tracked 
competing signals. For 
replay attacks: raw code 
ranging errors generally 
modeled as a drift with a 
rate that depends on the 
attack.  
 
Occurrence of 
singular event 
Precise occurrence unknown in airport 
environments. Jamming is frequent in or 
near airports, but jamming events do not 
have always an impact on the GNSS 
signals used in civil aviation.  
Unknown in airport 
environments 
 
Table 3-14: Causes and magnitude of ranging failures caused by intentional interfering 
signals   
 
Since the error magnitude, the error shape and the occurrence of interference, and more 
specifically of intentional interference, is not fully characterized, some current integrity 
monitoring systems, such as RAIM, used in aviation applications are not designed to detect 
the ranging failures induced by the intentional interference with the related and targeted level 
of detection performance.                               
3.2.2.5. Multipath 
The concept of GNSS ranging failures due to multipath and of probability of occurrence of 
multipath ranging failures will be further developed in Chapter 8 of this thesis. 
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3.2.3. Case of study 
In Chapter 2, it is established that the alert limits and integrity risks for the guidance 
application during surface operations under low visibility conditions are small compared to 
those for en-route to APV operations. Hence, designing integrity monitoring systems for 
surface operations requires taking into account the effects of multipath in airport environment 
and the effects of several error sources that were neglected for en-route to APV operations 
and that include: 
- Nominal ranging biases due to the space and control segments and due to the GNSS 
airborne antenna, 
- Single satellite ranging failures that have magnitude below the MSF not-to-exceed 
threshold, 
- Multiple satellite ranging failures, 
- Ranging failures due to ionosphere anomalies, 
- Ranging failures due to intentional and unintentional interference. 
Investigating the impact of nominal ranging biases on the accuracy and on the integrity for 
surface operations is not considered as a priority since the magnitude of nominal ranging 
biases is low compared to the magnitude of ranging errors as a result of multipath or 
ionosphere anomalies. 
Similarly, small single satellite ranging failures and multiple satellite ranging failures are not 
assessed in this thesis. The error magnitude, the error shape and the occurrence of such 
failures have not been sufficiently characterized to properly analyze the impact of these 
failures on the accuracy and integrity. In addition, two of the three implemented augmentation 
systems (GBAS and SBAS) are designed to detect such failures. GBAS and SBAS are 
presented in Section 3.3. 
As justified in Section 3.2.2.4.1, any positioning failure due to the combination of nominal 
errors and pulsed, narrowband or wideband interferences is detected by the current integrity 
monitoring systems with the same level of detection performance as the detection 
performance level related to the detection of positioning failures induced by the GNSS 
receiver thermal noise errors. For this reason, pulsed, narrowband and wideband interferences 
are not treated in this thesis.  
GNSS ranging failures induced by CW interferences may not be detected by GNSS integrity 
monitoring systems with the related and targeted level of detection performance. Biases 
induced by CW interferences occur when a powerful CW interfering signals is emitted at a 
frequency in the spectrum of a GNSS signal during few seconds. The occurrence of the 
emission of such CW interfering signals is considered as negligible in the literature. Hence, 
CW interferences are not treated in this thesis. 
Intentional interference effects may not be detected by the current integrity monitoring 
algorithms used in civil aviation and intentional interference effects may be especially 
dangerous for surface operations and low altitude in-flight operations. Nevertheless: 
- Occurrence and error amplitudes are unpredictable since they depend on the activity of the 
spoofers/jammers. The threat has not been sufficiently characterized to properly analyze 
the impact of these failures on the accuracy and integrity. In addition, in the absence of 
occurrence information and impact analysis of intentional interference on ranging 
measurements, there is still a doubt concerning the real necessity to consider this threat for 
the application.  
- The nature of all possible existing attacks is relatively unknown and as the nature of future 
attacks remains unpredictable.  There is a risk that the analyses or/and detection techniques 
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that would be proposed in this project are adapted to attacks that are or will become 
marginal.  
- Since intentional interference emissions in the L1 and L5 bands are illegal, one could argue 
that any potential threat induced by intentional interference needs to be addressed by law 
enforcement and not by the airborne system architecture.  
For these three last reasons, this thesis does not deal with intentional interference.  
Ionosphere anomalies and multipath generate the largest code ranging errors during surface 
operations. The standard deviation of the residual ionosphere code ranging error after 
corrections by the ionosphere models recommended in [RTCA, 2009] [EUROCAE, 2010] of 
after GBAS or SBAS differential ionosphere corrections may be inappropriate in the presence 
of ionosphere anomalies since: 
- The recommended ionosphere models [RTCA, 2009] [EUROCAE, 2010] assumes a 
nominal ionization of the ionosphere, 
- SBAS and GBAS ground subsystem and airborne receivers may experience significantly 
different ionospheric errors [Datta-Barua, 2008] in the presence of scintillations or 
irregular TEC gradients. 
In the single frequency mode, ionosphere anomalies detection techniques during operations 
supported by SBAS are implemented [Walter et al., 2000] [Sparks et al., 2005]. Recently, 
new techniques able to maintain the integrity and availability of the position solution under 
irregular ionosphere conditions have been developed and are expected to be implemented in 
the future SBAS versions [Sparks et al., 2011] [FAA, 2011]. Ground and airborne TEC 
gradients detection and mitigation techniques during operations supported by GBAS are under 
standardization [ICAO, 2010] [RTCA, 2008b] [EUROCAE, 2010].  
The Iono-free (Ifree) smoothing technique combines dual-frequency carrier and code 
measurements to eliminate the ionosphere component at the expense of an inflation of the 
ground and airborne thermal noise errors [Konno et al., 2006]. IFree technique is standardized 
in the drafts Galileo EUROCAE MOPSs [EUROCAE, 2010] and is expected to be 
standardized in the future GPSL1-L5 RTCA MOPSs. 
To conclude, even if current integrity monitoring systems are not designed to detect the 
effects of the ionosphere anomalies with the related and targeted level of detection 
performance, single frequency detection and mitigation techniques are under standardization 
and the Ifree technique will eliminate the ionosphere component. However, no multipath 
detection and mitigation technique exists which is able to maintain the integrity and 
availability of the position solution during surface operations is under standardization. The 
multipath error will not be eliminated by dual-frequency techniques. It is thus essential to 
design integrity monitoring systems that take into account the effects on multipath in airport 
environments. The multipath error modelling and the multipath failure analysis are addressed 
in the following chapters.  
 
3.3. GNSS augmentation systems 
3.3.1. Systems presentation  
In order to meet the civil aviation operational requirements in terms of accuracy, integrity, 
availability and continuity, the aviation community has standardized augmentation systems to 
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correct the GNSS pseudo-range measurements and to monitor the received SIS. Three kinds 
of GNSS augmentation systems are described below. 
SBASs are wide coverage augmentation system in which the user receives augmentation 
information from a satellite-based transmitter [ICAO, 2006]. SBAS consists of the satellite 
subsystems, the ground subsystem and the airborne subsystem. The ground subsystem 
collects measurements from the core constellation satellites and the SBAS geostationary 
satellites and computes differential corrections and SIS integrity data. It transmits these data 
to the airborne subsystem via the geostationary satellites. SBAS allows correcting each 
pseudo-range measurements by a satellite clock correction term, an ephemeris correction term 
and an ionospheric correction term [RTCA, 2006].  
GBASs provide locally relevant pseudo-range corrections and integrity monitoring for GNSS 
ranging sources [ICAO, 2006]. GBAS consists of the satellite subsystems, the ground 
subsystem and the airborne subsystem. The ground subsystem consists of GNSS reference 
receivers and a GBAS ground facility close to the airport and provides ephemeris and satellite 
clock errors, tropospheric errors and ionospheric errors differential corrections to the airborne 
receiver. The tropospheric and ionospheric delays are partially mitigated by the differential 
corrections since the spatial de-correlation between the reference receivers and the airborne 
receivers is responsible for small residual troposphere and ionosphere errors. The ground 
subsystem also monitors the integrity of the space and ground systems and provides 
differential correction integrity data to the airborne receiver.  
ABAS is an augmentation system that augments and/or integrates the information obtained 
from the other GNSS elements with information available on board the aircraft [ICAO, 2006]. 
ABAS monitors the integrity of the position solution using:  
- redundant information from GNSS information (multiple range measurements) through 
RAIM algorithms, 
- redundant information from additional on-board sensors (e.g. barometric altimeter, clock 
and inertial navigation system (INS)) through  Aircraft Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
(AAIM) algorithms. 
In addition, improvements of the accuracy, availability and continuity can be obtained in the 
case of AAIM thanks to the integration of GNSS measurements with external sensor 
measurements [Néri, 2011]. 
3.3.2. Case of study  
In Section 3.2.3, it is established that this thesis focuses on multipath error modelling and 
multipath failure modes analysis in airport environments. In order to analyze the multipath 
failure modes, the impact of multipath on the positioning error must be assessed. For this 
assessment, models of the residual ranging errors are required and depend on the GNSS 
augmentation system that is used. Three GNSS augmentation systems can be proposed to 
support surface operations: 
- SBAS. In obstructed areas, such as in airport environments, the visibility of the SBAS 
geostationary satellites may be degraded. Hence, the data link between the geo satellites 
and the airborne antenna may not be optimal. For this reason, SBAS is not retained in the 
context of this thesis. 
- GBAS. In order to meet the meter level SIS accuracy and integrity operational 
requirements for surface operations presented in Table 2-4, GBAS double-constellation 
GPS+Galileo and dual-frequency L1+L5 must be considered. 
- ABAS. As for GBAS, ABAS double-constellation GPS+Galileo and dual-frequency 
L1+L5 must be considered in this thesis.  
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GBAS double-constellation dual-frequency will not support surface operations before 2023. 
ABAS double constellations and dual frequency is likely to be used before the GBAS double-
constellation dual-frequency operation, that is to say by 2021.  In addition, ABAS is of 
particular interest as they do not need the support of external infrastructures.  Hence, this 
thesis assumes that surface operations will be supported by a double-constellation and dual-
frequency ABAS. 
3.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter, nominal ranging errors and ranging failures affecting GNSS measurements 
during surface operations are presented. Multipath is one of the main error contributors in the 
airport environment and may significantly degrade both accuracy and integrity of the position 
solution. It is thus essential to maintain the integrity of the position solution by designing 
integrity monitoring systems able to properly detect multipath failures. This thesis models the 
multipath error and analyzes multipath failures in the airport environment.  
The multipath error modelling and the multipath failure analysis require identifying first the 
GNSS constellations, the GNSS signals and the GNSS augmentation system that will support 
future surface operations under low visibility conditions. GPS and Galileo will be likely to be 
used in aviation applications by 2020 and are retained in this thesis. The L1 and L5 signals 
that are considered are: GPSL1C, GPSL5, GalileoE1 and GalileoE5a. Finally, ABAS double-
constellation multi-frequency is chosen to support the guidance function during surface 
operations under low visibility conditions. 
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  CHAPTER 4 
4. Impact of multipath on GNSS 
measurements 
 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical impact of multipath on: 
- the GNSS signals received by the GNSS airborne antenna,   
- the code delay estimated by the GNSS airborne receiver, 
- the code pseudo-range measurements estimated by the GNSS airborne receiver.  
In Section 4.1, this chapter introduces the transmission channel models in the presence of 
multipath. In Section 4.2, the signal processing blocks of the GNSS airborne receiver are 
described. In Section 4.3, the theoretical impact of multipath on the code tracking loop and on 
the code pseudo-range measurements is assessed.  
 
4.1. Transmission channel modeling 
4.1.1. Definition 
The transmission channel includes any media and device inside which the signal travels 
between the transmitter and the receiver [Pagani et al., 2008]. It includes: 
- the transmitter antenna, 
- the propagation channel,  
- the receiver antenna. 
The propagation channel represents the transformation of the electromagnetic waves 
throughout their propagation in the physical medium that is used to send the signal from 
transmitter to the receiver [Pagani et al., 2008] [Proakis, 2001]. In the literature, some 
publications assimilate the propagation channel and the transmission channel. In this thesis, 
both concepts are distinct. The transmitter, the transmission channel and the receiver are 
presented in Figure 4-1.  
Each part of the transmission channel can be mathematically represented by its own model. In 
the following, each transmission channel stage is presented separately. 
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Figure 4-1: Propagation channel and transmission channel 
4.1.2. Transmitter antenna  
The transmitter antenna is the satellite antenna which radiates GNSS signals with a Right-
Hand Circular Polarization (RHCP). 
4.1.3. Multipath propagation channels 
Throughout their propagation between the transmitter antenna and the receiver antenna, 
GNSS electromagnetic waves are affected by: 
- atmospheric perturbations, 
- interference perturbations, 
- multipath perturbations. 
The atmospheric perturbations occur in the ionosphere and troposphere. Atmospheric and 
interference perturbations are presented in Sections 3.2.1.4, 3.2.1.5 and 3.2.2.4.  
Multipath perturbations are due to EM scattering, defined as the re-radiation of EM field on 
an obstacle that is illuminated by an incoming EM field. EM scattering includes reflection, 
transmission, diffraction and shadowing perturbations. These perturbations are defined in 
Section 3.2.1.7. As a result of EM scattering, the received GNSS signal can be modelled as 
the combination of different signals, that is to say as a number of superimposed replicas of the 
signal emitted by the transmitter antenna. In this document, the echo signals, also called 
multipath, are the different GNSS signals resulting from the EM scattering phenomena. Each 
echo signal presents an attenuation, a phase rotation and a code delay with respect to the 
direct signal. 
In this chapter, both direct and echo signals are assumed to be affected by the same 
atmospheric perturbations. Indeed, at the local scale of the airport, it can be considered that the 
scattered signals are affected by the same ionospheric and tropospheric effects. In addition, it is 
assumed that the direct signal and the echo signals are not affected by interference. Multipath 
perturbations and other perturbations can thus be treated separately. The rest of this chapter 
focuses on the propagation channel modelling in the presence of multipath perturbations only. 
The parameters of the propagation channel can be predicted based on three types of models 
[Chen et al., 2010] that are described as follows: 
- The deterministic models use electromagnetic multipath prediction methods and require a 
description of the 3D scene to predict multipath parameters [Ercek et al., 2005] [Chen et 
al., 2009]. 
- The statistical models estimate the channel parameters as random variables by means of a 
statistical description of the environment based on extensive experimental data [Jahn et al., 
1996]. 
- The hybrid deterministic-statistical models are based on both deterministic and 
statistical predictions [Steingaß et al., 2004] [Chen et al., 2010].  
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4.1.4. Receiver antenna 
The receiver antenna induces two effects on the received GNSS signals [Chen, 2010] that are 
described as follows: 
- The receiver antenna introduces a group delay and a phase shift on the GNSS signals. 
- The receiver antenna influences the power of the received GNSS signals and introduces 
polarization losses due to polarization mismatch between the receiver antenna and the 
incoming GNSS EM waves. 
GNSS receiver antennas are not isotropic. This implies a variation of the induced group delay 
and phase shift as a function of the angle of arrival of the incoming GNSS EM waves. This 
variation may lead to errors on the GNSS measurements, as detailed in Section 3.2.1.8.1. The 
power of the received signals and the polarization losses also depend on the angle of arrival of 
the incoming GNSS EM waves. For example, signals coming from the ground are strongly 
attenuated by the antenna pattern. The group delay, the phase shift, and the power distortions 
induced by the GNSS receiver antennas also depend on the frequency of the received signal. 
The variations of the induced group delay and phase shift as a function of the frequency are 
further detailed in [Murphy et al., 2007]. 
From Chapter 3, this Ph.D. thesis assumes that the GNSS receiver will use GNSS signals on 
both L1 and L5 frequency bands to estimate the GNSS airborne antenna position. Hence, the 
GNSS receiver antenna is assumed to be a dual-band L1+L5 antenna. Dual-band antennas are 
generally represented by their antenna gain pattern or by their effective height on both L1 and 
L5 frequency bands. For the L1 frequency band, the antenna gain and effective height 
representations are detailed and compared in [Chen, 2010]. Since the effective height 
representation allows taking into account the impact of the antenna on the carrier phase of the 
received GNSS signal, this representation is chosen in this thesis.  
4.1.5. Transfer function of the transmission channel 
The received GNSS signal can be modelled as a number multipath, each of them presenting 
an attenuation, a phase rotation, and a code delay. The transmission channel can thus be 
represented like a linear filter [Pagani et al., 2008] characterized by a transfer function. Three 
techniques can be used to compute the transfer function of the transmission channel [Chen, 
2010].  
4.1.5.1. Narrowband model 
The narrowband model is based on assumptions on the mathematical expression of the 
transfer function. Narrowband transmission channel models consider that the transfer function 
is constant over the channel bandwidth. Both baseband impulse response and frequency 
responses related to the narrowband transmission channel models are given by Eq -  4-1. Both 
models apply to GNSS signals that are converted to baseband.  
 
 ( )    (   )    
 ( )              
Eq -  4-1 
 
 
where: 
   is the attenuation of the signal at the receiver antenna output, 
   is the Dirac distribution, 
   is the code delay of the signal at the receiver antenna output, 
   is the phase shift of the signal at the receiver antenna output. 
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The narrowband models do not differentiate the direct signal to the echo signals since the 
excess code delay and phase diversity of multipath are neglected in the impulse response and 
frequency response related to the narrowband transmission channel models. The narrowband 
models only take into account the amplitude attenuation induced by the multipath, that is to 
say the fading effect induced by multipath.  
Narrowband models imply that the channel is sufficiently narrow so that its response can be 
considered as constant across the channel bandwidth. GNSS signals are characterized by 
relatively wide bandwidth, that is to say of few MHz up to few dozens of MHz [Parkinson et 
al., 1996]. The frequency response of the multipath transmission channel cannot be 
considered to be constant over the channel bandwidth. The narrowband models are not 
adapted to represent the multipath transmission channel for GNSS signals, and they are thus 
not adapted to predict GNSS multipath errors. 
4.1.5.2. Wideband model  
The wideband model is based on assumptions on the mathematical expression of the transfer 
function. Wideband models consider that the direct signal and each echo signal are affected 
by their own attenuation, phase rotation and code delay over the frequency band. The channel 
impulse response is characterized by the presence of multiple paths which code delays are 
spread over a time delay range [Chen, 2010]. Both baseband impulse response and frequency 
responses related to the wideband transmission channel models are, respectively: 
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Eq -  4-2 
 
 
where:  
   is the number of multipath, 
    
  
  
 is the ratio between the amplitude    of the  
   multipath at the receiver antenna 
output and the amplitude   .    is the amplitude of the signal at the receiver antenna 
output that would have been obtained if no multipath sources would be present in the 
scene, 
   is the Dirac distribution, 
    is the code delay of the  
   multipath at the receiver antenna output. For the direct 
signal,    is denoted as    and is the geometric delay between the satellite and the GNSS 
receiver antenna. 
      is the Doppler-shift of the  
   multipath at the receiver antenna output, 
    is the phase shift of the  
   multipath at the receiver antenna output. 
4.1.5.3. Exact model  
In the absence of assumption on the mathematical expression of the transfer function, the 
exact channel model technique requires computing the frequency response of the channel on 
the whole spectrum of each GNSS signal. Chen [Chen, 2010] has demonstrated that both 
exact and wideband models lead to similar transfer functions. Since the exact model 
development is time-consuming, the wideband transmission channel model is adopted.  
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4.1.5.4. Received signal  
The expression of the GNSS signals broadcast by a satellite   at time t is given by Eq -  3-1. 
Omitting index  , and using the baseband impulse response of the wideband model from Eq -  
4-2, the total L1+L5 received signal at the receiver antenna output in the absence of noise is 
modeled as: 
 
  ( )        ( )         ( )        ( )         ( ) Eq -  4-3 
 
where: 
       ( ) and       ( ) are the data components on the L1 and L5 frequency bands, 
respectively, 
        ( ) and        ( ) are the pilot components on the L1 and L5 frequency bands, 
respectively. 
The rest of this chapter focuses on the impact of multipath on the GNSS receiver with a special 
attention on the impact of multipath on the DLL code delay estimate. Since the L1C, L5, E1 
and E5a signals have a data and a pilot channel, several DLL architectures exist. Among the 
tracking options, some use only the data or the pilot component, and other use both channels. 
Both approaches are further discussed in [Bastide, 2004]. It is shown that the absence of 
navigation data on the pilot component allows integrating longer. Tracking the pilot 
component leads to reduce the noise at the correlator output and to lower the tracking 
threshold. Hence, this tracking option is retained in the following and the DLL is assumed to 
use only the pilot components to estimate the code delay. For this reason, it is chosen to 
develop the expression of the received pilot components  ( )       and  ( )       in this 
paragraph: 
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Eq -  4-4 
 
where: 
 The indexes    and    indicates multipath parameters on the L1 and L5 frequency bands, 
respectively, 
      ( ) and      ( ) are the pilot waveforms on the L1 and L5 signals, respectively, 
                since the code delay of the  
   multipath is independent of the frequency 
band. 
4.1.6. Multipath parameters definition and computation 
From Section 4.1.5, each multipath   is characterized by four multipath parameters 
(             ) at the GNSS receiver antenna output. The amplitude    and the phase    
depend on the characteristics of both the propagation channel and the receiver antenna. They 
can be computed as in [Chen, 2010]: 
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where: 
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       is the unit vector of direction of arrival for the  
   multipath. 
    (     )  and    (     )are the electric fields of the  
   multipath on the L1 and L5 
frequency bands, respectively.  
    (     ) and    (     ) are the vectorial effective heights of the GNSS receiver antenna on 
the L1 and L5 frequency bands, respectively.  
    is the open-circuit voltage at the output of the antenna obtained for an ideal 
configuration in which the antenna is perfect and the scene is empty. 
The code delay    and the Doppler-shift       depend on the characteristics of the propagation 
channel. Assuming a stationary satellite and a stationary 3D scene,      is: 
 
        
   
 
                 
   
 
     
Eq -  4-6 
 
 
where: 
   is the speed of light in vacuum, 
      is given by              , 
   is the receiver speed vector. 
The multipath ranging error simulator presented in Section 5.1 has been developed in the 
framework of an Airbus-ENAC PhD thesis [Chen, 2010]. This software allows computing 
the multipath parameters presented in this section in a given 3D scene. Each illuminated facet 
of the 3D scene generates a multipath. In order to reduce the computation load and the 
number of multipath that can become important in case of a complex 3D scene, adjacent 
multipath in terms of delay are grouped in the simulator and multipath parameters are 
computed for each group of multipath. The multipath reduction process is further detailed in 
[Chen, 2010]. This process is used in the rest of this thesis.  
 
4.2. GNSS receiver  
Section 4.1 provides the expression of the GNSS signal at the GNSS receiver antenna output 
in the presence of multipath. The GNSS signal is then processed by the GNSS Radio-
Frequency (RF) front-end and by the Intermediate-Frequency (IF) signal processing block of 
the GNSS receiver. This processing allows providing both phase and code delay estimates of 
the received GNSS signal. This section presents the operation of the front-end and of the IF 
signal processing block for only one satellite signal.  
4.2.1. GNSS receiver architecture 
A generic GNSS receiver block diagram is provided in Figure 4-2.   
The signal parameters estimation is performed by the RF front-end and by the IF signal 
processing blocks. A brief overview of the RF front-end is provided in the next section. 
Further details on the front-end processing are given in [Kaplan et al., 2006]. 
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Figure 4-2: GNSS receiver architecture 
4.2.2. Radio-Frequency front-end 
The RF front end allows: 
- Amplifying the signal by means of Low Noise Amplifier (LNA) and input filters. 
- Down-converting the signal to the IF. The down-conversion is performed by mixing the 
incoming signal with a local carrier and by low-pass filtering the result. The local carrier is 
generated using a reference oscillator by a frequency synthesizer. 
- Pass-band filtering the IF signal. This filtering allows extracting the frequency band of 
interest. The bandwidth of the IF filter is denoted as     in the following.  
- Sampling and quantifying the IF signal.  
Omitting the noise term, the expression of the pilot component of the GNSS signal after 
amplification, down-conversion, sampling and quantization on L1 and L5 frequency bands are 
given by Eq -  4-7. Note that, in this equation, the time    represents the sampled time. For 
sake of clarity, the notation   is kept to designate the sampled time.  
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Eq -  4-7 
 
 
where: 
        and        are the intermediate frequencies of the L1 and L5 GNSS signals, 
respectively. 
An overview of the IF processing block is provided in the next section. 
4.2.3. Intermediate frequency processing 
4.2.3.1. Acquisition block 
The IF signal is firstly processed by the acquisition block, also called the correlator block, in 
the IF processing block. The goals of the acquisition stage are to decide either the presence or 
the absence of a GNSS signal and to provide a rough estimation of the propagation time and 
the Doppler frequency of the incoming signal. Different acquisition strategies specific to civil 
aviation applications are proposed in the literature [RTCA, 2008].  
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4.2.3.2. Tracking blocks 
The signal tracking block refines the estimation of the code delay and Doppler frequency. It 
also estimates the carrier phase. By maintaining continuously updated estimates of the signals 
parameters, the signal tracking block provides a dynamic estimation of these parameters. Two 
separate locked loops are used. 
- The DLL aims to precisely estimate the code delay and its changes over time. 
- The Phase Locked Loop (PLL) aims to precisely estimate the Doppler frequency and the 
carrier phase and their changes over time.  
It will be further explained in chapter 6 of this thesis that only raw code pseudo-range 
measurements are used to estimate the aircraft position. Indeed, the smoothing of the code 
measurements by the carrier phase measurements is not considered in the framework of this 
thesis. Hence, this chapter focuses on the multipath error on the code pseudo-range 
measurements. From Figure 4-2, the multipath phase tracking error induces an error on the 
code tracking estimate. However, the phase tracking error is small with respect to the code 
tracking error [Kaplan et al., 2006]. For this reason, in the analytical expressions of the 
multipath code tracking error proposed in this chapter, the effect of the phase tracking error 
on the code delay estimate is neglected. In the GNSS receiver simulator presented in Chapter 
5 and used to derive the multipath error mode, the phase tracking error is taken into account. 
An overview of the DLL is provided herein. Further details on the PLL are given in [Kaplan 
et al., 2006]. 
A DLL is a feedback system that is able to track the delay of a GNSS signal. DLL is able to 
synchronize its own local code replica with the incoming code signal, so that code delay 
estimate can be derived from estimate of the local code. Figure 4-3 depicts the general 
structure of the DLL. The DLL processing architecture is the same for both L1 and L5 GNSS 
signals. Hence, the expressions of the code replicas, carrier replicas, correlator outputs and 
discriminator outputs presented in this section can be applied to both L1 and L5 GNSS 
signals. In the next Figure,  ̂  is the Doppler-shift estimated by the PLL at sampled time   and 
 ̂ is the carrier phase estimated by the PLL at the sampled time  . 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: General structure of a DLL 
 
The DLL is an iterative process: at iteration        , the loop updates the code delay 
estimate by adding the code delay estimated by the loop at iteration     and the estimated 
code delay error provided by the loop during iteration  . The code delay estimate at iteration 
  (first iteration) is deduced from the acquisition stage. Several steps are needed to estimate 
the code delay error at iteration   and are presented in the following. 
CHAPTER 4: Impact of multipath on GNSS measurements  
 
69 
 
The pilot component of the incoming GNSS signal is multiplied by the in-phase and the 
quadrature-phase components of a local carrier in order to convert the incoming signal to 
baseband. In this document, the DLL architecture only uses the pilot component to estimate 
the signal parameters because this architecture is usually used in civil aviation. However, 
some implementations of tracking loops use both data and pilot channels [Muthuraman, 
2010]. The baseband signal is correlated by three copies of a local code replica, each with a 
different delay. At sampled time  , the Early, Prompt and Late copies are: 
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Eq -  4-8 
 
 
where  ̂ is the delay estimated by the DLL during iteration    , 
Integrate and Dump (I&D) filters are used to correlate the local code replica to the in-phase 
and quadrature-phase components of the incoming baseband signal.  In the digital domain, 
this integration is performed by adding together   samples of signals obtained after the 
multiplication with the three local codes. The integration time is denoted as    in this thesis. 
The I&D filter outputs are called “correlator outputs” in the following. They consist in an in-
phase component ( ) and in a quadrature-phase component( ). In order to group both in-
phase and quadrature phase components in a single term, the complex notation (    ) is 
used to represent the correlator outputs.  
Omitting the noise term, and assuming that the code delays    and carrier phases    of the  
   
multipath is considered to be constant during the integration time, the correlator outputs can 
be expressed as [Van Dierendonck et al., 1992]: 
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Eq -  4-9 
 
 
where: 
     ( )is the auto-correlation function of the pilot waveform. 
        ̂ is the code delay error. It is the code delay difference between the code delay 
of the direct signal and the code delay estimated by the DLL at the iteration    . 
           is the code delay difference between the  
   multipath and the direct signal. 
        ̂ is the carrier phase error. It is the carrier phase difference between the phase 
of the direct signal and the phase estimated by the PLL. 
           is the carrier phase difference between the phase of the  
   multipath and 
the phase of the direct signal. 
                 is the Doppler-shift difference between the  
   multipath and the direct 
signal. 
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           ̂  is the Doppler-shift error. It is the Doppler-shift difference between the 
Doppler-shift of the direct signal and the Doppler-shift estimated by the PLL. 
In the absence of echo signals, only the direct signal is tracked by the DLL. The direct signal 
is mentioned by index    . Eq -  4-9 can be simplified as: 
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Eq -  4-10 
 
 
The correlator outputs are processed by the DLL discriminator which aims to extract the code 
delay error   . The discriminator output is a signal that is proportional to the code delay error. 
Different DLL discriminators can be implemented. Their advantages and disadvantages are 
discussed in [Betz et al., 2009] [Kaplan et al., 2006]. The non-coherent EMLP discriminator 
is usually implemented in civil aviation receivers and the discriminator output signal is: 
     (  
    
 )  (  
    
 ) Eq -  4-11 
 
The DLL is locked when: 
                                (  
    
 )  (  
    
 ) Eq -  4-12 
 
The discriminator output signal is processed by the loop filter that aims to reduce the noise 
present at the discriminator output and to respond effectively to the signal dynamic. The loop 
filter is characterized by two parameters: 
- The loop filter order which determines the ability of the loop filter to respond to different 
types of signal dynamics, 
- The loop bandwidth denoted as    in this thesis. It determines the ability of the loop filter 
to reduce the noise present at the discriminator output. 
Finally, the Numerically Controlled Oscillator (NCO) is used to generate the local signal 
replicas. 
4.2.4. GNSS receiver settings 
Table 4-1 presents the GNSS receiver parameter values that are adopted to compute the 
multipath errors in the rest of the chapter. The choice of these values is further justified in 
Section 3.2.1.6. From Figure 4-2, the carrier-aiding technique is used by the code tracking 
loop. A first-order DLL is used in the rest of the thesis. Note that, without carrier-aiding, the 
DLL needs to be at least second-order to accommodate vehicle dynamics. 
GNSS signal     [MHz]    [ms]   [chip]    [Hz] 
DLL loop filter 
order 
GPSL1C-Q 14 20 1/12 1 1 
GPSL5-Q 20 20 1/4 1 1 
GalileoE1-C  14 20 1/12 1 1 
GalileoE5a-Q  20 20 1/4 1 1 
 
Table 4-1: GNSS receiver parameters setting 
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4.3. Impact of multipath on GNSS code pseudo-range 
measurements 
This section assesses the impact of multipath on the code delay estimation and on GNSS code 
pseudo-range measurements. 
4.3.1. Impact of multipath on the code delay estimate 
In order to understand the impact of multipath on the code delay estimate error, the case 
where no echo signal affects the received GNSS signal is firstly considered. In the absence of 
multipath, and from Eq -  4-10 and Eq -  4-12, the stability point is achieved when: 
 
|    (   
 
 
)|  |    (   
 
 
)| 
Eq -  4-13 
 
 
The symmetry of auto-correlation function of the pilot code     ( ) with respect to the 
ordinate axis is underlined in Section 3.1.2.2.5. Due to this symmetry, the stability point is 
achieved when     . As an illustration, Figure 4-4 shows the evolution of |    (   
 
 
)| and 
|    (   
 
 
)| as a function of    for GPSL5-P and for            . The stability point 
corresponds to a null error on the code delay estimate.  
 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Normalized correlator outputs for GPSL5 – absence of multipath 
 
In order to understand the impact of multipath on the code delay estimate error, the case 
where the direct signal and a single echo signal are received by the receiver antenna is 
secondly considered. In the following, the direct signal is mentioned by index     and the 
echo signal is mentioned by index    . From Eq -  4-10 and Eq -  4-12, the stability point is 
achieved when: 
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Eq -  4-14 
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As an illustration, Figure 4-5 shows the evolution of |      (   
 
 
)        (       
 
 
)| 
and |      (   
 
 
)        (       
 
 
)| as a function of    for GPSL5-P and for   
         . In this Figure, it is assumed that     ,       ,            ,          , 
         , and it is assumed that the tracking loops perfectly track the phase and the 
Doppler frequency of the direct signal. Hence,          and        . 
 
 
 
Figure 4-5: Normalized correlator outputs for GPSL5 – presence of a single echo signal 
 
From the last Figure, in the presence of multipath, correlator outputs are affected by a 
distortion. This distortion depends on the amplitude, code delay and carrier phase of the echo 
signals. Because of this distortion, when the discriminator output is null and the stability point 
is reached, the code delay estimate is affected by an error   .       in Figure 4-5.    is called 
multipath code tracking error in the following.  
4.3.2. Impact of multipath on the code pseudo-range measurements  
4.3.2.1. Raw code multipath ranging error definition 
The DLL code delay estimates are converted to code pseudo-range measurements in the 
GNSS receiver. The multipath code delay error induces an error on the code pseudo-range 
measurements that is called “raw code multipath ranging error” in the following and that is 
given by: 
 
        
 
Eq -  4-15 
 
Three different kinds of raw code multipath ranging errors are distinguished in this thesis. 
- The multipath errors that affect the L1 code pseudo-range measurements. They are denoted  
        and        for the GPSL1C and GalileoE1 signals, respectively. 
- The multipath errors that affect the L5 code pseudo-range measurements. They are denoted  
       and         for GPSL5 and GalileoE5a signals, respectively. 
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- The multipath errors that affect the iono-free L1+L5 code pseudo-range measurements. 
They are denoted            and            for the GPSL1C+GPSL5 and 
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a code pseudo-range measurements, respectively. 
From Section 3.2.1.4.3, the dual-frequency raw code multipath ranging errors are related to 
single-frequency raw code multipath ranging errors as follows: 
 
                                
                                
Eq -  4-16 
 
 
4.3.2.2. Raw code multipath ranging errors in the presence of a single echo signal 
In the case where the direct signal and a single echo signal are received by the receiver 
antenna, the minimal and maximal code tracking errors can be represented by multipath error 
envelopes. Multipath errors envelopes for the GPSL1C, GPSL5, GalileoE1 and GalileoE5a 
are presented in Section 4.3.2.2.1. In addition, the GPSL1C, GPSL5, GalileoE1 and 
GalileoE5a code tracking errors as a function of the amplitude, code delay and phase of the 
echo signal are represented and discussed in Section 4.3.2.2.2.  
4.3.2.2.1. Multipath error envelope  
The minimal and maximal multipath code tracking errors are commonly illustrated by the 
multipath error envelopes that provide the raw code multipath ranging error values as a 
function of the code delay between the direct and the echo signal    . Minimal and maximal 
multipath errors are achieved for       and      , respectively. Multipath error 
envelopes presented in this section have been simulated with the Airbus-ENAC GNSS 
correlator outputs simulator assuming that: 
- The ratio between the direct signal amplitude and a single echo amplitude is      .  
- The tracking loops perfectly track the phase and the Doppler frequency of the direct signal:  
        and        . 
- The satellite, the multipath sources and the receiver are static, meaning that            
        . 
- The DLL discriminator is a EMLP discriminator.  
- The IF filter is a rectangular band-pass filter. 
- The DLL chip spacing and the IF filter bandwidth values are indicated in Table 4-1. 
 
Figure 4-6 represents the multipath errors envelope for GPSL5 and GalileoE5a signals that are 
both BPSK-modulated signals.  
 
 
Figure 4-6 : Multipath errors envelope for GPSL5 and GalileoE5a signals 
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The analytical expressions of the maximal and minimal multipath errors for an unlimited IF 
filter bandwidth are indicated in the Figure and are    
 
 
 [Macabiau, 2004].  The maximal 
multipath error is reached when     (   )
 
 
  for an unlimited IF filter bandwidth.  
Section 3.1.2.2.5 underlines the differences in the autocorrelation function of the pilot 
waveform     (  ) for the L5 and the L1 signals. Due to these differences, the error envelopes 
for the L5 signals are different than the multipath error envelopes obtained for GPSL1C and 
GalileoE1 signals. Figure 4-7 represents the multipath errors envelope for GPSL1C and 
GalileoE1 signals.  
 
 
Figure 4-7 : Multipath errors envelope for GPSL1C and GalileoE1 signals 
 
The high similarities in the shape of the autocorrelation function of the pilot waveform 
between GPSL1C and GalileoE1 is underlined in Section 3.1.2.2.5. These similarities explain 
the high correlation between the multipath error envelopes of both GPSL1C and GalileoE1 
signals. The deviation between both errors envelope tends to increase with    . At low     
values, that is to say for     
  
 
, the deviation is not significant since the CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) 
and TMBOC(6,1,4/33) autocorrelation functions are quasi-identic around the correlation 
peak. At high     the maximal difference between both errors envelopes is 73cm, when the 
GalileoE1 error is roughly 80cm.   
For GPSL1C, GPSL5, GalileoE1 and GalileoE5a signals, the maximal amplitude of the 
multipath errors depend on the relative amplitude of the echo signal. The maximal error for 
GPSL1C and GalileoE1 is roughly twice the maximal error for GPSL5 and GalileoE5a given 
the relative amplitude of the echo signal       and given the chip spacing values indicated 
in Table 4-1. Multipath characterized by a relative code delay     higher than    
 
 
  are 
filtered out by the receiver [Kaplan et al., 2006] and their impact on the raw code multipath 
ranging error is considered to be negligible. In the ranging domain, this means that when the 
difference between the distance travelled by an echo signal and by the direct signal is higher 
than 329.7m for L1 signals, the echo signal has a no influence on the L1 multipath error. 
Similarly, when the difference is higher than 33.0m for L5 signals, the echo signal has a no 
influence on the L5 multipath error.  Hence, compared to GPSL1C and GalileoE1, GPSL5 
and GalileoE5a enable filtering out more multipath than GPSL1C and GalileoE1 signals, 
since all multipath characterized by a relative code delay above 33.0m (in the ranging 
domain) are filtered out by L5 signals.  
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4.3.2.2.2. Multipath error models and representations  
The multipath error values are represented in the previous paragraph for       and 
     . For the case of BPSK-modulated signals, and in the presence of a single echo 
signal, Appendix A, Section A.3, derives the analytical expression of the multipath code 
tracking error as a function of the relative amplitude  , of the relative code delay     and of 
the relative carrier phase     of the echo signal under the following assumptions: 
- The tracking loops perfectly track the phase and the Doppler frequency of the direct signal: 
        and        . 
- The satellite, the multipath sources and the receiver are static, meaning that            
        . 
- The front-end filtering effects on the Early and Late correlator outputs are not taken into 
account, or, equivalently, the front-end low-pass filter is assumed to have an infinite 
bandwidth, 
- the DLL discriminator is a EMLP discriminator. 
- The relative code delay     is below (   )
 
 
. 
The multipath code tracking error can be expressed as: 
 
         
       (   )
          (   )
 
 
Eq -  4-17 
 
 
Assuming a stationary satellite, a stationary 3D scene and a stationary GNSS receiver 
antenna: 
 
                  
 
Eq -  4-18 
 
where     is the phase shift difference between the phase shift of the first echo signal and the 
phase shift of the direct signal. 
Figure 4-8 represents the evolution of the code tracking errors on L5 and E5a given by Eq – 
4-17 as a function of     for different values of   and for          . If a different value of 
    is taken to represent the evolution of the errors, the error shape would remain similar, but 
the position of the peaks along the     axis would change. The error envelope presented in 
Figure 4-6 for       is also represented in Figure 4-8.  
 
Figure 4-8 : Multipath code tracking errors for GPSL5 and GalileoE5a signals  
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From Figure 4-8, the code tracking errors present high variations along the     axis.  The 
period of the oscillations is  
   
. Indeed, from Eq -  4-18, if the difference between the relative 
code delays      of two multipath is 
 
   
, both multipath have the same relative carrier phase 
   . In addition, the amplitude of the oscillations of the raw code multipath ranging errors is 
proportional to the relative amplitude  .  
Due to the complexity of the autocorrelation function of the CBOC(6,1,1/11,-) and 
TMBOC(6,1,4/33) waveforms, the related analytical expressions of  the raw code multipath 
ranging error is not provided in this thesis. However, multipath errors have been simulated 
with the ENAC GNSS correlator outputs simulator assuming: 
- The tracking loops perfectly track the phase and the Doppler frequency of the direct signal: 
        and        . 
- The satellite, the multipath sources and the receiver are static, meaning that            
        . 
- The DLL discriminator is a EMLP discriminator.  
- The DLL chip spacing and the IF filter bandwidth values are indicated in Table 4-1. 
-                  . 
Figure 4-9 represents the evolution of the simulated code tracking errors on L1C and E1 as a 
function of     for different values of   and for          . The error envelopes presented 
in Figure 4-7 for       and for GPSL1C and GalileoE1 is also represented in Figure 4-9.  
For the same reasons as for the L5 signals, the period of the oscillations is  
   
. In addition, the 
amplitude of the oscillations of the errors is proportional to the relative amplitude  . Finally, 
since the values of      are low with respect to the chip period in Figure 4-9, the difference 
between the GPSL1C and GalileoE1 multipath errors is not significant. Further details about 
the difference between the GPSL1C and GalileoE1 multipath errors are provided in Section 
4.3.2.2.1.  
 
 
Figure 4-9: Multipath code tracking errors for GPSL1C and GalileoE1 signals as a 
function of the relative code delay 
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4.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has reviewed the definition of the transmission channel. The transfer function of 
the transmission channel can be represented by different models. In the presence of multipath 
perturbations, the wideband model has been adopted to represent the transmission channel 
transfer function.  Based on this transfer function, the received GNSS signal at the receiver 
antenna output has been modelled as the sum of the direct signal and of the echo signals. The 
presence of the echo signals in the expression of the total received signal induces code delay 
estimate errors and raw code multipath ranging errors. Three kinds of parameters influence 
the raw code ranging errors: the parameters of the GNSS signals, the parameters of the GNSS 
receiver and the multipath parameters. The influence of the multipath parameters on the raw 
code multipath ranging error values has been discussed. The analytical expression of the 
GPSL5 and GalileoE5a multipath code tracking errors as a function of the multipath 
parameters has been established.  
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  CHAPTER 5 
5. GNSS multipath ranging error 
models  
 
 
As explained in Section 3.2.3, there is a need to develop a GNSS integrity monitoring system 
capable of protecting users from the effects of multipath in airport environments. The design 
of such a system requires modelling the impact of multipath on the GNSS pseudo-range 
measurements and on the GNSS-based position estimate. 
This chapter analyzes the shape of multipath errors that may affect GNSS raw code pseudo-
range measurements during the taxi operation. From Chapter 2, the taxi operation includes 
three sub-phases: the taxi on the taxiway, the taxi on the apron taxiway and the taxi on the taxi 
lane.  Based on an error shape analysis, GNSS raw code ranging error models adapted to 
surface operations are proposed for the taxi sub-phases. Parameters influencing the error 
models are identified. In order to illustrate the multipath error shapes and the multipath error 
models, simulation results are presented based on a simple 3D modeling of Toulouse Blagnac 
airport, France. Nevertheless, the way to model raw code multipath ranging errors proposed in 
this chapter could be used for any airport. 
This chapter is organized as follows. The GNSS multipath error generator used to analyze the 
multipath errors and to develop the multipath ranging error models is presented in Section 5.1. 
The assumptions made to simulate the multipath errors are discussed. The simulation scenario 
is presented in Section 5.2. Next, both static and dynamic configurations are defined in 
Section 5.3. Finally, the error models in both static and dynamic configurations are derived 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5. The values of the error model outputs are discussed.  
5.1. GNSS multipath ranging error computation 
5.1.1. GNSS multipath ranging error simulator architecture 
In this chapter, GNSS multipath raw code ranging errors are computed by means of a 
prediction simulator that estimates the GNSS multipath ranging errors in an airport 
environment in a deterministic way. This simulator has been mainly developed in the 
framework of a previous ENAC-Airbus PhD thesis and is fully described in [Chen et al., 
2009].  
Figure 5-1 presents the architecture of the simulator.  
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Figure 5-1 : Architecture of the deterministic GNSS multipath ranging error simulator 
 
The EM fields associated with the direct signal and with each echo signal arriving at the 
GNSS receiver antenna input are predicted by the EM field generator. This prediction uses 
Physical Optics (PO) method, Geometrical Optics (GO) and an adaptation of the generalized 
image theorem to take into account a dielectric ground. It computes the scattered EM field at 
the GNSS receiver input. The EM field prediction is fully described in [Chen et al., 2009]. 
The simulator can compute multiple interactions up to order 2 for metallic and dielectric 
multilayer facets. When modeled as dielectric, a facet is modeled as a multilayer slab of 
constant thickness. Each layer is characterized by its thickness and its dielectric coefficient. 
The first and second order interactions are presented in Section 5.1.3.  
The input parameters of the EM field generator are the GNSS satellite position, a 3D 
modeling of the airport environment and the GNSS receiver antenna positions. These input 
parameters and the computed EM fields are used by the multipath generator to predict the 
transmission channel parameters, that are the multipath parameters presented in Section 4.1.6. 
The multipath parameters prediction depends on the GNSS receiver antenna model 
implemented in the software. It is underlined in Section 5.5 that the multipath parameters 
present small scale variations in the space domain. The variations are of the order of the 
wavelength of the GNSS signals, that is to say of the order of     . Hence, due to the 
Shannon criterion, the maximal possible spatial sampling period is     . Assuming an 
aircraft speed of        , the maximal time sampling period is     , leading to a minimal 
sampling period of        In this Chapter, it is chosen to compute the multipath parameters 
with a temporal sampling period of    , leading to a sampling frequency of      . The 
multipath parameters are then processed by the GNSS receiver simulator that predicts the raw 
code multipath ranging errors for the GPSL1C, GalileoE1, GPSL5, GalileoE5a and dual-
frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 and GalileoE1+GalileoE5a measurements. The multipath error 
prediction depends on the GNSS receiver settings implemented in the software. 
The following section presents the main input parameters that have been used to present the 
simulation results proposed in this chapter, that are the GNSS satellite position, the 3D model 
of the airport environment, the GNSS receiver antenna model and the GNSS receiver settings.  
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5.1.2. Input parameters of the GNSS multipath ranging error simulator  
5.1.2.1. GNSS satellite position 
Table 2-5 reveals that the mean duration of the taxi on the taxiway, the taxi on the apron 
taxiway and the taxi on the taxi lane sub-phases is between 90 seconds and 360 seconds. The 
taxi operation duration is thus up to few minutes. The angular variation of the elevation and 
azimuth angles of the GNSS satellite is few tenths of degrees during trajectories of few 
minutes. These angular variations are not significant and the satellite is assumed to be 
stationary during the taxi operation. The stationary position of the GNSS satellite is an input 
parameter of the software. 
5.1.2.2. 3D model of the airport environment 
The simulator presented in Section 5.1.1 is designed to predict the multipath errors affecting 
the GNSS receiver of an aircraft A319. In order to clearly distinguish this A319 aircraft to 
other aircraft potentially present in the airport environment, the A319 aircraft is called the 
“assessed aircraft” and the other aircraft are named as “surrounding aircraft” in the following. 
The elements of the airport environment that may have an impact on the multipath errors are 
called “multipath sources” and can be classified into three types of elements: 
- The structure of the A319 assessed aircraft itself, including its fuselage, wings and 
empennage, 
- The airport surface, also called ground in the following, 
- The obstacles that are defined as any element of the airport environment other than the 
airport surface and the A319 assessed aircraft structure. Obstacles can be classified as 
follows: 
 Fixed obstacles that mainly include terminal buildings, terminal gates and warning 
signs, 
 Mobile obstacles that mainly include surrounding aircraft, buses, cars, trucks, 
footbridges and containers. 
The model of each type of multipath sources is described in the three next sections. 
5.1.2.2.1. Structure of the assessed aircraft 
The structure of the assessed aircraft induces echo signals characterized by relative code 
delays     of roughly              [Steingass et al., 2004].   represents the index of the 
echo signal. Hence, for GPSL1C and GalileoE1 signals, we get: 
 
                
                                           
                
                                           
 
Eq -  5-1 
 
The aircraft structure is not a significant source of multipath. As an example, Macabiau in 
[Macabiau et al., 2006] shows that the multipath ranging errors during the approach phase is 
essentially induced by the structure of the assessed aircraft. The standard deviation of this 
error has been obtained by combining the statistical multipath propagation channel model 
called the High Resolution Aeronautical channel and described in [Steingaß et al., 2004] with 
a GNSS receiver simulator. Regardless of the elevation angle, the standard deviation of the 
raw (unsmoothed) multipath code tracking error is several centimeters up to a few decimeters 
for the GPSL1C, the GalileoE1 BOC(1,1), the GPSL5 and the GalileoE5a signals.  
The excess code delays of the echo signals are non-significant with respect to the chip period 
of the GNSS signals. The transmission channel model does not take into account the excess 
code delays of the multipath from the structure of the assessed aircraft. It only takes into 
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account the amplitude attenuation induced by the multipath from the structure of the assessed 
aircraft, that is the fading effect induced by these multipath. The assessed aircraft structure is 
not modelled in the 3D airport environment model. However, the aircraft structure is 
integrated in the model of the GNSS receiver antenna, as detailed in Section 5.1.2.3. 
5.1.2.2.2. Airport surface 
The airport surface is supposed to be flat, flawless and homogeneous at the scale of the 
airport. The airport surface is assumed to be dry tar. Dry tar is characterized by a permittivity 
of         in the L1 and L5 frequency bands [Von Hippel, 1961]. The imaginary part of the 
permittivity represents losses. Concrete has a similar permittivity as dry tar. Lawn or metallic 
parts of the airport surface are also represented by dry tar. In addition, the airport surface can 
be considered as an infinite plane if the airport surface can be considered to be flat over few 
hundreds of meters. This hypothesis is valid for most of the airports, including Toulouse 
Blagnac airport. It is considered that Toulouse Blagnac airport surface can be represented by 
an infinite plane.  
5.1.2.2.3. Obstacles 
5.1.2.2.3.1. Fixed obstacles 
 
Figure 5-2 is a representation of the 3D modeling of the terminal buildings and terminal gates 
of Toulouse Blagnac airport. The positions of the terminal buildings and terminal gates are 
expressed in the direct and orthogonal reference frame (       ). The horizontal plane 
(     ) represents the airport surface. The   axis is the local vertical vector pointing 
upwards.   is the center of the semi cylinder that represents Blagnac airport Hall D. The 
A319 assessed aircraft is also represented in Figure 5-2. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-2: 3D modeling of the terminal buildings and terminal gates of Toulouse 
Blagnac airport, France  
 
Let’s denote           the positions of the airborne antenna, of the satellite antenna and of 
the center of a facade in (       ), respectively. Let’s denote    the position of the projection 
of point   in the horizontal horizontal plane (     ).    is expressed in (       ). The 
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following angles are presented in Figure 5-2. The satellite elevation angle     is the angle 
between the vector     and the vector  .   
- The azimuth angle       is the angle between the    axis and the vector   . 
- The aircraft azimuth angle       is the angle between the vector parallel to the aircraft 
centerline pointing towards the aircraft nose and the vector    . 
- The facade azimuth angle        (defined for plane facades only) is the angle between the 
normal vector of the facade and pointing towards the exterior of the façade and the vector 
   . 
Blagnac airport consists in four different halls called Hall A to Hall D. Each hall is made of 
concrete (brown facets), glass (blue facets) or/and metallic (grey facets) rectangular facades. 
The assumed dielectric permittivity and thickness of concrete and glass walls are provided in 
Table 5-1. The imaginary part of the relative permittivity represents losses. The assumed 
permittivity and thickness of concrete facades correspond to realistic values that typically 
represent the permittivity and thickness of hardened concrete walls [Von Hippel, 1961]. The 
assumed permittivity and thickness of glass walls also correspond to realistic values.  
 
Material Assumed permittivity in the L1 
and L5 frequency bands 
Assumed thickness 
Concrete               
Glass              
 
Table 5-1: Assumed characteristics of the concrete and glass facades 
 
In addition, the terminal and gate façades of each hall are represented by simple 3D modeling. 
More specifically, five types of simplifications have been done when designing the 3D 
modeling of the terminal buildings and terminal gates of the airport. 
- Simplification 1: Details characterized by a size below the wavelength, are not 
represented. Amongst these details there are: 
 Bricks 
 Windows frames 
 Metallic armatures on the glass walls characterized by a width of a few centimeters. 
Glass facades with such metallic armatures are represented by homogeneous and 
flawless glass facades.  
 Glass horizontal sticks on metallic walls (such as for the metallic façade of Hall C of 
Toulouse Blagnac airport) characterized by a width of a few centimeters. Metallic 
facades with such glass parts are represented by homogeneous and flawless metallic 
facades. 
- Simplification 2: Sub-meter level concrete details on concrete walls such as concrete 
overhangs and recesses on are not represented. 
- Simplification 3: The roughness of the building and gate walls, that are the millimeter to 
centimeter level asperities on the walls (such as small asperities on rendering) are not 
represented. 
- Simplification 4: the GNSS multipath errors are computed by only considering the EM 
field reflected over the ground and scattered by the facades of the airport buildings and 
gates.  The EM field that penetrates in the buildings and gates, that is scattered by obstacles 
in buildings such as walls, and that reaches the GNSS airborne antenna, is not considered 
in the multipath error computation. Hence, the interior parts of the buildings and gates are 
not represented. 
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- Simplification 5: The dielectric permittivity and thickness of concrete and glass walls are 
constant in the airport.  
The impact of simplifications 1 and 2 on the multipath ranging error models and the validity 
of these simplifications will be further discussed in Appendix B, Section B.1. The analysis of 
the validity of simplifications 3 to 5 for the derivation of the multipath error models presented 
in this Chapter remains as future work.  
Other fixed obstacles at Toulouse Blagnac airport environment are small-size (sub-meter 
level) obstacles such as panels. Isolated small-size obstacles induce ranging errors that are 
negligible with respect to larger objects (meter level) since [Chen, 2010] has shown that the 
power scattered by small objects is negligible compared to the power scattered by larger 
objects. Hence, fixed sub-meter level obstacles are not represented in the 3D model of 
Toulouse Blagnac airport environment. 
5.1.2.2.3.2. Mobile obstacles 
The presence of some mobile obstacles in the scene, such as parked surrounding aircraft, may 
considerably influence the magnitude of the GNSS multipath ranging errors [Chen, 2010]. 
However, this Ph.D. remains a first step in the development of a multipath threat model 
adapted to surface operations. It appears to be judicious in a first step to develop multipath 
error models in the presence of fixed obstacles only. For this reason, mobile obstacles are thus 
not represented in the 3D modeling of the airport environment. It can be proposed in a second 
step to develop models of prediction of the positions of the mobile obstacles in a specific 
airport environment. These position models could be used to develop multipath error models 
that are valid in the presence of both fixed and mobile obstacles.  
5.1.2.3. GNSS receiver antenna  
In the simulations, the GNSS receiver antenna is mounted on a A319 aircraft. In Section 
5.1.2.2.1, it is explained that the structure of the assessed A319 aircraft is not a significant 
source of multipath. However, the presence of this aircraft structure impacts the GNSS 
receiver antenna pattern. For this reason, the model of the airborne antenna integrates the 
presence of the structure of the A319 assessed aircraft. Right and left circular polarization 
gains have been measured on the L1 frequency band by Airbus on a GPS antenna mounted on 
a model of a A319 aircraft. The data have been interpolated in the framework of a previous 
Ph.D. thesis [Chen, 2010] on a grid of 5 degrees in azimuth and elevation. The antenna gain 
pattern in both RHCP and Left Hand Circular Polarization (LHCP) is provided in Figure 5-3 
on a grid of 5 degrees in azimuth and elevation.  
 
 
 
 RHCP gain pattern [dB] LHCP gain pattern [dB] 
 
Figure 5-3: 3D L1 gain pattern of the GPS antenna mounted on a A319 aircraft [Chen, 
2010] 
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The interpolated RHCP and LHCP gains are plotted in Figure 5-4 when the signal arrives 
orthogonally to the aircraft fuselage and for different elevation angles. In this Figure, 0° 
corresponds to zenith and 180° corresponds to the ground direction. 
 
 
Figure 5-4: 2D L1 gain pattern of the GPS antenna mounted on a A319 aircraft 
 
The radiation pattern is designed to reject the impact of signals coming from the ground and is 
oriented towards the sky.  
In this thesis, the antenna gains, initially measured on an A319 model for the L1 frequency 
band, have been used for both L1 and L5 GPS and Galileo signals. Indeed, the gain patterns 
of the future dual-band L1+L5 antennas that will be used in civil aviation are not currently 
publically known. In addition, it is expected that the difference between the gain patterns on 
the L1 and L5 frequency bands will not be significant for three reasons. Firstly, both L1 and 
L5 antennas will be located at the same position on the aircraft fuselage. Secondly, both L1 
and L5 frequency bands are closed. Thirdly, the same type of antenna (patch antennas) will be 
used to design both L1 and L5 frequency band antennas.  
The antenna model does not take into account the group delays and phase delays induced by 
the antenna and by the multipath from the structure of the assessed A319 aircraft. The design 
of an antenna model that takes into account these delays remains as future work. 
5.1.2.4. GNSS receiver settings  
The GNSS receiver settings are discussed and provided in Section 4.2.4. 
5.1.3. First and second-order interactions 
The simulator can compute multiple interactions up to order 2 for metallic and dielectric 
multilayer facets. Indeed, [Chen, 2010] has shown that the prediction of the interactions with 
the scene up to order 2 is sufficient to predict the multipath ranging errors. First-order 
interactions are classified as follows: 
- Ground first-order reflections correspond to the field coming from the satellite, reflected 
by the airport surface and reaching the antenna.  
- Obstacle first-order interactions correspond to the field coming from the satellite, 
scattered by an obstacle and reaching the antenna.  
Second-order interactions are classified as follows: 
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- Ground/obstacle second-order interactions correspond to the field coming from the 
satellite, reflected by the ground, then scattered by an obstacle, and finally reaching the 
antenna. 
- Obstacle/Ground second-order interactions correspond to the field coming from the 
satellite, scattered by an obstacle, then reflected by the ground, and finally reaching the 
antenna. 
- Obstacle/Obstacle second-order interactions correspond to the field coming from the 
satellite, scattered by an obstacle, then scattered by another obstacle, and finally reaching 
the antenna. 
First and second-order interactions that include the assessed aircraft structure (such as 
obstacle/aircraft interactions) are partially taken into account in the software since the impact 
of the multipath from the aircraft structure is included in the radiation pattern of the GNSS 
receiver antenna. The excess code delays and phase shifts that affect the multipath scattered 
by the structure of the assessed aircraft structure are not taken into account.  
5.1.4. Limitations 
This section summarizes the main assumptions that have been made when computing the 
multipath errors in the airport environment by means of the simulator described in Section 
5.1.1. The assumptions can be classified into three categories that are listed below. 
- The first category includes assumptions that have been demonstrated as being valid. 
Among these assumptions, the GNSS satellites are considered to be stationary. Isolated 
obstacles of size below 80cm are not represented in the 3D modeling of the airport 
environment.  
- The second category includes the simulation assumptions that have been made in the 
simulations presented in this chapter: 
 A simplified 3D modeling of the terminal buildings and terminal gates is implemented.  
 The ground is an infinite plane made of dry tar. 
 The same antenna gain pattern is used to compute both L1 and L5 antenna gains. The 
antenna group delay and phase delay are not included in the antenna model.  
The assumptions are relative to the values of the parameters used in the simulations for the 
computation of the multipath errors. A modification in these assumptions would result in 
changes in the values of the computed errors, but would not modify the way to model 
multipath errors in the airport environment.  
- The third category includes the simplification assumptions. Indeed, this project constitutes 
a first step in the design of a multipath threat model adapted to airport environments. Some 
of the phenomena influencing the multipath ranging errors in the airport environment are 
not treated. More specifically, the impact of mobile obstacles on the multipath error is 
notably not assessed in this thesis. The error models presented in this chapter are valid in 
the absence of mobile obstacles. 
 
5.2. Simulations scenario  
In order to illustrate and analyze the shape of raw code multipath ranging errors in an airport 
environment, the multipath errors that affect the GNSS receiver of the assessed A319 aircraft 
that performs an arrival taxi operation at Toulouse Blagnac airport are considered.  The 
aircraft will follow an assigned path in the airport during the operation, and this path is 
defined in the next section. 
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5.2.1. Low Visibility Procedure path  
Under low visibility conditions, aircraft must follow specific paths from the runway to the 
gates. These paths are referred to as the Low Visibility Procedure (LVP) paths in the 
following. It is assumed that the assessed aircraft must perform an arrival taxi operation under 
low visibility conditions and that the assessed aircraft wants to reach the gate referred to as 
“Arrival gate” in Figure 5-5. From the Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures, it must follow 
the LVP path indicated by red arrows in Figure 5-5 [SIA, 2013]. This path is constituted by 4 
segments, referred to as Segment 1 to 4. 
 
 
Figure 5-5: LVP path at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France 
 
It can be easily demonstrated that, if the difference between the height of the assessed A319 
antenna and the height of a building is above a given threshold      , the obstacle may mask 
the reception of the direct GNSS signal from the satellite, and the GNSS antenna may not 
receive the Line Of Sight (LOS) signal. This is represented in Figure 5-6. 
 
 
Figure 5-6: GNSS receiver antenna height and façade height representation 
 
       is: 
 
          (  )  
 
Eq -  5-2 
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where: 
   is the horizontal distance between the obstacle and the GNSS antenna, 
    is the satellite elevation angle. 
An analysis based on the height of each airport building and on the distance of the antenna to 
each building along the LVP procedure shows that the LOS is always present in the 
considered scenario along segments 1, 2 and 3, even with a satellite elevation as low as   . 
However, when the antenna is on segment 4, on the last 15m of the segment before arriving 
at the gate, the difference between the height of the assessed A319 antenna and the height of 
Hall C is below the threshold       for    in the range [       ]. Hence, on this segment 
portion, and if the satellite azimuth angle       [        ], the antenna may only receive 
Non Line Of Sight (NLOS) signals.  
5.2.2. Aircraft dynamic 
This section presents the typical speed of the assessed aircraft along the LVP path presented 
in the last paragraph. The taxi operation at the arrival can be divided into three sub-phases: the 
taxi on taxiway is performed along segments 1 and 2, taxi on apron taxiway is performed 
along segments 3, and the taxi on taxi lane is performed on segment 4. Each phase is further 
detailed in Chapter 2. The typical aircraft is indicated in Table 5-2..  
 
 Taxi on taxiway 
Segments 1 and 2 
Taxi on apron taxiway 
Segment 3 
Taxi on taxi lane 
Segment 4 
Aircraft speed                              
 
Table 5-2: Taxi speeds [RTCA, 1999] 
 
5.3. Static and dynamic configurations  
5.3.1. Static configuration and steady-state 
The static configuration is defined as the configuration in which the assessed A319 aircraft is 
static in the airport environment. Since only fixed obstacles are considered in the scene, and 
since the GNSS satellite is assumed to be stationary, the transmission channel in the static 
configuration is stationary. The impulse response of the transmission channel is represented in 
Eq -  4-2.  
Let’s analyze the DLL response to the multipath in the static configuration. It is assumed that 
the static GNSS receiver antenna of the assessed aircraft receives a GNSS signal emitted by 
the GNSS stationary satellite. At time     , the received GNSS signal only consists of the 
direct signal. From time      , the received signal is the aggregate of the direct signal and of 
the echo signals scattered by the scene. Simulation parameters are recapped in Table 5-3.   
 
 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite position 
Satellite elevation angle    20° 
Satellite azimuth angle       0° 
GNSS airborne antenna 
position 
Coordinates in (       ) [                ] 
Aircraft azimuth angle           
 
Table 5-3: Simulation parameters used for Figure 5-7  
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Figure 5-7 represents the evolution of the raw code multipath ranging errors in the time 
domain before and after the apparition of the echo signals. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-7: Raw code multipath ranging error in the static configuration 
 
The evolution of the multipath error in the time domain can be viewed as the response of a 
first-order filter to a step input. This is because the DLL order 1 one. Hence, the DLL can be 
viewed as a first-order low-pass filter [Borre et al., 2006]. After the apparition of the echo 
signal, the multipath error converges in the time domain until a time-constant value that is 
referred to as “raw code multipath ranging error in steady-state” in the following. This 
convergence period is called “transient state” and lasts few seconds. This is shown in Table 
5-4 that provides the 99% response time related to the evolution of the raw code multipath 
ranging errors plotted in Figure 5-7.  
 
 GPSL1C GalileoE1 
GPSL5 and 
GalileoE5a 
GPSL1C+ 
GPSL5 
GalileoE1+ 
GalileoE5a 
99% response 
time                               
 
Table 5-4: 99% response time related to the evolution of the raw code multipath ranging 
error  
 
It is also shown in Table 5-4 that the values of the multipath parameters and the modulation 
technique influence the duration of the transient state. This is because the transfer function of 
the DLL discriminator depends on the modulation of the GNSS signal that is processed 
[Julien, 2005] and on the power of the received signal. After the transient state, the multipath 
error remains constant since the multipath parameters are constant. This time interval is called 
“steady-state”. 
5.3.2. Dynamic configuration 
When the assessed aircraft is moving in the airport, the relative position of the GNSS receiver 
antenna with respect to the position of the obstacles of the scene and with respect to the 
position of the GNSS satellite is varying. The parameters of the transmission channel change 
in the time domain. The rate of change of the channel parameters depends on the aircraft 
dynamic. Fast variations of the parameters change the way the DLL responds to the multipath. 
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When the parameters variations are fast, the DLL cannot converge to the static multipath error 
in steady-state at each point of a given trajectory. The aircraft is said to be in the “dynamic 
configuration” or “dynamic regime”. As an illustration, Figure 5-8 plots the GPSL1C 
multipath error along a segment parallel to the   axis assuming that the assessed aircraft has a 
constant speed of       . These errors are compared to the static GPSL1C raw code 
multipath ranging errors in steady-state obtained when the assessed aircraft is in the static 
configuration on the segment. Other parameters of the simulation are stated in Table 5-3. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-8: Raw code multipath ranging error in the static and dynamic configurations 
 
From Figure 5-8, when the aircraft speed is as low as      , the variations of the 
transmission channel parameters are fast enough to change the way the DLL responds to the 
multipath compared to the static configuration. As long as the aircraft moves with a speed 
higher than      , the aircraft is said to be in the dynamic configuration. The magnitude of 
the error is reduced in the dynamic configuration, as further detailed in Section 5.5.2. In this 
Ph.D. thesis, the multipath errors are analyzed when the assessed aircraft performs uniform 
and rectilinear trajectories. The aircraft speed is assumed to be at least       during uniform 
and rectilinear trajectories. Hence, in this thesis, when the aircraft performs uniform and 
rectilinear trajectories, the aircraft is said to be in the dynamic configuration.  
 
5.4. Multipath error models in static configuration 
This section analyzes the multipath errors that affect raw code pseudo-range measurements in 
the static configuration in an airport environment. The evolution of the raw code multipath 
ranging error as a function of the time in the static configuration is assessed in Section 5.3.1. 
This section aims to investigate the evolution of the steady-state raw code multipath ranging 
error in the space domain and to propose models of the steady-state raw code multipath 
ranging errors adapted to the static configuration in airport environments.  
As an illustration of the space dependence of the multipath errors at the scale of the airport, 
Figure 5-9 presents the map of the dual-frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging error 
in steady- state. This simulation has been obtained based on the simplified 3D model of 
Toulouse Blagnac airport presented in Section 5.1.2.2.3.1. The parameters used for this 
simulation are presented in Table 5-5.  
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 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite position Satellite elevation angle    20° 
Satellite azimuth angle       0° 
GNSS airborne antenna 
position 
Antenna height            
Aircraft azimuth angle          
 
Table 5-5: Simulation parameters used for Figure 5-9 
 
 
 
Figure 5-9: Simulated multipath ranging error GPSL1C+GPSL5 in steady state at 
Toulouse Blagnac airport, France 
 
Depending on the relative positions of the GNSS airborne antenna, the GNSS satellite, and 
the obstacles in the scene, two scenarios can be distinguished. 
- In the first scenario, the GNSS airborne antenna only receives echo signals reflected from 
the ground and scattered from the structure of the assessed aircraft. This configuration also 
includes the situation where the antenna also receives weak echo signals that have been 
scattered by one or several fixed obstacles, but the presence of these weak signals does not 
influence the raw code multipath ranging error at the DLL output. This is the case in point 
A of segment 3. 
- In the second scenario, the GNSS airborne antenna also receives echo signals scattered by 
one or several obstacles. This is the case in point B of segment 4. 
The next section investigates the spatial evolution of the steady-state raw code multipath 
errors due to echo signals from the airport surface and from the structure of the assessed 
aircraft (first scenario) and provides a model of such an error.  
CHAPTER 6: GNSS-based positioning algorithm  
 
92 
 
5.4.1. Error due to the ground and the aircraft structure  
5.4.1.1. Multipath parameters and multipath error variation in the space domain 
The spatial variations of the multipath errors depend on the spatial variations of the multipath 
parameters. Hence, in the following paragraph, the spatial variation of the multipath 
parameters is firstly investigated. 
The impact of the structure of the assessed aircraft is included in the GNSS airborne antenna 
radiation pattern. Hence, at the receiver antenna output, the signal can be modelled as the sum 
of the direct signal and the echo signals due to the reflection on the airport surface. Since, 
from Section 5.1.2.2.2, the ground is assumed to be an infinite plane and made of dry tar, the 
reflection of the incident GNSS EM wave on the ground results in a single echo signal [Chen, 
2010] that is represented by index     in this paragraph. It can be easily demonstrated that the 
relative code delay between the echo signal from the ground and the direct signal is given by: 
 
          
        (  ) 
 
 
Eq -  5-3 
 
 
where      [m] is the antenna height with respect to the airport surface.  
A realistic GNSS airborne antenna induces group delays on both direct and reflected signals. 
These group delays are not taken into account in Eq -  5-3. From Eq -  5-3, it can be already 
expected that     will remain roughly constant over the airport scale since the angular 
variations of the elevation angle    at the scale of the airport is roughly   degree. Table 5-6 
quantifies the maximal variations of     ,    , and    along a 1 kilometer long segment on the 
  axis at Toulouse Blagnac airport.  
 
 Difference between the minimal and maximal value along the 1km 
segment 
GNSS signal GPSL1C and GalileoE1 GPSL5 and GalileoE5a 
                 
             
      
                                    
                          
                         
 
Table 5-6: Maximal variations of the multipath parameters and error from the ground 
echo signal along a 1km segment 
 
    is roughly constant along the segment since the satellite elevation angle remains roughly 
constant over the 1 kilometer segment. Similarly,     is roughly constant along the segment. 
Indeed,     is roughly constant along the segment. In addition, the phase shift on echo signal 
“1” is roughly constant along the segment since the ground is assumed to be an infinite plane 
and made of dry tar.   
The group delays and phase shifts induced by the GNSS antenna are not taken into account in 
the simulation results presented in Table 5-6. It can be expected that      and      are roughly 
constant along the segment even if the group delays and phase shifts induced by the GNSS 
antenna would be taken into account in the simulation results. Indeed, the group delays and 
phase shifts induced by the GNSS antenna on both direct and echo signals would remain 
constant over the segment since both satellite elevation angle and aircraft azimuth angle 
remain roughly constant over the segment. 
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Finally,   is roughly constant along the segment. This is because: 
- The power of the EM wave scattered by the ground is roughly constant along the segment. 
Indeed, the ground is assumed to be planar and infinite tar ground and the dielectric 
permittivity of the ground is thus considered to be constant at the scale of the airport.  
- The GNSS airborne antenna gains on both direct and echo signals remain constant over the 
segment since both satellite elevation angle and aircraft azimuth angle remain roughly 
constant over the segment. 
As a conclusion, for a fixed satellite elevation angle, for a fixed aircraft azimuth angle, and for 
a planar and infinite ground made of dry tar, the multipath parameters of the echo signal from 
the ground are roughly constant at the scale of the airport.  
The multipath parameters determine the value of the multipath ranging error in steady-state. 
Hence, it can be expected that the multipath ranging error induced by the airport surface and 
by the structure of the assessed aircraft is roughly constant at the scale of the airport for a 
fixed satellite elevation angle and a fixed aircraft azimuth angle. The maximal variations of 
the multipath ranging error over the 1 kilometer segment are quantified in Table 5-6 and are 
few hundredths of millimeters up to few tenths of millimeters, depending on the GNSS signal.  
The multipath errors at the scale of a realistic airport would show higher variations. Indeed, 
the airport surface is in reality frequently inhomogeneous and may contain lawn or metallic 
parts. It may also contain snow, water or ice layers. Hence, the permittivity of the ground may 
in reality not be constant at the scale of the airport. Hence, the phase and the amplitude of the 
echo signal from the ground may present relatively high variations compared to the variations 
obtained under the planar and infinite ground made of dry tar hypothesis. 
5.4.1.2. Multipath error model 
Figure 5-10 provides the values of the GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging errors in steady-
state due to the airport surface and the structure of the assessed aircraft for a wide range of 
pairs {                                             } and for a planar and infinite ground 
made of dry tar.    and       are sampled with a step of size    each.     is in the range [0°, 
90°] and       is in the range [0°, 360°]. The GNSS receiver antenna height is           .  
From Eq -  5-3, and denoting    the chip period of GPSL1C and GalileoE1,      is between 
            for       and       
      for       . From Section 4.3.2.2.1, and taken into 
account the low values of    , the multipath ranging error on GPSL1C is roughly equal to the 
multipath ranging error on GalileoE1. Hence, the errors values shown in Figure 5-10 also 
represent the GalileoE1+GalileoE5a multipath ranging errors in steady-state due to the airport 
surface and the structure of the assessed aircraft. 
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Figure 5-10: Dual-frequency multipath ranging error due to the airport surface and the 
aircraft structure 
From Figure 5-10, three main observations can be made: 
- For a fixed aircraft azimuth angle, the amplitude of the multipath errors tends to decrease 
when the elevation angle increases. The radiation pattern is designed to reject the impact of 
signals coming from the ground and is oriented towards the sky. At high elevation angles, 
the echo signal is coming downwards and is thus strongly rejected by the antenna. The 
amplitude of the multipath error is low (millimeter level). At low elevation angles, both 
direct and echo signals have roughly the same direction of arrival that is parallel to the 
airport surface. The reflected EM wave from the ground, which is mainly LHCP, is not 
strongly rejected since the antenna polarization is roughly linear at low elevation angles. 
The amplitude of the multipath error is large (decimeter up to meter level). 
- For a fixed elevation angle, the error varies from a few millimeters up to a few decimeters 
with respect to the relative aircraft orientation. This is due to the GNSS airborne antenna 
pattern that is not-omnidirectional. At low elevation angles, the antenna gains depend 
significantly on the direction of arrival of the incoming EM waves, as represented in 
Figure 5-3. The error varies of a few decimeters with respect to the relative aircraft 
orientation. At high elevation angles, the direction of arrival of the incoming EM waves 
does not significantly change with respect to the aircraft azimuth angle. The antenna gains 
do not depend significantly on the azimuth angle of the incoming EM waves, as 
represented in Figure 5-3. The error varies of a few millimeters with respect to the relative 
aircraft orientation. 
At low elevation angle and for         , the GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging errors in 
steady-state due to the airport surface and the structure of the assessed aircraft is significantly 
different from the error values when         . An interpretation of this observation is 
proposed in Appendix A, Section A.4.  
The next section investigates the spatial evolution of the multipath errors in steady-state due 
to echo signals from the airport surface, from the structure of the assessed aircraft and from 
obstacles in the airport environment (second scenario) and provides a model of such an error. 
5.4.2. Error due to the ground, the aircraft structure and the obstacle(s) 
5.4.2.1. Static impact zone 
The multipath ranging errors due to the airport surface, the structure of the assessed aircraft 
and obstacle(s) are analyzed in the impact zones of the airport. This section defines the 
concept of the impact zone. 
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Figure 5-9 shows that the steady-state raw code multipath ranging error presents spatial 
variations in the horizontal plane of the scene located at            above the ground. 
Closed to the obstacles, that is to say a few meters far from the obstacles, the echo signals 
reaching the GNSS receiver antenna are characterized by high relative amplitudes. At fixed 
satellite elevation and aircraft azimuth angles, this leads to relatively high variations of the 
multipath error (variations up to few meters) around a central value, which is the multipath 
error that would be obtained if the ground and the aircraft structure were the only multipath 
sources in the scene. Far from the obstacles, the error variations are low for two possible 
reasons: 
- Firstly, the relative amplitude of the echo signals scattered from the obstacles is reduced, 
leading to relatively weak variations of the multipath error (variations of up to few 
centimeters) around the central value. 
- Secondly, the relative code delay of the echo signals scattered from the obstacles become 
high and thus may not affect the multipath error. Indeed, from Section 4.3.2.2.1, any echo 
signal characterized by a relative code delay above       
 
 
 does not impact the 
multipath ranging error. 
As an illustration of the relative amplitude of the echo signals, the histograms of the relative 
amplitudes in the L1 frequency band for the direct and echo signals are presented in Figure 
5-11. In scenario 1, 10 true receiver antenna positions are equally distributed in an inner grid 
in zone 1 which is closed to the obstacles, and the relative amplitudes are simulated over all 
antenna positions. In scenario 2, 10 true receiver antenna positions are equally distributed in 
an inner grid in zone 2 which is far from the obstacles, and the relative amplitudes are 
simulated over all antenna positions. The simulation parameters are recapped in Table 5-7.  
 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite position 
Satellite elevation angle    20° 
Satellite azimuth angle       0° 
GNSS airborne antenna 
positions 
Aircraft azimuth angle          
Scenario 1: antenna positions in 
zone 1 (closed to the airport 
buildings) 
  range: [         ] 
  range: [           ] 
       
Scenario 2: antenna positions in 
zone 2 (far from the airport 
buildings) 
  range: [           ] 
  range: [           ] 
       
 
Table 5-7: Simulation parameters used for Figure 5-11 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Histograms of the L1 relative amplitude of the echo signals 
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In Figure 5-11 it is shown that the number of echo signals arriving in zone 1 and characterized 
by a relative high amplitude (relative amplitude above 30dB) represents 20.7% of the total 
number of echo signals arriving in this zone. In comparison, the number of echo signals 
arriving in zone 2 and characterized by a relative high amplitude (relative amplitude above 
30dB) represents 5.1% of the total number of echo signals arriving in this zone. Hence, Far 
from the obstacles, the relative amplitude of the echo signals scattered from the obstacles is 
reduced. 
In this document, the static impact zone is defined as the horizontal area of the airport located 
at            above the ground where the variations of the raw code multipath ranging 
error in steady-state are significant with respect to the other sources of ranging errors. Section 
3.2.1.9 reveals that, in dual frequency mode, the standard deviation of the stochastic ranging 
error due to the troposphere, the ionosphere, the satellite clock and ephemeris inaccuracies, 
and the receiver thermal noise is few decimeters. The impact zone is the area where the 
amplitude variations of the multipath error around the central value are higher than 10% of 
10cm, that is to say 1cm. 
The impact zone location depends on the satellite elevation and azimuth angles since both 
angles influence the amplitude of the multipath ranging errors closed to the obstacles. In order 
to determine the location of the impact zone related to a given satellite position, the multipath 
ranging errors are computed in the scene with a spatial period of     for that satellite 
position. The spatial period must be small enough with respect to the wavelength to clearly 
observe the variations of the multipath error around the central value. The impact zone is then 
determined by considering the zone of the airport where the amplitude variations of the 
multipath error around the central value are higher than 1cm. As an example, Figure 5-12 
represents the evolution of the multipath ranging errors along a 30 meter long sub-segment of 
segment 3 represented in Figure 5-9 for a satellite elevation of 5° and for a satellite azimuth of 
0°. Note that, in this simulation, the elevation angle has been voluntary decreased to 5° in 
order to clearly distinguish the high amplitude variations of the errors inside the impact zone 
to the low amplitude variations of the errors outside the impact zone. It is shown in this plot 
that all antenna positions characterized by an   coordinate above 170.3m are considered to be 
out of the impact zone for a satellite elevation of 5° and for a satellite azimuth of 0°. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-12: Evolution of the multipath ranging error in steady-state over segment 3 
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The next two sections investigate the spatial evolution of the multipath parameters and of the 
multipath errors in steady-state and in the impact zone.  
5.4.2.2. Multipath parameter variations in the impact zone 
The spatial variation of the multipath parameters in the impact zone is investigated in this 
section. In the impact zone, the signal received by the GNSS antenna can be modelled as the 
sum of the direct signal, the echo signal from the airport surface and the echo signals that 
have been scattered by at least one obstacle. The multipath parameters of the echo signal 
reflected from the ground and reaching the GNSS receiver antenna have been analyzed in 
Section 5.4.1.1. The multipath parameters of the echo signals that have been scattered by at 
least one obstacle are investigated in this paragraph.  
For this analysis, a static assessed aircraft on segment 4 depicted in Figure 5-9 is considered.  
The error is computed over segment 4 that is located closed to the airport obstacles. This 
allows clearly visualizing the amplitude variations of the errors induced by the airport 
obstacles. On segment 4, the aircraft is in the impact zone related to the GNSS satellite 
characterized by a satellite elevation angle of 20° and by a satellite azimuth angle of 0°. The 
airborne antenna receives a large number of multipath from airport obstacles along the 
segment 4. The evolutions of the multipath parameters of any echo signals are not represented 
in this section. It is preferred to illustrate the multipath parameter evolution of a single echo 
signal, referred to as echo signal “2”. Echo signal “2” is scattered from Hall C and received by 
the airborne antenna along segment 4. Estimating the multipath ranging error in the impact 
zone by considering only one single echo signal from the airport buildings is not valid. 
However, in this section, a single echo signal is considered since it allows going even further 
in the multipath parameter analysis. The conclusions proposed in this section concerning the 
spatial evolution of the multipath parameters of echo signal “2” can be applied to any echo 
signals scattered by at least one airport obstacle and received by the GNSS antenna.   
The evolution of the multipath parameters of an echo signal, referred to as index “2”, that is 
emitted by the satellite, scattered by the metallic façade of Hall C, and that arrives at the 
GNSS receiver antenna, is plotted in Figure 5-13 over the 116 meter long segment 4 [CD] for 
the relative amplitude and relative code delay parameters and over a 1 meter long portion of 
segment 4 [ED] for the relative phase shift. Simulation parameters are provided in Table 5-8.  
 
 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite position 
Satellite elevation angle    20° 
Satellite azimuth angle       0° 
GNSS airborne antenna 
position 
Aircraft azimuth angle on segment 4 
      
        
Between points E and D for the relative 
phase shift plot 
 [                 ] 
 [                ] 
Between points C and D for the relative 
amplitude and for the relative code 
delay plots 
 [                ] 
 [                ] 
 
Table 5-8: Simulation parameters used for Figure 5-13 
 
The spatial variation of the multipath parameters related to echo signal “2” are analyzed as 
follows.  
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The relative code delay evolution is quasi linear. Appendix A, Section A.1.1, proposes the 
analytical expression of the relative code delay     of an echo signal that is emitted by the 
satellite, scattered by a reflector and that reaches the receiver antenna. The expression is 
provided along a segment located in the specular direction.  
The relative phase shift is quasi periodic. Spatial periods of 13cm for L1 signals and 17cm for 
L5 signals are observed. The spatial period of     is of the order of   . As demonstrated in 
Appendix A, Section A.1.2, the spatial period of the phase shift     depends on the 
orientation of the segment in the impact zone, on the satellite elevation and azimuth angles 
and on the central frequency of the GNSS signal   .  
The relative amplitude presents large scale variations on the assessed segment. The small 
discontinuities of   are due to the antenna gains interpolation in the software. The amplitude 
of    depends on the orientation of the facade on which echo signal “2” is scattered, and thus 
on the satellite azimuth angles. This phenomena is underlined in Figure 5-13 by comparing 
the values of   for GPSL1C,          and        to the values of   for           and 
      . In addition, the amplitude of    depends on the satellite elevation angle. The 
amplitudes of the echo signals from the façade of Hall C are high for low elevation angles and 
tend to decrease for high elevation angles. This phenomena is underlined in Figure 5-13 by 
comparing the values of   for GPSL1C,          and        to the values of   for 
GPSL1C,          and      .  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5-13: Evolution of the multipath parameters of echo signal “2” over segments 
[CD] and [ED] 
CHAPTER 6: GNSS-based positioning algorithm  
 
99 
 
5.4.2.3. Multipath ranging error variations in the impact zone 
The spatial variation of the multipath ranging errors in the impact zone is investigated in this 
section. The multipath parameters determine the value of the raw code multipath ranging error 
in steady-state. Hence, it can be expected that the variations of the multipath parameters, and 
more specifically the small scale variations of the relative phase shift, cause variations of the 
multipath error in the impact zone. This is validated as follows. The evolution of the dual 
frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 steady-state raw code multipath ranging errors and over 
segments [CD] and [ED] are plotted in Figure 5-14.   
  
 
 
Figure 5-14: Evolution of the GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging error over segments 
[CD] and [ED] 
 
5.4.2.3.1. Analysis of the spatial variations of the multipath errors   
The small-scale spatial variations of the errors along segment [ED] is discussed in this 
section. The spatial variations of multipath errors along [ED] are due to the small scale 
variations of the relative phase shift     on GPSL1C and on GPSL5 along segment [ED]. The 
spatial period of     and thus the spatial period of the oscillations of the multipath errors 
depend on the orientation of the segment in the impact zone and on the satellite elevation and 
azimuth angles. The spatial period of the multipath ranging error is of the order of   .  
5.4.2.3.2. Analysis of the amplitude of the multipath errors   
The values of the errors along segment 4 are discussed in this section.  
Firstly, both plots of Figure 5-14 reveal that the multipath errors oscillate on segment 4 
around a central value. This central value corresponds to the multipath error that would be 
obtained if the ground and the aircraft structure were the only multipath source. The multipath 
error due to the ground and the aircraft structure is fully analyzed in Section 5.4.1.2. In this 
section, this error is denoted as           (        ). This error depends on both the satellite 
elevation angle and the aircraft azimuth along the segment.  
Secondly, the amplitude of the oscillations of the multipath errors along segment 4 is driven 
by the amplitude of the multipath at the GNSS receiver antenna output. The evolution of the 
multipath error along segment [CD] reveals that the amplitude of the oscillations of the 
multipath errors tend to decrease when the distance to the obstacles increases. This is because 
the amplitude of the echo signals tends to decrease when the distance to the obstacles 
increases. The amplitude of the error oscillations also depends on the satellite azimuth angles. 
This is because the echo signal amplitude depends on the satellite azimuth angle with respect 
to the scene (see Figure 5-13). As an illustration, the maximal peak-to-peak amplitudes of the 
multipath errors along segment [ED] are indicated in Table 5-9 for different satellite azimuth 
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angles. Finally, from Table 5-9, and for a constant satellite azimuth angle of   , the peak-to-
peak amplitude for       is roughly 5 times the peak-to-peak amplitude for       . This 
is because low elevation angles cause relatively high echo signal amplitudes (see Figure 5-13) 
and high multipath error amplitudes.  
 
        
         
       
          
      
         
Maximal peak-to-peak 
amplitude over segment 
[ED]  
                   
 
Table 5-9: Peak-to-peak amplitude of the GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging error 
over segment [ED] 
 
This section has investigated the spatial evolution and the amplitude of the multipath errors in 
steady-state and in the impact zone. The next section provides a model of the multipath errors 
in the impact zone. 
5.4.2.4. Over-bounding Gaussian multipath error model 
5.4.2.4.1. Methodology 
It is established in Section 5.4.2.3 that the multipath ranging error at a given location in the 
impact zone can be decomposed as follows: 
 
                     (        )       
 
Eq -  5-4 
 
where: 
           (        ) is the multipath ranging error that would have been obtained if the 
ground and the aircraft structure were the only multipath sources present at that given 
location. This term is induced by the ground first-order reflection. 
      represents the oscillations of the multipath ranging error            around the central 
value           (        ) in the impact zone.      is induced by the scattering of the EM 
field on the airport obstacles. This term is induced by the obstacle first and second-order 
interactions. 
The component           (        ) depends on: 
- the GNSS receiver antenna radiation pattern and the GNSS receiver settings, 
- the airborne antenna height     , 
- the satellite elevation    and aircraft azimuth       angles. 
Both angles can be predicted or measured. In addition, assuming a planar and infinite ground 
made of dry tar, the values of           (        ) can be predicted and are provided in 
Section 5.4.1.2 for the antenna pattern and for the receiver settings considered in this thesis 
and presented in Section 5.1.2.  For this reason, it can be considered that the component 
          (        ) can be determined in a deterministic way. 
The component      depends on: 
- the satellite position (the satellite elevation    and azimuth       angles), 
- the 3D model of the airport environment, 
- the GNSS receiver antenna radiation pattern and the GNSS receiver settings, 
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- the true position of the GNSS receiver antenna and the aircraft azimuth angle      . 
Determining the component      in the impact zone in a deterministic way is complex as it 
would require knowing the position of the airborne antenna in the impact zone with a high 
level of precision (centimeter precision level since the spatial period of the multipath error is 
of the order of 10 centimeters). It is thus proposed to provide a statistical model of the error 
component      in the impact zone that is independent of the true position of the GNSS 
receiver antenna in the impact zone. Since a model independent of the aircraft azimuth angle 
will be simpler to use, it is proposed to set up a statistical model of the error component       
that is also independent of the aircraft azimuth angle       . The methodology used to obtain 
the error models is sketched in Figure 5-15.  
 
 
Figure 5-15: Methodology to model of      in the impact zone  
In order to illustrate this methodology, the dual-frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 over-bounding 
Gaussian multipath error model is derived in an impact zone on segment 4. The satellite 
elevation and azimuth angles are        and         , respectively. 
Step 1 
Figure 5-14 shows the evolution of the multipath ranging error over segment 4 (segment 
[CD]) for        and         . The amplitude of the oscillations      around the central 
value is above 1cm on the entire segment 4. Hence, the entire segment 4 is included in the 
impact zone. Figure 5-16 depicts segment 4. 
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Figure 5-16: Random position of the GNSS receiver antenna in the impact zone 
Step 2 
In order to estimate the Probability Density Function (PDF) of the components      along 
segment 4 and in the impact zone, a Monte Carlo simulation is performed. For each Monte 
Carlo iteration, two input variables are randomly generated: the aircraft position in the impact 
zone along segment 4 and the aircraft azimuth angle.  The probability distributions attached to 
each variable are detailed below.  
From Chapter 2, the lateral distance between the desired path and the true position shall be 
lower than  √    
      
      
        99.6% of the time. In this thesis, it is assumes 
that a system monitors the accuracy of the GNSS horizontal position estimate and that the 
lateral distance between the desired path and the true position is lower than 
 √    
      
      
        99.6% of the time.  From the values of the required     , 
     and      presented in Chapter 2, the maximal allowed value of      is set to 46cm for 
the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase, 61cm for the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase, and 1.01m for 
the taxi on taxiway sub-phase. At each iteration, it is chosen to select uniformly the true 
horizontal GNSS receiver antenna position in the rectangular zone depicted in Figure 5-16. 
An important remark is that the error model along segment 4 is developed by simulating 
multipath errors along the whole segment 4. A single error model is developed along segment 
4. However, the error amplitude along segment 4 is not constant. Hence, it is recommended as 
future work: 
- either to define and distinguish the parts on the segment on which the error amplitude is 
roughly constant and then to develop an error model for each of these parts. 
- or to determine the segment part where the error amplitude is maximal and to estimate the 
standard deviation parameter on this part. Note that this suggestion is more conservative 
than the suggestion stated above, but is easier to manipulate since only one error model is 
developed for the segment. 
The aircraft azimuth angle follows a Gaussian distribution that is centered on the aircraft 
azimuth angle on segment 4 (218.29°) and that is characterized by a standard deviation equal 
to            . Hence, 99.6% of the simulated aircraft azimuth angles will be in the interval 
[                                 ]  [                       ].  
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The multipath ranging error is then computed for each Monte Carlo iteration.  The 
convergence test is performed and the simulation is stopped at the first iteration for which the 
convergence test is passed. The convergence test is detailed in Appendix B, Section B.2. As 
shown in Appendix B, Section B.2,          is the minimal number of samples required to 
correctly estimate the model parameters in the simulation scenario considered in this section. 
A rigorous approach to quantify the quality of the parameter estimators is to use confidence 
interval [Papoulis, 1991]. The computation of the confidence intervals is not presented in this 
thesis. 
Step 3 
The estimated Probability Density Function (PDF) based on the         simulated 
GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging errors is plotted in Figure 5-17, blue curve.  The 
estimated mean and standard deviation of the error when the simulation stops are denoted as 
     and      , respectively.      and      are indicated in Table 5-10. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-17 : Estimated and over-bounding Gaussian PDFs of      in the impact zone 
 
Estimated statistical moments of the distribution of      
                      
 
Table 5-10 : Standard deviation and mean of the distribution of       
 
The distribution of      in the impact zone can be considered as centered. This is because      
represents the oscillation term of the multipath error around the central value 
          (        ).  
The multipath ranging error model proposed in this document is intended to be included 
within GNSS integrity monitoring algorithms for airport operations. For this reason, the 
priority is to model the estimated distribution by a distribution that over-bounds the tails of 
the estimated distribution. In addition, it has been chosen to over-bound the estimated 
distribution by a Gaussian distribution since the stochastic measurement error models used in 
the ABS integrity monitoring algorithms to check GNSS measurements consistency and 
compute protection levels are over-bounded Gaussian distributions. The feasibility to over-
bound the estimated PDF by a distribution that best fits the estimated distribution and to 
design integrity monitoring algorithms that use non-Gaussian distribution as expected 
measurement error models is not discussed in this thesis and remains asfuture work.  
DeCleene’s Cumulative Density Function (CDF) algorithm is used [DeCleene, 2000] to 
compute the standard deviation of the over-bounding Gaussian distribution. Note that the 
CDF over-bounding method requires the estimated distributions to be symmetric and 
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unimodal. The estimated distributions do not exactly fulfil these conditions, but 
approximately do. In the application, it is always possible to find a Gaussian distribution that 
over-bounds the tails of the distribution of the multipath ranging error in the impact zone. 
This is because the PDF of the multipath ranging errors in the impact zone is a positive and 
bounded function. Indeed, as shown in Section 4.3.2.2.1, the maximal amplitude of the 
multipath ranging errors in the impact zone is driven by the amplitude of the multipath. Since 
the multipath amplitude is bounded in the scene, the amplitude of the multipath errors is also 
bounded in the impact zone. Hence, the PDF is a bounded function. 
The multipath ranging error at a given location in the impact zone can be modelled as follows: 
 
                     (        )       Eq -  5-5 
 
where: 
 
      (         ) 
 
Eq -  5-6 
The PDF of the over bounding Gaussian distribution is represented in red in Figure 5-17. The 
standard deviation of the DeCleene distribution is        and is roughly 3 times higher than 
the standard deviation of the multipath errors obtained by simulations. The values of the over-
bounding Gaussian distribution parameter         is further discussed in the next paragraph. 
5.4.2.4.2. Simulation results 
The sensitivity of the over-bounding Gaussian distribution parameter          to the satellite 
elevation    and to the satellite azimuth        angles is analyzed in this section. The 
simulation results presented in this paragraph have been obtained by simulating the 
GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging errors      in the impact zone. However, it is shown in 
Appendix B, Section B.3, that the modulation difference between GPSL1C and GalileoE1 
signals does not significantly impact the values of       . Hence the simulation results 
provided in this section are also valid for the GalileoE1+GalileoE5a case.  
The evolution of          as a function of    in the impact zones located along segments 3 and 4 
is represented in Figure 5-18. The over-bounding Gaussian error model is not developed for 
elevation angles above 35 degrees and for segment 3 since segment 3 does not cross any 
impact zone for these elevation angles. 
 
 
Figure 5-18:         as a function of the satellite elevation angle          
 
For segment 4,         tends to decrease when    increases. The amplitude ratios of the echo 
signals are relatively high at low elevation angles, and tend to decrease when the elevation 
angle increases. This phenomenon is underlined in Section 5.4.2.2. The amplitude of the 
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oscillations of the multipath ranging errors in the impact zone increases with the amplitude 
ratios of the received echo signals, as illustrated in Table 5-9. This explains why the estimated 
PDF of the multipath error in the impact zone is characterized by a standard deviation         
that is significant at low elevation angles.  For segment 3,         is roughly constant as a 
function of   . Indeed, segment 3 is relatively far from the airport obstacles (few dozens of 
meters up to few hundred of meters), and the amplitude of the variations of the multipath error 
in the impact zone along segment 3 are low (few centimeters level) regardless of the satellite 
elevation angle. 
Note that other parameters influence the echo signal amplitude ratios, and thus the values of 
       . The characteristics of the obstacles inducing echo signals in the impact zone and the 
relative location of the impact zone with respect to these obstacles also determine the 
amplitude of the echo signals. Points located in the impact zone of segment 3 are further away 
from the large metallic Hall C facade than points located in the impact zone of segment 4. 
Hence, at fixed elevation angles, the values of         are lower for the impact zone along 
segment 3 than for the impact zone along segment 4. As an illustration,         reaches few 
meters over segment 4 at low elevation angles while         reaches few decimeters over 
segment 3 at low elevation angles. 
The evolution of         as a function of        in the impact zones located along segments 3 
and 4 are represented in Figure 5-19.  
 
 
 
Figure 5-19:         as a function of the satellite azimuth angle,        
 
For segment 3,         is roughly constant as a function of       . Indeed, segment 3 is 
relatively far from the airport obstacles, and the amplitude of the variations of the multipath 
error in the impact zone along segment 3 at an elevation angle of        are low regardless 
of the satellite azimuth angle. Hence,         is roughly constant and low (few centimeter level) 
as a function of       . For segment 4,         varies as a function of       . Indeed, the error 
amplitude on segment 4 varies as a function of       . This phenomenon is further discussed in 
Section 5.4.2.2. 
 
5.5. Multipath error models in dynamic configuration 
This section analyzes and proposes models of the multipath errors that affect raw code 
pseudo-range measurements in dynamic configurations in an airport environment. In this 
thesis, the dynamic multipath error models are developed for uniform and rectilinear 
trajectories. The error models are not developed for non-constant speed trajectories or/and 
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curved trajectories. The minimal aircraft speed along a uniform and rectilinear trajectory is 
assumed to be       .  
5.5.1. Error due ground and aircraft structure 
5.5.1.1. Multipath parameters and multipath error variation in the space domain 
This subsection analyzes the multipath parameters evolution and the raw code multipath 
ranging error evolution throughout a uniform and rectilinear trajectory that is outside of any 
impact zone. Throughout such a trajectory, the ranging measurement between the satellite and 
the GNSS airborne antenna is mostly affected by multipath errors due to the reception of the 
echo signal transmitted by the GNSS satellite and reflected over the ground and over the 
aircraft structure. This echo signal is indicated by index “1” in this section.  
Throughout the trajectory, and at time  , the echo signal from the ground is characterized by 
three multipath parameters: the relative code delay    ( ), the amplitude ratio  ( ) and the 
relative phase shift    ( ). Assuming that the airport surface is modelled as an infinite and 
planar  ground made of dry tar, and as explained in Section 5.4.1.1, the relative code delay 
and the relative phase are roughly constant throughout the trajectory. In the dynamic 
configuration, the phase shift at time   of both direct and echo signal “1” induced by the 
transmission channel are, respectively: 
 
    ( )     (         ( ))  ( )    ( ) 
    ( )     (         ( ))  ( )    ( ) 
 
 
Eq -  5-7 
where: 
        and        are the Doppler frequency shifts of the direct and echo signals, respectively, 
    and    are the phase shifts induced by the propagation channel and by the GNSS 
receiver antenna on the direct and echo signals, respectively. 
 
The relative phase shift of echo signal “1” is: 
 
   ( )      ( )      ( )
    (         ( ))   ( )    (         ( ))   ( )    ( )
   ( ) 
 
 
Eq -  5-8 
   ( ) is roughly constant throughout the trajectory. There are three reasons for this: 
- As explained in Section 5.4.1.1, the relative phase shift   ( )    ( ) induced by the 
propagation channel and by the GNSS receiver antenna is roughly constant throughout the 
trajectory. 
- It is demonstrated in Appendix A, Section A.2.1, that the Doppler frequency shifts of both 
direct and echo signals are roughly equal and constant throughout the trajectory. 
- The relative code delay    ( )    ( )    ( ) is roughly constant throughout the 
trajectory.  
For a planar and infinite ground made of dry tar, the multipath parameters of the echo signal 
from the ground are roughly constant at the scale of the airport throughout an uniform and 
rectilinear trajectory. It can be expected that the multipath ranging error induced by the airport 
surface and by the structure of the assessed aircraft is roughly constant throughout a 
rectilinear trajectory outside from any impact zone. This hypothesis is validated in Table 5-11 
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that shows the maximal variation of the error throughout a constant speed straight line 
trajectory on 30m long portion of segment 3 [FG].  
 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite position 
Satellite elevation angle    20° 
Satellite azimuth angle       0° 
GNSS airborne antenna 
position 
Aircraft azimuth angle on segment 3 
      
        
Between points F and G   
[                ] 
 [                ] 
GNSS airborne antenna 
speed 
Aircraft speed          
Maximal variation of  
           and            
           
 
Table 5-11: Maximal variation of the dual-frequency raw code multipath ranging errors 
in the dynamic configuration over a 30 meter long portion 
The maximal variations of the raw code multipath ranging error over the trajectory are few 
tenths of millimeters. Note that the multipath error induced by the ground and the aircraft 
structure is varying throughout curved trajectories. Indeed, in this case, the aircraft azimuth 
angle is changing throughout the trajectory, and this would result in the variation of the 
ranging bias            throughout the trajectory. Note also that, as mentioned in Section 
5.4.1, the phase and the amplitude of the echo signal from the ground may present relatively 
high variations over a segment in realistic airport since the airport surface is in reality 
frequently inhomogeneous and may contain lawn or metallic parts. 
5.5.1.2. Multipath error model 
The multipath parameters of the echo signal from the airport surface reflection throughout a 
uniform and rectilinear trajectory do not strongly depend on the aircraft speed on that 
trajectory. There are two reasons for this: 
- Firstly, the amplitude ratio and the relative code delay do not depend on the aircraft 
dynamic and are the same in both static and dynamic configurations for a fixed satellite 
elevation angle and for a fixed aircraft azimuth angle. 
- Secondly, the relative phase shifts throughout the trajectory do not strongly depend on the 
aircraft dynamic on a straight line trajectory. Indeed, it can be easily demonstrated that the 
relative phase shift in the dynamic configuration (       ) and in the static configuration 
(          ) throughout a given segment are related by: 
 
       ( )            ( )    (      ( )        ( ))  ( )          ( )   ( ) 
 
Eq -  5-9 
It is demonstrated in Appendix A, Section A.2.2, that both terms   (      ( )  
      ( ))   ( ) and         ( )   ( ) are low regarding           ( ). Hence, it can be 
considered that        ( )            ( ) over a segment. To conclude, for fixed elevation and 
aircraft azimuth angles, both static and dynamic aircraft receive an echo signal from the 
ground characterized by roughly the same multipath parameters. Hence, the multipath ranging 
error induced by the airport surface and by the structure of the assessed aircraft is roughly 
constant throughout a trajectory outside from any impact zone, and is equal to: 
 
   ( )            (        ) 
 
Eq -  5-10 
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where: 
 The bias values            can be extracted from the static configuration.              
values are provided in Section 5.4.1.2 for the dual-frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 and 
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a measurements.  
              are the satellite elevation angle and the aircraft azimuth angle of the aircraft 
when the aircraft performs the straight line trajectory.  
The next section investigates the evolution of the multipath ranging errors due to echo signals 
from the airport surface, from the structure of the assessed aircraft and from obstacles 
throughout a uniform and rectilinear trajectory. It also provides a model of such an error.  
5.5.2. Error due to ground, aircraft structure and obstacle(s) 
5.5.2.1. Dynamic impact zone 
The multipath ranging errors due to the airport surface, the structure of the assessed aircraft 
and obstacle(s) in the dynamic configuration are analyzed in the dynamic impact zones of the 
airport. The goal of this section is to define the concept of dynamic impact zone. 
In order to illustrate the concept of dynamic impact zone, let’s consider the case where an 
aircraft performs a uniform and rectilinear trajectory along segment 3. Throughout the 
trajectory, the aircraft crosses the static impact zone related to one satellite. The portion of 
segment 3 in the static impact zone related to a satellite characterized by a satellite elevation 
angle of 20° and by a satellite azimuth angle of 0° is represented in Figure 5-20. More details 
about the determination of the location of the static impact zone are provided in Section 
5.4.2.1. 
Two cases can be distinguished: 
- In case 1, the aircraft will park at the gate and arrives from segment 2. The multipath error 
due to the aircraft structure, the ground and the obstacles must be modelled between the 
instant the aircraft reaches point H until the end of the segment located in point C. In this 
case, the locations of both static and dynamic impact zones are identical.  
- In case 2, the aircraft will leave the airport and arrives from segment 4. The multipath error 
must be modelled between point C until the moment the aircraft has left the static impact 
zone for   , that is to say when the aircraft reaches point I. Indeed, as underlined in Section 
5.3, the DLL behaves as a first-order low pass filter characterized by a response time of 
roughly   , that is the inverse of the DLL bandwidth. Hence, along a trajectory, the 
multipath ranging errors are time-correlated. Denoting    the time instant when the aircraft 
reaches point H, the multipath error at time    depends on the multipath error in the 
interval [        ]. Hence, the multipath errors between points H and I may still be 
affected by the obstacle effects, even if the airborne antenna is physically outside the static 
impact zone. In this case, the portion of segment 3 located in the dynamic impact zone is 
[CI], while the portion of segment 3 located in the static impact zone is [CH]. 
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Figure 5-20: Static and dynamic impact zones 
 
To conclude, along a uniform and rectilinear trajectory, the aircraft is said to be in the 
dynamic impact zone: 
- from the instant the aircraft enters in the static impact zone, or from the beginning of the 
trajectory if the first point of the trajectory is in the static impact zone, 
- until the instant the aircraft hast left the static impact zone for   , or until the end of the 
trajectory if the last point of the trajectory is in the static impact zone. 
5.5.2.2. Multipath parameters variation in the impact zone  
The multipath parameters of the echo signals that have been scattered by at least one obstacle 
are analyzed in this section.  
For this analysis, the aircraft performs a rectilinear and uniform trajectory along segment 4, 
that is to say along segment [CD] (dynamic configuration). The coordinates of C and D and 
the aircraft azimuth angle along [CD] are provided in Table 5-8.  On segment 4, the aircraft is 
in the dynamic impact zone related to the GNSS satellite characterized by a satellite elevation 
angle of 20° and by a satellite azimuth angle of 0°. For the same reasons as those presented in 
Section 5.4.2.2, the multipath parameters evolution is illustrated in this section for a single 
echo signal, referred to as echo signal “2”. Echo signal “2” is scattered from Hall C and 
received by the airborne antenna along segment 4.  
Both relative amplitude and relative code delay parameters are not affected by the dynamic of 
the aircraft along segment 4. The evolutions of the relative amplitude and code delay of echo 
signal “2” have been plotted in Figure 5-13 over segment [CD] in the static configuration. 
Conclusions provided in Section 5.4.2.2 concerning the evolution of these parameters along a 
segment of the impact zone in the static configuration can be applied to the dynamic 
configuration. 
The relative phase shift related to echo signal “2” over segment [CD] is different in the static 
and dynamic configurations because both direct signal and echo signal “2” are affected by a 
Doppler frequency in the dynamic configuration.  For this reason, the relative phase shift is 
specifically investigated in this section. Figure 5-21 represents the evolution of the relative 
phase shift     along the 1 meter long portion [DE] of segment 4 in the dynamic impact zone 
for different aircraft speeds. Simulation parameters are provided in Table 5-8.  
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Figure 5-21: L1 and L5 dynamic relative phase shifts over segment [DE] on segment 4 
From Section 5.4.2.2, the spatial period of the relative phase shifts in the static configuration 
depends on the central frequency of the assessed signal, the trajectory orientation in the scene 
and the satellite elevation and azimuth angles. In the dynamic configuration, the temporal 
period of the oscillations of the phase also depends on the aircraft speed. Figure 5-21 shows 
that the relative phase shift     of echo signal “2” present fast variations along segment [DE] 
characterized by a temporal period that is roughly      for an aircraft speed of        on 
the L1 frequency band. The temporal period is increased to roughly       for an aircraft 
speed of       .  This is mainly due to the fact that, in the high speed scenario, the quasi-
linear evolution of the relative code delay     is fast compared to the evolution in the low 
aircraft speed scenario. The fast relative code delay evolution in the high speed scenario 
induces fast variations of the relative phase shift.  
5.5.2.3. Multipath ranging error variation in the impact zone  
The spatial variation of the multipath ranging errors in the impact zone is investigated in this 
section. The evolution of the dual frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging errors over 
segment [ED] described in Table 5-8 are plotted in Figure 5-22.  
  
 
Figure 5-22: GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging errors over segment [CD] and [ED] 
 
5.5.2.3.1. Analysis of the temporal period of the multipath errors   
The time period of the errors along segment [ED] is discussed in this section. Two 
observations can be made from Sections 5.5.2.2 and 5.5.2.3: 
CHAPTER 6: GNSS-based positioning algorithm  
 
111 
 
- From Figure 5-22, the period of the oscillations of the error is roughly       for an 
aircraft speed of       . This roughly corresponds to the period of the relative phase shift 
on L1, as shown in Figure 5-21. 
- From Figure 5-22, the period of the oscillations of the error is roughly      for an aircraft 
speed of       .  However, the period of the oscillations of the error for an aircraft speed 
of        is roughly much lower and is 30ms.  
To conclude, in the dynamic configuration, the DLL induces a smoothing of the multipath 
errors compared to the static configuration. The DLL impacts the time period of the error 
along the segment, especially for relatively high aircraft speeds such as for       . As a 
consequence, the time period of the error along the segment is higher than the time period of 
the relative phase shifts over the same segment.  
5.5.2.3.2. Analysis of the amplitude of the multipath errors   
The values of the errors along segment 4 are discussed in this section.  
Firstly, from Figure 5-22, the error presents oscillations around a central value that 
corresponds to the multipath error that would have affected the pseudo-range measurement if 
the multipath sources were the airport surface and the structure of the assessed aircraft only. 
This error is denoted as  (        ) and is fully described in Section 5.5.1.2.  
Secondly, from Figure 5-22, the amplitude ratio of the echo signals is not the only parameters 
influencing the multipath error amplitude over the trajectory. In the dynamic configuration, 
the DLL induces a smoothing of the multipath errors induced by the airport obstacles 
compared to the static configuration. The amplitude of the error oscillations tends to decrease 
when the aircraft speed increases. Hence the aircraft speed is the second parameter 
influencing the multipath error amplitude over the trajectory.  
5.5.2.4. First-order Gauss-Markov process multipath error model 
5.5.2.4.1. Methodology 
It is established in Section 5.5.2.3 that the multipath ranging error in the dynamic 
configuration and in the impact zone can be decomposed as follows: 
 
          ( )            (        )      ( ) Eq -  5-11 
 
where: 
-           (        ) is the multipath ranging error that would have been obtained if the 
ground and the aircraft structure were the only multipath sources present at that given 
location. This error is induced by the ground first-order reflections. As explained in 
Section 5.4.2.4.1,           (        ) is considered as a deterministic bias in the thesis.  
-     ( ) is a zero-mean time-dependent error that represents the oscillation of           ( )  
around           (        ).      is induced by obstacles first and second-order 
interactions. This oscillation term depends on: 
 The satellite position (the satellite elevation    and azimuth       angles). 
 The 3D model of the airport environment. 
 The GNSS receiver antenna radiation pattern and the GNSS receiver settings. 
 The true trajectory location and orientation. 
 The aircraft speed over the trajectory  . 
Determining the component     ( ) in the impact zone in a deterministic way is complex as it 
would require knowing the trajectory location and orientation of the airborne antenna in the 
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impact zone with a high level of precision (centimeter precision level since the spatial period 
of the multipath error is of the order of 10 centimeters). It is thus proposed to provide a 
stochastic model of the error component     ( )  in the impact zone that is independent of the 
true trajectory of the GNSS receiver antenna in the impact zone. The true trajectory is 
modelled by its own statistical distribution. The parameters of the stochastic ranging error 
model are obtained by doing Monte Carlo simulations. The methodology used to obtain the 
stochastic error models is sketched in Figure 5-23. 
 
 
Figure 5-23: Methodology to derive the multipath error model in the impact zone – 
dynamic configuration 
 
In order to illustrate this methodology, the dual-frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 error model of 
    ( ) is derived in an impact zone on segment 4. In this simulation, it is assumed that the 
aircraft performs a uniform and rectilinear trajectory over the whole segment 4. The aircraft 
comes from segment 3 and will park at the gate. The aircraft speed is         . The 
satellite elevation and azimuth angles are        and         , respectively. 
Step 1 
Figure 5-14 shows that the amplitude of the oscillations of the multipath ranging error in 
steady state around the central value is above 1cm on the entire segment 4. Hence, the entire 
segment 4 is included in the dynamic impact zone.  
Step 2 
In order to estimate the Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the components      along a 
segment 4 and in the impact zone, a Monte Carlo simulation is performed. For each Monte 
Carlo iteration, an aircraft trajectory in the impact zone along segment 4 is randomly 
generated.  The probability distribution attached to this variable is detailed as follows. The 
coordinates of the entrance point in the impact zone are uniformly chosen on segment [    ] 
represented in Figure 5-16. The trajectory orientation is randomly selected in such a way that 
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the final point of the trajectory is uniformly distributed on segment  [    ] represented in 
Figure 5-16. The multipath ranging errors are then computed along each simulated trajectory, 
and the errors     ( ) are extracted from the computed multipath ranging errors along each 
trajectory.  Since the multipath errors in the dynamic impact zone depend on the multipath 
errors affecting the pseudo-range measurements up to 1s before entering in the impact zone, 
the multipath errors are also computed along the trajectory up to 1s before the entrance in the 
impact zone. Note finally that, in the simulations, only N=5 trajectories are randomly chosen 
in the impact zone. Indeed, Appendix B, Section B.4, shows that the PSD functions of the 
components      over two distinct trajectories in the impact zone are almost the same. For this 
reason, it is acceptable to develop the error model of the component      based on a limited 
number of Monte Carlo iterations along segment 4. 
An important remark is that the error model along segment 4 is developed by simulating 
multipath errors along the whole segment 4, and by processing and over-bounding the PSD of 
the simulated errors along the whole segment 4. A single error model is developed along 
segment 4. However, the error amplitude along segment 4 is not constant, as underlined in 
Figure 5-22. Hence, it is recommended as future work: 
- to sub-divide the trajectory into parts where the error amplitude is roughly constant and to 
develop a time-varying (non-stationary) error model throughout the trajectory. 
- or to determine the trajectory part where the error amplitude is maximal and to estimate the 
model parameters on this part. Note that this suggestion is more conservative than the 
suggestion stated above, but is easier to manipulate since only one stationary error model is 
developed for the trajectory. 
Step 3 
The multipath ranging error model related to the zero-mean component     ( ) proposed in 
this document is intended to be included within GNSS integrity monitoring algorithms for 
airport operations. For this reason, the priority is to model the estimated PSD of     ( )  over 
segment 4 by the PSD of a stochastic process that over-bounds the estimated PSD of     ( ). 
In addition, it has been chosen to over-bound the estimated PSD by the PSD of a stationary 
zero-mean first-order Gauss-Markov process  (         ) characterized by a correlation 
time      and by a standard deviation     . Indeed, as underlined in Section 5.4.2.4.1, the 
stochastic measurement error models used in the ABAS integrity monitoring algorithms are 
Gaussian models. Figure 5-24 illustrates the estimated PSD of the errors     ( ) along the 
segment 4 and the PSD of the Gauss-Markov process for different values of          . It is 
clearly shown in this figure that the estimated PSD cannot be assimilated to the first-order 
Gauss-Markov PSD shape. However, the first-order Gauss-Markov is retained for the 
application since judicious choices of the parameters (         ) enable the Gauss-Markov 
PSD to over-bound the estimated PSD. Combinations of multiple first-order Gauss-Markov 
processes or second-order low-pass filters are sometimes used to obtain slightly better 
modelling of correlated processes [Xing, 2010][Kubrak, 2008] at the expense of increasing 
the complexity of the model. The feasibility to over-bound the estimated PSD by a PSD that 
best fits the estimated PSD and to design integrity monitoring algorithms that use non-
Gaussian error models as expected measurement error models is not discussed in this thesis 
and remains as future work. In this Ph.D. thesis, it is this proposed to model the multipath 
ranging error in the dynamic configuration and in the impact zone as follows: 
 
          ( )            (        )      ( ) Eq -  5-12 
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where     ( ) is a zero-mean correlated error that is modelled as a stationary first-order 
Gauss-Markov process (         ).  
The methodology used to determine the parameters           is presented as follows. The 
normalized PSD of the first-order Gauss-Markov process is provided below: 
 
     ( )  
     
 
    ((   )  
 
     
)
 
 
Eq -  5-13 
For any given value of     , it is possible to find the minimal value of      for which the PSD 
of the Gauss-Markov process over-bounds the estimated PSD. Similarly, for any given value 
of     , it is possible to find the minimal value of      for which the PSD of the Gauss-
Markov process over-bounds the estimated PSD. Hence, there is an infinite number of pairs 
(         ) that lead to over-bound the estimated PSD. In this thesis, it has been chosen to set 
     to a fixed value and to compute the minimal value of      for which the PSD of the 
Gauss-Markov process over-bounds the estimated PSD. Note that this is a first approach. An 
advanced methodology that is recommended as future work consists in determining the pair 
(                     ) that meets the two following criteria: 
- The PSD of the first-order Gauss-Markov process (                    ) over-bounds 
the estimated PSD of     ( ), 
- The pair (                    ) leads to minimize the effects of the multipath ranging 
error     ( ) modelled as a Gauss-Markov process on the covariance of the horizontal 
position error. The impact of a stochastic error modelled as a first-order Gauss-Markov 
process  (         ) on the covariance of the horizontal position error is analyzed in 
Chapter 7. 
Let’s detail the methodology used to compute the parameter      when the parameter      is 
fixed. Figure 5-24, left hand side, illustrates the estimated PSD over one of the simulated 
trajectory over segment 4, namely trajectory 1. It also illustrates the Gauss-Markov process 
PSD for different values of       and for          .  It can be observed in this figure that 
the PSD of the Gauss-Markov process under-estimates the estimated PSD when      
      . The PSD of the Gauss-Markov process over-estimates the estimated PSD when 
                   is chosen to be the lowest standard deviation of the Gauss-Markov 
process that over-bounds the estimated PSD of the error along all simulated trajectories in the 
impact zone.  In the example treated in this section,      is        for the trajectory 1, and is 
the highest standard deviation obtained over all simulated trajectories.   
Let’s detail the methodology used to choose the value of     . Figure 5-24, right hand side, 
illustrates the PSD of the Gauss-Markov process for different values of 
    (              ). For each value of     ,      has been calculated via the 
methodology illustrated in Figure 5-24, left hand side and is called optimal     . 
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Figure 5-24 : First-order Gauss-Markov process PSDs and estimated PSD of      in the 
impact zone on segment 
 
High values of      (          ) concentrate the power of the Gauss-Markov process in 
the low frequencies. The value of the optimal      for             is roughly 60cm, which 
is larger than the value of      obtained for          , that is 41.5cm. The analysis 
proposed in Section 7.1 on the covariance of the horizontal position error shows that this 
covariance is proportional to both      and      parameters. The choice of            
leads to inflate both correlation time and standard deviation compared to the choice      
    . Since it is suitable to adopt a value of      that reasonably inflates the covariance of 
the position error, the choice of             is discarded for the application.  
A low value of      (        ) leads to over-bound the high-frequency components. The 
optimal value of      for           is roughly 1.2m, which is larger than the value of      
obtained for          , that is 41.5cm. The analysis proposed in Section 7.1 on the 
covariance of the horizontal position error shows that this covariance is very sensitive to the 
value of     . As an illustration, it is shown that when      is increased of roughly 50cm, the 
variance of the position error in both North and East directions is increased of a few 
centimeters. However, the error position variances only vary by a few millimeters when       
vary in the time interval [         ]. The choice of           is discarded for the 
application. It is chosen to adopt the value of      that minimizes the value of the optimal 
    , that is to say 10ms. 
In order to show that            is  a reasonable choice for other simulation scenarios, the 
optimal      has been calculated for different values of      (              ) under 
different simulation scenarios described in Table 5-12.  
For the same reasons as those exposed for the simulation scenario 1 (      ,      , 
        ),            is  a reasonable choice for other simulation scenarios and is 
adopted in the rest of the thesis.  
 
Scenario 1 
       
       
         
Scenario 2 
       
       
         
Scenario 3 
       
       
         
Scenario 4 
       
       
          
         1.17m 40.3cm 83.6cm 1.31m 
          41.5cm 15.2cm 28cm 45.9cm 
           60.1cm 27.2cm 41.2cm 63.6cm 
 
Table 5-12 : Optimal      for different simulation scenarios 
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5.5.2.4.2. Simulation results 
The sensitivity of the first-order Gauss-Markov process parameter      to the aircraft speed  , 
to the satellite elevation angle   , and to the satellite azimuth angle        is analyzed in this 
section.  
The simulation results presented in this paragraph have been obtained by simulating the 
GPSL1C+GPSL5 multipath ranging errors      in the impact zone. However, it is shown in 
Appendix B, Section B.3, that the modulation difference between GPSL1C and GalileoE1 
signals does not significantly impact the values of the multipath ranging errors in the impact 
zone. Hence the simulation results can be extended to the GalileoE1+GalileoE5a case.  
The evolution of       as a function of     in the impact zones located along segments 3 and 4 
is represented in Figure 5-25.  
 
 
Figure 5-25:      as a function of the aircraft speed,       ,           
 
     tends to decrease when   increases. Indeed, the aircraft speed induces a smoothing of the 
multipath ranging error along the trajectory. This phenomenon is underlined in Section 
5.5.2.3. The characteristics of the obstacles inducing echo signals in the impact zone and the 
relative location of the impact zone with respect to these obstacles also determine the 
amplitude of the echo signals. Points located in the impact zone of segment 3 are further away 
from the large metallic Hall C facade than points located in the impact zone of segment 4. 
Hence, at fixed aircraft speed, the values of      are lower for the impact zone along segment 
3 than for the impact zone along segment 4.  
The evolution of       as a function of    in the impact zones located along segments 3 and 4 
is represented in Figure 5-26. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-26:      as a function of the satellite elevation angle,       ,           
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For segment 3,         decreases with the elevation angle when the elevation angle is between 
5° and 20°. For elevation angles equal or higher than 20°,          is roughly constant and is 
relatively low (centimeter level) regardless the satellite elevation angle. For segment 4, 
        tends to decrease when    increases and may reach few meters at low elevation angles. 
An interpretation of this observation is detailed in Section 5.4.2.4.2.  
The evolution of      as a function of        in the impact zones located along segments 3 and 
4 are represented in Figure 5-27. 
 
 
 
Figure 5-27:      as a function of the satellite azimuth angle,       ,        
 
For segment 3,         is low (centimeter level) roughly constant as a function of       . For 
segment 4,         is of the order of a few decimeters and varies with        increases. An 
interpretation of this observation is detailed in Section 5.4.2.4.2. 
 
5.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has proposed multipath ranging error models adapted to surface operations. 
Three multipath sources are considered: the structure of the assessed A319 aircraft, the airport 
surface modelled as an infinite and planar ground made of dry tar, and fixed airport obstacles 
that are the airport buildings and the airport gates. 
The model parameter values proposed in this chapter have been obtained using a simple 3D 
model of Toulouse Blagnac airport, France. The types of simplification that have been done 
when modelling the 3D model of this airport have been exposed. The validity of two 
simplifications for multipath error models derivation has been discussed and demonstrated. 
Firstly, details characterized by a size below the wavelength do not have to be represented. 
Secondly, sub-meter level concrete details on concrete walls such as concrete overhangs and 
recesses on are not represented. The analysis of the validity of other simplifications for the 
application remains as future work. Even if parameter values provided in this chapter are 
specific to an airport and to an antenna model, the way to model the multipath error is 
intended to be used in other airports and for other antenna models.  
In the static configuration, the multipath ranging error induced by the airport surface, the 
structure of the assessed aircraft and the obstacle(s) is modelled as the sum of: 
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- a deterministic bias            induced by the ground first-order reflections and that 
depends on the antenna height, on the elevation angle, and on the relative aircraft azimuth 
angle. This bias reaches several decimeters at low elevation angles. The values of the 
biases            provided in the thesis are independent of the 3D model of the airport 
buildings and gates.  
- a bias      induced by obstacles first and second-order interactions. Due to the 
uncertainties in the aircraft position in the impact zone,     is considered as a random 
variable.      has been over-bounded by a zero-mean Gaussian distribution characterized 
by a standard deviation        .         depends on the elevation angle, on the satellite 
azimuth angle, and on the position and characteristics of the obstacles inducing echo 
signals in the impact zone. Highest values of         are obtained at low elevation angles 
and closed to the airport obstacles. As an illustration, the worth case values of         along 
the LVP procedure of Toulouse airport are obtained along the taxi lane and are a few 
meters. 
In the dynamic configuration, only uniform and rectilinear trajectories are considered.  The 
multipath ranging error induced by the airport surface, the structure of the assessed aircraft 
and the obstacle(s) in a dynamic impact zone is modelled as the sum of: 
- a stationary bias           , 
- a zero-mean oscillation term     ( ). Due to the uncertainties in the aircraft trajectory 
around the procedure path in the impact zone,      is considered as a stochastic correlated 
process. The correlated process      has been over-bounded by a stationary first-order 
Gauss-Markov process over the trajectory. The correlation time      of this Markov 
process has been set to a fixed value of 10ms. This choice has been justified and illustrated 
by simulations. The standard deviation      of this process depends on the elevation angle, 
on the satellite azimuth angle, on the position and characteristics of the obstacles inducing 
echo signals in the impact zone, and on the aircraft speed. Highest values of are obtained at 
low elevation angle, close to the airport buildings, and at low aircraft speed. As an 
illustration, the worth case values of      along the LVP procedure of Toulouse airport are 
obtained along the taxi lane and are a few meters. It is also recommended as future work to 
validate the developed multipath ranging error models by real data. 
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  CHAPTER 6 
6. GNSS-based positioning algorithm 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, there is a need to develop a GNSS-based navigation system 
capable to support the required navigation performance relating to the guidance function for 
use during taxi operations under low visibility conditions. The first step in the design of this 
navigation system is the development of the GNSS-based positioning algorithm capable of 
estimating the GNSS receiver antenna position with an accuracy that is compliant with the 
navigation system accuracy performance requirements. From Chapter 3, two GNSS 
constellations are considered in this thesis: GPS and Galileo. GPS and Galileo satellites 
broadcast both L1 (GPSL1C and GalileoE1) and L5 (GPSL5 and GalileoE5a) signals.  
This chapter describes the architecture of a GNSS-based positioning algorithm suitable for the 
application. The reasons behind this choice of architecture are explained in Section 6.1. The 
algorithm architecture is further detailed in Section 6.2. The accuracy performance of the 
algorithm will be quantified in Chapter 7.  
6.1. Choice of the positioning algorithm architecture 
6.1.1. Review of Position Velocity Time estimation techniques  
Position Velocity Time (PVT) estimation techniques are classified as follows: 
- “Stand alone” PVT techniques use a set of GNSS pseudo-range measurements and 
possibly initial estimates of the user position and clock. The GNSS measurements are not 
corrected by any differential corrections and are not integrated with other information 
sources. However, the initial user position and clock may be estimated by means of 
external sensor(s). The Least-Squares (LS) and Weight Least-Squares (WLS) solutions 
[Kaplan et al., 2006] use GNSS measurements at one snapshot in time to estimate the PVT 
solution. It is also possible to incorporate the past GNSS measurements into the position 
estimator by the means of algorithms such as the Kalman filter. This algorithm will be 
further detailed in the second part of this chapter. Since some applications require high 
navigation performance in terms of accuracy, integrity, continuity and availability, two 
classes of augmented PVT techniques have been developed and are listed below. 
- Differential PVT techniques improve the positioning performance using one or more 
reference stations at known locations, each equipped with at least one GNSS receiver. The 
reference station(s) provides GNSS pseudo-range corrections to the user via a data link. 
GBAS and SBAS are used in civil aviation applications to bring differential corrections. 
Both systems are briefly presented in Section 3.3.1. 
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- PVT techniques based on the integration of GNSS with other sensors or information 
sources may be used to define a system whose performance exceeds that of the individual 
sensors [Kaplan et al., 2006]. The method most widely used for this integration is the 
Kalman filter. 
Among the PVT estimation techniques listed in the previous paragraph, differential PVT 
techniques are not considered in this project since the use of GBAS and SBAS are out of the 
scope of this thesis, as explained in Section 3.3.2.  
Concerning the “stand alone” PVT techniques, [Néri, 2011] shows that, under the following 
conditions: 
- A double constellation GPS (24 satellites constellation) and Galileo (27 satellites 
constellation) is considered. Iono-free GPSL1C/A+GPSL5 and GalileoE1+GalileoE5a 
smoothed code pseudo-range measurements are used to estimate the user position. The 
code carrier smoothing technique is implemented as presented in [RTCA, 2009] with a 
smoothing time constant of             . 
- The nominal GNSS pseudo range measurement errors are induced by the inaccurate 
satellite clock correction and ephemeris information, by the residual ionosphere and 
troposphere delay, by the receiver thermal noise and by the multipath. Except for 
multipath, nominal error models related to these error sources are developed in Section 
3.2.1. The nominal multipath ranging error model standardized for in-flight operations 
[RTCA, 2009] is used.  
- The user position is estimated by means of a combined GPS/Galileo WLS algorithm fully 
described in [Néri, 2011]. The position solution is computed during 270 seconds 
approaches, over around three days, with a time step of 10 minutes, and over 16 different 
airport locations around the world.  
the worst case standard deviation of the vertical NSE under nominal conditions, computed 
over each 270 second approach, is 1.2m. It is assumed that the standard deviation of the 
horizontal NSE will have the same order of magnitude than the standard deviation of the 
vertical NSE. 
From Table 2-4, the maximal acceptable standard deviation of the horizontal NSE required to 
meet the accuracy requirement is      for the taxi on taxiway phase,      for the taxi on 
apron taxiway phase and      for the taxi on taxi lane phase.  
By comparing the order of magnitude of the standard deviation of the horizontal NSE 
obtained with WLS in the dual-frequency double constellation mode to the maximal 
acceptable standard deviation needed to meet the accuracy requirement, it is concluded that an 
augmented PVT technique must be used to reach the navigation performance requirements. A 
PVT technique based on the integration of GNSS with other sensors and other information 
sources is thus considered in the rest of this thesis. In the next section, a review of possible 
navigation sensors and signals of opportunity that could be integrated with GNSS is provided. 
6.1.2. Review of navigation sensors/signals of opportunity  
Inertial sensors are good candidates to be integrated with GNSS due to the complementary of 
their characteristics with respect to GNSS. GNSS can be used to compensate for slow inertial 
position drifts. In return, inertial sensors may ensure coasting during GNSS outage due to 
intentional or non-intentional interference for example.  In addition, inertial sensors have been 
used on commercial aircraft for several decades [Diesel, 1995] and their error models are fully 
described in the literature [Kayton et al., 1996]. Inertial Reference System (IRS) is thus 
considered to be a suitable technology for the application.  
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Other navigation sensors and signals of opportunity which may be integrated with GNSS and 
inertial sensors are listed below: 
- Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) 
- Instrument Landing System (ILS) 
- Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR) 
- Wheel Speed Sensor (WSS) and odometer 
- Wi-Fi or Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) 
- Ultra Wide Band (UWB) 
- Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) 
- Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) 
- Ultrasound sensors and infrared sensors 
- Video camera 
The main drawbacks and advantages related to each technology are indicated in Appendix C. 
By means of the elements provided in Appendix C concerning each technology, the 
navigation sensors and signals of opportunity can be classified into three categories: 
- Technologies which are not sufficiently mature to have a known level of accuracy 
performance or technologies not sufficiently accurate regarding the application. DME, 
SSR, RFID, ultrasound and infrared sensors and video camera are included in this 
category. Since this project does not aim to derive the performance of navigation sensors, 
but rather to investigate the impact of multipath on multi-sensors positioning algorithms, 
these navigation sensors are not considered in this thesis. They are thus not yet suitable 
technologies. 
- Technologies not well-adapted to airport navigation since they are sensitive to topologic 
changes, they are adapted to small scale environments (indoor applications), they cannot be 
used in the entire maneuvering and apron area and/or they require equipment installation 
over the airport surface. ILS, Wi-Fi and WiMAX and UWB are included in this category 
and are not suitable technologies. 
- Technologies that use external and expensive database to be fully operational, or sensors 
that are installed onboard but their use increases the complexity of the positioning 
algorithm. LIDAR and WSS/odometers are included in this category. These technologies 
are envisaged to be part of the PVT solution if the PVT solution based on the coupling 
GNSS/inertial sensors is not enough accurate to meet the accuracy requirement. 
To conclude, the proposed PVT solution is a GNSS/IRS coupling architecture. Three other 
sensors are identified to potentially enhance the performance of the GNSS/IRS solution in 
terms of accuracy: WSS, odometers and LIDAR.  
6.1.3. Review of GNSS/IRS coupling techniques  
This section presents the different existing GNSS/IRS coupling techniques and selects the 
coupling techniques used in the PVT solution considered in this thesis. Three main coupling 
architectures can be considered: 
- Ultra-tight coupling techniques wherein, for example, IRS estimates are used to aid the 
GPS receiver delay and phase lock loops [Li, 2009]. 
- Tight coupling techniques that use GNSS pseudo-range measurements to estimate the slow 
time varying growth of the inertial position error vector by means of a Kalman filter 
[Diesel, 1995]. 
- Loose coupling techniques where GNSS position and velocity are used to estimate the IRS 
position errors [Kubrak, 2008]. 
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Ultra-tight techniques generally require complex modifications in the signal processing blocks 
of the GNSS receiver. In the framework of this project, it is preferred to propose a positioning 
algorithm that does not require modifying the core of the GNSS receiver and the tracking 
loops. For this reason, ultra-tight techniques are not retained for the application.  
Conversely, loose coupling techniques are simple to implement but present several 
drawbacks. Firstly, they cannot be used when the number of visible satellites falls under five 
satellites since the GNSS estimated position velocity and time are used as measurements in 
the fusion Kalman filter. However, this does not represent a significant drawback for the 
application since two separate satellite constellations are considered and airport environments 
are not obstructive environments. Secondly, they generally present suboptimal performance in 
terms of accuracy compared to the tight-coupling techniques [Farrell et al., 1999] [Kubrak, 
2008]. Among the reasons that explain this sub-optimality, the GPS position error 
components are correlated to each other. The cross covariance must be implemented in the 
Kalman filter but are generally unknown by the user [Farrell et al., 1999]. This may lead to 
relatively poor accuracy performance of the loose coupling techniques. 
Tight coupling techniques are commonly used in commercial aircraft [Diesel, 1995]. They 
generally present better performance than loose coupling techniques but at the expense of a 
higher complexity.  Tight coupling techniques are selected for the application. There is no 
limitation on the number of satellites in visibility with this coupling strategy. Nonlinear 
pseudo-range information are used as measurements.  
In addition, tight coupling algorithms can operate in open-loop or closed-loop modes. In the 
open-loop mode, the INS operates independently of the GNSS measurements. Hence, there is 
no risk of propagating error modes from one senor to the other. The main drawback of the 
open-loop mode is that no compensation or calibration of the inertial sensor or altitude error 
sources are performed by a GNSS feedback. Hence, due to the inertial drift, the inertial 
mechanization model implemented in the Kalman filter can suffer from non-linearities during 
long flights, and the filter may potentially diverge.  
In the closed-loop mode, a feedback loop is used to correct the inertial sensor outputs using 
the error estimates obtained from the Kalman filter. The main advantage of the close-loop 
mode is that the inertial position, attitude angles and velocity errors do not grow rapidly in the 
time domain, as it can be observed with the open-loop mode. The linearization of the inertial 
error model is more accurate when the inertial position, velocity and attitude angles are small. 
The main disadvantage is that, in case of large GNSS measurement errors, the calibration of 
the inertial sensors by the GNSS feedback in the closed-loop scheme is degraded until the end 
of the flight. There is thus a risk of propagating error modes from one sensor to the other.  
In the application considered in the thesis, the inertial errors will remain relatively small 
during the operation. Indeed, the exposure time of the taxi operations is only few minutes, and 
the inertial sensors used to estimate the aircraft position have good performance. As an 
illustration, the horizontal inertial position errors after a taxi operation with the inertial 
sensors considered in the thesis will be several decimeters.  Hence, even in the open-loop 
mode, the linearity of the inertial error model implemented in the Kalman filter will be 
maintained for the application. For this reason, a tight-coupling algorithm that operates in 
open-loop mode can be considered in this thesis.  
6.1.4. Synthesis 
In this thesis, a GNSS/IRS tight coupling technique is considered. It operates in the open-loop 
mode. The GNSS pseudo-range measurements are used to estimate the slow varying growing 
inertial position error vector. This position error vector estimate is performed by means of a 
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Kalman filter. The inertial position estimate is then corrected by the inertial position error 
vector estimate, and this corrected position estimate is called “GNSS/IRS position estimate”.  
6.2. GNSS/IRS/DEM position error computation  
It is shown in Section 6.1.3 that the proposed GNSS-based positioning technique is a 
GNSS/IRS tight coupling technique. In order to investigate the performance of such an 
algorithm, a Matlab software aiming to compute the positioning error vector at the output the 
coupling algorithm has been implemented. The general structure of this software is provided 
in Figure 6-1. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-1: Architecture of the GNSS/IRS/DEM positioning error simulator 
 
As depicted in the Figure 6-1, five main modules are implemented in the software, namely the 
trajectory simulator module, the GNSS module, the inertial module, the Digital Elevation 
Map (DEM) module and the Kalman filter module. A brief description of each module is 
provided below. 
6.2.1. Trajectory simulator module 
A trajectory simulator is implemented in order to compute: 
- The true Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) position and the true IMU velocity vector, 
- The true aircraft attitude angles, 
- The true GNSS receiver antenna position, 
along a specific taxi operation in a given airport. The true IMU position and velocity vectors 
are firstly computed in the North East Down (NED) coordinate frame centered on the first 
point of the trajectory and presented in Appendix F. Since the airport surface is considered as 
a horizontal plane (see Section 5.1.2.2.2), both pitch and roll angles are considered as zero 
along the operation. Raised cosine functions are used to represent the continuous evolution of 
the yaw angle and of the aircraft speed along the operation. The true IMU position is then 
converted to geodetic coordinates (the Latitude Longitude Altitude-LLA) reference frame. 
The true IMU position in LLA, the yaw angle and the relative position of the IMU with 
CHAPTER 6: GNSS-based positioning algorithm  
 
124 
 
respect to the GNSS receiver antenna allow computing the true GNSS receiver antenna 
position in LLA along the operation. The true IMU and GNSS receiver antenna positions, the 
true IMU velocity vector and the true yaw angle are computed with a sampling frequency of 
5Hz, that is a typical sampling frequency used in GNSS/IRS tight coupling Kalman filters in 
commercial aircraft.  
6.2.2. GNSS module 
A GNSS module is implemented so as to compute the GNSS pseudo-range measurements 
injected in the Kalman filter in order to determine the GNSS/IRS position estimate. The 
GNSS pseudo-range measurements used in commercial aircraft to be hybridized with the IRS 
outputs are not smoothed by the code-carrier smoothing filter since the Kalman filter itself 
induces a smoothing on the position estimate. Hence raw code GNSS pseudo-range 
measurements are generated by the GNSS module. The GNSS measurements are computed 
with a sampling frequency of 5Hz. The methodology used to simulate these GNSS 
measurements is sketched in Figure 6-2. 
 
 
 
Figure 6-2: General architecture of the GNSS module 
 
6.2.2.1. GNSS satellite position computation 
The first step consists in computing the GPS and Galileo satellite positions based on the 
almanac data. An optimized 24 satellite GPS constellation [RTCA, 2006] and a 27 satellite 
Galileo constellation [EUROCAE, 2010] are considered in the simulator. The GNSS satellites 
are considered to be stationary during the trajectory, as justified in Section 5.1.2.1. By 
denoting    and      the first and last time instants of the considered trajectory respectively, 
the GNSS satellite positions are computed at epoch    and are considered to be constant in the 
time interval [       ], that is to say during the trajectory. 
6.2.2.2. GNSS satellites used in the PVT solution 
The second step consists in selecting the GNSS pseudo-range measurements that will be used 
in the PVT solution at each time epoch    [       ].    is a discrete time instant sampled at 
   . A GNSS satellite   is used in the PVT solution at time epoch    if the three following 
conditions are met: 
- The visibility test is passed, that is to say the elevation angle of satellite j is above the 
elevation mask angle   . The minimal mask angle set to 5° in [RTCA, 2006] for GPS 
satellites and is set to 10° for Galileo satellites [EUROCAE, 2010]. These mask angles can 
be easily increased in the software since they are considered to be software inputs. The 
effect of the satellite elevation mask angle on the accuracy of the horizontal position error 
is further discussed in Chapter 7. 
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- The GNSS receiver antenna receives the LOS signal from satellite   at   . Three situations 
can be distinguished, depending on the nature of the GNSS signals from satellite    
reaching the GNSS receiver antenna. In the first situation, the LOS and the NLOS are 
received by the GNSS receiver antenna. In second situation, the LOS and NLOS signals 
are not received by the GNSS receiver antenna. The satellite is not used in the PVT 
solution. In third situation, NLOS signals are received by the GNSS receiver antenna and 
the LOS signal is not received. The satellite is not used in the PVT solution.  Indeed, in this 
thesis, it is considered that detection techniques are implemented in the GNSS receiver in 
order to detect the reception of NLOS signals in the absence of the LOS signal. It is 
assumed that NLOS GNSS measurements are detected and excluded from the PVT 
solution. Among the existing detection techniques, some solutions are based on the 
monitoring of the received signal-to-noise ratio [Groves et al., 2013], some solutions use 
an antenna array to measure the angle of arrival of the received signals [Xiong, 1998], 
some techniques use a 3D model of the environment to detect NLOS signals [Bourdeau et 
al., 2012] [Peyraud et al., 2013] [Wang et al., 2013].   
- The C/N0 ratio of the total (pilot+data) GPSL1C signal (or GalileoE1 signal) received 
from satellite j at    is above the GPSL1C (or GalileoE1) minimal C/N0 ratio required for 
the demodulation, acquisition and tracking steps and detailed in [Julien 2010]. If it is the 
case, and if the C/N0 ratio of the total (pilot+data) GPSL5 signal (or GalileoE5a signal) 
received from satellite j at    is above the GPSL5 (or GalileoE5a) minimal C/N0 ratio 
required for the demodulation, acquisition and tracking steps and detailed in [RTCA, 2004] 
[EUROCAE, 2010], the dual-frequency L1/L5 GNSS pseudo-range measurement from 
satellite   is used in the PVT solution. If the C/N0 test is passed only by the L1 signal 
received from the visible satellite  , the single-frequency L1 GNSS pseudo-range 
measurement from satellite   is used in the PVT solution. The C/N0 ratios of the signals 
received from each visible GNSS satellite at    are obtained considering that the GNSS 
receiver antenna only receives the LOS signal. The link budget used to derive the C/N0 
ratios is fully described in Appendix D.   
One of the main limitations relating to the GNSS/IRS position generator is that the impact of 
multipath on the C/N0 ratios is not taken into account in the link budget used to compute the 
C/N0 ratios and developed in Appendix D. This has two main consequences. 
- Firstly, the potential loss of track of L1 and/or L5 signals due to the effects of multipath is 
not considered in this thesis.  
- Secondly, the increase of the standard deviation of the receiver noise error        of a 
GNSS measurement induced by a reduction of the C/N0 ratio due to multipath on that 
GNSS measurement is not considered in this thesis. A preliminary analysis reveals that 
C/N0 reductions induced by multipath are not expected to have a significant impact on the 
standard deviation of the receiver noise ranging errors and on the standard deviation of the 
UERE. There are two reasons for this.  
 Firstly, a preliminary analysis shows that most of the C/N0 ratios computed based on 
Appendix D are comprised in the interval [40dB-Hz;45dB-Hz] If multipath induces a 
reduction of the C/N0 of few dB-Hz, the C/N0 ratios will be mostly comprised in the 
interval [35dB-Hz;45dB-Hz]  The function that relates        to C/N0 is roughly 
constant (centimetre-level variations) for       [35dB-Hz;45dB-Hz], regardless of the 
GNSS signals considered in this Chapter (GPSL1C, GPSL5, GalileoE1 and 
GalileoE5a). This can be observed in Figure 3-4. Hence, the        is not expected to be 
significantly affected by multipath. 
 Secondly,        for       [35dB-Hz;45dB-Hz] are few centimeters, regardless of the 
GNSS signals considered in this Chapter. In comparison, the standard deviation of the 
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ranging error induced by the satellite clock and ephemeris inaccuracies is          
    . Consequently, the standard deviation of the UERE is not dominated by the 
receiver noise effects.  
To conclude, a first analysis reveals that the impact of the multipath on the C/N0 ratios is not 
expected to have a significant impact on the standard deviation of the UERE. However, 
further investigations are required to assess the reduction of the C/N0 and to validate this first 
analysis. 
6.2.2.3. GNSS measurement computation 
The third step consists in generating GNSS raw code pseudo range measurements at each time 
epoch    [       ]. GNSS measurements are generated based on the true GNSS receiver 
antenna position at   , on the GNSS satellite positions during the trajectory and on the GNSS 
raw code pseudo range measurement error models described in Section 3.2.1 and in Chapter 
5. Assuming that   GNSS raw code pseudo range measurements are used in the Kalman filter 
at time   , the GNSS measurement vector generated at time    by the GNSS module is: 
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        (  )   (  )         (  )          (  )
           (  )          (  )       (  ) 
 
 
 
Eq -  6-1 
 
where: 
        (  ) is the true range between satellite “j” and the GNSS airborne antenna at time   , 
  (  ) is the receiver clock offset at time   . The receiver clock offsets are generated 
assuming that the airborne GNSS receiver is equipped with a TCXO clock. Clock errors 
are generated from the differential technique developed in [Winkel, 2000]. 
        (  ),         (  ),           (  ),         (  ) are the raw code nominal ionosphere, 
troposphere, satellite clock and ephemeris, receiver thermal noise errors between satellite   
and the GNSS airborne antenna at time   , 
      (  ) is the raw code multipath error between satellite   and the GNSS airborne antenna 
at time   . 
The impact of multipath on the C/N0 ratios is not taken into account in the link budget used to 
compute the C/N0 ratios. Hence, the increase of the standard deviation of the thermal noise 
code ranging error due to the effects of multipath is not considered in this thesis.  
6.2.3. Inertial module 
An inertial module is implemented so as to compute: 
- The IRS position and velocity estimates of the IMU in LLA and in the NED navigation 
frame, 
- The IRS Euler angle estimates. 
CHAPTER 6: GNSS-based positioning algorithm  
 
127 
 
6.2.3.1. IMU module 
The first step consists in computing the accelerometer and gyroscope measurements through 
the IMU module. This module has been implemented in the framework of a PhD project 
[Vézinet, 2013]. The accelerometer measurements are defined as the absolute non-
gravitational acceleration of the aircraft expressed in the aircraft body frame (b) presented in 
Appendix F. The gyroscope measurements are defined as the absolute angular velocity of the 
aircraft expressed in the aircraft body frame (b). The IMU module firstly computes the ideal 
accelerometer and gyroscope measurements from the true IMU position and velocity as well 
as from the true aircraft Euler angles computed in the trajectory simulator module. The IMU 
mechanization is not detailed in this document and further details about these computations 
are provided in [Farrell et al., 1999] and [Escher, 2003]. Since typical sampling frequencies of 
the IMU and IRS modules are few hundreds of Hz in commercial aircraft, the trajectory 
simulator outputs are oversampled at       at the IMU module input. Secondly, The IMU 
module computes the non-ideal accelerometer and gyroscope measurements by considering 
several typical sources of errors affecting the accelerometer and gyroscope measurements that 
are [Kayton et al., 1996]: 
- The measurement noise. The white random noise error vector is denoted as      in the 
following. 
- The measurement bias on the measured acceleration or angular rate. This bias can be 
caused by an error in the initial bias estimation and/or uncompensated temperature 
fluctuations. The measurement bias is denoted as      in the following.  
- The misalignment error due to the alignment of the measurement axes from the orthogonal 
platform axes. The misalignment matrix is denoted as     in the following. 
- The error in the calibrated gyroscope or accelerometer scale factor. The scale factor error 
matrix is denoted as        in the following. 
The inertial measurement error models used in the described IMU module have been 
extracted from the outputs of another ENAC/Airbus PhD project that partly focuses on the 
accelerometer and gyroscope measurement error models [Vézinet, 2013]. The measured 
absolute non-gravitational acceleration or angular velocity of the aircraft expressed in the 
body frame at time    is: 
 
     (  )      (  )      (  )      (           )     (  ) 
 
Eq -  6-2 
 
where: 
       represents the ideal acceleration or the ideal angular velocity of the aircraft at   . 
      represents the non-ideal acceleration or angular velocity measurements at   .   
     (  ) is modelled as a zero-mean three dimensional Gaussian distribution  [Vézinet, 
2013]:     (  )  ([
 
 
 
]  [
  
   
   
  
    
 
]), 
     (  ) is modeled by a three dimensional first-order Gauss-Markov process [Vézinet, 
2013]: 
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Eq -  6-3 
 
 
where: 
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    is the initial time epoch of the simulation, 
       ( 
  
    
) 
      is the correlation time related to the Gauss-Markov process, 
    is the sampling period of the inertial sensor measurements, 
       (  ) is modelled as a zero-mean three dimensional Gaussian distribution  [Vézinet, 
2013]:        (  )  ([
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.                         are modelled as 
uniform distributions [Vézinet, 2013] in the misalignment interval      , 
        [
          
          
          
] .         ,          and          are modelled as 
uniform distribution [Vézinet, 2013] in the scale factor uncertainty interval   .  
The values of the parameters describing the error terms used in the simulator cannot be 
published in this thesis since these values come from an Airbus supplier and are protected by 
copyright. 
6.2.3.2. IRS module 
The second step consists in computing the inertial position and velocity estimates of the IMU 
and the inertial Euler angle estimates based on the accelerometer and gyroscope 
measurements through the IRS module. This module has been implemented in the framework 
of another Ph.D. thesis [Escher, 2003]. The IRS mechanization is not detailed in this 
document and further details about these computations are provided in [Escher, 2003].  
An important remark is that, when the IRS estimates the IMU position based in the inertial 
measurements, the vertical position error may grow in the time domain. This phenomenon is 
frequently referred to as “vertical channel divergence” in the literature. The vertical channel 
of the IRS platform may be stabilized by means of a baro-aiding technique that use both 
inertial measurements and baro-altimeter measurements to bound the vertical channel error 
within limits [Kayton et al., 1996] [Dadu et al., 2007]. Due to the relatively poor performance 
of baro-altimeters (0.06% full scale, or, equivalently, few meters accuracy [Honeywell, 
2010]) compared to the navigation solution accuracy performance required for the application, a 
Digital Elevation Map (DEM) is used in the navigation algorithm to estimate the terrain 
altitude. The inertial vertical channel is bounded by a third-order loop described in [Vézinet, 
2013]. The DEM module is presented in the next section. 
The inertial position, velocity and attitude angle estimates are finally under sampled to reach a 
sampling frequency of     that is the sampling frequency adopted in the GNSS/IRS/DEM 
tight coupling Kalman filter.   
6.2.4. Digital Elevation Map module 
The terrain altitude estimated by the DEM at time    is generated as follows: 
 
      (  )        (  )      (  ) Eq -  6-4 
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where: 
        represents the ideal IMU altitude at   .  
     (  )  is the altitude noise error at time    and is assumed to be over bounded by a zero-
mean Gaussian distribution [Salos, 2012].  
The distribution of the altitude error at the scale of the airport is complex to assess. The 
altitude error will vary smoothly at the scale of the airport, meaning that the altitude error is 
spatially correlated at the scale of the airport. In addition, altitude errors can be biased. In 
order to represent the error by a simple and conservative model, the altitude error distribution 
at the scale of the airport can be over-bounded by a zero-mean normal distribution 
characterized by a standard deviation     . The values of      are further discussed below. 
The accuracy of DEM depends on production steps from the photogrammetric or LIDAR-
generated mass points to the DEM generation. The vertical accuracy of elevation models is 
also a function of horizontal resolution [NDEP, 2004]. By denoting      the standard 
deviation of the altitude noise error,             for a horizontal contour interval of 1ft 
and reaches 7.5m for a horizontal contour interval of 80ft [NDEP, 2004]. It is chosen to take a 
medium vertical accuracy of        . This corresponds to a commercialized DEM 
[Intermap, 2012]. 
6.2.5. Kalman filter module 
A Kalman filter module is implemented so as to estimate the slowly varying inertial 
estimation errors. GNSS raw code pseudo range measurements are used to estimate the 
inertial estimation errors. The coupling technique is a tight coupling, wherein INS outputs are 
integrated with GNSS measurements in a Kalman filter. The IMU position and velocity as 
well as the aircraft Euler angle estimated by the INS module are then corrected by the inertial 
error estimates. This section presents the Kalman filter architecture used to estimate the 
inertial estimation errors.  
6.2.5.1. Nonlinear to linearized system model  
The Kalman filter model consists in two subsystems: a dynamics subsystem and a 
measurement subsystem. Let’s denote  ( ) the vector comprised of the position, velocity and 
attitude as well as sensor measurements at time  , as if they were provided by an ideal IRS 
platform. The dynamics model relates  ( ) to  ̇( ) and this describes the time evolution of 
 ( ). Let’s denote  ( ) the vector made of the GNSS pseudo-range measurements at time  : 
 ( )  
[
 
 
 
 
      ( )
 
       ( )
 
      ( )]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eq -  6-5 
 
The measurement model relates  ( ) to  ( ). Both dynamic and measurement models are 
given as follows: 
 
 ̇( )   ( ( )  )    ( ) 
 ( )   ( ( )  )    ( ) 
Eq -  6-6 
 
 
where: 
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    is the state noise vector. 
    is the observation noise vector. 
Both dynamic and measurement models are nonlinear models [Farrell et al., 1999]. In order to 
use the Kalman filter to estimate the position, it is firstly necessary to linearize the system 
model. As done in [Farrell et al., 1999], let’s define a reference trajectory  ̅ satisfying: 
 
 ̇̅( )   ( ̅( )  ) 
 ̅( )   ( ̅( )  ) 
Eq -  6-7 
 
Let’s state: 
 
 ( )   ̅( )    ( ) 
 ( )   ̅( )    ( ) 
Eq -  6-8 
 
 
  ( ) is expected to be small during the operation. It is demonstrated in [Farrell et al., 1999] 
that the system model can be defined by the following linear continuous model: 
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Eq -  6-9 
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Eq -  6-10 
 
After discretization, the dynamics model equation and the measurement model equation are, 
respectively: 
 
  ̇(  )   (    )  (    )    (  ) 
  (  )   (  )  (  )    (  ) 
 
Eq -  6-11 
 
 
where: 
   (  ) is the observation vector defined as the difference between the GNSS pseudo-range 
measurements   and ranges calculated between the reference trajectory position and the 
tracked satellites position  ̅. 
   is the linearized transition matrix in discrete time. 
   is the linearized observation matrix also known as design matrix in discrete time. 
   (  ) is the state vector in discrete time. It consists in the inertial position errors, the 
inertial velocity errors, the inertial attitude errors and sensors measurement errors. Three 
types of states are also added to the state vector: the receiver clock bias, the receiver clock 
drift, and the long term GNSS correlated ranging errors.  
The state vector is further detailed in the next section.  
6.2.5.2. State vector 
The errors estimated in the Kalman filter are classified as follows: 
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- The inertial navigation errors, that are the inertial position error, the inertial velocity error, 
and the inertial Euler angle errors, 
- The inertial measurement errors, that are the accelerometer and gyroscope errors, 
- The errors affecting GNSS measurements, that are GNSS receiver clock bias and drift and 
the long term correlated errors. From Section 3.2.1, in the dual frequency configuration, 
the GNSS ranging errors are affected by two kinds of long-term correlated errors: the 
troposphere errors and the errors due to inaccuracies in the broadcast satellite clock 
corrections and ephemeris. In nominal conditions, the inaccuracies in the broadcast 
satellite clock corrections and ephemeris are the dominant source of long-term correlated 
errors since the standard deviation of the satellite clock and ephemeris errors is higher than 
the standard deviation of the troposphere errors. Further details about the standard 
deviation of the nominal satellite clock and ephemeris errors and of the nominal 
troposphere errors are provided in Section 3.2.1. For this reason, the Kalman filter is 
calibrated so as to estimate long term correlated ranging errors due to inaccuracies in the 
broadcast satellite clock corrections and ephemeris. Note that a more optimal approach 
would be to design the filter so as to estimate also the troposphere residual errors in the 
correlated ranging errors states. The design of such as filter remains as future work. 
Let’s assume that   raw code GNSS pseudo range measurements are used by the Kalman 
filter at time   to estimate the inertial estimation errors. The state vector at time   is formed by 
the quantities to estimate and is: 
 
  (  ) 
 [  (  )   (  )   (  )   (  )   (  )  (  )  (  )         (  )]  
 
Eq -  6-12 
 
 
where: 
   (  )  [    ( )     ( )]
  is the IRS horizontal position error vector in the wander 
azimuth navigation reference frame at time   , 
   (  )  [    (  )     (  )]
  is the IRS horizontal velocity error vector in the wander 
azimuth navigation reference frame at time   , 
   (  )  [    (  )       (  )       (  )]
 
 is the IRS alignment errors vector in the  
wander azimuth navigation reference frame at time  , 
   (  )  [     (  )       (  )        (  )]
 
 is the gyrsoscope error vector in the aircraft 
body reference frame at time  , 
   (  )  [      (  )        (  ) ]
 
 is the horizontal accelerometer error vector in the aircraft 
body reference frame at time   
  (  ) and  (  ) are the GNSS receiver clock bias and drift at time   . In this thesis, it is 
assumed that the inter-system time shift between the GPS and Galileo times is known in 
the dual-constellation GPS/Galileo receiver. Hence, the receiver clock bias and drift are 
estimated for both GPS and Galileo measurements. If the inter-system time shift were 
unknown, a clock bias and a clock drift would have been evaluated separately for the GPS 
measurements and for the Galileo measurements.  
         (  )  [          (  )             (  )            (  )]
 
 is the long term 
correlated raw code GNSS ranging errors vector due to inaccuracies in the broadcast 
satellite clock corrections and ephemeris at time   . 
The inertial position, velocity and attitude angle error estimates are expressed in the wander 
azimuth reference frame that is defined in Appendix F. The aircraft body reference frame is 
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also presented in Appendix F. The next section explains how the state vector is estimated by 
means of a Kalman filter.  
6.2.5.3. State vector estimation  
The Kalman filter computes the estimated state vector components by taking into account: 
- The a priori dynamics of the unknown states, 
- Information provided by the GNSS measurements.  
The system is thus characterized by two models: a dynamic model, also called the state 
transition model and a measurement model. Both models are presented in Eq -  6-11. The 
Kalman filter computes at each time epoch    the estimate of the state vector from all GNSS 
measurements from    to   . The state vector estimate is denoted as: 
 
  ̂ (  )   [  (  )     (  )   (  )] 
 
Eq -  6-13 
The Kalman filter computes   ̂ (  ) in two steps:  
 
- The prediction step determines the state vector at time    knowing all the observations 
from time    to time      by means of the state transition model equation. This prediction is 
the a priori state vector estimate and is denoted as: 
 
 
  ̂ (  )   [  (  )    (  )   (    )] Eq -  6-14 
 
 
- The estimation step determines the state vector at time    by correcting the former 
prediction by taking into account the information provided by the observation   (  ). 
The Kalman filter extension to nonlinear system models is provided in Table 6-1. The 
following notations are used: 
   (  ) represents the predicted covariance matrix of the a priori estimation error. 
   (  ) represents the estimated covariance matrix of the estimation error. 
  (  ) represents the predicted covariance matrix of the state noise vector at time   : 
 
 (  )     [  (  )] Eq -  6-15 
  (  ) represents the predicted covariance matrix of the measurement noise vector at time 
  : 
 
 (  )     [  (  )] Eq -  6-16 
  (  ) and  (  ) are the innovation vector and the Kalman gain matrix at time   . 
The equations provided in Table 6-1 are implemented using one of the following techniques 
[Farrell et al., 1999]. 
- In the linearized Kalman filter implementation,  ̅( ) is a predetermined trajectory. The 
GNSS measurements do not affect the calculations of  ,  ,   or  . 
- In the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) implementation,  ̅( ) is the estimated trajectory that 
is the predetermined trajectory corrected by the state vector estimated by the Kalman filter. 
The design matrix   is linearized around the estimated trajectory and does depend on the 
GNSS measurements. The GNSS measurements also affect the calculations of   and  . 
In the EKF implementation, and if the estimated trajectory is near the actual trajectory, the 
linearization of the Kalman matrices will be good and the state estimate will be good. In this 
case, the EKF may produce better performance than the linearized Kalman filter. If the 
estimated trajectory is far from the actual trajectory, the linearization of the Kalman matrices 
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will be inaccurate and the state estimate will be degraded. The EKF is thus riskier than the 
linearized Kalman filter when large GNSS ranging errors make the state estimation 
inaccurate. In this case, the EKF may produce worse performance than the linearized Kalman 
filter. 
In the application, the aircraft may be affected by severe multipath ranging errors (few tens of 
meters amplitude), specifically during the taxi on taxi lane operation. This is underlined in 
Chapter 5. Hence, the linearized Kalman filter implementation is chosen for this thesis. The 
possibility of using an EKF and the comparison between both linearized and EKF 
implementations remains as future work.  
Initialization  Initial estimates of   ̂
 (  ),  
 (  ) 
Measurement 
update 
  (  )   
 (  ) (  )
 [ (  ) 
 (  ) (  )
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 (  ) 
Time propagation 
   ̂ (    )   (  )  ̂
 (  ) 
   (    )   (  ) 
 (  ) (  )   (    ) 
Definitions 
  ̅ is the reference trajectory around which the transition and 
design matrix are linearized 
  ̅( )   ( ̅( )  ) 
  (  ) is the linearized transition matrix in discrete time. The 
linearized continuous transition matrix is: 
 ( )  
  
  
|
 ( )  ̅( )
 
  (  ) is the linearized design matrix in discrete time. The 
linearized design transition matrix is: 
 ( )  
  
  
|
 ( )  ̅( )
 
 
Table 6-1: Extension of Kalman filter equations to non-linear systems [Farrell et al., 
1999] 
The next paragraph presents the implementation of the state transition model matrices. 
6.2.5.4. State transition model matrices 
Since it is assumed that the GNSS measurement errors, the receiver clock/drift, and the 
inertial errors are independent of each other, the state transition matrix and the predicted state 
noise covariance matrix are implemented as follows: 
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Eq -  6-17 
 
Presentation of     and    
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   is the       sub state transition matrix that represents the a priori dynamics of the first 
12 components of     that are the inertial navigation errors, the inertial measurement errors. 
The model of the continuous    matrix is as follows [Farrell et al., 1999] [Diesel, 1995]: 
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Eq -  6-18 
 
The wander azimuth mechanization used to compute the sub-matrices of    is described in 
[Diesel, 1995].            and               represent the a-priori dynamics of the gyroscope and 
accelerometer measurement biases. The correlation times of the gyroscope and accelerometer 
biases used in the Kalman filter for the implementation of            and               are the 
correlation times used to generate the gyroscope and accelerometer biases.    is then 
discretized. The discretization process is based on Taylor series approximations and is if fully 
described in [Escher, 2003]. 
   is the       sub state noise covariance matrix that represents the predicted covariance 
of the first 12 components of the state noise vector denoted as     . More specifically,     is 
the predicted covariance matrix of the error made in the prediction of the first 12 lines of the 
state vector. The prediction errors may come from two main error sources. Firstly, there are 
the linearization and integration processes used in the prediction mechanization of the error 
state. Secondly, there are the inertial sensor measurement errors that are not estimated by the 
Kalman filter and that affect the prediction of the state vector. In the continuous domain,    is 
given by: 
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Eq -  6-19 
 
 
   is then discretized. The discretization process is based on Taylor series approximations 
and is if fully described in [Escher, 2003]. In Eq -  6-19: 
-    is the predicted covariance matrix of the error    made in the prediction of the 
horizontal positioning error. Since the predicted horizontal positioning error is a linear 
function of the horizontal velocity error, the prediction of the horizontal positioning error is 
not affected by any linearization effects. Hence,     .  
-     is the predicted covariance matrix of the error             made in the prediction of 
the horizontal velocity error.    represents the error in the prediction of the horizontal 
velocity error due to the linearization and integration processes used in the prediction of 
the velocity error. In addition,          represents the error in the prediction of the 
horizontal velocity error due to the integration of the accelerometer measurement noise. 
    has been implemented by using the covariance matrix of the accelerometer 
measurement noise error developed in Eq -  6-2. This covariance matrix has been 
voluntarily inflated by a factor 106 in order to include the errors in the velocity error 
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prediction due to the integration of the residual accelerometer measurement biases that 
have not been estimated by the Kalman filter.  
-      is the predicted covariance matrix of the error            made in the prediction of 
the attitude angle errors. As done for    ,     has been implemented by using the 
covariance matrix of the gyroscope measurement noise error developed in Eq -  6-2. This 
covariance matrix has been voluntarily inflated by a factor 104 in order to include the errors 
in the attitude angle error prediction due to the integration of the residual gyroscope 
measurement biases that have not been estimated by the Kalman filter.  
-     is the predicted covariance matrix of the error      made in the prediction of the 
gyroscope bias.     has been implemented by using the covariance matrix of the same 
order of magnitude than the covariance matrix of the gyroscope measurement bias 
developed in Eq -  6-3.  
-      is the predicted covariance matrix of the error      made in the prediction of the 
accelerometer bias.     has been implemented by using the covariance matrix of the same 
order of magnitude than the covariance matrix of the accelerometer measurement bias 
developed in Eq -  6-3.  
 
Presentation of    and    
   is the     sub state transition matrix that represents the a priori dynamics of the GNSS 
receiver clock bias and drift. The model of the continuous    matrix is as follows: 
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Eq -  6-20 
 
 
   is the predicted covariance matrix of the error vector      that corresponds to the errors 
made in the prediction of receiver clock bias and drift. The discrete covariance matrix     is 
as follows: 
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] 
 
Eq -  6-21 
 
 
where     ,     ,     ,     are developed in [Brown et al., 1994].     ,     ,     ,     depend 
on the quality of the local oscillator that is characterized by the Allan constants. The Allan 
constants for the TCXO receiver clocks are provided in [Winkel, 2000].  
Presentation of    and    
   is the      sub state transition matrix that represents the a priori dynamics of the last   
raw code pseudo-range measurement errors due to inaccuracies in the satellite clock 
corrections and ephemeris. Assuming that the Kalman filter perfectly knows the dynamics of 
correlated long-term ranging errors due to inaccuracies in the satellite clock corrections and 
ephemeris, the discrete    matrix is as follows: 
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Eq -  6-22 
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where: 
          is the sampling period of the discretized Kalman filter, 
 A correlation time                is implemented.  
   is the predicted covariance matrix of the error vector    that corresponds to the errors 
made in the prediction of long-term GNSS ranging errors. The discrete covariance matrix is as 
follows   : 
 
   [
(    )           
   
  (    )         
] 
 
Eq -  6-23 
 
 
where: 
   and          are defined in Section 3.2.1.3.  
The next paragraph presents the implementation of the observation model matrices. 
6.2.5.5. Measurement model matrices 
The design matrix implementation is described in [Diesel, 1995]. The measurement noise 
covariance matrix at time    is implemented by assuming that the sources of raw code ranging 
errors are independent to each other at time   : 
 
 (  )  
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   (  )
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Eq -  6-24 
 
where: 
       (  )
  is the expected variance of the raw code pseudo range measurement error on 
satellite   at time   . It is assumed that the Kalman filter perfectly knows the standard 
deviation of the troposphere, ionosphere, satellite clock and ephemeris and thermal 
receiver noise errors affecting the pseudo-range measurement from satellite     to the 
GNSS receiver antenna at time   . It is also assumed that the Kalman filter has no 
information on the multipath ranging error standard deviation during surface operations. 
Hence, the measurement noise variance on satellite      at     is implemented as: 
   (  )
         (  )
          (  )
            
          (  )
  
        (  ) is the standard deviation of the nominal ionosphere raw code ranging error used 
to generate the ionosphere ranging error on satellite   at time   , 
         (  ) is the standard deviation of the nominal troposphere raw code ranging error 
used to generate the troposphere ranging error on satellite   at time   , 
           
         , 
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         (  )
  is the standard deviation of the nominal receiver thermal noise raw code 
ranging error used to generate the noise ranging error on satellite   at time   .  
Note that it has been decided to include the standard deviation of the ranging errors induced 
by the satellite clock and ephemeris inaccuracies in the matrix  . This is because these 
ranging errors are not entirely estimated by the filter and removed from the ranging 
measurements. Hence,   a conservative model of the actual covariance matrix of the code 
ranging error vector.  
6.3. Conclusions 
This chapter has selected the architecture of a GNSS-based positioning algorithm suitable to 
support the navigation performance requirements related to the guidance function during taxi 
operations under low visibility conditions. The selected PVT solution is a GNSS/IRS/DEM 
tight coupling algorithm wherein GNSS raw code pseudo range measurements are used in a 
Kalman filter to estimate the inertial position estimate errors. In order to analyze the 
performance of this coupling algorithm in terms of accuracy and to provide a model of the 
positioning error at the output of this PVT solution, a Matlab software is implemented. This 
software simulates the positioning errors at the PVT solution output and is composed of four 
main modules: 
- The trajectory module simulates the true aircraft trajectory, velocity and attitude during 
taxi operations, 
- The GNSS module directly generates the GNSS measurements used by the Kalman filter 
to estimate the inertial position errors. The GNSS pseudo-range measurements are affected 
by errors whose models are provided in Chapters 3 and 5 of this thesis. The main limitation 
of the implemented software is that the effects of multipath on the C/N0 of the tracked 
GNSS signals are not taken into account in the code. This has two consequences. Firstly, 
the potential loss of tracking of GNSS signals due to multipath in airport environments are 
not taken into account in the GNSS module. Secondly, the degradation of the receiver 
thermal noise ranging error standard deviation due to multipath is not taken into account in 
the GNSS module.  
- The inertial module simulates the accelerometers, gyroscopes measurements and 
estimates the aircraft position, velocity and attitude angles by means of these 
measurements and by means of the terrain altitude estimated by the DEM. 
- The Kalman filter module simulates the inertial position error estimates and the 
GNSS/IRS position estimates. The Kalman filter state transition matrices and measurement 
matrices are implemented assuming that the Kalman filter knows perfectly the correlation 
times of the GNSS ranging errors induced by the satellite clock and ephemeris inaccuracies 
and the correlation times of the gyroscope and accelerometer biases. Note that this is 
another limitation related to the software since real Kalman filters do not have perfect 
knowledge on the system dynamics.  The Kalman filter is also supposed to know the 
variances of the ionosphere, troposphere, satellite clock and ephemeris, and thermal noise 
ranging errors. The Kalman filter is supposed to have no information on the multipath 
ranging errors.  
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  CHAPTER 7 
7. Impact of multipath on the 
position error 
 
 
In order to develop a GNSS-based navigation system capable to support the required 
navigation performance related to the guidance function during the taxi operation under low 
visibility conditions, a GNSS/IRS/DEM tight coupling positioning algorithm is selected for 
the application and is presented in Chapter 6.   
This chapter analyses the impact of the multipath ranging errors on the GNSS/IRS/DEM 
position estimate errors. The multipath ranging errors are modelled using the multipath 
ranging error models adapted to surface operations and presented in Chapter 5. This chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 7.1 recalls the GNSS multipath ranging error models and the 
GNSS measurement error models adapted to airport surface operations and extracted from 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 5. The theoretical impact of the multipath ranging errors on the 
GNSS/IRS position estimate error is derived. Section 7.2 re-uses this theoretical analysis to 
quantify the impact of the GNSS multipath ranging errors on the GNSS/IRS/DEM position 
error.  Section 7.3 analyses the GNSS/IRS/DEM position errors induced by GNSS multipath 
from the airport surface and from the aircraft structure and evaluates the performance of the 
GNSS/IRS position estimate in terms of horizontal accuracy.  
7.1. Theoretical multipath impact on the position error  
7.1.1. Notations  
This section presents the notations that will be used in the rest of the chapter. The navigation 
performance requirements presented in Section 2.3.2.3 for taxi operations are provided in the 
horizontal domain. For this reason, the impact of multipath on the GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal 
position estimate error is investigated. The general architecture of the GNSS/IRS/DEM tight 
coupling positioning algorithm is given in Figure 7-1.  
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Figure 7-1: Architecture of the GNSS/IRS/DEM tight coupling positioning algorithm 
 
Denote  ̂  (  ) the GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position estimate of the IMU at time epoch    
and  (  ) the true horizontal position of the IMU at time epoch   : 
 
 (  )   ̂  (  )    (  ) Eq -  7-1 
 
where   (  ) is the (   ) horizontal GNSS/IRS position estimate error at time epoch   . 
Section 7.1 derives the theoretical impact of the multipath ranging errors on the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position estimate error   . The methodology used to analyze this 
impact is developed in the next section.  
7.1.2. Methodology  
Let’s state: 
  ̂   (  ) the horizontal position estimated by the inertial module at time   , 
   ̂ (  ) the inertial horizontal position error that is estimated by the Kalman filter at time 
  , 
   (  )the true inertial horizontal position error at time   . 
Using these notations, we get: 
 
 ̂  (  )   ̂   (  )    ̂
 (  ) 
 (  )   ̂   (  )    (  ) 
 
Eq -  7-2 
 
From Eq -  7-1, the GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position error at time    is: 
 
  (  )   (  )   ̂  (  ) 
 
Eq -  7-3 
Eq -  7-2 and Eq -  7-3 lead to: 
 
  (  )    (  )    ̂
 (  ) 
 
Eq -  7-4 
From Eq -  7-4,    (  ) can be written as: 
 
  (  )  [  (  )]    [  ̂
 (  )]    [  (  )    ̂
 (  )]    
 
Eq -  7-5 
 
where: 
   (  )is the true state vector at time   , 
   ̂ (  ) is the state vector estimated by the Kalman filter at time   , 
 [ ]    is the (   ) sub-vector of vector [ ] composed of the first two elements of [ ]  
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From Eq -  7-5, and in order to investigate the theoretical impact of multipath on the 
horizontal GNSS/IRS position estimate error, it is proposed to assess the impact of multipath 
on the state vector estimate error   (  )    ̂
 (  ). Based on the following analysis, the 
multipath impact on the expectation and on the covariance of the GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal 
position estimate error is derived. Note that the position estimate error is Gaussian in this 
chapter since the measurement errors are modelled by over-bounding Gaussian distributions 
and since the Kalman filter is a linear filter. Hence, the position estimate error is fully 
characterized by a mean vector and a covariance matrix. For this reason, it is sufficient to 
analyze the multipath impact on the mean vector and on the covariance matrix of the position 
error in order to assess the multipath impact on the position error. 
7.1.3. Multipath impact on the state vector estimate error  
In order to analyze the multipath impact on the state vector estimate error, it is proposed to 
compare: 
- The state vector estimate error that would have been obtained assuming that the GNSS 
pseudo-range measurements at any time    are affected by all error sources (ionosphere 
effects, troposphere effects, receiver noise effects, satellite clock and ephemeris 
inaccuracies, and multipath effects), 
- The state vector estimate error that would have been obtained assuming that the GNSS 
pseudo-range measurements at any time    are only affected by the other error sources 
(ionosphere effects, troposphere effects, receiver noise effects and satellite clock and 
ephemeris inaccuracies) whilst in the absence of multipath effects. 
For this analysis, we state: 
-   ̂ (  ) the state vector estimate at time    assuming that the GNSS pseudo-range 
measurement vector at any time    is: 
 
  (  )   (  )   (  )   (  ) Eq -  7-6 
 
  ̂ (  ) is the estimate of the true state vector   (  ). The GNSS linearized measurement 
model that links   (  ) to  (  ) is: 
 
  (  )   (  )  (  )    (  ) Eq -  7-7 
 
In Eq -  7-6 and Eq -  7-7: 
  (  ) is the zero-mean stochastic GNSS measurement error vector induced by the 
ionosphere effects, the troposphere effects, the receiver noise effects, the satellite 
clock and ephemeris inaccuracies. 
  (  ) is the deterministic GNSS measurement error vector induced by multipath. As 
discussed in Chapter 5,  (  ) is the multipath error component induced by the ground 
first-order interactions.  
  (  ) is the stochastic GNSS measurement error vector induced by multipath. As 
discussed in Chapter 5,  (  ) is the multipath error component induced by the 
obstacles first and second-order interactions.  (  ) is a zero-mean error vector. 
   (  ) is the observation vector obtained when the GNSS measurements are affected 
by all error sources, including multipath. 
In Eq -  7-6, the total ranging error is assumed to be the sum of the ranging errors due to 
all error contributors. Eq -  7-6 is true if it is considered that the tracking loops can be 
approximated by linear models. This assumption is valid since the ranging errors standard 
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deviations of the different contributors of errors are sufficiently low regarding the 
parameters of the tracking loops.  
-   ̂      (  ) the state vector estimate at time    that would have been estimated by the 
Kalman filter if the GNSS pseudo-range measurement vector at any time    were only 
affected by the stochastic term due to the receiver noise, the satellite clock and ephemeris 
errors, the troposphere and the ionosphere.   ̂      (  ) the state vector estimate at time 
   assuming that the GNSS pseudo-range measurement vector at any time    is: 
 
       (  )   (  ) Eq -  7-8 
 
  ̂      (  ) is the estimate of the true state vector        (  ). The GNSS linearized 
measurement model that links        (  ) to       (  ) is: 
 
       (  )   (  )       (  )         (  ) 
 
Eq -  7-9 
 
In Eq -  7-9,        (  ) is the observation vector obtained when the GNSS 
measurements are affected by all error sources, excluding multipath. 
 
Let’s state the following hypotheses (*): 
- At any time   , the GNSS measurement error vectors   (  )  (  )   (  ) and the process 
noise vector   (  ) are independent of each other. This assumption is considered to be 
valid since they are due to error sources that are independent.  
- The initial predictions of the covariance matrix   (  )  and of the state vector    ̂
 (  ) are 
independent of the multipath ranging error vector   (  )   (  ). 
- The state vector    is estimated by a linearized Kalman filter, meaning that the Kalman 
filter matrices     are independent of the GNSS measurements. In addition, it is assumed 
that the Kalman filter contains the exact models of the transition state matrix   and of the 
design matrix  . The potential non-linearities in the propagation model (matrix  ) are not 
accounted for. In other words, the horizontal position error models developed in the thesis 
do not consider the effects of the potential non-linearities in the propagation model 
implemented in the Kalman filter. This is because, for the application, the linearity of the 
propagation model is maintained, as justified in Section 6.1.3.  
- The Kalman filter matrix   is independent of the GNSS multipath measurement errors. 
It is demonstrated in Appendix E, Section E.1, that, under the hypotheses stated above (*), the 
error in the state vector estimated in the presence of multipath   (  )    ̂
 (  ) and the error 
in the state vector that would have been estimated in the absence of multipath (  (  )  
  ̂      (  )) can be related by: 
 
  (  )    ̂
 (  )  (  (  )    ̂
 
     (  ))   (  ) Eq -  7-10 
 
where  (  ) represents the impact of the multipath on the error in the state vector estimate 
error at time    and can be expressed as: 
 
 (  )  (   (  ) (  )) (    ) (    )   (  )( (  )   (  )) 
 
Eq -  7-11 
where  (  )   . From Eq -  7-11, the impact of the multipath on the state vector estimate 
error at time    is due to: 
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- The propagation of the multipath error from time      to time   . This propagation is 
represented by the first term of the right part of Eq -  7-11. 
- The multipath error vectors at time   . This impact is represented by the second term of 
the right part of Eq -  7-11. 
In this section, the theoretical impact of multipath on the state vector estimate error has been 
analyzed. In the next section, this analysis is re-used to assess the theoretical impact of 
multipath on the expectation of the GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position estimate error.  
7.1.4. Multipath impact on the expectation of the position error  
From Eq -  7-5, the GNSS/IRS horizontal position error at time    can be expressed as: 
 
  (  )  [  (  )    ̂
 (  )]    
 
Eq -  7-12 
Let’s compute the expectation of the GNSS/IRS horizontal position error at time   : 
 
 [  (  )]   [  (  )    ̂
 (  )]    
 
Eq -  7-13 
From Eq -  7-10 we get: 
 
 [  (  )]   [(  (  )    ̂
 
     (  ))   (  )]
   
 
 
Eq -  7-14 
At any time   , the GNSS measurement error vectors   (  )  (  ) and the process noise vector 
  (  ) are zero-mean stochastic error vectors. It is demonstrated in Appendix E, Section E-2, 
that, under this assumption, and using Eq – 7-10, the expectation of the GNSS/IRS/DEM 
horizontal position error at time    is: 
 
 [  (  )]  [ [ (  )]]   
 [(   (  ) (  )) (    ) [ (    )]   (  ) (  )]    
 
Eq -  7-15 
where  [ (  )]   . Note that, if the following matrices or vectors are known at any time   , 
      : 
- The Kalman filter matrices  (  ),  (  ) and  (    ), 
- The deterministic multipath ranging error  (  ), 
then it is possible to predict the expectation of the GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position error 
at time    by means of Eq -  7-15. From Eq -  7-15, the expectation of the GNSS/IRS/DEM 
horizontal position error at time    is due to: 
- The propagation of expectation of the GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position error from time 
     to time   . This propagation is represented by the first term of the right part of Eq -  
7-15. 
- The deterministic multipath ranging error vector  (  ) at time   . This impact is represented 
by the second term of the right part of Eq -  7-15. 
In this section, the theoretical impact of multipath on the expectation of the GNSS/IRS/DEM 
horizontal position estimate error has been analyzed. In the next section, the theoretical 
impact of multipath on the covariance of the GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position estimate 
error is assessed.  
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7.1.5. Multipath impact on the covariance of the position error  
From Eq – 7-5, the GNSS/IRS horizontal position error at time    can be expressed as: 
 
  (  )  [  (  )    ̂
 (  )]    
 
Eq -  7-16 
Let’s compute the covariance of the GNSS/IRS horizontal position error at time   : 
 
   [  (  )]     [  (  )    ̂
 (  )]    
 
Eq -  7-17 
From Eq - 7-8 we obtain: 
 
   [  (  )]     [(  (  )    ̂
 
     (  ))   (  )]
   
 
 
Eq -  7-18 
From Chapter 5, the correlated process  (  ) can be modeled as zero-mean first-order Gauss-
Markov process. From Eq – 3-14,  (  ) can be expressed as: 
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Eq -  7-19 
where: 
    is the sampling period of the GNSS pseudo-range measurements at the Kalman filter 
input. 
       (  ) and       (  ) are the correlation time and the standard deviation associated with 
the Gauss-Markov process that models the multipath ranging error on satellite j at time   . 
Let’s denote    (  ) the covariance matrix of the stochastic multipath ranging error vector 
 (  ): 
 
   (  )  [
      (  )
   
   
       (  )
 
] 
 
 
Eq -  7-20 
It is demonstrated in Appendix E, Section E-3, that, if  (  ) can be modeled as zero-mean 
first-order Gauss-Markov process, and under the assumptions stated above (*), the covariance 
of the GNSS/IRS horizontal position error at time    is: 
 
   [  (  )]         (  )      (  ) 
 
Eq -  7-21 
where: 
        (  )     [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )]        represents the covariance matrix of the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position estimate error at time    in the absence of multipath 
affecting the GNSS pseudo-range measurements. 
 [ ]        represents the (   ) sub-matrix of [ ] composed of the first two lines and of the 
first two columns of [ ]. 
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     (  )     [ (  )]         represents the increase of the covariance of the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position estimate error induced by the presence of multipath 
stochastic ranging errors on the GNSS pseudo-range measurements: 
 
    (  )     [ (  )]        [ (  )   [ (    )] (  )
  
  (  )   (  ) (  )
  
  (  ) [ (    ) 
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]        
 
Eq -  7-22 
 
where: 
  (  )  (   (  ) (  )) (    ) 
    (  ) and  (  ) are detailed in Eq -  7-19,  
    [ (  )]    
  [ (    ) (    )
 ] can be expressed as : 
 
 [ (    ) (    )
 ]   (    ) [ (    ) (    )
 ] (    )
   (    )   (    ) 
 
Eq -  7-23 
where  [ (  ) (  )
 ]   . 
Note that, if the following matrices or vectors are known at any time   ,       : 
- The Kalman filter matrices  (  ),  (  ) and  (    ), 
- The covariance matrix of the stochastic multipath ranging error vector    (  ) and the 
correlation time matrix of the stochastic multipath ranging error vector  (  ), 
then it is possible to predict the term     (  ). From Eq -  7-22, the covariance of the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position error at time    is due to: 
- The propagation of the covariance matrix induced by multipath from time      to time   . 
This propagation is represented by the first term of the right part of Eq -  7-22. 
- The covariance matrix of the stochastic multipath ranging errors at time   . This impact is 
represented by the second term of the right part of Eq -  7-22. 
- The time correlation of the stochastic multipath ranging errors at time   . This impact is 
represented by the last two terms of the right part of Eq -  7-22. 
7.2. Quantification of the multipath impact on the position error  
One of the objectives of this thesis is to identify the GNSS multipath ranging failures, which 
are the multipath ranging errors that may lead to a horizontal position error larger than the 
HAL for the guidance function under low visibility conditions. For this identification, it is 
firstly required to quantify the impact of the GNSS multipath ranging errors on the horizontal 
position error. 
This section provides a quantitative analysis of the horizontal position bias  [  (  )] induced 
by multipath and of the covariance increase of the horizontal position error     (  ) induced 
by multipath.  
7.2.1. Multipath impact on the expectation of the position error  
This section is organized as follows. The simulation scenario used to quantify the position 
bias  [  (  )] is presented in Section 7.2.1.1. Next, the deterministic GNSS multipath ranging 
error vector  (  ) inducing the position bias  [  (  )] throughout the simulated trajectory is 
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presented in Section 7.2.1.2. Finally, the deterministic GNSS multipath ranging errors and the 
position bias  [  (  )] are quantified throughout the simulated trajectory in Section 7.2.1.3. 
7.2.1.1. Simulation scenario  
The expectation of the horizontal position error induced by the GNSS multipath ranging 
biases is evaluated using the following simulation scenario. An aircraft arrives at Toulouse 
Blagnac airport, France. The followed procedure is the LVP path that is fully described in 
Section 5.2.1. The considered LVP path is depicted in Figure 7-2.  
 
 
Figure 7-2: LVP path at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France 
 
The LVP path consists in four segments. 
- Segment 1 and 2 that correspond to the taxi on taxiway sub-phase. 
- Segment 3 that corresponds to the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase. 
- Segment 4 that corresponds to the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase. 
In this scenario, the aircraft is moving on segments 1, 2, 3 and 4. The case where the aircraft 
stops during the operation is not considered. The speed of the aircraft along each segment is 
constant and is indicated in Table 7-1. The aircraft velocity may change during turns. The 
velocity variation during turns follows the shape of a raised cosine function, as detailed in 
Section 6.2.1.  
 
 
Taxi on taxiway 
 
Taxi on apron 
taxiway 
Taxi on taxi lane 
 
Segments 1 and 2 Segment 3 Segment 4 
Typical aircraft 
speed [RTCA, 
1999] 
                            
Aircraft speed 
used for the 
simulation  
                      
 
Table 7-1: Taxi speeds used along the LVP path 
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Denoting    the epoch time when the operation begins, that is to say when the aircraft starts to 
move on segment 1 after having left the runway. As justified in Section 5.1.2.1, the satellite 
geometry is considered to be frozen during the taxi operation. Hence, from time instant    
until the moment the aircraft reaches the arrival gate     , the satellite positions are 
considered to be stationary. Both    and      are indicated in Figure 7-2.  
In order to quantify  [  (  )] for each time epoch    [       ] of the trajectory, the LVP 
trajectory is simulated by the trajectory simulator presented in Section 6.2.1. Next, a particular 
satellite geometry indicated by time epoch    is considered and the position error simulator 
presented in Section 6.2 is used to simulate the Kalman filter matrices  (  )   (  ) and 
 (    ) at each time epoch    of the simulated trajectory. The deterministic multipath ranging 
error vector  (  ) is computed for each time epoch    [       ]  using the error models 
developed in Section 7.2.1.2. Finally, the horizontal position bias  [  (  )] is computed for 
each time epoch    using the model established in Section 7.1.4. Note that, in the following, 
the 2D position bias  [  (  )] in the horizontal domain induced by the deterministic multipath 
ranging errors in the dynamic configuration is denoted as     (  ). 
The next section reminds the models of the GNSS deterministic multipath ranging error 
vectors   (  ) in both static and dynamic configurations.  
7.2.1.2. GNSS multipath ranging error models 
As established in Section 5.5.1 and in Appendix A, Section A.5, the multipath ranging errors 
that affects the GNSS pseudo-range measurement related to satellite   at time    [       ] 
throughout the LVP trajectory is: 
 
     (  )            (   (  )        (  ))        (  ) 
 
Eq -  7-24 
where: 
       (  ) is the stochastic multipath ranging error, 
           (   (  )        (  )) is a deterministic multipath ranging error. 
      (  ) is the satellite    elevation angle along the trajectory.     is considered to be 
constant throughout the trajectory, 
        (  ) is the aircraft azimuth angle with respect to the satellite   at time   . Note that the 
angle         is defined in Section 5.1.2.2.3.1.  
Let’s denote   the number of GNSS measurements used in the Kalman filter to estimate the 
PVT solution at time     The deterministic GNSS multipath ranging error vector  (  ) at time 
   in the dynamic configuration is: 
 
     [       ]  (  )  [
           (   (  )        (  ))
 
          (   (  )       (  ))
] 
 
 
Eq -  7-25 
7.2.1.3. Simulation results 
GNSS deterministic multipath ranging errors 
This sub-section illustrates the evolution of the GNSS deterministic multipath ranging error 
vector  (  ) in the time interval [       ] throughout the LVP trajectory presented in Section 
7.2.1.1.  
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For this illustration, the evolution of the aircraft azimuth angle        (  )  and of the 
deterministic multipath ranging error            (   (  )        (  )) throughout the 
simulated trajectory is shown in Figure 7-3 for two satellites: a Galileo satellite identified by 
PRN 62 and a GPS satellite identified by PRN 4. Both PRN 4 and PRN 62 satellites are 
visible satellites for the considered satellite geometry and are used in the Kalman filter to 
estimate the PVT solution throughout the whole LVP trajectory. Both satellite elevation angle 
and satellite azimuth angle are indicated in Table 7-2.  
 
 Satellite elevation angle    Satellite azimuth angle       
PRN 4 satellite                
PRN 62 satellite                
 
Table 7-2: Satellite elevation and azimuth angles for PRN 4 and PRN 62 satellites 
 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Aircraft azimuth angle and of the multipath ranging error            for 
PRN 4 and PRN 62 satellites 
 
As expected from Section 5.4.1.2, the GNSS multipath ranging error            induced by 
the aircraft structure and by the airport surface is roughly zero for PRN 4 since the satellite 
elevation angle related to this satellite is relatively high, that is to say almost    . The 
magnitude of the GNSS multipath ranging error            for PRN 62 is much higher, that 
is to say roughly      , since the satellite elevation angle related to PRN 62 is roughly    . 
The value of            varies by a few decimeters when the direction of the aircraft fuselage 
characterized by the angle        changes in the airport scene.  
Horizontal position bias 
The evolution of the position bias     (  ) induced by the deterministic multipath ranging 
error vector  (  ) throughout the LVP trajectory is detailed in this sub-section. For this 
presentation, the evolution of the North      (  ) and East      (  ) components of 
    (  ) throughout the simulated trajectory is shown in Figure 7-4 for the considered 
satellite geometry.  
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The evolution of     (  ) is computed in two configurations (configurations 1 and 2) 
characterized by different elevation mask angles. The elevation mask angles for each 
configuration are provided in Table 7-3. Table 7-3 also indicates the number of satellites used 
in the Kalman filter to estimate the position solution. In both configurations, and for the 
considered satellite geometry, simulations have shown that this number of satellites is fixed 
throughout the trajectory.  
 
 
Elevation mask 
angle 
GPS constellation  
Elevation mask angle 
Galileo constellation 
Number of satellites 
used to estimate the 
position  
Configuration 1    [RTCA, 2006]      [EUROCAE, 2010] 15 
Configuration 2         12 
 
Table 7-3: Elevation mask angles for configurations 1 and 2 
 
 
 
Figure 7-4: Expectation of the horizontal position error       
 
In configuration 1, three satellites used throughout the trajectory to estimate the PVT solution 
have a satellite elevation below 15°. From Section 5.4.1.2, the GNSS multipath ranging errors  
           that affect the pseudo-range measurements associated to low elevation satellites 
are characterized by high amplitudes (several decimeters). These high amplitude ranging 
errors             induce relatively high horizontal position biases in both North and East 
directions. The position biases are of the order of few decimeters in the North and East 
directions.  
In configuration 2, the satellites characterized by an elevation below 15° are not used in the 
estimation of the PVT solution, reducing the number of satellites used by the Kalman filter 
from 15 for configuration 1 to 12 for configuration 2. These high amplitude ranging errors  
           do not impact anymore the horizontal position biases in both North and East 
directions. The position biases are of the order of a few centimeters in the North and East 
directions.  
In configurations 1 and 2, the horizontal position biases in both North and East directions vary 
by a few centimeters throughout the simulated trajectory. This is due to the variations of the 
aircraft azimuth angles       throughout the trajectory that induces variations of the 
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deterministic ranging errors             due to the multipath from the aircraft structure and 
the airport surface.  
7.2.2. Multipath impact on the covariance of the position error  
It has been underlined in Chapter 5 that, in the dynamic configuration, and when the GNSS 
airborne antenna is in the impact zone related to satellite j at time epoch   , the GNSS pseudo-
range measurement from the GNSS airborne antenna to the satellite j is affected by the sum 
of: 
- a GNSS ranging error       (  ) induced by the airport obstacles, 
- a GNSS multipath deterministic error           (   (  )        (  )) induced by the 
aircraft structure and the airport surface. 
In this document, the impact zone is defined as the horizontal area of the airport located at 
           above the ground where the amplitude variations of the multipath error        
around the multipath bias            are higher than 1cm. Since the true trajectory of the 
airborne antenna around the procedure path in the impact zone is considered as a random 
parameter, and since the error term        depends on this parameter,       (  ) has been 
modelled by a stochastic correlated process. This process is a zero-mean first-order Gauss-
Markov process  (             ) characterized by a correlation time        and a standard 
deviation       . The GNSS multipath stochastic error        induces an increase of the 
position error covariance matrix assessed in this section. This section provides a quantitative 
analysis of the augmentation of the covariance of the horizontal position error      induced 
by the GNSS stochastic multipath ranging errors during airport surface operations.  
7.2.2.1. Simulation scenario  
In order to quantify the term     (  ) induced by the GNSS stochastic multipath ranging 
errors, the simulation scenario described in Section 7.2.1.1 is considered. The stochastic 
multipath ranging error vector  (  ) is computed for each time epoch    using the error 
models developed in Section 7.2.2.2. Finally, the augmentation of the covariance of the 
horizontal position error     (  ) induced by the GNSS stochastic multipath ranging errors is 
computed for each time epoch    using the model established in Section 7.1.4. 
The next section reminds the models of the GNSS stochastic multipath ranging error vectors  
 (  ) in the dynamic configuration.  
7.2.2.2. GNSS multipath ranging error models 
By keeping the same notations as in Section 7.2.1.1, denote    and      the initial and final 
instants of the trajectory, respectively. In the time interval [       ], the multipath ranging 
errors that affect the GNSS pseudo-range measurement related to satellite   at time    is: 
 
     (  )            (   (  )        (  ))        (  ) 
 
Eq -  7-26 
where: 
            is a deterministic multipath ranging error.  
       (  ) is the stochastic multipath ranging error. The model of       (  ) is developed in 
this section. 
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As explained in Chapter 5,         represents the oscillations of the multipath ranging error 
          around the multipath ranging deterministic error            induced by multipath 
from the aircraft structure and by the airport surface. Two cases can be distinguished: 
- If the GNSS airborne antenna is outside the impact zone related to satellite j at time epoch 
  ,  the ranging error       is equal to the deterministic ranging error induced by the aircraft 
structure and by the airport surface. 
- If the GNSS airborne antenna is inside the impact zone related to satellite j at time epoch 
  , the correlated process       (  ) can be over bounded by a first-order Gauss Markov 
process characterized by a standard deviation        and by a correlation time       .  
An important remark is that this project aims to quantify the impact of a single multipath 
ranging error induced by the airport surface, the aircraft structure, and the airport obstacles. 
For this reason, it is assumed in this part that only one satellite is affected by multipath from 
the airport obstacles. The quantification of the covariance of the horizontal position error in 
the presence of multipath ranging errors induced by the airport obstacles on multiple satellites 
at the same time remains as future work.  
A preliminary analysis shows that, for the considered satellite geometry, when the elevation 
mask is set to 5° for GPS and 10° for Galileo, and when the aircraft is on segment 3, the 
GNSS airborne antenna is in the impact zone related to satellite PRN 62. Let’s note   the 
point on segment 3 where the GNSS airborne antenna enters in the impact zone related to 
satellite PRN 62. The coordinates of point   have been determined by means of the 
methodology established in Section 5.4.2.1.  Let’s note    the epoch time for which the 
airborne antenna reaches point  .  
Both satellite elevation angle and satellite azimuth angle of PRN 62 are indicated in Table 
7-4. The methodology presented in Section 5.5.2.4 is re-used to compute the standard 
deviation        and correlation time         that characterize the Gauss-Markov process that 
over-bounds the correlated process         (  ) in the impact zone and along segment 3. The 
obtained values of         and         are indicated in in Table 7-4.   
 
 
Satellite 
elevation angle 
      
Satellite azimuth 
angle      
                  
PRN 62 
satellite                              
 
Table 7-4: Characteristics of the Gauss-Markov process for PRN 62 satellite 
 
As explained above, it is assumed that, on segment 3, and from epoch time   ,  PRN 62 is the 
only satellite affected by multipath from the airport obstacles. The GNSS multipath ranging 
errors on the other satellites are assumed to be due to the aircraft structure and to the airport 
surface. In the simulation,  (  ) can thus be modelled as follows: 
 
     [     [  (  )  
[
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
          [            ]  (  )  
[
 
 
 
 
  
 
        (  )
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
 Eq -  7-27 
 
where: 
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  (  ) is a (15x1) vector since, when the elevation mask is set to 5° for GPS and 10° for 
Galileo, Section 7.2.1 reveals that the number of satellites used in the PVT solution 
estimation is constant throughout the LVP procedure and is 15 satellites. 
        (  ) is modelled as a first-order Gauss Markov process characterized by a standard 
deviation                and by a correlation time               . 
           is the epoch time for which the aircraft reaches segment 4.  
The covariance term       of the horizontal position error induced by the GNSS stochastic 
multipath ranging error           is analyzed in the next section.   
7.2.2.3. Simulation results 
Temporal evolution of     (  )  
The evolution of the horizontal position error covariance induced by multipath     (  ) 
along the segment 3 is presented in this section. For this analysis, the evolution of the 
standard deviations of the North and East position errors induced by multipath is shown in 
Figure 7-5. The variance of the position error induced by multipath in the North and East 
directions at time    are denoted as      (  ) and      (  ), respectively.    
     (  ) and      (  ) are related to      (  ) as follows: 
 
    (  )  [
     (  )        (  ) 
       (  )      (  )
] 
 
Eq -  7-28 
where        (  )is the cross-covariance of the position errors in the North and East 
directions. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-5 : Standard deviations of the North and East position errors induced by the 
multipath stochastic ranging error on PRN 62  
 
As depicted in Figure 7-5, the error variances in the North and East directions converge to a 
final constant value after a transient state that follows the apparition of the stochastic ranging 
error on the PRN 62 satellite. The evolution of the terms       and       in the time 
domain are interpreted as follows. From Eq -  7-22,     (  ) can be considered as the 
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response of an equivalent filter to the stochastic multipath ranging error vector  (  ). The 
coefficients of the equivalent filter depend on the Kalman matrices          . During the 
considered trajectory, the coefficients of the equivalent filter remain roughly constant. There 
are three reasons for this. 
- Firstly, the GNSS satellites are considered to be stationary during the operation and the 
impact of the multipath on the      of the GNSS signals used in the PVT solution is not 
taken into account. Hence, the satellite elevation angles and the      ratios are roughly 
constant over the trajectory. Hence, the predicted covariance of the GNSS measurement 
errors   is roughly constant throughout the trajectory.  
- Secondly, due to the relatively low dynamic of the aircraft throughout the trajectory, the 
design matrix   and the state transition matrix   are roughly constant throughout the 
trajectory. 
- Thirdly, the Kalman filter is assumed to have converged at the epoch at which the taxi on 
taxiway operation starts. Hence, and from the two previous remarks, the Kalman gain 
matrix   is roughly constant throughout the trajectory.  
Hence, the error variances in the North and East directions converge to constant values. 
Moreover, the convergence time lasts roughly several tens of milliseconds. As an example, 
Table 7-5 provides the 99% response time of the filter observed in Figure 7-5.  
 
99% response time, North direction:    99% response time, East direction:     
          
 
Table 7-5: 99% response time related to the the position error variances 
 
This transient time highly depends on the expected values of the raw code pseudo range 
measurement errors standard deviations that are given to the Kalman filter. In the simulation, 
the expected standard deviation of the GNSS measurement errors is dominated by the 
expected standard deviation of the ranging error induced by inaccuracies in the satellite clock 
corrections and in the ephemeris, which is relatively high at 85cm. The Kalman filter mainly 
“relies on” the dynamic model, the Kalman gain is thus relatively low, and the transient 
period is thus relatively short. 
 
Sensitivity of     (  ) to the characteristics of the stochastic multipath ranging error  
The influence of the characteristics of the stochastic multipath ranging error (               ) 
on the covariance of the horizontal position error covariance induced by multipath     (  ) 
is presented in this section. In Chapter 5, a value of             has been adopted to 
model the stochastic multipath ranging errors along segments 3 and 4, regardless of the 
satellite position and of the aircraft speed in the impact zone. However, it is mentioned in 
Section 5.5.2.4 that the choice of the first-order Gauss-Markov model parameters 
(         ) can be refined. In this case, the value of      will depend on the satellite position 
and on the aircraft speed in the impact zone. Hence, even if the value of       is fixed in the 
simulation results proposed in Chapter 5, it is proposed in this section to investigate the 
impact of          on     (  ).  
It has been shown in the last subsection that the components of     (  )  converge to 
constant values in steady state after the apparition of the stochastic multipath ranging error on 
PRN 62. The evolution of the steady state values of     (  )  as a function of          and 
for a fixed                is depicted in Figure 7-6. Note that, in this Figure,         varies 
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between    and   . Indeed, it has been established in Chapter 5 that the values of        
may reach several meters.  
As depicted in Figure 7-6, for a fixed               , the steady state standard deviations 
of the North and East position errors induced by multipath increase quasi linearly with respect 
to the standard deviation of the stochastic multipath ranging error on PRN 62        . The 
standard deviations of the position errors are up to few centimeters when         is below   . 
The standard deviations of the position errors are up to few decimeters when         reaches 
few meters.  
 
 
Figure 7-6: Steady state standard deviations of position errors induced by multipath as a 
function of          
 
The evolution of the steady state standard deviations of the position error  induced by 
multipath as a function of         is depicted in Figure 7-7 for                (left hand 
side) and for              (right hand side). The evolution of the standard deviations as a 
function of         are plotted for a low and a high value of         in order to show that the 
shape of this evolution does not depend on the value of        . 
 
 
 
                                                                     
 
Figure 7-7: Steady state standard deviations of position errors induced by multipath as a 
function of         
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The Kalman filter behaves as a low pass filter. This implies that the high-frequency (low 
correlation time        ) multipath stochastic errors are filtered out by the Kalman filter. The 
minimal steady state standard deviations of the North and East position errors are thus 
obtained for multipath stochastic ranging errors almost uncorrelated in the time domain, that 
is to say for         closed to   . When         reaches few seconds, that is to say when 
        is around   , the steady state standard deviations of the North and East position errors 
are almost twice the steady state standard deviations obtained when         is few 
milliseconds. Note finally that the shape of the evolution of the position error standard 
deviations as a function of         is similar to the shape of the evolution of  
  
 
  as a function 
of   . Indeed, as shown in Eq -  7-22, the covariance matrix     (  ) is proportional to the 
correlation time matrix: 
 
 (  )  
[
 
 
 
 
 
     
   
  
  
  
       (  )  
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 Eq -  7-29 
 
7.3. Evaluation of accuracy performance 
Section 7.1 proposes analytical models of the impact of GNSS multipath ranging errors on the 
horizontal position error at the GNSS/IRS tight coupling positioning algorithm output during 
the taxi operation. This section re-uses these models to assess the accuracy of the horizontal 
position error in the presence of multipath throughout the LVP procedure path at Toulouse 
Blagnac airport, France. 
The objective of this section and the error models used in this section are detailed in Section 
7.3.1. The simulation scenario and the methodology used to assess the accuracy are presented 
in Section 7.3.2. The simulation results are presented in Section 7.3.3 for different elevation 
mask angles. In the same section, these performances are discussed and compared to the 
accuracy system navigation performance requirements presented in Section 2.3.2.3.  
7.3.1. Objective and limitations  
The objective of this section is to evaluate the accuracy of the horizontal position estimated by 
the tight coupling GNSS/IRS/DEM Kalman filter during the taxi on taxiway, taxi on apron 
taxiway, and taxi on taxi lane sub-phases related to the LVP procedure path at Toulouse 
Blagnac airport, France. For this accuracy analysis, it is considered that the GNSS pseudo-
range measurements and the inertial sensors are affected by the following error models: 
- The inertial sensors are affected by the nominal error model detailed in Section 6.2.3. 
- The GNSS pseudo-range measurements are affected by the stochastic nominal errors 
detailed in Section 3.2.1 for the ionosphere, troposphere, satellite clock and ephemeris 
inaccuracies, and receiver noise error sources. 
- The GNSS pseudo-range measurements are affected by the deterministic multipath ranging 
induced by the ground first-order reflections.  
The results presented in this section do not take into account the effects of multipath from 
airport obstacles on the horizontal position errors. A rigorous analysis of the accuracy 
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performance during the surface operations would require taking into account the impact of 
multipath from the airport obstacles on the position error. Indeed, multipath from the airport 
obstacles affect GNSS measurements during the LVP taxi on apron taxiway and the LVP taxi 
on taxi lane sub phase, as underlined in Chapter 5. However, it is chosen not to consider the 
effects of multipath from airport obstacles in this section for the following reasons. 
- It is acceptable not to take into account the effects of multipath from the airport obstacles 
when evaluating the accuracy performance during both taxi on taxiway and taxi on apron 
taxiway sub-phases throughout the LVP procedure path at Toulouse Blagnac airport. Using 
the methodology developed in Section 5.4.2.1, it can be shown that, for the satellite 
geometry used in Section 7.2.2 and for an elevation mask angle of 5° for GPS and 10° for 
Galileo, the airborne antenna does not cross any impact zone throughout the LVP taxi on 
taxiway sub-phase and is in the impact zone related to six different visible satellites during 
the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase. In other words, six GNSS measurements are affected 
by GNSS stochastic multipath ranging errors induced by the airport obstacles during the 
taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase. From Chapter 5, the standard deviation of the multipath 
stochastic ranging errors induced by the airport obstacles during the taxi on apron taxiway 
are at most few decimeters. By using the methodology used in Section 7.2.2, it has been 
calculated that, if the six GNSS measurements are simultaneously affected by a stochastic 
error modelled as a zero-mean first-order Gauss Markov process characterized by a 
correlation time of 10ms and a standard deviation of 20cm, these multipath errors will 
result in an increase of the standard deviation of the position errors of 3cm in the East 
direction and of 5cm in the North direction. This remains insignificant regarding the 
standard deviations of the North and East position errors induced by the troposphere, 
satellite clock corrections and ephemeris inaccuracies, and receiver noise stochastic errors. 
These standard deviations are of the order of a several decimeters, as underlined in 
Appendix E, Section E.4. Hence, even if several measurements are affected by multipath 
from the airport obstacles, it is acceptable not to take into account the effects of multipath 
from the airport obstacles when evaluating the accuracy performance during both taxi on 
taxiway and taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases throughout the LVP procedure path at 
Toulouse Blagnac airport.  
- The standard deviation of the multipath stochastic ranging errors induced by the airport 
obstacles during taxi on taxi lane may reach several decimeters up to few meters. Section 
7.2.2 shows that these errors will result in an increase of the standard deviation of the 
North and East position errors of few centimeters up to few decimeters. Hence, it is 
unacceptable not to take into account the effects of multipath from the airport obstacles 
when evaluating the accuracy performance during the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase. 
However, the motivation for this section is to have a first overview of the capacity of the 
positioning algorithm to maintain the accuracy navigation requirements in the presence of 
multipath errors from the airport surface and from the aircraft structure during the taxi on 
taxi lane sub-phase.  
For both reasons, it is proposed not to take into account the effects of multipath from the 
airport obstacles in the accuracy assessment presented in this section.  
7.3.2. Methodology 
In order to properly explain the methodology that has been adopted to assess the accuracy of 
the horizontal position estimate, it is important to define firstly the concept of surface 
operation. 
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7.3.2.1. Surface operation definition  
In the context of airport surface navigation, an operation is defined based on three parameters: 
- the time epoch    of the beginning of the operation, 
- the sub-phase length   , 
- the procedure (desired path) that is indicated by the Air Traffic Control (ATC) staff and 
that must be followed by the aircraft. When the aircraft performs a taxi on taxiway sub-
phase, the procedure path is on the taxiway network. When the aircraft performs a taxi on 
apron taxiway sub-phase, the procedure path is on the apron taxiway network. When the 
aircraft performs a taxi on taxi lane sub-phase, the procedure path is on the taxi lane 
network. 
  ,    and the procedure path are sketched Figure 7-8. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7-8: Representation of a surface operation 
 
Since the satellite geometry is considered to be frozen throughout the operation from time   , 
   is also used in the following to indicate the satellite geometry.   
7.3.2.2. General methodology for accuracy assessment  
The accuracy of the position estimate over a given sub-phase must be evaluated along every 
operation related to the sub-phase, and at every time epoch    of each operation. The accuracy 
navigation system performance requirement at time epoch    of an operation starting at epoch 
time    is met if the following constraint is met: 
 
 |  |       (  )       Eq -  7-30 
 
where:   
        represents the required horizontal 95% confidence level for the considered sub-
phase and is presented in Section 2.3.2.3 for the different taxi sub-phases. 
 |  | is the norm of the horizontal position error in nominal conditions, 
  |  |       (  ) is the probability that |  | exceeds        at time epoch    of the 
operation and with the satellite geometry at   .  
Meeting the accuracy requirement presented in Eq -  7-30 is a condition for the availability of 
service for each geometry [Lee et al., 2007] and for each time epoch of the taxi operation.  
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7.3.2.3. Adopted methodology 
7.3.2.3.1. Horizontal position error model 
In order to correctly estimate the probability  |  |       (  ) for a given satellite geometry    
at time   , it is essential to provide a model of the horizontal position error    over the 
segment and for the satellite geometry at   . The Kalman filter described in Chapter 6 is a 
linear estimator. Since the measurement errors are normally distributed and since the position 
estimator is linear, the horizontal position error distribution at epoch time    and for the 
satellite geometry    can be modelled by a bi-dimensional Gaussian distribution [Younes, 
2000][Ober, 2003]: 
 
  (  )  (    (  )        (  )) 
 
Eq -  7-31 
where: 
        (  ) is the covariance matrix of the horizontal position at epoch time    and for 
the satellite geometry       
     (  ) is the horizontal position bias at epoch time    and for the satellite geometry       
Recall that, since the GNSS measurement errors that have been applied to the GNSS pseudo-
range measurements in the position error simulator described in Section 6.2 over-bounds the 
true GNSS measurement error distributions, the bi-dimensional Gaussian distribution that 
models the horizontal position error at the Kalman filter output over-bounds the true 
horizontal position error distribution. 
7.3.2.3.2. Methodology description  
Considering a satellite geometry at   , the accuracy of the position estimate at every time 
epoch    of a given segment is roughly constant. Indeed, over a given segment, both 
covariance         and bias       of the horizontal position error can be considered as 
constant in the (NED) reference frame for a satellite geometry at   . This is explained as 
follows.  
For a given satellite geometry at   , and considering the error sources listed in Section 7.3.1, 
the covariance of the horizontal position error over a given segment at epoch time    depends 
on the inertial sensor errors and on the stochastic nominal ionosphere, troposphere, satellite 
clock and ephemeris, and receiver noise ranging errors. This covariance        (  ) is 
roughly constant over a given segment since: 
- the inertial sensor error parameters (covariance matrix of the measurement noise     , 
covariance matrix and correlation time of the measurement bias     , the misalignment 
matrix      and the scale factor error matrix       ) are considered to be constant during 
the taxi operation.  
- the standard deviations related to the stochastic nominal ionosphere, troposphere, satellite 
clock and ephemeris, and receiver noise ranging errors only depend on the satellite 
geometry in this thesis. Hence, these standard deviations are considered to be constant 
during the taxi operation.  
For a given satellite geometry at   , and considering the error sources listed in Section 7.3.1, 
the bias on the horizontal position error over a given segment at epoch time    depends on the 
GNSS deterministic multipath ranging errors induced by the airport surface and the aircraft 
structure. This position bias     (  ) is roughly constant over a given segment. Indeed, it is 
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established in Section 7.2.1 that, for a given constellation configuration, the horizontal 
position bias     (  ) on a segment depends on the aircraft azimuth angle on that segment. 
Along a given segment, the aircraft may not perfectly follow the procedure path. The aircraft 
azimuth angle and the horizontal position bias     (  ) may vary along the segment. 
However, it is shown in Section 7.2.1.3 that, when the aircraft azimuth angle variations are a 
few dozens of degrees, the resulting position bias variations is at most a few centimeters. This 
remains low regarding the magnitude of the horizontal position bias     (  )  that is a few 
decimeters in magnitude for a GPS elevation mask of 5° and for a Galileo elevation mask of 
10°. In addition, the expected aircraft angle variations along a segment are of the order of few 
degrees, so the horizontal bias variations along a segment will be less than the few 
centimeters observed in Figure 7-4. It is considered that the horizontal position bias     (  ) 
that affects the antenna position estimate on a given segment of the airport is the position bias 
    (  ) that would have affected the position estimate if the aircraft would have perfectly 
followed the straight line trajectory path along the segment. This horizontal position bias is 
constant over the segment.  
To conclude, for a given satellite geometry, the covariance        (  ) and the bias 
    (  ) of the horizontal position error can be considered as roughly constant over a given 
segment. Since the horizontal position error at each epoch time    on the segment can be 
modelled by a bi-dimensional Gaussian distribution and since this error can be considered as a 
second-order stationary random process over the segment,   |  |       (  )  is constant over 
the segment. Hence, a single probability  |  |       (  )  is evaluated per segment and for 
each satellite geometry   .  
The methodology to compute     (  ) over a segment is developed in Section 7.2.1 for a 
given satellite geometry at   . Appendix E, Section E.4, develops the methodology to 
compute        (  ) over a segment for a given satellite geometry at   . The methodology 
used to compute  |  |       (  )  based on the model of the 2D position error model is 
explained in the next section. 
7.3.2.3.3. Probability of exceeding the 95% accuracy confidence bound 
It is shown in Section 7.3.2.3.1 that the 2D horizontal position error   (  ) over a segment of 
the airport is over-bounded by a bi-dimensional Gaussian distribution. Different techniques 
have been elaborated in the literature to compute the probability that the 2D horizontal 
position error stays within a circle of radius       . In this thesis, it is chosen to use a model 
of  |  |        to evaluate this probability. Indeed, no analytical solution has been founded to 
compute this probability and numerical computations are complex and time-consuming.  
Among the existing techniques to model  |  |       , [Lee, 1995] [Kelly, 1997] [Milner et 
al., 2010] propose methodologies that may lead to underestimate  |  |        , which is 
undesirable when evaluating the accuracy performance. It is preferred in this thesis to use the 
methodology developed in Appendix B of [Ober, 2003] and in [ICAO, 2006]. Indeed, this 
methodology always leads to over-bound  |  |       . 
CHAPTER 7: Impact of multipath on the position error  
 
160 
 
7.3.3. Simulation results 
7.3.3.1. Limitations  
Before presenting the simulation results, it is important to state the main assumptions that 
have been made when evaluating the accuracy of the horizontal position error at Toulouse 
Blagnac airport. The assumptions can be classified into three categories that are listed below. 
- Assumptions have been made concerning the sources of multipath affecting the GNSS 
measurements during the LVP procedure path at Toulouse Blagnac airport. More 
specifically, results proposed in this section do not take into multipath from airport 
obstacles. The reasons of this assumption have been detailed in Section 7.3.1.  
- Assumptions have been made concerning the computation of the GNSS deterministic 
multipath ranging errors from the aircraft structure and from the airport surface: 
 The airport surface is an infinite and planar ground made of dry tar. 
 The same antenna gain pattern is used to compute both L1 and L5 antenna gains. The 
antenna group delay and phase delay are not included in the antenna model.  
- A simplification has been made in the evaluation of standard deviations of the GNSS 
receiver noise ranging errors. The impact of multipath on the C/N0 ratios, and hence on 
the standard deviation of the receiver thermal noise ranging errors, has not been taken into 
account. The validity of this simplification is discussed in Section 6.2.2.3.  
7.3.3.2. Simulation settings  
Based on the methodology explained in Section 7.3.2.3,  |  |       (  ) is computed over 
each segment of the LVP procedure path for different satellite geometries   . The number of 
simulated satellite geometries is indicated below. 
Most of the constellation configurations are represented by simulating the GPS and Galileo 
constellations over three days. Due to the limited simulation capacity, it is choosen to 
simulate the constellations with a time step of 10 minutes over three days. This leads to 
simulate            different constellation configurations over a three day time interval.  
The  |  |       (  ) over each segment of the LVP procedure path and for a given satellite 
geometry are computed using the horizontal bias      and the covariance matrix 
        of the horizontal postion error. The position bias has been computed based on the 
analytical expression developed in Eq -  7-15. The covariance matrix has been estimated using 
the simulation scenario presented in Appendix E, Section E-4.  As detailed in this Appendix, a 
total number of 80 position error samples has been used to estimate the covariance matrix 
        over each segment of the LVP procedure path and for a given satellite geometry. 
The  |  |       (  ) over each segment of the LVP procedure path are computed in two 
configurations (configurations 1 and 2) characterized by different elevation mask angles. The 
elevation mask angles for each configuration are provided in Table 7-3. 
7.3.3.3. Results  
Figure 7-9 presents the probability that the 2D horizontal position error    is lower than the 
95% accuracy confidence bound on the taxi on taxiway segment (segment 1), on the taxi on 
apron taxiway segment (segment 3) and on the taxi on taxi lane segment (segment 4).  For 
sake of clarity,   |  |       (  ) is not represented for segment 2 (taxi on taxiway segment). 
The evolution of  |  |       (  ) as a function of the satellite geometry    for segment 2 is 
similar to the evolution of  |  |       (  ) for segment 1. This is because: 
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- The horizontal bias      varies of at most few centimeters when the segment orientation 
changes, 
- The covariance matrix         in the (NED) reference frame is considered to be 
independent of the trajectory orientation in the scene. 
The ratio of the number of satellite configurations for which  |  |       (  )       over the 
total number of simulated trajectories            is quantified Table 7-6. Table 7-6 also 
presents the mean  |  |       (  ) computed over the            satellite geometries 
simulated over three days. 
In the presence of multipath from the airport surface and from the aircraft structure only: 
- The accuracy navigation system performance requirement is met for the taxi on taxiway 
sub-phase for all satellite constellations on segment 1. 
- The accuracy navigation system performance requirement is not met for the taxi on taxi 
lane sub-phase, regardless the satellite elevation mask angle and the satellite geometry. 
- The accuracy navigation system performance requirement is met for the taxi on apron 
taxiway sub-phase for 95.85% of the satellite configurations when the GPS and Galileo 
mask angles are    . The accuracy requirement is met for the taxi on apron taxiway sub-
phase for 50.81% of the satellite configurations when the GPS mask angle is    and when 
the GPS mask angle is    . An interpretation of this result is provided in the next section. 
 
 
Taxi on taxiway (segment 1) 
 
 
Taxi on apron taxiway (segment 3) 
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Taxi on taxi lane (segment 4) 
 
Figure 7-9:  |  |        over three days on segments 1, 3 and 4 
 
        
Percentage of satellite 
geometries for which 
 |  |             
Mean probability 
 |  |        calculated over 
three days 
Configu-
ration 1 
Configu- 
ration 2 
Configu- 
ration 1 
Configu-
ration 2 
Taxi on taxiway                 99.98  100  
Taxi on apron taxiway                      90.46  98.41  
Taxi on taxi lane              44.02  67.40  
 
Table 7-6 : Percentage of satellite geometries for which  |  |             and mean 
 |  |        over all simulated satellite configurations 
 
7.3.3.4. Interpretations of the accuracy performance over segment 3 
Figure 7-10 shows the mean number of satellites used along segment 3 (apron segment) for 
both mask angle configurations and for each constellation configuration over 72 hours.  In 
configuration 2, approximately three satellites are excluded from the PVT solution estimation 
compared to configuration 1.  Indeed, the elevation mask angles related to configuration 1 are 
lower than those related to configuration 2.  
Due to this reduction in the number of satellites, the mean Horizontal Dilution of Precision 
(HDOP) over segment 3 is higher for configuration 2 than for configuration 1, as depicted in 
Figure 7-10. The HDOP is a function of the satellite/user geometry [Kaplan et al., 2006] and 
represents the amplification of the standard deviation of the measurement errors onto the 
horizontal position error. However, the HDOP values for both elevation mask configurations 
remain excellent since they are below 1 most of the time. Indeed, the reception conditions are 
close to the open-sky conditions. The GNSS signals are not blocked by any obstacles along 
segment 3, as underlined in Section 5.2.1. In addition, a double satellite constellation is 
considered in this thesis, and the number of satellites in view is thus relatively high. 
Figure 7-11 shows the norm of the horizontal position bias |    (  )| induced by multipath 
from the airport surface and from the aircraft structure along segment 3 for each constellation 
configuration over 72 hours. The elevation mask configuration 2 reduces the amplitude of the 
positioning biases compared to the elevation mask configuration 1. The horizontal position 
biases are roughly 10 centimeters for configuration 1, while they may reach 70 centimeters for 
configuration 2. This phenomenon is interpreted and discussed in Section 7.2.1. The position 
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bias reduction is significant regarding the 95% accuracy confidence bound for the taxi on 
apron taxiway sub-phase, that is     meter.  
To conclude, the increase in elevation mask angles from configuration 1 to configuration 2 
has two main effects. On the one hand, it leads to increase the HDOP factor. Even in the 
configuration 2, the HDOP factors remain very good and are below 1. On the other hand, it 
significantly reduces the horizontal position biases induced by multipath. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-10: Mean number of satellites and mean PDOP along segment 3 for each 
constellation configuration  
 
 
Figure 7-11: Norm of the horizontal position bias along segment 3 for each constellation 
configuration  
 
Adopting a satellite elevation mask angle of 15° for both GPS and Galileo constellations 
significantly reduces the position biases while maintaining a good HDOP. In the absence of 
multipath ranging errors from the airport obstacles, this mask angle allows meeting the 
accuracy requirement for 95.85% of the simulated satellite configurations. In comparison, 
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adopting a standard mask angle of 5° for GPS and 10° for Galileo leads to meet the accuracy 
requirement for 50.81% of the simulated satellite configurations. The identification of the 
optimum mask angle in terms of accuracy, that is the mask angle that maximizes the 
availability of the navigation system in terms of accuracy, remains as future work.  
7.3.3.5. Synthesis 
It has been underlined in this section that, with the satellite elevation mask angle of 15° for 
GPS and Galileo, the positioning algorithm presented in Chapter 6 leads to meet the accuracy 
performance requirements for: 
- 100% of the satellite geometries and for the taxi on taxiway sub-phase. 
- 95.85% of the satellite geometries and for the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase. 
- 0% of the satellite geometries and for the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase. 
In order to improve the availability of the accuracy function during both apron and taxi lane 
sub-phases, a tight coupling GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS algorithm has been developed in 
Appendix G. Simulations presented in this appendix have shown that the accuracy 
performance for a given satellite geometry is improved by the aid of WSS in the Kalman 
filter. However, this improvement is relatively weak and the availability of the accuracy 
function is unchanged by the WSS aid.  
In the rest of the thesis, it has been decided to discard the taxi lane sub-phase since the 
considered algorithm does not enable meeting the accuracy requirements for this sub-phase. 
Designing a navigation system that enables the surface movement guidance function under 
low visibility conditions for the taxi on taxiway and for the taxi on apron taxiway presents 
several operational benefits. Amongst these benefits there is the improvement of the airport 
capacity under low visibility conditions. To propose a navigation algorithm that enables the 
guidance function during the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase remains as future work. In this Ph.D. 
thesis, the development of such a system is not considered as a priority since the aircraft can 
be assisted by a tow vehicle under low visibility conditions to perform the taxi on taxi lane 
sub-phase.  
Note finally that it has been decided to keep considering the GNSS/IRS/DEM positioning 
algorithm for the taxiway and apron sub-phase, even if the accuracy function availability 
reaches roughly 96% for the apron sub-phase, and not the required 99.9% level. There are 
three main reasons for this. 
- Firstly, the 96% availability is not far from the required 99.9% required availability level. 
Several possible solutions can be envisaged to potentially improve the availability 
performance for the apron sub-phase  and are listed below : 
 To find the optimal elevation mask angle, that is the mask angle that leads to maximize 
the accuracy function availability during the apron sub-phase. 
 To check if the FTE standard deviation in the future aircraft will be improved compared 
to the current FTE budgets, and to relax the accuracy navigation system performance 
requirements if the FTE budget can be lower. 
 To compute the availability using real constellations and not baseline constellations. 
Indeed, performance obtained with real constellations will likely to be better since real 
constellations contain more satellites in the sky than baseline constellations.  
- Secondly, this GNSS/IRS/DEM has a simple architecture and can be considered as a 
relatively low-cost solution without external infrastructure. Hence, even if this solution 
cannot be considered as a full-availability solution for the apron sub-phase, it constitutes an 
interesting and low cost back up that meets the accuracy requirements for nearly 96% of 
the satellite geometries. 
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- Thirdly, this GNSS/IRS/DEM architecture is likely to be the basis for an improved 
algorithm that would show better performance in the future. The list of the navigation 
sensors that can be integrated to this GNSS/IRS/DEM architecture is further detailed in 
Section 6.1.3. 
To conclude, for these three reasons, it appears reasonable to continue considering the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM architecture in the following and for both taxiway and apron sub-phases.  
 
7.4. Conclusions 
In this chapter, the impact of the GNSS multipath ranging errors in the dynamic configuration 
on the horizontal position error at the output of the GNSS/IRS tight coupling position 
algorithm has been analyzed. The GNSS multipath ranging error in the dynamic configuration 
can be modelled as the sum of a GNSS deterministic multipath ranging error and a GNSS 
stochastic multipath ranging error. 
The GNSS deterministic multipath ranging errors are due to the ground first-order reflections. 
They continually affect the GNSS pseudo-range measurements. These deterministic ranging 
errors induce horizontal biases of the order of few centimeters with a 15° elevation mask 
angle, regardless of the 3D model of the airport buildings and gates.  
The GNSS stochastic multipath ranging errors are due to the obstacles first and second-order 
interactions. They may temporally or continually affect one or several GNSS measurements 
throughout the taxi operation, depending on the relative position of the GNSS antenna, the 
GNSS satellites and the airport obstacles during the operation. It is reasonable to indicate that, 
in airport environments such as at Toulouse Blagnac airport, only few (3 to 5 satellites) 
satellites are simultaneously affected by multipath from obstacle interactions. Obstacles first 
and second-order interactions induce an increase in the covariance of the horizontal position 
error. Since only few of the satellites are affected by multipath from obstacles at a time, there 
is a significantly dilution of the effects of multipath from obstacles in the positioning domain. 
As an illustration, when the standard deviations of the obstacle multipath ranging errors are a 
few decimeters (such as along the LVP apron-taxiway at Blagnac airport), the standard 
deviation of the horizontal position error is increased by a few centimeters. When the standard 
deviations of obstacle multipath ranging errors are a few meters (such as along the LVP taxi-
lane at Blagnac airport), the standard deviation of the horizontal position error is increased by 
a few decimeters.  
In this chapter, the accuracy of the horizontal position error has also been evaluated assuming 
that the GNSS measurements are not affected by multipath from the airport obstacles. It has 
been established that the use of the 15° elevation mask angle for both GPS and Galileo 
constellations leads to significantly improve the accuracy performance. This result is valid 
regardless of the 3D model of the airport buildings and gates. Even in the absence of 
multipath from the airport obstacles, the GNSS/IRS/DEM tight coupling algorithm does not 
allow meeting the accuracy navigation system performance requirement for the taxi on taxi 
lane sub-phase. For this reason, the rest of this thesis focuses on the taxi on taxiway and on 
the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases. Even if the accuracy function availability for the apron 
sub-phase with the GNSS/IRS/DEM tight coupling algorithm is slightly lower than the 
required 99.9% availability level, it has been decided to keep considering this algorithm for 
the rest of this thesis. The reasons of this choice have been further discussed.  
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  CHAPTER 8 
8. GNSS multipath integrity failure 
model 
 
 
Current GNSS integrity monitoring systems are not designed to protect against the effects of 
multipath during surface operations. In order to maintain the integrity of the position solution 
during surface operations, it is necessary to design integrity monitoring systems that are able 
to properly detect multipath ranging failures. The design of such systems requires identifying 
the GNSS multipath integrity failure model. The multipath integrity failure model is defined 
as the model that describes: 
- The factors influencing the characteristics (correlation time, standard deviation) of the 
GNSS multipath integrity failures, 
- The characteristics of the GNSS multipath integrity failures, 
- The conditions of occurrence of the GNSS multipath integrity failures, 
- The model of the occurrence of the GNSS multipath integrity failures. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.1 details the concept of aviation integrity 
requirements and of HMI. It explains how the failure models drive the GNSS integrity 
monitoring system design. Section 8.2 assesses the characteristics of the multipath ranging 
failures. Simulation results are presented for Toulouse Blagnac airport, France. Section 8.3 
proposes a methodology to develop an occurrence model of GNSS multipath ranging failures 
in a given airport. It evaluates the presence of multipath ranging failures at Toulouse Blagnac 
airport, France. 
Simulation results proposed in this chapter are presented for both taxi on taxiway and taxi on 
apron taxiway sub-phases. The multipath failure model is not developed for the taxi on taxi 
lane sub-phase, as fully explained in Section 7.4.   
 
8.1. Integrity concept 
Section 8.1.1 recalls and discusses the integrity navigation system performance requirements 
adapted to the taxi operation. It defines the concepts of HMI and of GNSS ranging failures. 
Next, Section 8.1.2 explains how the GNSS integrity failure models drive the design of the 
GNSS integrity monitoring systems. The two main strategies used in civil aviation to develop 
occurrence models of GNSS ranging failures are also exposed in this section.  
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8.1.1. Integrity navigation system performance requirements  
8.1.1.1. Requirements  
As explained in Section 2.2, the navigation system performance requirements are defined 
using four criteria that are accuracy, availability, continuity and integrity. The integrity 
navigation system performance requirements are recalled in Table 8-1 for both taxi on 
taxiway and taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases.  
 
Sub-phase  TTA     HAL 
Taxi on taxiway                     
Taxi on apron taxiway                      
 
Table 8-1 : Integrity navigation system performance requirements – guidance function – 
category F airports  
 
8.1.1.2. Interpretation  
The previous section provides the integrity navigation system performance requirements for 
the guidance function under low visibility conditions. This section details the concept of 
integrity requirements and provides explanations in terms of integrity requirement parameters 
(TTA,    , HAL). 
As indicated in Table 8-1, the integrity requirements are given “per operation” [/op]. Section 
7.3.2.1 provides the definition of “surface operation” used in the rest of this chapter. The 
integrity requirement is a “per operation” requirement. This means that the integrity 
performance requirement must be met individually for every operation [Walter et al., 2003]. 
In addition, the integrity requirement must be met for every epoch    of each operation. In 
other words, for every epoch   , the probability of loss of integrity must be below the 
allowable integrity risk    .  
The loss of integrity, or HMI, occurs when a position error is larger than the alert limit, or the 
current protection level, without any indication of the error within the TTA for the applicable 
phase of flight [RTCA, 2009]. The TTA is the maximum allowable elapsed time from the 
onset of a positioning failure until the equipment annunciates the alert [RTCA, 2009] [ICAO, 
2006]. A positioning failure is said to occur whenever the position error exceeds the 
applicable alert limit [ICAO, 2006]. By means the HMI definition, the probability of loss of 
integrity at time epoch    of an operation can be formulated as: 
 
         
[
 
 
 
 
(|  (  )|     )⏟    
                   
 (                      )
⏟                     
   ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eq -  8-1 
 
 
 
where |  (  )| represents the norm of the horizontal position error at   . For every time epoch 
   of every operation, the integrity monitoring system must be designed to meet the following 
constraint:  
            
 
Eq -  8-2 
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where     is the allowed probability of providing a position that is out of tolerance without 
warning the user within the TTA.  
8.1.1.3. Fault-free mode and failure modes 
8.1.1.3.1. Presentation  
An HMI at the time epoch    of an operation may be induced by: 
- The fault-free mode. This mode covers the causes of HMI that are due to large random 
errors that can occur with small probability in the normal operation of the system [Lee, 
2004].  
- A failure mode. This mode covers the causes of HMI that are due to:  
 A GNSS single ranging failure on a GNSS pseudo-range measurement. A ranging 
failure is said to occur when a significantly large error in the range measurement 
(whether that error is due to an anomaly of the satellite itself or to environmental effects 
on the satellite ranging signal such as multipath) may potentially cause an HMI event 
[Lee et al., 2007]. 
 A GNSS multiple ranging failure on multiple GNSS pseudo-range measurements. A 
multiple ranging failure is said to occur when significantly large errors affect 
simultaneously multiple ranging measurements and this combination may potentially 
cause an HMI event. Note also that each multipath ranging error taken separately may 
not lead to a HMI event.  
In the following, the failure mode   is said to occur when a ranging failure induced by a given 
threat affect a given subset of GNSS satellite measurements. A failure mode   is defined by 
the particular threat that induces the failure and by the subset of satellites that are affected by 
the failure. In this chapter, a threat describes the nature of the event that may lead to a ranging 
failure. As an example, ionosphere anomalies or multipath are GNSS threats for the zero-
visibility guidance application during airport surface operations.  
8.1.1.3.2. Integrity risk allocation  
As underlined in Section 8.1.1.3.1, both fault-free mode and failure modes may lead to a loss 
of integrity. The total allowed integrity risk     can be sub-allocated among the fault-free 
mode and different failure modes as follows: 
 
            ∑      
 
 Eq -  8-3 
 
where: 
        is the integrity risk allocated to the fault-free mode.  
        is the integrity risk allocated to the failure mode  .  
The integrity risk allocation drives the design of the GNSS integrity monitoring algorithms. 
For ABAS, this allocation impacts the required probability of missed detection related to each 
failure mode, and it also impacts the protection level computation. Several allocation schemes 
are proposed in the literature so as to improve the integrity function availability. Amongst 
these publications, allocation schemes to improve the RAIM availability are discussed in 
[Lee, 2004] [GEAS, 2010].  
From Section 8.1.1.2, for every time epoch    of every operation, the integrity monitoring 
system must be designed to meet the following constraint:  
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                   Eq -  8-4 
 
where            is the probability of HMI at time    induced by the failure mode  . 
8.1.1.3.3. Probability of occurrence of failure modes 
This section presents the concept of the probability of occurrence model of a failure mode and 
explains how the occurrence model drives the design of the GNSS integrity monitoring 
systems. Eq -  8-4 is equivalent to: 
 
                           Eq -  8-5 
 
where: 
              is the probability of HMI at time    given that the failure mode   is present at 
time   . 
       is the probability of occurrence of the failure mode   at time   . 
The model of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode   drives the requirements on 
the GNSS integrity monitoring system. Indeed, From Eq -  8-5, the lower the probability of 
occurrence model is, the less demanding the requirement is on the probability of missed 
detection related to the failure mode  . The required probability of missed detection related to 
a failure mode   is the maximal allowable probability of undetected positioning failure within 
the TTA in the presence of the failure mode  . For this reason, it is essential to derive a 
suitable occurrence model of the GNSS ranging failures. 
8.1.2. GNSS integrity failure model and GNSS integrity monitoring system 
design 
This section explains how the GNSS integrity failure models influence the design of the 
GNSS integrity monitoring algorithm. Section 8.1.2.1 shows how the conditions of 
occurrence of a failure mode influence the way to develop the model of the probability of 
occurrence of this failure mode. Section 8.1.2.2 shows how the description of the factors 
influencing the characteristics of the failure mode impacts the protection level computations. 
8.1.2.1. Failure mode occurrence models 
It is underlined in Section 8.1.1.3.3 that the probability of occurrence model of a failure mode 
is essential to compute the required probability of missed detection related to this failure 
mode. Hence, the occurrence models drive the design of the GNSS integrity monitoring 
systems. This section presents the different strategies that are adopted to derive the models of 
the probability of occurrence of a failure mode.  
The strategy that must be adopted to properly model the occurrence of a failure mode depends 
on the conditions of occurrence of that failure mode. The conditions of occurrence can be 
classified into three categories: 
- The conditions that are known. 
- The conditions that are considered as random. Two types of random conditions can be 
distinguished: 
 The conditions that cannot be known in practice, but which may be characterized by 
known probability distributions.  
 The conditions that could be known in practice, but that are considered as random. 
These conditions can be considered as random since they depend on environmental 
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parameters that are difficult to obtain, and since sufficient amount of data and 
understanding concerning the occurrence of the fault mode is available to consider the 
probability distribution of these conditions as well-known conditions [Walter et al., 
2003][Pullen, 2014].  
- The conditions that may not be known in practice but that are considered as 
deterministic. These conditions are assigned to their worst case values, that is to say the 
value that lead to maximize the probability of HMI induced by the failure mode. 
Conditions that may not be known in practice are considered as deterministic when: 
 these conditions are knowable or potentially foreseeable by means of the installation of 
measurement equipment or detection and monitoring techniques. More precisely, these 
conditions can be known or foreseen if there exist a reasonable technique or equipment 
to predict, detect, observe or measure the value of this factor. It means that such a 
technique or equipment requires a reasonable financial investment and does not require 
the installation of a complex and costly system architecture. 
 or the probability distribution of these conditions is not well-known. This can be due to 
a limited amount of data available to characterize this distribution or/and limited 
knowledge and understanding concerning these conditions. 
Examples of conditions that are considered to be random and conditions that are considered 
to be deterministic are further developed in the next two sections. Two methodologies are 
used in civil aviation to derive the occurrence model of a failure mode. These approaches are 
referred to as “average risk strategy” and “specific risk strategy”. Both approaches are 
developed in Sections 8.1.2.1.1 and 8.1.2.1.2.  
8.1.2.1.1. Average risk strategy  
In the average risk strategy, all conditions that are unknown in practice are considered as 
random. The probability distributions of all conditions that are unknown in practice are 
derived. The probability distributions of all unknown parameters are convolved to create an 
overall probability of occurrence as a function of the known conditions. The derived 
probability of occurrence is referred to as the “prior probability of occurrence” in the 
literature [Pullen et al., 2006]. The average risk strategy does not necessarily imply that the 
mean operator is used to compute the prior probability of occurrence. The average risk 
strategy is used to model the probability of occurrence of the GNSS ranging failures if the 
following criteria are met: 
- The conditions of occurrence of the failure mode that are unknown in practice have known 
probability distributions [Pullen, 2014] and can thus be considered as random. More 
specifically, the civil aviation community has sufficient understanding on the failure mode 
and has collected enough data in past observations to accurately estimate the probability 
distributions of the conditions of occurrence of the failure mode unknown in practice. 
Based on this knowledge, the aviation community is convinced that the estimated 
probability distributions of conditions of occurrence used to build the prior probability 
model are conservative. 
- The GNSS threat that induces the failure is infrequent [Walter et al., 2003], meaning that 
the a priori likelihood of the GNSS threat is well below 1 per operation. Indeed, the main 
benefit of the average risk strategy is to reduce the probability of occurrence model of the 
failure mode compared to the model obtained by the “specific risk strategy” presented in 
the next section. This is because the occurrence model is obtained by averaging the failure 
mode occurrence over all unknown conditions of occurrence.  Using a reduced probability 
of occurrence bound related to a failure mode allows increasing the probability of missed 
detection related to this failure mode. If the threat inducing the failure mode occurs 
relatively frequently, the probability of occurrence model related to the failure mode will 
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not be well below 1 by using the average risk strategy. The related probability of missed 
detection will be comparable to the one obtained by means of the specific risk strategy. 
Hence, using the average risk strategy is not useful when the a priori likelihood of the 
GNSS threat is not well below 1 per operation. 
As an example of the use of prior probability models in civil aviation, the average risk 
strategy is used to model the probability of occurrence of the GNSS single ranging failures 
induced by a Major Service Failures (MSF) on a given GNSS measurement. This example is 
briefly presented below.  
The satellite   is affected by a GNSS single ranging failure at time    if a MSF occurs at that 
time and if the MSF impacts the satellite  . In order to compute the probability that one of the 
satellite that is used in the PVT solution is affected by a MSF at time    of an operation, the 
probability that at least one MSF occurs in one hour is required [Martineau, 2008]. This 
paragraph explains why the average risk can be used to model the probability of occurrence of 
a MSF in one hour. This probability can be obtained by averaging the occurrences of the MSF 
over all times. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the onset time of the MSF is considered 
as unpredictable and unobservable parameters. Secondly, sufficient knowledge and data 
concerning the MSF are available to get a conservative model of the prior probability of 
occurrence model of the MSF per hour and per satellite [Pullen, 2014]. For both reasons, it is 
acceptable to compute a bound on the probability of occurrence of a MSF per hour by 
averaging the MSF occurrences over all times. The bound of this probability is set to      / 
hr / sat [Pervan, 2011]. The complete methodology used to derive this probability is 
developed in [Pervan, 2011]. 
8.1.2.1.2. Specific risk strategy 
In the specific risk strategy, the failure mode   is treated as always present. Equivalently, the 
model of the probability of occurrence of the failure mode   is set to  . The specific risk 
strategy is used if at least one of the following criteria is met: 
- The a priori likelihood of the threat inducing the failure mode is relatively frequent, 
- The failure mode is driven by conditions of occurrence that are knowable or potentially 
foreseeable by means of the installation of measurement equipment or detection and 
monitoring techniques. More precisely, these conditions can be known or foreseen if there 
exist a reasonable technique or equipment to predict, detect, observe or measure the value 
of this factor. 
- The civil aviation community has no sufficient understanding and data to estimate the 
probability distributions of the unknown parameters that drive the failure mode.  
As an example, the specific risk is used in civil aviation to model the occurrence of GNSS 
integrity failures induced by the ionosphere anomalies threat. One of the conditions of 
occurrence of a failure mode induced by an abnormal TEC gradient is the onset of the 
abnormal TEC gradient over the airport. No conservative models of occurrence probability of 
abnormal TEC gradients have been retained by the safety community. This is due to the 
limited understanding and data concerning the onset time of such ionosphere events [Pullen, 
2014]. In addition, a networked GBAS or SBAS architecture would help detecting quickly the 
abnormal ionosphere conditions [Datta-Barua et al., 2010]. Consequently, the onset of 
abnormal TEC gradients over a given airport can be considered as an observable parameter. 
Since the onset time of the ionosphere event is considered as an observable parameter and 
since not enough data are currently available to provide a conservative probability distribution 
of this parameter, the failure modes induced by the ionosphere event must be treated as 
always present.  
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To conclude, Section 8.1.2.1 has shown that it is essential to distinguish the conditions of 
occurrence of a failure mode to derive a suitable occurrence model of this failure mode and to 
properly design the GNSS integrity monitoring system. The next section explains how the 
GNSS integrity failure models also impact the computation of the protection levels by the 
GNSS integrity monitoring systems. 
8.1.2.2. Protection levels 
8.1.2.2.1. Protection level concept 
In order to properly detect HMI events within the TTA, integrity monitoring algorithms are 
implemented. The integrity algorithms employed within ABAS consist of functions to check 
measurement consistency of the sensors and to compute Protection Levels (PLs). During 
surface operations only Horizontal Protection Levels (HPLs) are computed. Hence, the 
concept of HPLs is further detailed in this section.  
The HPL is the radius of a circle in the horizontal plane [...] with its center being at the true 
position that describes the region assured to contain the indicated horizontal position [RTCA, 
2006]. The HPL under the failure mode   is a statistical bound on the horizontal position error 
in the presence of this failure mode  . When ABAS is used, the HPL under the failure mode   
is a function of the user geometry, of the expected error characteristics in the presence of the 
failure mode   as well as of the probability of the failure mode   allocated to the 
responsibility of ABAS. 
Different techniques can be used to compute the HPL, depending on the integrity monitoring 
algorithm that is used to detect and exclude failures. Integrity monitoring algorithms can be 
classified into two groups, depending on whether the history of data is taken into account or 
not: 
- Sequential methods exploit instantaneous and past measurements. As an example, some 
sequential methods cumulate the norm of the least-square solution residuals, and detect any 
change in the mean of these residuals [Younes, 2000], [Souteyrat, 1997]. 
- Snapshot methods calculate a test statistic from the instantaneous measurement 
redundancy. Thus they do not take into account either the correlation of measurements 
with time or the consistency of the constellation geometry between two instants [Diesel et 
al., 1995].  
8.1.2.2.2. HPL computation 
In order to properly derive the HPL under the failure mode  , it is important to identify the 
factors influencing the signature of the failure mode  . Let’s firstly discuss the concept of 
failure mode signature. Sequential methods take into account information on the history of the 
measurements to compute the HPL. Hence, the signature of the failure mode for sequential 
methods is the shape ( step, ramp, drift) and the magnitude of the errors induced by the failure 
mode. Snapshot methods take into account instantaneous expected performance of GNSS 
measurements to compute the HPL. Hence, the signature of the failure mode for snapshot 
methods is the instantaneous magnitude of the errors induced by the failure mode. 
By using the same classification as the one expressed in Section 8.1.2.1, the factors 
influencing the signature of a failure mode are classified as follows: 
- the factors that are known, 
- the factors that are considered as random. Two random factor types can be distinguished: 
 The factors that cannot be known in practice, but which may be characterized by known 
statistical distributions whose parameters can be predicted or measured. As an example, 
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the receiver noise errors have a known distribution that depends on the received signal 
strength. 
 The factors that could be known in practice, but since they depend on environmental 
parameters that are difficult to obtain, and since their statistical distribution is well-
known, they are considered as stochastic factors [Walter et al., 2003]. As an example, 
the nominal ionosphere ranging error is considered as a noise-like distribution which is 
driven by parameters, such as the elevation angle, that are known. Another example is 
the multipath ranging error induced by airport obstacles. This error depends on the true 
airborne antenna position in the airport which is difficult to obtain with a high 
(centimeter level) accuracy level. Hence, it has been chosen in this thesis to model the 
error by a statistical distribution which parameters can be obtained by means of a GNSS 
multipath ranging error simulator that uses a 3D model of the airport building.  
- the factors that may not be known in practice but that are considered as deterministic. 
Parameters that may not be known in practice are considered as deterministic when: 
 these factors are knowable or potentially foreseeable by means of the installation of 
“reasonable” measurement equipment or detection and monitoring techniques. More 
details about what “reasonable” means in this context are provided in Section 8.1.2.1. 
 or the statistical distribution of these parameters is not well-known. This can be due to a 
limited amount of data available to characterize this distribution or/and limited 
knowledge and understanding concerning these parameters. 
In civil aviation, the HPL under failure mode   must be computed under the worst case 
scenario [Pullen et al., 2011]. This means that the HPL under failure mode   must be 
computed by considering that all factors influencing the signature of the failure mode and that 
are considered to be deterministic take the values that maximize the probability of HMI. 
As an example, let’s consider the Major Service Failure (MSF) as the fault mode  . The 
magnitude of the ranging error induced by the MSF has not been sufficiently characterized 
and its statistical distribution is considered as unknown. Hence, current ABAS snapshot 
integrity monitoring algorithms, such as AIME [Diesel et al., 1995], compute the HPL under 
the MSF by considering that the ranging error magnitude of the MSF is the highest bias that is 
not detected with the required missed detection probability. The affected PRN is the PRN that 
leads to maximize the HPL under the MSF condition. Note that another approach has been 
retained for the computation of the PLs in the presence of a MSF in future RAIM algorithms, 
such as ARAIM algorithms. This approach is further described in [WG-C ARAIM, 2012].  
Another example concerns the GBAS integrity monitoring algorithm. The signature of the 
ionosphere failure modes affecting a single or multiple GNSS measurement depends on the 
characteristics of the ionosphere anomaly. The PLs under abnormal TEC gradient conditions 
are computed by the GBAS integrity monitoring algorithms using the worst case ionosphere 
front parameters [Pullen et al., 2011]. These parameters are described by the ionosphere threat 
models published in [ICAO, 2009b]. Indeed, the ionosphere anomaly parameters, such as the 
spatial and temporal gradients of an ionosphere front, cannot be considered as purely random 
parameters. This is because: 
- The ionosphere anomaly parameters can be considered as observable parameters [Pullen, 
2014]. Indeed, a networked GBAS or SBAS architecture would provide indications on the 
ionosphere conditions and on the ionosphere anomaly parameters. 
- Not enough data have been collected to correctly characterize the statistical distribution of 
the ionosphere anomaly parameters. For this reason, the ionosphere anomaly parameters, 
such as the spatial and temporal gradients of an ionosphere front, cannot be considered as 
purely random parameters.  
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In other applications, it is acceptable to consider the factors that are knowable or potentially 
foreseeable as purely random if their statistical distributions are known [Pullen et al., 2011]. 
Hence, the HPL are computed by using the statistical distributions of all factors that are not 
known in practice, even for the factors that could be known by means of additional 
investment. This approach is referred to as the “average risk” approach in the literature. It 
differs from the “specific risk strategy” approach that uses the worst case value of the factors 
that could be known in practice to evaluate the PLs. The main advantage of the average risk 
approach is that it leads to lower PLs and thus improves system availability.  Both approaches 
to compute the PLs are further compared in [Pullen et al., 2011]. 
8.1.2.3. Synthesis 
It has been underlined in Section 8.1.2 that the probability of missed detection related to a 
specific failure mode and the computation of the PLs under the failure mode are driven by the 
GNSS integrity failure model associated to the failure mode. The GNSS integrity failure 
model includes the factors influencing the signature of the failures and the signature of the 
failures as well as the conditions of occurrence of the failures and the occurrence models of 
the failures.  
 
8.2. GNSS multipath integrity failures 
As discussed in Section 8.1, the development of the GNSS multipath integrity failure models 
is essential to design a GNSS integrity monitoring that is able to properly detect and exclude 
multipath failures. The first step in the development of the integrity failure model is to 
identify the characteristics of the GNSS multipath integrity failures. The second step in the 
development of such a model is to identify the conditions of occurrence of the multipath 
failure modes, and to model the occurrence of such failure modes.  
This section proposes a methodology to identify the characteristics of the GNSS multipath 
integrity failures in a given airport environment. An important remark is that this section does 
not quantify the size of the GNSS multipath ranging errors that affect GNSS measurements in 
a given airport environment. Instead, this section identifies the multipath ranging errors that 
would represent a threat in terms of integrity if they were present in the airport environment. 
The identification of the multipath ranging errors that may represent a threat in terms of 
accuracy is also essential to maintain the accuracy requirements during surface operations. 
However, this thesis focuses on the development of integrity failure models and this 
identification remains as future work.  
Section 8.2.1  details the concept of GNSS multipath integrity ranging failures. Section 8.2.2 
states which kinds of GNSS failures are identified in this section. Section 8.2.3 elaborates a 
methodology to identify the GNSS single multipath integrity ranging failures in a given 
airport environment. Section 8.2.4 re-uses this methodology to identify the GNSS single 
multipath ranging failures at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France, during both taxi on taxiway 
and taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases. 
8.2.1. Definitions 
Based on the general definition of the GNSS ranging failures provided in Section 8.1.1 the 
GNSS single and multiple multipath integrity ranging failure are defined as follows.  
A GNSS single multipath ranging failure occurs when a significantly large error in the 
range measurement due to multipath may potentially cause a HMI event.  
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A GNSS multiple multipath ranging failure occurs when significantly large errors due to 
multipath affect simultaneously multiple ranging measurements and this combination may 
potentially cause a HMI event. Note also that each multipath ranging error taken separately 
may not lead to a HMI event. 
8.2.2. Case of study 
As explained in Chapter 5, during a surface operation, all GNSS measurements used in the 
PVT estimation are affected by a multipath error induced by the airport surface and the 
aircraft structure. This error is denoted as            in this thesis. During the operation, 
some of the GNSS measurements used in the PVT estimation may also be temporarily or 
continually affected by multipath from airport obstacles. These measurements are affected by 
an additional multipath ranging error that represents the impact of multipath from airport 
obstacles on the GNSS measurement.  
This thesis constitutes a first step in the development of a GNSS multipath integrity failure 
models. The focus is then on the identification of GNSS single multipath ranging failures. The 
identification of the GNSS multiple multipath ranging failures remains a future work. Hence, 
in this chapter, it is assumed that only one GNSS measurement can be affected by GNSS 
multipath from the airport obstacles at each time    of the operation. The situation where 
multiple GNSS measurements are simultaneously affected by multipath from airport obstacles 
is not considered in this chapter. If the GNSS measurement   is affected by obstacle multipath 
at time   , the GNSS measurement   is affected by an additional multipath ranging error 
      (  ) induced by the airport obstacles. The multipath ranging errors          that may 
potentially cause an HMI event are identified in this section. 
8.2.3. Methodology for GNSS multipath single failure identification  
This section develops a methodology to identify the GNSS single multipath ranging failures 
in a given airport environment.  
8.2.3.1. Criterion 
This section establishes a mathematical criterion to identify which GNSS multipath ranging 
errors        can be classified as GNSS single multipath ranging failures. Let         be the 
integrity risk allocated to the GNSS single multipath ranging failure affecting the GNSS 
measurement  . From Section 8.2.1, the GNSS multipath ranging error        on the GNSS 
measurement   is a GNSS single ranging failure if this ranging error may potentially cause an 
HMI event. In this chapter,        is not modelled as a deterministic ranging bias characterized 
by a given amplitude. Instead,         is a correlated process over the trajectory in the impact 
zone and is modelled by a first-order Gauss-Markov process characterized by two statistical 
parameters, namely the correlation time        and the standard deviation       . As shown in 
Section 8.3.1.2.2, both parameters        and        can be known in a deterministic way by 
means of the methodology presented in Section 5.5. It is proposed to identify the values of the 
parameters        and        for which the GNSS multipath ranging error        may 
potentially cause an HMI event. In addition,        is modelled as a Gauss-Markov process. 
Hence, it is always possible to find a realization of         that lead to an HMI event, 
regardless the values of        and        in  
  . For this reason, it is proposed to identify the 
parameters        and        that may cause an HMI event with a probability that is higher 
than         . Mathematically, the GNSS multipath ranging error        characterized by the 
parameters        and        is classified as a GNSS single multipath integrity failure if: 
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      (             )            Eq -  8-6 
 
where       (             )  is the probability of HMI induced by the GNSS multipath 
ranging error        modelled by the Gauss-Markov process  (              ) on the GNSS 
measurement  . Eq -  8-6 is equivalent to: 
 
       (             )   (             )            Eq -  8-7 
 
where: 
        (             )  is the probability of HMI given that a GNSS multipath ranging error 
       modelled by the Gauss-Markov process  (              ) is present on the GNSS 
measurement  . 
   (             )  is the probability of occurrence of the GNSS multipath ranging error 
       modelled by the Gauss-Markov process  (              ) on the GNSS 
measurement j. In this thesis, the event “the Gauss-Markov process 
 (              ) models the ranging error        affecting the GNSS measurement  ” is a 
deterministic event. In this chapter, the abusive notation  [ ]   is used to represent the 
probabilities of deterministic events [ ]. The value of the probability of a deterministic 
event is assigned to 1 if the event occurs and is assigned to 0 if the event does not occur.  
Let’s consider the two following conservative assumptions. 
-   (             )  is not available at this stage of the multipath integrity failure model 
development. Hence, it is assumed that the error is always present on the satellite  : 
 
  (             )     Eq -  8-8 
 
- It is assumed that no detection algorithms are used by the system in order to detect within 
the TTA the potential positioning failures induced by the the GNSS multipath ranging 
error        modelled by the Gauss-Markov process (              ). 
Under the previous two assumptions, Eq -  8-7 is equivalent to: 
 
 |  |       (             )            Eq -  8-9 
 
where  |  |       (             ) is the probability of positioning failure given that the GNSS 
multipath ranging error        modelled by the Gauss-Markov process  (              ) is 
present on the GNSS measurement  . 
The next section develops a methodology to assess the pairs (              )  modelling the 
GNSS multipath ranging errors         on satellite   that may lead to probability of positioning 
failure higher than the allocated integrity risk          for a given sub-phase.  
8.2.3.2. Methodology 
8.2.3.2.1. General description  
This section develops a methodology to assess the pairs (              )  characterizing the 
GNSS multipath single ranging failures on satellite  . The methodology consists firstly in 
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computing the worst-case probability of positioning failure in the presence of a GNSS 
multipath ranging error modelled by the Gauss-Markov process (              )  on satellite 
 . Secondly, the pairs (              )  that lead to a worst-case probability of positioning 
failure higher than the allocated integrity risk          are identified. Figure 8-1 represents the 
general methodology to identify the GNSS multipath single ranging failures for a given sub-
phase.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-1 : Methodology to identify the GNSS multipath single ranging failures 
 
Section 8.2.3.2.2 presents the methodology to compute the worst-case probability of 
positioning failure in the presence of a GNSS multipath ranging error        modelled by the 
Gauss-Markov process  (              ) on satellite   (Phase 1). Section 8.2.3.2.3 presents 
the methodology used to identify the GNSS multipath single ranging failures on satellite   
(Phase 2). 
8.2.3.2.2. Worst case probability of positioning failure 
From Chapter 5, in the dynamic configuration, and in the impact zone, the GNSS multipath 
ranging error on satellite j can be modelled as: 
 
     (  )            (   (  )        (  ))        (  ) 
 
Eq -  8-10 
This section elaborates a methodology to quantify the worst case probability of positioning 
failure in the presence of the correlated error process        on satellite j modelled by the 
Gauss-Markov process (              ). For this quantification, the following scenario has 
been used. An aircraft performs a given taxi sub-phase. Let’s note    the starting time of the 
operation and      the final time instant of the operation. The multipath ranging error is 
injected on satellite   during the sub-phase for each constellation configuration. If the satellite 
  is not visible for a given satellite geometry, the probability of positioning failure induced by 
the GNSS multipath ranging error on satellite j is not computed.  
As justified in Section 5.1.2.1, the satellite geometry is considered to be frozen during the 
sub-phase. In addition, the apparition or the disappearance of GNSS satellites during the sub-
phase induced by the signal masking are not considered. Indeed, during the taxi on taxiway 
and during the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases, the GNSS signals are not likely to be 
masked by airport buildings. As an example, it is shown in Section 5.2.1 that the GNSS 
signals are not masked at Toulouse Blagnac airport during these sub-phases, even when the 
elevation mask angle is as low as 5°.  
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At time    , the GNSS multipath ranging error        is assumed to affect satellite   until the 
end of the operation     . Equivalently, the GNSS airborne antenna is assumed to enter in the 
impact zone related to satellite   at     .   ,      and      are depicted in Figure 8-2.  
 
 
Figure 8-2: Scenario to identify the worst case probability of positioning failure 
 
As explained in Section 7.2.2, the presence of the GNSS multipath ranging error        on 
satellite   from time     induces an inflation of the covariance matrix of the horizontal 
position error. This covariance matrix is progressively inflated from     to    .     is 
represented in Figure 8-2. At time    , this covariance matrix reaches its steady-state value 
and remains roughly constant until     . The time     is chosen over the operation so that the 
covariance matrix reaches its steady state value before     . In other words,      is chosen 
such as: 
 
         
 
Eq -  8-11 
From Chapters 5 and 7, the stochastic ( ) multipath ranging error vectors during the time 
interval [       ] of the sub-phase are: 
 
     [      ]  (  )  
[
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
      [        ]  (  )  
[
 
 
 
 
  
 
      (  )
 
 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eq -  8-12 
From Chapter 7, the horizontal position error in the time interval [        ] can be modelled 
as: 
 
 
     [        ]    (  )  (    (  )         (  )      (  )) 
 
 
Eq -  8-13 
where: 
     (  )  is the horizontal position bias induced by the GNSS deterministic multipath 
ranging error vector.   (  ) is evaluated using Eq -  7-15. 
         (  ) is the covariance matrix of the horizontal position error that would be 
obtained in the absence of stochastic multipath ranging errors.         (  ) is evaluated 
using the methodology developed in Appendix E, Section E.4. 
     (  ) represents the impact of the stochastic multipath error on satellite    on the 
covariance of the horizontal position error.     (  ) is evaluated using Eq -  7-22. 
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Based on the horizontal position error model provided in Eq -  8-13 in the presence of the 
GNSS multipath ranging error on satellite j, the probability of positioning failure is estimated: 
- for every time epoch     in the time interval  [        ], 
- for every satellite configurations. The satellite configurations are represented by index   . 
The probability of positioning failure in the presence the multipath ranging error process 
       modelled by  (               ) at a given time epoch     and for a given satellite 
configuration     is denoted as   |  |       (             )(     )   As justified in Section 7.3, 
the algorithm developed in [Ober, 2003] is used to estimate   |  |       (             )(     ). 
The worst case probability of positioning failure in the presence of the multipath error 
modelled by (               )  on satellite j is then obtained as follows: 
 
  |  |       (             )     
   
     [        ]
     [          ]
(  |  |       (             ) (     )) 
 
 
Eq -  8-14 
 
where        is the total number of simulated satellite configurations.  
8.2.3.2.3. Integrity risk allocated to GNSS multipath single ranging failures 
This section presents the methodology used to identify the pairs (              ) that 
characterize the GNSS multipath single ranging failures on satellite   based on the worst case 
probabilities of positioning failure  |  |       (             )     (Phase 2).  
As justified in Section 8.2.3.1, the pairs (              )  that characterize the GNSS multipath 
single ranging failures are the pairs for which: 
 
  |  |       (              )            Eq -  8-15 
 
where          is the integrity risk allocated to the GNSS single multipath ranging failure 
affecting the GNSS measurement j. 
The integrity risk allocation among the fault-free mode and the failure modes has not been 
established at this stage of the project. In the following, it is assumed that the integrity risk 
allocated to the GNSS single multipath ranging failure         represents 10% of the total 
integrity risk    . Note that the impact of the choice of         on the identification of the 
GNSS multipath single ranging failures is further discussed in the next section.         is not 
sub-allocated among the different satellites in view during an operation. There are two 
reasons for this. Firstly, it is assumed in this chapter that at most one GNSS measurement can 
be affected by an abnormal multipath ranging error induced by the airport obstacle at each 
time epoch     of the operation. Secondly, the factors that determine which satellite is faulty 
are known, as fully explained in Section 8.3. Hence, in the following, the index j is omitted in 
       .       is the integrity risk allocated to the GNSS single multipath ranging failure. 
8.2.4. GNSS multipath failure identification at Toulouse Blagnac airport 
This section identifies the pairs (              )  that characterize of the GNSS multipath 
integrity ranging failures for the following sub-phases: 
- the taxi on taxiway sub-phase of the LVP procedure, 
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- the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase of the LVP procedure. 
For this identification, the methodology presented in Section 8.2.3 is re-used. From Section 
7.3.2.3, the worst case probability of positioning failure in the presence of the error       , can 
be considered as independent of the orientation of the segment when the elevation mask angle 
of 15° for both GPS and Galileo constellations is chosen. Hence, the failures identified in this 
section are valid over the entire taxi on taxiway sub-phase (segments 1 and 2) of the LVP 
procedure path. 
The methodology established in Section 8.2.3 aims to identify the characteristics of the GNSS 
single multipath ranging failures related to each satellite  . Since proposing an identification 
of the GNSS single multipath ranging failure that depends on the satellite PRN may not be 
simple to manipulate, it is chosen in this section to provide an identification of the GNSS 
single multipath ranging failures that is independent of the satellite PRN. To do so, the worst 
case probability of positioning failure in the presence of a GNSS stochastic multipath ranging 
error        is computed over the time epochs      [        ], over the satellite 
constellations    for which the navigation system accuracy performance requirement is met, 
and over the satellite PRN   of the GPS+Galileo double constellation. This probability is 
denoted as   |  |       (        )     in this section. Figure 8-3 represents the estimated 
  |  |       (        )     as a function of each pair (         ) for the taxi on taxiway sub-
phase (left part) and for the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase (right part). 
The simulation settings used for Figure 8-3 are recapped in Table 8-2. 
 
Number of simulated 
satellite geometries 
Satellite geometries simulated over 72hr with a time step of 10 
minutes => 433 satellite geometries 
Number of satellites in 
the constellation 
GPS 24 satellites 
Galileo 27 satellites 
Elevation mask angle 
GPS 15° 
Galileo 15° 
GNSS signals 
GPS Dual frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 
Galileo 
Dual frequency 
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a 
GNSS receiver settings As described in Section 4.2.4 
GNSS measurement 
error models 
Error source Error model 
 Troposphere 
 Ionosphere  
 Satellite clock and 
ephemeris inaccuracies 
 Receiver thermal noise  
Stochastic error models described 
in Section 3.2.1 
Multipath induced by the 
aircraft structure and the 
airport surface  
Deterministic error model 
described in  Section 7.2.1.2 
Multipath induced by 
aircraft structure, ground 
and airport obstacles  
Stochastic error model described 
in  Section 5.5.2.4 
 
Inertial sensor error 
models 
Stochastic error models described in  Section 6.2.3 
 
 
Table 8-2: Simulation settings for Figure 8-3 and Figure 8-4 
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Taxi on taxiway 
 
 
Taxi on apron taxiway 
 
 
Figure 8-3: Worst case probability of positioning failure in the presence of a stochastic 
multipath ranging error on a single GNSS pseudo-range measurement  
 
The following remarks can be made from Figure 8-3. 
- For a fixed value of     ,   |  |       (        )     tends to increase when      
increases. This is because the covariance matrix       of the 2D horizontal position error 
induced by the presence of the stochastic multipath ranging error is inflated when      
increases, as underlined in Section 7.2.2. 
- For a fixed value of     ,   |  |       (        )     tends to increase when      
increases in the interval [     ]. This is because the covariance matrix       rapidly 
grows with      when      is in the interval [     ]. This is underlined in Section 7.2.2. 
When      is above   ,       grows less rapidly as a function of     , and 
  |  |       (        )     remains roughly constant as a function of      .  
- For a fixed pair (         ),   |  |       (        )     is roughly   
   to      times 
lower for the taxi on taxiway sub-phase than for the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase. 
Indeed, the HAL for than taxi on taxiway sub-phase is roughly twice the HAL for the taxi 
on apron taxiway sub-phase. 
- When all GNSS measurements used in the PVT solution are only affected by multipath 
from the airport surface and form the aircraft structure, that is to say when         and 
       ,   |  |       (        )     can be neglected regarding the integrity risk. This 
means the probability of loss of integrity induced by GNSS nominal errors, the inertial 
nominal errors, and GNSS multipath errors due to the airport surface and the aircraft 
structure, can be neglected for the application. The values of   |  |       (        )     
when         and         are recapped in Table 8-3. 
 
   |  |       (               )          
Taxi on taxiway                       
Taxi on apron taxiway                        
 
Table 8-3: Worst case probability of positioning failure in the absence of a multipath 
from airport obstacles 
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Next, the pairs (         ) for which the worst case probability of positioning failure is equal 
to the allowed integrity risk        are identified by a blue line in Figure 8-4 for the taxi on 
taxiway sub-phase (left part) and for the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase (right part). 
Simulation settings for Figure 8-4 are recapped in Table 8-2. As discussed in Section 
8.2.3.2.3, it is considered that the integrity risk allocated to GNSS multipath single ranging 
failures is:   
 
               Eq -  8-16 
 
The analysis of Figure 8-3 shows that, if another value of        is chosen in the interval 
[            ], the values of the (         ) represented in the next Figure will only be 
changed of few millimeters up to few centimeters. 
 
 
 
Taxi on taxiway 
 
Taxi on apron taxiway 
 
 
Figure 8-4: Pairs (         ) characterizing the GNSS single multipath ranging failures 
 
In Figure 8-4, two regions can be distinguished. 
- The regions       and        represent the pairs  (         ) characterizing the multipath 
ranging errors from the airport obstacles that are not identified as GNSS single multipath 
ranging failures. Indeed, the worst case probability of positioning failure in the presence of 
these errors is below       . 
- The regions   ̅    and   ̅     represent the pairs  (         ) characterizing the multipath 
ranging errors from the airport obstacles that are identified as GNSS single multipath 
ranging failures. Indeed, the worst case probability of positioning failure in the presence of 
these errors is above       . 
Quantitatively, let’s consider a stochastic multipath ranging error that is modelled by a first 
order Markov process   (         ). If        , the minimal value of      for which 
the stochastic multipath ranging error is considered to be a single failure is set to      for the 
taxi on taxiway and      for the apron sub-phase. If        , the minimal value of      
for which the stochastic multipath ranging error is considered to be a single failure is roughly 
to      for the taxi on taxiway and      for the apron sub-phase. 
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8.3. Presence of GNSS multipath ranging failures 
The development of the GNSS multipath integrity failure models is essential to design a 
GNSS integrity monitoring that is able to properly detect and exclude multipath failures. The 
first step in the development of the integrity failure model is to identify the characteristics of 
the GNSS multipath integrity failures. This has been done in Section 8.2 for the GNSS single 
multipath failures. The second step, which is the main objective of this section, is to identify 
the conditions of occurrence of the multipath failures and to model the occurrence of such 
failures.  
Section 8.3.1 proposes a methodology to model the occurrence of such GNSS single ranging 
failures in a given airport and along a given procedure path. Section 8.3.2 assesses the 
presence of GNSS multipath ranging failures over the taxi and apron sub-phases of the LVP 
procedure at Blagnac airport.  
8.3.1. Occurrence model for GNSS multipath failure 
It is underlined in Section 8.1.2.1 that identifying the conditions inducing the GNSS ranging 
failures is essential in order to elaborate a suitable strategy to develop the probability of 
occurrence models. Section 8.3.1.1 presents the conditions leading to multipath single ranging 
failures during taxi on taxiway and taxi on apron taxiway phases. Section 8.3.1.2 proposes a 
methodology to model the occurrence of such GNSS single ranging failures. 
8.3.1.1. Conditions of occurrence  
Considering a given operation (starting time    + sub-phase length    + procedure path) in a 
given airport, a GNSS multipath single ranging failure on the GNSS measurement   at epoch 
time    is said to occur if the following conditions are met.  
- Firstly, the GNSS receiver antenna is located in an impact zone related to the satellite j at 
epoch time   . From Chapter 5, this implies that the GNSS measurement   is affected by a 
correlated process       (  )  modelled as a first-order Gauss-Markov process 
 (              ) at this time epoch.  
- Secondly, the pair (              ) that characterizes the multipath error       (  )  is such 
that: (              )   ,̅ where   ̅ represents the pairs  (         ) that characterize the 
GNSS single multipath ranging failures.   ̅is indicated in Figure 8-4 for the taxi on taxiway 
and for the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases of the LVP procedure path at Toulouse 
Blagnac airport.  
8.3.1.2. Occurrence model development  
Based on Section 8.3.1.1, and considering a given operation in a given airport, the probability 
of occurrence of a GNSS single multipath ranging failure on the measurement   at epoch time 
   is formulated as follows: 
 
                         (              )  ̅              Eq -  8-17 
 
where: 
                is the probability that the GNSS receiver antenna is in the impact zone related to 
satellite   at time   , 
  (             )  ̅               is the probability that (              )   ,̅ given that the GNSS 
receiver antenna is in the impact zone related to satellite   at time   . 
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The strategy to compute                is expressed in Section 8.3.1.2.1. The strategy to develop 
 (              )  ̅               is thus developed in Section 8.3.1.2.2. Finally, the strategy to 
evaluate           is recapped and discussed in Section 8.3.1.2.3. 
8.3.1.2.1. Computation of           
The condition “GNSS receiver antenna is located in an impact zone related to the satellite   at 
epoch time    and given the satellite configuration   ” is driven by the following parameters: 
- the airport obstacle positions and characteristics as well as the satellite position (elevation 
and azimuth angles) for the satellite configuration   . These parameters determine the 
location of the impact zone(s) related to satellite   for the satellite configuration   . 
- the true GNSS receiver antenna position at epoch time   . 
In this thesis, the obstacle positions and characteristics and the satellite elevation and azimuth 
angles are supposed to be known in a deterministic way. This thesis does not take into account 
the uncertainty on the predicted true airport building positions and characteristics as well as 
on the satellite elevation and azimuth angles. Deterministic multipath ranging error simulators 
[Chen, 2010] allow predicting the impact zone locations as a function of these parameters. As 
a consequence, the impact zone locations related to satellite   for the satellite configuration    
are considered to be known in a deterministic way. The impact zone related to satellite   for 
the satellite constellation    is also sketched in Figure 8-5 and is denoted as    in the 
following.  
 
 
 
Figure 8-5: Impact zone related to satellite   and positions of the GNSS airborne antenna 
 
The true GNSS antenna position at epoch time    cannot be predicted nor precisely measured 
in practice. One possible strategy to evaluate               is to use the statistical distribution of 
the true GNSS airborne antenna positions at time    in order to derive the probability that the 
GNSS airborne antenna is in the impact zone related to satellite   by means of the average risk 
strategy. However, using the average risk strategy to evaluate               has limited interest. 
Indeed, and particularly during the apron sub-phase and close to the airport obstacles, the 
probability               may be close to  . For this reason, using the average risk strategy 
instead of the specific risk strategy does not reduce significantly the model of               . For 
this reason, the specific risk strategy is used in this thesis to evaluate              . This means 
that the airborne antenna is treated as always in the impact zone related to satellite   at time    
if the airborne antenna may be located in the impact zone at time   . From Chapter 2, the 
horizontal distance between the desired GNSS airborne antenna position and the true GNSS 
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airborne antenna position is the TSE. Assuming that the TSE follows a zero-mean Gaussian 
distribution characterized by a standard deviation      [Shuster et al., 2011], 99.6% of the 
true antenna positions at time    are in a disk centered on the desired position at time    and 
characterized by a radius of      . This disk is represented in red in Figure 5-8 and is denoted 
as  (  ) in the following. The maximal allowed value of      is discussed in Section 5.4.2.4 
and is set to        for the taxi on taxiway sub-phase and to       for the taxi on apron 
taxiway sub-phase.  The true antenna positions at time    are considered in the disk  (  ). 
Using the specific risk strategy, the               can thus be evaluated as follows: 
 
              {
     (  )       
     (  )      
 Eq -  8-18 
 
8.3.1.2.2. Computation (              )  ̅            
From Section 5.5, the values of the Gauss-Markov parameters (               ) in the impact 
zone are driven by the following parameters: 
- the satellite position (elevation and azimuth angles), 
- the airport obstacle positions and characteristics, 
- the GNSS receiver antenna radiation pattern and the GNSS receiver settings, 
- the aircraft speed over the trajectory. 
As underlined in Section 8.3.1.2.1, in this thesis, the obstacle positions and characteristics and 
the satellite elevation and azimuth angles are supposed to be known in a deterministic way. 
Similarly, the aircraft speed is considered to be measurable and is considered to be known in a 
deterministic way. This thesis does not take into account the uncertainty on the measured 
speed that is inherent to the measurement process. 
To conclude, both         and        depend on a set of parameters that are considered to be 
observable or predictable.        and        can be predicted by means of multipath ranging 
error simulators [Chen, 2010]. As a consequence, the characteristics of the multipath ranging 
error in the impact zone         and        are supposed to be known in a deterministic way. 
 (             )  ̅              can thus be evaluated as follows: 
 
 (             )  ̅              {
    (              )    ̅
     (              )   ̅
 Eq -  8-19 
 
8.3.1.2.3. Synthesis  
Considering a given operation in a given airport, the probability of occurrence of a GNSS 
single multipath ranging failure on the satellite   at epoch time               is the product of two 
sub probabilities: 
- The probability that the GNSS airborne antenna is in the impact zone related to satellite j at 
  .  
- The probability that the multipath ranging error        on the satellite   at epoch time     is a 
GNSS single multipath ranging failure knowing that the GNSS airborne antenna is in the 
impact zone related to satellite j at   .  
Remark that           represents the probability of occurrence of GNSS single multipath 
ranging failure for: 
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- a given operation (starting time    + sub-phase length     + procedure path) in a given 
airport, 
- a given time epoch     along the given operation, 
- a given satellite PRN  . 
In order to provide a model of the probability of occurrence of GNSS single multipath ranging 
failure that is easier to manipulate and that is conservative, it is proposed to remove the 
dependency of the probability on the epoch time    of the operation starting at    by using the 
following model:  
 
           
  
(        ) 
 
Eq -  8-20 
It can also be envisaged to maximize the probability over the satellite PRNs and over the 
satellite geometries   . The resulting probability would be only dependent on the procedure 
path, and would be simple to manipulate. However, this probability of occurrence model 
would be extremely conservative. This would decrease the required probability of missed 
detection of GNSS single multipath ranging failures and this would potentially lead to 
degrade the availability of the navigation system. For this reason, it can be advised to 
investigate the effect of maximizing the probability of occurrence over the PRN and the 
satellite geometries on the availability of the system in order to analyze the real benefits and 
drawbacks of proposing an occurrence model that is independent of the PRNs and of the 
satellite geometries.  
The occurrence model developed in this section depends on the obstacles positions and 
characteristics and on the GNSS aircraft positions along the procedure path. Hence, the 
occurrence model depends on the 3D representation of the airport buildings and on the surface 
procedure. However, the 3D models of all airports and the procedures paths of all airports are 
not known. As a consequence, the development of an occurrence model that is common to all 
procedure paths and all airports is not feasible. The occurrence model is thus specific to an 
airport and to a procedure path. The next section evaluates the presence of the GNSS single 
multipath ranging failures along the LVP procedure path of Toulouse Blagnac airport, France. 
8.3.2. Presence of GNSS multipath failure at Toulouse Blagnac airport 
Section 8.3.1 elaborates a strategy to develop the model of GNSS multipath single ranging 
failures along a given taxi operation. This section re-uses this methodology to provide the 
presence model of GNSS multipath single ranging failures at Toulouse Blagnac airport, 
France over taxi on taxiway and taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases of the LVP procedure path. 
The taxi on taxiway and the taxi on apron taxiway segments along the LVP procedure path 
are depicted in Figure 8-6. 
This section is organized as follows. Section 8.3.2.1 summarizes the assumptions and the 
simplifications that have been made in this thesis to evaluate the presence of GNSS single 
multipath ranging failures at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France. Section 8.3.2.2 presents the 
presence model during the taxi on taxiway sub-phase of the LVP procedure path. Section 
8.3.2.3 presents the presence model during the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase of the LVP 
procedure path. 
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Figure 8-6: Taxi on taxiway and taxi on apron taxiway segments along the LVP 
procedure path 
 
8.3.2.1. Limitations 
This section summarizes the main assumptions that have been made when evaluating the 
presence model of GNSS single multipath ranging failures at Toulouse Blagnac airport. The 
assumptions can be classified into two categories that are listed below. 
- Assumptions and simplifications have been made in the evaluation of the Gauss-Markov 
process parameters (              ) that characterize the multipath ranging errors induced 
by the airport obstacles at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France: 
 (              ) have been evaluated using the following parameters and models : 
o The 3D model of the airport is a simplified 3D model. The validity of this model is 
further discussed in Appendix B, Section B.1. The airport obstacles represented in 
the scene are the airport buildings and the airport gates. The mobile and movable 
obstacles, such as other aircraft, footbridges or trucks, are not represented in the 
scene.  
o The airport surface is an infinite and planar ground made of dry tar. 
o The same antenna gain pattern is used to compute both L1 and L5 antenna gains. The 
antenna group delay and phase delay are not included in the antenna model.  
 (              ) have been evaluated assuming that the variance of the GNSS multipath 
ranging error induced by the airport obstacles when the aircraft crosses the impact zone 
is stationary throughout the trajectory in the impact zone.  
- Assumptions and simplifications have been made in the evaluation of the Gauss-Markov 
process parameters (              ) that characterize the GNSS multipath single ranging 
failures. The values of these parameters are presented in Section 8.2.4: 
 The impact of multipath on the C/N0 ratios, and hence on the standard deviation of the 
receiver thermal noise ranging errors, has not been taken into account. The validity of 
this simplification is discussed in Section 6.2.2.3.  
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 An algorithm is assumed to be implemented in the navigation system to set the 
navigation system “unavailable” when the navigation accuracy performance does not 
meet the accuracy navigation performance requirement stated in Section 2.3.2.3.  
8.3.2.2. Taxi on taxiway  
This section presents the presence model of the GNSS single multipath ranging failures over 
the taxi on taxiway procedure represented by red lines in Figure 8-6. An analysis based on the 
2D model of Toulouse Blagnac airport represented in Figure 8-6 shows that the minimal 
horizontal distance between the procedure path and the airport obstacles is: 
 
                    
 
Eq -  8-21 
 
               is represented in  Figure 8-6. As discussed in Section 8.3.1.2.1, the maximal 
distance between the procedure path and the true aircraft path is               
     . Hence, the minimal horizontal distance between the true aircraft path and the airport 
obstacles is: 
 
                                
 
Eq -  8-22 
 
The methodology developed in Section 5.4.2.1 has been used to estimate the impact zone 
locations over segment 3 and in the presence of Halls A to D when the satellite elevation is 
above the mask angle of 15°. This analysis shows that, if the horizontal distance between the 
GNSS receiver antenna and the façade of an airport obstacle is roughly above     , the 
influence of the echo signals of satellite   received from this obstacle on the multipath ranging 
error related to satellite   is not significant for the application.  It is concluded that, along the 
considered taxi on taxiway procedure path, the GNSS receiver antenna does not go through 
any impact zone along this procedure path. As a result, regardless the satellite PRN, the time 
instant     and the operation starting time   , we obtain: 
 
                Eq -  8-23 
 
This leads to: 
 
                             
 
Eq -  8-24 
To conclude, considering the assumptions and simplifications stated in Section 8.3.2.1, it can 
be considered that GNSS multipath single ranging failures are not present on the taxi on 
taxiway sub-phase of the LVP procedure path at Toulouse Blagnac airport.  
8.3.2.3. Taxi on apron taxiway  
This section presents the presence model of the GNSS multipath single ranging failures over 
the taxi on apron taxiway procedure represented by a green line in Figure 8-6. 
8.3.2.3.1. Analysis of           
The minimal horizontal distance between the procedure path and the airport obstacles is: 
 
                     
 
Eq -  8-25 
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                is represented in Figure 8-6. A portion of segment 3 can be included in the 
impact zone, depending on the satellite elevation and azimuth angles. It is underlined in 
Section 5.4 that aircraft does not cross the impact zone related to satellite   on segment 3 when 
the elevation of satellite   is above 35°. It but may cross the impact zone when the elevation of 
satellite   is below 35°, regarding the azimuth angle of satellite  . The identification of the 
pairs satellite elevation/satellite azimuth for which the impact zone covers the segment 3 
remains as future work.   
To conclude, the GNSS airborne antenna may potentially cross the impact zone along the 
apron segment of the LVP procedure. In order to evaluate the presence model of the GNSS 
multipath single ranging failures along the apron sub-phase, the probability 
 (             )  ̅           along the apron segment are presented in the next section. 
8.3.2.3.2. Analysis of  (              )  ̅                    
In this section, the model parameters (            ) characterizing the multipath ranging 
errors induced by the airport obstacles in the impact zone along the apron segment are 
presented and compared to the pairs (         )    ̅     that characterize the multipath 
ranging errors considered as GNSS single ranging failures.  
Figure 8-7 presents: 
- The pairs (         ) that characterize the multipath ranging errors considered as GNSS 
single ranging failures for the apron sub-phase and that are above the blue line depicted on 
each Figure. These pairs are further discussed in Section 8.2.4 and are located in the region 
denoted as   ̅    . 
- The multipath error model parameters (         )  that characterize the multipath ranging 
error induced by the airport obstacles along segment 3. These pairs are represented by the 
dots. These parameters have been obtained by means of the GNSS multipath ranging error 
simulator described in Chapter 5. The simulation methodology to obtain these pairs is fully 
described in Section 5.5.  The parameters (         )  along segment 3 are driven by: 
 the satellite position (elevation and azimuth angles), 
 the airport obstacle positions and characteristics, 
 the GNSS receiver antenna radiation pattern and the GNSS receiver settings, 
 the aircraft speed over the trajectory. 
For this reason, multipath error model parameters (         ) are plotted for : 
- different aircraft speeds in the range [             ] (left part of Figure 8-7), 
- different satellite elevation angles in the range [       ] (middle part of  Figure 8-7), 
- different satellite azimuth angles in the range [        ] (right part of  Figure 8-7). 
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Figure 8-7 : First-order Gauss-Markov process parameters (         ) for different 
aircraft speeds, satellite elevation angles and satellite azimuth angles 
 
The following remarks can be made from Figure 8-7. 
- Firstly, for fixed satellite elevation and azimuth angles, the highest value of      is 
obtained for the lowest aircraft speed, that is set to        in this thesis. An interpretation 
of this observation is provided in Section 5.5. 
- Secondly, for a fixed satellite azimuth angle and for a fixed aircraft speed,      is roughly 
constant as a function of the satellite elevation angle. 
- Thirdly, for a fixed satellite elevation angle and for a fixed aircraft speed,      is roughly 
constant as a function of the satellite azimuth angle.  
Following these remarks, the highest value      is obtained for an aircraft speed of     
  , 
and is below      regardless of the satellite elevation angle or the satellite azimuth angle. 
The correlation time parameter       is set to      regardless of the aircraft speed and of the 
satellite position, as justified in Section 5.5. Hence, regardless of the satellite elevation and 
azimuth angles, and regardless the aircraft speed on segment 3: 
 
(         )          
 
Eq -  8-26 
It can be concluded that: 
 
                (             )  ̅                      Eq -  8-27 
 
8.3.2.3.3. Analysis of         
Eq -  8-27 leads to: 
 
                             
 
Eq -  8-28 
To conclude, considering the assumptions and simplifications stated in Section 8.3.2.1, it can 
be considered that GNSS multipath single ranging failures are not present on the taxi on 
apron taxiway sub-phase of the LVP procedure path at Toulouse Blagnac airport.  
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8.4. Conclusions 
The navigation system integrity performance requirements for the guidance function during 
the taxi operation and under low visibility conditions have been recalled and discussed in this 
chapter. The concept of GNSS integrity failure model has been defined and the importance of 
the GNSS integrity failure models in the design of the GNSS integrity monitoring systems has 
been underlined.  
Since this project represents a first step in the development of the GNSS multipath integrity 
failure model, it is proposed to focus on the identification and on the occurrence model of 
GNSS single multipath ranging failures in the airport environment. This chapter has proposed 
a methodology to identify the characteristics of the GNSS multipath single ranging failures in 
a given airport.  
Next, this chapter has proposed a methodology to model the occurrence of GNSS multipath 
single ranging failures in a given airport environment.  Since the occurrence model is driven 
by the airport obstacle characteristics and by the procedure path location relative to the airport 
obstacles location, the proposed methodology is specific to a procedure path in a given 
airport. Extending the occurrence models to all procedure paths in a given and to all airports 
has been discussed. This methodology has been used to model the presence of the GNSS 
multipath ranging failures during the taxi on taxiway and during the taxi on apron taxiway 
sub-phases along the LVP procedure path at Toulouse Blagnac airport. By considering that 
the airport buildings and the airport gates are the only airport obstacles present in this airport, 
the occurrence of GNSS multipath ranging failures during the taxi on taxiway and during the 
taxi on apron taxiway sub-phases along the LVP procedure path can be considered as null. 
The occurrence model in the presence of mobile airport obstacles, such as other moving or 
parked aircraft, has to be assessed. This part remains as future work.  
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CHAPTER 9 
9. Conclusions 
 
 
The conclusions relative to each chapter of the thesis are summarized in Section 9.1. Section 
9.2 presents the recommendations for future work. 
 
9.1. Summary  
In order to make the surface operations safer and to maintain the airport capacity under 
critical conditions (under low-visibility conditions or high traffic density conditions), 
advanced surface movement systems are being developed. These systems should support the 
guidance function under all visibility conditions. Using GNSS for the zero-visibility surface 
guidance function raises issues since GNSS measurements may be affected by GNSS singular 
events in airport environments. GNSS singular events may lead to unacceptable position 
errors in terms of accuracy and integrity for the zero-visibility guidance function. Current 
GNSS integrity monitoring systems are not designed to totally account for the GNSS singular 
event effects. Hence, GNSS singular events may represent a threat in terms of accuracy and 
integrity for the zero-visibility surface guidance function. 
The overall objective of this Ph.D. was to address the effects of singular events on the 
accuracy and integrity of GNSS-based navigation systems for the zero-visibility guidance 
function application, with a special attention to multipath. More specifically, GNSS 
measurement error and integrity failure models are key inputs in the design of GNSS integrity 
monitoring systems. In this thesis, work has been mainly focused on the modelling of GNSS 
multipath measurement errors, on the assessment of the multipath impact on the GNSS-based 
position error, and on the development of GNSS multipath integrity failure models for airport 
navigation.  
For this matter, the navigation system performance requirements adapted to the surface 
guidance function under zero-visibility conditions have been firstly identified in Chapter 2. 
The taxi operation is part of the surface operations and includes three sub-phases: the taxi on 
taxiway, the taxi on apron taxiway and the taxi on taxi lane.  The navigation system 
performance requirements for the three sub-phases are presented and discussed. New and less 
stringent accuracy and integrity requirements are proposed to account for a less conservative 
FTE budget.   
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Next, the GNSS constellations (GPS and Galileo) and the GNSS signals (GPSL1C, GPSL5, 
GalileoE1 and GalileoE5a) used in the development of the multipath ranging error and 
position error models have been selected in Chapter 3. ABAS has also been chosen as the 
augmentation system that will support the application. The choice of these constellations, 
signals and augmentations system have been discussed and justified. After that, a 
bibliographic study has been conducted to review the shape, the magnitude and the 
occurrence of GNSS error measurements with a specific attention to the errors induced by 
singular events. The capacity of current and future GNSS integrity monitoring systems to 
provide sufficient protection against the effects of the singular events has been assessed. 
Based on this assessment, it has been chosen to focus the rest of the thesis on multipath.  
Chapter 4 proposes a general analysis of the multipath impact on the GNSS signals and 
measurements. A wideband model has been chosen to represent the transmission channel. 
Based on this representation, the analytical expressions of the GNSS signals at the receiver 
antenna output are presented. Next, the chapter analyzes the multipath impact on the GNSS 
code delay estimate. For this analysis, a brief description of the DLL has been provided. 
Finally, the evolution of the multipath code ranging error in the presence of a single multipath 
and as a function of the relative code delay between the direct and the echo signal has been 
discussed. The analytical expression of this error for both GPSL5 and GalileoE5a signals has 
been proposed.  
Chapter 5 has proposed the model of the GNSS multipath measurement errors adapted to taxi 
sub-phases. The error models account for the presence of three types of multipath sources: the 
airport surface, the aircraft structure, and the airport buildings and gates. Multipath error 
models have been developed at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France by means of a GNSS 
multipath ranging error simulator. This software uses a simple 3D model of the airport 
buildings and gates. The simplifications done to build this 3D model have been presented. It 
has been identified from the literature that sub-wavelength level details and isolated obstacles 
of size below 80cm do not have to be modelled in order to properly estimate the GNSS 
ranging errors. In addition, concrete meter level details on concrete façade do not have to be 
modelled in order to properly estimate the GNSS ranging error model parameters. Other 
simplifications, such as on the assumed dielectric permittivity of the glass and concrete walls, 
have been identified and their analysis is recommended as future work. 
Chapter 5 has also proposed multipath ranging error models when the aircraft is parked or is 
moving in the airport scene. In the dynamic configuration (rectilinear and uniform trajectories 
with an aircraft speed of 1m/s or higher), the multipath ranging error can be modelled as the 
sum of two error components. The time-constant deterministic error component throughout 
the rectilinear trajectory is induced by the ground first-order reflections. It reaches a few 
decimetres up to a few meters at low satellite elevation angles (that is to say below 15°). 
Hence, few measurements experience significant ground reflections at a time. The zero-mean 
time-varying error component throughout the rectilinear trajectory is induced by the obstacles 
first and second-order interactions. This time-correlated error highly depends on the aircraft 
trajectory in the scene. Since the aircraft trajectory cannot be known deterministically with a 
high accuracy level (centimetre level), the time-varying error has been considered as a 
stochastic correlated process modelled as a zero-mean first-order Gauss-Markov process 
characterized by a standard deviation and by a correlation time. The sensitivity of the standard 
deviation to the satellite elevation angle, to the satellite azimuth angle and to the aircraft speed 
has been assessed. The highest values of the standard deviation are obtained at low aircraft 
speed, low satellite elevation angles, and close to the airport buildings. As an example, the 
standard deviation reaches a few meters at Blagnac airport in the gate area, for an aircraft 
speed of 1m/s and for a satellite elevation angle of 5°. 
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Next, the effects of the GNSS multipath measurement errors on the horizontal position error 
has been modelled and quantified. Chapter 6 has focused on the identification of a 
positioning algorithm suitable for the application. An open-loop double constellation 
GPS+Galileo/IRS/DEM tight coupling positioning algorithm has been chosen. The coupling 
technique is based on a linearized Kalman filter. The reasons that have justified these choices 
are discussed in the chapter. After having chosen the positioning algorithm, the 
implementation of the software that simulates the horizontal position error at the output of the 
positioning algorithm has been presented.  
Once the GNSS-based navigation algorithm has been detailed, the impact of multipath on the 
GNSS-based horizontal position error at the output of the selected positioning algorithm has 
been assessed in the dynamic configuration and in Chapter 7. It has been firstly justified that 
the position error in the 2D horizontal plane and during surface operations can be over-
bounded by a bi-dimensional Gaussian distribution characterized by a 2D bias vector and by a 
covariance matrix. Next, the multipath impact on both position bias and positioning error 
covariance matrix has been assessed. It has been concluded that: 
- The GNSS deterministic multipath ranging error vector induced by the airport surface and 
by the aircraft structure generates a bias on the horizontal position error. The analytical 
expression of this position bias as a function of the Kalman filter matrices and of the 
deterministic multipath ranging error vector has been provided. The norm of the induced 
horizontal position bias is a few decimetres for standard satellite elevation mask angles (5° 
for GPS and 10° for Galileo) and is significantly reduced to a few centimetres for satellite 
elevation mask angles of 15° for both GPS and Galileo constellations.  
- The stochastic multipath ranging error vector induced by the airport buildings and airport 
gates and modelled as a first-order Gauss-Markov process vector generates an increase of 
the covariance matrix of the position error in the 2D horizontal plane. The analytical 
expression of the additional covariance matrix of the position error induced by multipath as 
a function of the Kalman filter matrices and of the first-order Gauss-Markov process vector 
has been provided. When only few of the satellites are affected by multipath from the 
airport buildings and gates at a time, a significant dilution of the obstacle multipath in the 
positioning domain is observed. In airport environments such as at Toulouse Blagnac 
airport, it is reasonable to say that few satellites are simultaneously affected by obstacles (3 
to 5 satellites at Blagnac airport). As an illustration, the worst case inflation of the standard 
deviation of the horizontal position error induced by multipath at Blagnac airport is a few 
decimeters and is experienced in the gate area (taxi-lane operation). 
Once the position error models adapted to surface operations have been set up, the accuracy 
of the positioning algorithm has been assessed along the three taxi sub-phases related to a 
specific procedure path at Blagnac airport. It has been concluded that the elevation mask 
angle of 15° for both GPS and Galileo constellations improves the accuracy and availability 
of the system compared to the standard mask angles of 5° for GPS and 10° for Galileo. It is 
also shown that the accuracy requirement is not met for the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase, is met 
for nearly 96% of the satellite geometries for the apron sub-phase and is met for 100% of the 
satellite geometries for the taxiway sub-phase. An open-loop GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS tight 
coupling positioning algorithm has been implemented to evaluate the benefit of using WSS 
measurements in the coupling algorithm to improve the accuracy performance. Even if the 
WSS aid reduces the standard deviation of the horizontal position error of a few centimeters, 
this aid is not sufficient to meet the accuracy requirement for the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase 
and does not improve the accuracy function availability for the apron sub-phase. The 
operational benefits of developing a navigation system only for the taxiway and apron sub-
phases have been underlined. Even if the GNSS/IRS/DEM solution is not a full-availability 
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solution for the apron sub-phase, the benefits of proposing this solution for both taxiway and 
apron sub-phases have been discussed.  
Finally, Chapter 8 has detailed a methodology to develop the GNSS multipath integrity 
failure model for single multipath ranging failures in a given airport for the taxiway and apron 
sub-phases. The developed failure model describes the characteristics in terms of standard 
deviation and correlation time of the GNSS single multipath ranging failures, the factors 
influencing these characteristics as well as the occurrence model of the GNSS single 
multipath ranging failures and their conditions of occurrence. Under the assumptions stated in 
the thesis, and particularly in the absence of mobile obstacles in the scene, such as other 
parked aircraft, GNSS single ranging failures do not occur during both taxiway and apron 
operations along the considered procedure path at Blagnac airport.  
9.2. Future work 
The different recommendations for future work have been discussed in the different chapters 
of this thesis and are summarized as follows. 
Navigation system requirement performance 
Concerning the development of integrity navigation system requirement performance for the 
zero-visibility guidance function, the integrity risk used in this thesis is proportional to the 
exposure time related to that sub-phase. It would be valuable to account also for the produced 
effects of the integrity loss for that sub-phase. The produced effects of a loss of integrity 
depend on the aircraft speed and on the type of obstacles in which the aircraft may collide. 
GNSS multipath ranging error models 
Concerning the simulation parameters employed by the GNSS multipath ranging error 
simulator for the estimation of the error model parameters, it is proposed to enhance the 
model of the GNSS airborne antenna by implementing a dual-band L1+L5 antenna that take 
into account the group delays and phase delays induced by the antenna and by multipath from the 
structure of the assessed A319 aircraft.  
Concerning the development of the 3D airport models suitable for the estimation of the GNSS 
multipath ranging error model parameters, further analyses are recommended for future work: 
- It is proposed to develop error models that account for more realistic ground surfaces, such 
as ground surfaces made of tar and grass parts. It would be also valuable to investigate the 
impact of rain or snow on the error models. 
- In order to fully demonstrate the validity of the 3D model of Toulouse Blagnac for the 
estimation of the multipath error model parameters, it would be valuable to investigate: 
 The impact of the roughness of the building and gate walls on the error models. 
 The necessity to model the interior parts of the buildings and gates in order to estimate 
the error model parameters.  
 The impact of the dielectric permittivity and thickness of concrete and glass walls on the 
error models. It would also be valuable to propose recommendations on the values of 
thickness and permittivity that can be adopted in the 3D airport models to estimate the 
error model parameters.  
- Finally, it is useful to develop a general methodology to develop the 3D airport models 
suitable for the error model development. In this thesis, the error models have been 
developed at Blagnac airport. Developing the error models in a given airport is possible if a 
precise 3D model of the environment is available for that airport. If such data bases are not 
available, it can be envisaged to build a simple 3D model of the airport environment by 
classifying each airport façade into clusters. Each cluster gathers together realistic facades 
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that can be represented by a simple façade in the 3D model. The identification of all façade 
clusters is required to extend the error models to other airports and is recommended as 
future work. 
Concerning the development of the GNSS multipath ranging error models, recommendations 
to enhance the models proposed in this thesis are listed as follows: 
- The dynamic error model can be enhanced by extending this dynamic model to curved 
and/or non-uniform trajectories.  
- The GNSS multipath ranging errors induced by the airport obstacles in the dynamic 
configuration are modelled by a first-order Gauss-Markov process characterized by a 
standard deviation and by a correlation time. In this Ph.D. thesis, the correlation time is set 
to a fixed value and the standard deviation of the model is calculated in a way that the PSD 
of the Gauss-Markov process over-bounds the PSD of the time-varying correlated error 
process throughout the trajectory. It is proposed as a future work to develop an algorithm 
that estimates the correlation time and the standard deviation of the Gauss-Markov model 
that lead to over-bound the PSD of the correlated process obtained by simulations while 
minimizing the covariance matrix of the position error induced by these time-varying 
multipath errors.  
- The static and dynamic models of the GNSS multipath ranging error induced by the airport 
obstacles along a segment located in the impact zone are characterized by a standard 
deviation parameter. This parameter is estimated by simulation assuming that the 
amplitude variations of the error induced by the airport obstacles are constant along the 
segment. However, along the taxi lane segments particularly, the amplitude of the error 
induced by the airport obstacles is not constant.  Hence, it would be valuable to determine 
the segment part where the error amplitude is maximal and to estimate the standard 
deviation parameter on this part.  
- The models of the GNSS multipath ranging error are not adapted to the presence of mobile 
obstacles. In order to account for the presence of mobile obstacles in the scene, it can be 
proposed to estimate the positions and orientations of the mobile obstacles in the scene by 
using Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) systems. It can also be 
proposed to develop models of prediction of the positions and orientations of the mobile 
obstacles in the scene.  After that, error models valid in the presence of both fixed and 
mobile obstacles have to be developed.  
- The error component induced by the airport buildings has been modelled by a Gaussian 
distribution in the static configuration and by a first-order Gauss-Markov process in the 
dynamic configuration. It is recommended to investigate the feasibility to model the error 
by over-bounding models that best fits the estimated error. The design of integrity 
monitoring algorithms that use non-Gaussian error models as expected measurement error 
models has also to be assessed. 
- It is also recommended as future work to validate the developed multipath ranging error 
models by real data. 
Horizontal position error models 
Concerning the simulation parameters and the type of Kalman filter employed by the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM simulator to compute the horizontal position errors, further analyses are 
recommended: 
- It is recommended to analyze the impact of multipath on the C/N0 ratios, on the standard 
deviations of the receiver thermal noise ranging errors during surface operations, and on 
the loss of tracking of the GNSS signals. If the multipath impact on the noise error 
CHAPTER 9: Conclusions  
 
198 
 
standard deviations and on the loss of tracking is significant, it is recommended to develop 
a C/N0 link budget that accounts for the multipath effects.  
- It has been underlined that the satellite elevation mask angles for both GPS and Galileo 
constellations significantly impact the horizontal position bias and the horizontal position 
error covariance matrix. It would be valuable to determine the optimal satellite elevation 
mask angle. The optimal mask angle is the angle value for which the accuracy performance 
of the position algorithm is optimal.   
- It is further recommended to analyze and compare the performance of both EKF and 
linearized Kalman filters during sub-phases where the GNSS measurements are mainly 
affected by low multipath errors (such as during the taxi on taxiway sub-phase) and during 
sub-phases where the GNSS measurements may be affected by severe multipath errors 
(such as during the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase). If the EKF presents better performance for 
some of the sub-phases, it is recommended to assess the multipath impact on the position 
error at the output of the EKF GNSS/IRS positioning algorithm.  
It has been shown that the proposed GNSS/IRS and the GNSS/IRS/WSS coupling algorithms 
do not meet the accuracy navigation system performance requirement related to the taxi on 
taxi lane sub-phase. It is recommended as future work to identify the WSS correlation modes 
in the time domain and between the wheels by real data analysis and to propose a Kalman 
filter implementation that accounts for these correlation modes. It is also recommended to 
integrate an extra sensor in the GNSS/IRS/WSS algorithm in order to meet the accuracy 
requirement for the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase. Among the proposed technologies that could 
be used for this sub-phase, it has been recommended in this thesis to consider LIDAR. Note 
also that, since the gate area is a relatively small-scale environment, it can be envisaged to 
integrate GNSS and IRS with technologies adapted to small-scale environments on taxi lanes. 
Among these technologies, UWB is of particular interest due to its centimeter level accuracy.  
GNSS multipath integrity failure model 
Concerning the development of the GNSS multipath integrity failure models for surface 
operations, further analyses are recommended: 
- It is recommended to develop the GNSS multipath multiple failure models for both 
taxiway and apron sub-phases.  
- Once the GNSS-based positioning adapted to the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase will be 
developed, it is recommended to develop the GNSS multipath single and multiple failure 
models for this sub-phase.  
- Since the aircraft cannot respond instantaneously to the navigation system, a given 
positioning failure must persist for several seconds before the aircraft position will 
significantly deviate. Indeed, the aircraft and its control system behaves as a low-pass filter 
on the NSE. Hence, it is recommended as future work to analyze the minimal duration of a 
positioning failure required before the aircraft position significantly deviates.  
General recommendations and perspectives 
As underlined in Chapter 1, extending the use of GNSS to the zero-visibility guidance 
function requires analyzing the multipath impact on both accuracy and integrity of GNSS-
based airport surface navigation systems. This thesis has mainly focused on the identification 
of GNSS integrity failures. One of the main perspectives is to address the effects of multipath 
on the accuracy of the positioning algorithm and to identify which GNSS multipath ranging 
failures may represent a threat in terms of accuracy.  
The second main perspective related to this thesis is to develop a GNSS integrity monitoring 
systems designed to protect users from the effects of multipath during the taxi sub-phases. 
The designed integrity monitoring systems must be capable of detecting GNSS multipath 
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failures with required probabilities of missed detection. The following methodology can be 
suggested concerning the development of a real-time GNSS multipath failure detection 
technique in airport environments.  
- The first step consists in developing a technique to estimate in real-time the multipath error 
models on the GNSS. The following suggestions can be made for the development of the 
estimation technique: 
 Firstly, a data-base that pre-defines the signature of each airport obstacle in terms of 
multipath ranging error models by means of a GNSS multipath ranging error simulator 
can be developed. Note that it is recommended in this thesis to develop a data-base of 
error models for two reasons. The first reason is that determining the error models 
requires a relatively high computation load. Hence, the error models can be difficult to 
estimate onboard and in real-time. The second reason is that the number of facades and 
obstacles present in airport environments is limited. In addition, some facades and 
obstacles may have similar signature in terms of multipath errors.  
 Secondly, it is proposed to develop an algorithm that estimates the localization of the 
impact zones in real-time from the GNSS satellites positions estimates and from a 
simplified 3D airport model. 
 Thirdly, it is proposed to develop an algorithm that estimates the GNSS multipath 
ranging error models on the GNSS measurements in real-time from the estimated 
impact zone locations, from the GNSS airborne antenna position estimates, and from the 
pre-defined data base that includes the obstacle signatures in terms of multipath error 
models.  
- The second step consists in detecting and excluding the GNSS measurements that are 
affected by GNSS multipath failures. Note that the technique that estimates the GNSS 
multipath ranging error models in real-time can also be used to estimate the accuracy of the 
horizontal position estimate in real-time and to detect and exclude the GNSS 
measurements that represent a threat in terms of accuracy. 
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 ACRONYMS  
 
 
AAIM Aircraft Autonomous Integrity Monitoring  
ABAS Aircraft Based Augmentation System  
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast  
AL Alert Limit  
AltBOC Alternate Binary Offset Carrier  
APV Approach and landing Procedures with Vertical guidance   
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance and Control System 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
BARO-VNAV APV Barometric Vertical Navigation 
BPSK Binary Phase Shift Keying 
C/A Coarse/Acquisition  
CAST Commercial Aviation Safety Team  
CBOC Composite Binary Offset Carrier  
CDF Cumulative Density Function 
CNS Communications, Navigation, Surveillance 
CW Carrier Wave 
DEM Digital Elevation Map  
DH Decision height 
DLL Delay Locked Loop  
DME Distance Measuring Equipment  
DoA Direction of Arrival 
EKF Extended Kalman Filter 
EM ElectroMagnetic 
EMLP Early Minus late Power  
EUROCAE European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FHA Functional Hazard Assessment  
FOG Fiber Optic Gyroscope 
FTE Fight Technical Error  
GBAS Ground Based Augmentation System 
GO Geometrical Optics 
GPS Global Positioning System 
HAL Horizontal Alert Limit  
HMI Hazardous Misleading Information 
HPLs Horizontal Protection Levels 
HRG Hemispherical Resonator  
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I&D Integrate and Dump 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization  
IF Intermediate Frequency 
IFR Instrument Flight Rules 
Ifree Iono-free 
IGS International GNSS Service 
ILS Instrument Landing System 
IMU Inertial Measurement Unit  
INS Inertial Navigation System 
IR Integrity Risk  
IRNSS  Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System 
IRS Inertial Reference System 
JTIDS Joint Tactical Information Distribution System  
LAL Lateral Alert Limit 
LIDAR Light Detection and Ranging  
LLA Latitude Longitude Altitude 
LNA Low Noise Amplifier 
LOS Line Of Sight 
LS Least-Squares 
MBOC Multiplexed Binary Offset Carrier  
MEMS Micro-Electro-Mechanical System 
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Specification 
MOPS Minimum Operational Performance Standards  
NCO Numerically Controlled Oscillator 
NED North East Down 
NLOS Non Line Of Sight 
NPA Non-Precision Approach 
NSE Navigation System Error  
P(Y) Precise  
PA Precision Approach 
PBN Performance Based Navigation  
PDE Path Definition Error  
PDF Probability Density Function 
PDOP Position Precision Of Dilution  
PLs Protection Levels 
PO Physical Optics 
PRN Pseudo Range Noise  
QPSK Quadrature Phase Shift Keying  
QZSS  Quasi Zenith Satellite System 
RAIM Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring 
RF Radio Frequency  
RF Radio-Frequency 
RFID Radio Frequency IDentification  
RHCP Right Hand Circular Polarization 
RLG Ring Laser Gyroscope 
RNAV Area Navigation  
RTCA Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics  
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RVR Runway visual range  
SARPs Standards And Recommended Practices  
SBAS Satellite Based Augmentation System 
SIA Service de l'Information Aéronautique 
SISA Signal In Space Accuracy 
SSR Secondary Surveillance Radar 
TACAN TACtical Air Navigation  
TEC  Total Electron Content  
TIDs Travelling Ionosphere Disturbances 
TLS Target Level of Safety  
TMBOC Time Multiplexed Binary Offset Carrier  
TSE Total System Error  
TTA Time-To-Alert  
URA User Range Accuracy  
URE User Ranging Error  
UWB Ultra Wide Band 
VAL Vertical Alert Limit  
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access  
WLS Weight Least-Squares 
WSS Wheel Speed Sensor 
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  APPENDIX A 
A. GNSS multipath parameters 
and ranging errors 
 
 
This appendix: 
- provides the analytical expression of the relative code delay and of the relative phase shift 
related to an echo signal scattered by a single point reflector, 
- investigates the relative Doppler frequency shift and the relative phase shift related to an 
echo signal reflected by the ground over a uniform and rectilinear trajectory, 
- derives the analytical expression of the raw code multipath ranging error induced by a 
single echo signal, 
- analyzes the multipath ranging induced by the ground and by aircraft structure, 
- develops a GNSS multipath ranging error model induced by the ground and by the aircraft 
structure during turns and assesses the validity of this model.  
 
A.1. Multipath parameters of an echo signal scattered by a single 
point reflector 
This subsection derives the analytical expression of the relative code delay and of the relative 
phase shift of an echo signal mentioned by index “2”. Echo signal “2” is emitted by a 
stationary GNSS satellite, scattered on a single static point reflector and reaches the static 
GNSS receiver antenna. The notations used in this appendix are provided in Table A-1. 
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 Parameter description 
Satellite position 
Satellite elevation angle    
Satellite azimuth angle       
Reflector position 
Illuminated facade orientation with respect to the GNSS satellite: 
       .  
Obstacle height:      
GNSS airborne 
antenna position 
On segment [AB] that is parallel to the airport surface considered as 
a planar and infinite and in the specular direction.   
Aircraft azimuth angle constant on [AB]. 
Antenna height:       
 
Table A-1: Description of the scenario 
 
The GNSS airborne antenna, the obstacle, the direct signal, the echo signal reflected from the 
obstacle, and the ground are illustrated in Figure A-1.  
 
 
Side view Top view 
 
 
Figure A-1 : Description of the scenario 
 
A.1.1. Relative code delay  
The relative code delay at a point  of segment [AB] is given by: 
 
 
    
‖  ‖  ‖  ‖
 
 
Eq -  A-1 
 
 
where: 
   is the orthogonal projection of   on line (D) represented in Figure A-1. 
 ‖  ‖ and ‖  ‖ are the distances between points   and  , and between points   and  , 
respectively.  
Let’s consider (       ) the orthonormal reference frame attached to  . The   axis is 
orthogonal to the illuminated façade and is oriented as depicted in Figure 1. The   axis is 
parallel to the illuminated façade and the   axis points up in such a way that (       ) is a 
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orthonormal direct reference frame. Let’s compute ‖  ‖. The coordinates of   in 
(       ) are: 
 
    [
    (      )
     (      )
 (         )
] 
 
Eq -  A-2 
 
 
where   is the distance between A and M in (     ) plane. The norm of vector    is: 
 
 ‖  ‖  √   (         )  
 
Eq -  A-3 
 
 
Let’s compute ‖  ‖. Let’s state   the unit vector on line (D) pointing to the satellite. The 
coordinates of   in (       ) are: 
   [
   (  )   (      )
   (  )   (      )
   (  )
] 
 
Eq -  A-4 
 
 
Denote    the coordinates of   in (       ). Since   is on line (D): 
 
 
         [
   (  )   (      )
   (  )   (      )
   (  )
] 
 
Eq -  A-5 
 
 
Moreover, vectors   and   are orthogonal. Hence: 
 
        Eq -  A-6 
 
Using Eq -  A-2, Eq -  A-4 and Eq -  A-5, and considering the constraint stated in Eq -  A-6: 
 
       (  )    (       )  (         )    (  ) Eq -  A-7 
 
Using Eq -  A-5 and Eq -  A-7: 
 
 
   (    (  )    (       )  (         )    (  )) [
   (  )   (      )
   (  )   (      )
   (  )
] 
 
Eq -  A-8 
 
The norm of vector    is: 
 
 ‖  ‖      (  )    (       )  (         )    (  ) Eq -  A-9 
 
Eq – 9, Eq – 3 in Eq – 1 lead to: 
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{√   (         )      (  )    (       )
 (         )    (  )} 
  
Eq -  A-10 
 
where   is the horizontal distance beween the obstacle and the airborne antenna. When 
             , it can be considered that     increases linearly with respect to  : 
 
 
    
 
 
{ (     (  )    (       ))} 
  
Eq -  A-11 
 
The evolution of     along [AB] depends on the orientation of the segment [AB] w.r.t. the 
reflector since it depends on the angle       . It also depends on the satellite elevation angle 
  . 
A.1.2. Relative phase shift  
The relative phase shift is given by: 
 
 
                 Eq -  A-12 
 
where     is the phase shift induced by the reflection of the EM wave on the obstacle and by 
the GNSS antenna phase shift. In the case where the     is constant on [AB], and from Eq -  
A-11 and Eq -  A-12, it is deduced that, when              , two points on [AB] 
separated by a distance of  
  
      (  )    (       )
have the same modulo    relative phase    . 
Hence, along segment [AB], the spatial period of     is equal to: 
 
   
  
      (  )    (       )
 Eq -  A-13 
 
To conclude, the spatial period of     along [AB] depends on the orientation of the segment 
[AB] w.r.t. the reflector (      ), on the satellite elevation angle (  ), on the GNSS central 
frequency (  ). For a segment [AB] in the specular direction of the reflector, the spatial 
period p is between    and 
  
 
. 
 
A.2. Multipath parameters of an echo signal reflected from the 
ground 
A.2.1. Relative Doppler frequency  
This subsection shows that, in the dynamic configuration, the Doppler frequency shifts of the 
direct signal and of the echo signal emitted by the satellite, reflected from the ground and 
reaching the GNSS receiver antenna are roughly equal and constant throughout a uniform and 
rectilinear trajectory. 
Assuming a stationary satellite, the Doppler frequency shift of the direct signal        at time   
is: 
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       ( )  
  
 
(  ( )   ( )) Eq -  A-14 
 
where: 
  ( ) is the GNSS airborne antenna velocity vector at time  , 
   ( ) is the unit vector from the GNSS satellite to the GNSS airborne antenna at time  . 
Throughout the trajectory,   ( ) is roughly constant since the satellite is static and the aircraft 
has a weak dynamic during surface operations. In addition,  ( ) is constant throughout a 
constant speed straight line trajectory. Hence,       ( ) is roughly constant throughout the 
trajectory. This is validated by the fact that the maximal variation of       ( ) throughout the 
trajectory [FG] described in Section 5.5.1.1. is of the order of       . 
The Doppler frequency shift of the echo signal        reflected from the ground at time   is: 
 
      ( )  
  
 
(  ( )       ( )) 
 
Eq -  A-15 
where       ( ) is the unit vector from the point P of the ground where the echo signal is 
reflected to the GNSS airborne antenna at time  . 
Let’s state: 
 
 
  ( )  [
        ( )
        ( )
        ( )
]                           ( )  [
        ( )
        ( )
        ( )
] 
 
 
Eq -  A-16 
From the generalized image theorem detailed in [Chen, 2010], it can be considered that: 
 
 
[
        ( )
        ( )
        ( )
]  [
        ( )
        ( )
         ( )
] 
 
 
Eq -  A-17 
Since the vertical component of the aircraft velocity vector is null, we can write: 
 
  ( )   ( )   ( )       ( ) 
 
Eq -  A-18 
It is deduced that: 
 
       ( )        ( ) 
 
Eq -  A-19 
 
Hence, the Doppler frequency shifts of the direct signal and of the echo signal emitted by the 
satellite, reflected from the ground and reaching the GNSS receiver antenna are roughly equal 
and constant throughout a uniform and rectilinear trajectory. As an illustration, the difference 
between both Doppler frequency shifts on the trajectory [FG] described in Section 5.5.1.1 is 
of order       . 
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A.2.2. Relative phase shift 
This subsection shows that the relative phase shift of the echo signal emitted by the satellite, 
reflected over the ground and reaching the GNSS receiver antenna on a segment of the airport 
is roughly the same in both static and dynamic configurations.  
Along the segment, and at time  , the echo signal from the ground is characterized by the 
following relative phase shift: 
 
       ( )     (         ( ))   ( )    (         ( ))   ( )    ( )
   ( ) 
Eq -  A-20 
 
 
The relative phase shift of the echo signal from the ground at time   of a static aircraft 
characterized by the same aircraft orientation on that segment is given by: 
 
          ( )         ( )        ( )    ( )    ( ) Eq -  A-21 
 
 
The static aircraft and the dynamic aircraft have the same orientation on the segment. Hence, 
the phase shift   ( )    ( ) induced by the reflection of the signal on the ground and by the 
airborne antenna is the same in both static and dynamic configurations. By using the 
following notation:   ( )    ( )     ( ),  it comes: 
 
       ( )            ( )    (      ( )        ( ))   ( )          ( )   ( ) 
 
Eq -  A-22 
 
From Section A.2.1,       ( )        ( ) is of order   
    .   ( ) is of order few dozens of 
milliseconds. Hence,   (      ( )        ( ))   ( ) is of order   
     . Hence, 
  (      ( )        ( ))   ( ) can be neglecting regarding           ( ): 
 
      ( )            ( )          ( )   ( ) 
 
Eq -  A-23 
 
From Section 5.4.1.2, the code delay difference between the direct signal and the echo signal 
reflected from the ground    ( ) is of the order of   
    up to      . In addition, since 
aircraft speeds during the taxi operation are in the range [              ],       ( ) does 
not exceed few Hz. Hence,         ( )   ( ) is of order   
     . Hence, 
        ( )   ( ) can be neglected regarding           ( ). It comes: 
 
        ( )            ( ) Eq -  A-24 
A.3. Multipath code tracking error in the presence of a single 
multipath 
This subsection derives the analytical expression of the multipath code tracking error under 
the following assumptions: 
- The front-end low-pass filter is assumed to be of infinite bandwidth, 
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- The GNSS signal at the receiver antenna output is modelled as the sum of the direct 
signal and a single echo signal, 
- The DLL uses a BPSK-modulated signal to track the code delay of the resulting GNSS 
signal, 
- The tracking loops perfectly track the phase and the Doppler frequency of the direct 
signal,  
- The satellite, the reflector and the antenna are static, meaning the Doppler frequency of 
the direct and echo signals are null, 
- The DLL discriminator is a EMLP discriminator, 
- The code delays and carrier phases  of the direct and echo signals are considered to be 
constant during the integration time. 
Under these conditions, from Eq -  4-9, the Early and Late DLL correlator outputs are 
modelled as: 
 
       ∑
  
 
   (       
 
 
)   (   )
 
   
 
       ∑
  
 
   (       
 
 
)    (   )
 
   
 
Eq -  A-25 
 
Let’s derive the expressions of the DLL discriminator output: 
 
     (  
    
 )  (  
     ) 
 
        [   
 (   
 
 
)     
 (   
 
 
)]
    [   
 (   
 
 
    )     
 (   
 
 
    )]
          (   ) [   (   
 
 
)   (   
 
 
    )     (   
 
 
)   (   
 
 
    )]
 
Eq -  A-26 
 
   (   
 
 
) and    (   
 
 
) are represented in Figure A-2 as a function of   . 
 
Figure A-2 : Early and Late auto-correlation functions 
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The analytical expressions of the Early and Late autocorrelation functions are provided in 
Table A-2 [Macabiau, 2004]. 
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Table A-2 : Analytical expressions of the Early and Late auto-correlation functions 
    can only have a positive value since the echo code delay is always larger than the direct 
code delay. Let’s consider the following example: 
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Eq -  A-27 
From Figure 4-6 we get: 
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Eq -  A-28 
Hence: 
 
 
   
   
        
 
 
 
 
Eq -  A-29 
Since 
  
  
  , we get: 
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
      
 
 
    
 
 
  
 
Eq -  A-30 
By taking into account the expressions of the Early and Late autocorrelation functions 
proposed in Table A-2, we get: 
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Eq -  A-31 
A stable lock point is reached when       . In this case, Eq -  A-31 becomes: 
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Eq -  A-32 
Eq -  A-32 provides the analytical expression of the DLL code delay estimate error for 
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A.4. Multipath ranging error induced by the ground and the 
aircraft structure  
This subsection analyzes the multipath ranging error in steady state induced by the airport 
surface and by the aircraft structure when the satellite has a low elevation angle and is aligned 
with the fuselage and is forward the aircraft, that is to say when         . 
The GPSL1C+GPSL5 and the GalileoE1+GalileoE5a multipath ranging errors in steady state 
due to the airport surface and the structure of the assessed aircraft are represented in Figure 
A-3 for a wide range of pairs {                                             } and for a planar 
and infinite ground made of dry tar.  
 
 
 
Figure A-3: Dual-frequency raw code multipath ranging error due to the airport surface 
and the aircraft structure  
 
From Figure A-3, at low elevation angle, the error for an aircraft azimuth angle of          
is significantly different from the values of the errors for other azimuths. The errors for 
         and for                                   are indicated by a red 
square in Figure 3. When         , the satellite is aligned with the fuselage and is forward 
the aircraft. This situation is depicted in Figure A-4.  
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Figure A-4: EM waves scattered by the wing or by the vertical empennage 
 
The echo signals from the aircraft structure are scattered from the fuselage. At low elevation 
angles, these echo signals can also be scattered from the wings, as shown by Case 2 in Figure 
A-4. However, in this case, the echo signal scattered by the wings arrive from downwards and 
are thus strongly rejected by the antenna. When the satellite has a low elevation angle and is 
aligned with the fuselage and is forward the aircraft, that is to say when         , the echo 
signals may be scattered by the fuselage and by the vertical empennage. In this case, the echo 
signals scattered by the empennage arrive from above the horizon at low elevation angle and 
are not strongly rejected by the antenna. This explains why the error for an aircraft azimuth 
angle of          is significantly different from the values of the error for other azimuths.  
 
A.5. Dynamic multipath ranging error model induced by the 
ground and the aircraft structure during turns  
This subsection develops a GNSS multipath ranging error model induced by the airport 
surface and by the aircraft structure during turns and assesses the validity of this model. This 
section is organized as follows. Firstly, the multipath ranging error model established for 
straight line trajectories is recalled. This model is extended to curved trajectories and is 
compared to the multipath ranging errors induced by the airport surface and by the aircraft 
structure obtained by the deterministic ranging error simulator [Chen, 2010] during turns. 
Secondly, the position biases induced by multipath from the airport surface and from the 
aircraft structure are computed by means of the error model extended to curved trajectories 
and compared to the position biases obtained by means on the GNSS multipath ranging error 
simulator.  
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A.5.1. Extended error model to curved line trajectories 
It is established in Chapter 5 that the GNSS multipath ranging error induced by the airport 
surface and by the aircraft structure during a straight line trajectory at time    can be modelled 
as a constant ranging error: 
 
   ( )            (        ) Eq -  A-33 
 
It is proposed to extend the dynamic multipath ranging error adapted to straight line 
trajectories to non-uniform and curved trajectories as follows: 
 
   ( )            (        ( )) 
 
Eq -  A-34 
where      ( ) is the aircraft azimuth angle at time t throughout the trajectory. 
In order to discuss the validity of this model, the following scenario is considered. An aircraft 
performs a trajectory at Toulouse Blagnac airport along segments 3 and 4 of the LVP 
procedure path. The aircraft turns between segments 3 and 4. The trajectory is simulated by 
means of the trajectory simulator presented in Chapter 6. The GNSS multipath ranging errors 
induced by the airport surface and by the aircraft structure along the simulated trajectory are 
obtained: 
- by the model stated in Eq -  A-34, 
- by means of the GNSS ranging error simulator [Chen, 2010]. 
Both errors are plotted in Figure A-5. This figure also represents the evolution of the aircraft 
azimuth angle       along the simulated trajectory. Simulation parameters are recapped in 
Table A-3.  
It is shown in Figure A-5 that the GNSS ranging error predicted by the error model is varying 
during the turn and becomes constant at time             , that is to say when the aircraft 
begins the straight line trajectory on segment 4.  
In comparison, the GNSS ranging error obtained by the GNSS multipath error simulator is 
delayed with respect to the error obtained by the model. The simulated error is varying until 
           . In other words, the error is still varying when the GNSS airborne antenna has 
left the turn. This can be explained as follows. The DLL behaves as a first-order low pass 
filter characterized by a response time of the order of few seconds. The DLL is thus 
characterized by a response time. The DLL response time is not taken into account in the error 
model presented in Eq -  A-34, while the DLL response time is taken into account in the 
simulated errors. For this reason, the simulated error is delayed of few seconds with respect to 
the error obtained by the model. 
 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite position 
Satellite elevation angle    20° 
Satellite azimuth angle 
      
0° 
GNSS signals   GPSL1C+GPSL5 
GNSS airborne antenna 
position 
 
Along segments 3 and 4 of the 
LVP procedure  
GNSS airborne antenna 
speed 
Aircraft speed          
 
Table A-3 : Simulation parameters for Figure A-5 
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Figure A-5: Aircraft azimuth angle and GNSS multipath ranging error induced by the 
aircraft structure and by the airport obstacle  
 
For a fixed simulation time   , the maximal difference between the error predicted by the 
model and the error obtained by the simulator is 7 millimeters, which is low regarding the 
value of the error that is several decimeters. It is concluded that the error model proposed in 
Eq -  A-34 can be used to model the GNSS ranging error model induced by multipath from 
the airport surface and from the aircraft structure during curved trajectories.  
A.5.2. Horizontal position biases obtained by the extended error model 
It has been shown in Chapter 7 that multipath ranging errors induced by the airport surface 
and the aircraft structure induce an horizontal position bias denoted as   . This section 
compares the horizontal position biases    obtained when the GNSS multipath ranging error 
vector is computed by means of: 
- the extended error model developed in Eq -  A-34, 
- the GNSS multipath ranging error simulator. 
In order to compare the position biases obtained by means of the multipath ranging error 
model and by means of the multipath ranging error simulator, the following scenario is 
considered. An aircraft performs a trajectory at Toulouse Blagnac airport along segments 3 
and 4 of the LVP procedure path. The aircraft turns between segments 3 and 4. The trajectory 
is simulated by means of the trajectory simulator presented in Chapter 6. The horizontal 
position biases    are computed along the trajectory based on Eq -  7-15 and are plotted in 
Figure A-6. Figure A-6 also represents the evolution of the aircraft azimuth angle       along 
the simulated trajectory. Simulation parameters are recapped in Table A-4.  
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 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite 
constellations 
Total number of satellites in 
the constellation  
GPS: 24 
Galileo: 27 
Number of satellites in view 
during the trajectory  
GPS: 6 
Galileo: 6  
Elevation mask angle 
GPS: 15° 
Galileo: 15° 
GNSS signals   
Dual frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5  
 
Dual frequency GalileoE1+GalileoE5a  
GNSS airborne 
antenna position 
 
Along segments 3 and 4 of the LVP 
procedure  
GNSS airborne 
antenna speed 
Aircraft speed          
 
Table A-4 : Simulation parameters for Figure A-6 
 
 
 
Figure A-6 : Aircraft azimuth angle and GNSS multipath position biases induced by the 
aircraft structure and by the airport obstacle 
 
It is shown in Figure A-6 that the horizontal position biases    obtained when the GNSS 
multipath ranging error vector is computed by the error model or by the GNSS multipath 
ranging error are similar. For the same reason as the one exposed in Section A.5.1, the 
position bias obtained by the GNSS multipath error simulator is delayed of roughly   seconds 
with respect to the bias obtained by the model. The maximal difference in terms of horizontal 
position bias between the blue and red curves  is       in the East direction and       in 
the North direction. It is concluded that the error model proposed in Eq -  A-34 can be used to 
model the horizontal position biases induced by multipath from the airport surface and from 
the aircraft structure. 
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  APPENDIX B 
B. GNSS stochastic multipath 
ranging error models 
 
 
This appendix: 
- analyses the validity of the 3D model of Blagnac airport to derive the parameters         
and      of the stochastic multipath error models in both static and dynamic 
configurations, 
- presents the convergence test implemented for the derivation of the error model parameter 
       , 
- shows that the parameters         and      presented in this thesis for the dual-frequency 
GPSL1C+GPSL5 mode are also valid for the dual-frequency GalileoE1+GalileoE5a mode, 
- investigates the PSD functions of the components      over two distinct trajectories chosen 
randomly along a given segment in the impact zone.  
 
B.1. Validity of the 3D model of Toulouse Blagnac airport 
As detailed in Section 5.1.2.2.3, five simplifications have been made when designing the 3D 
model of the terminal buildings and the terminal gates of Toulouse Blagnac airport, France. 
Among these simplifications there are: 
- Simplification 1: Details characterized by a size below the wavelength, that is to say 
centimeter level details, are not represented. Amongst these details there are: 
 Bricks 
 Windows frames 
 Metallic armatures on the glass walls characterized by a width of a few centimeters. 
Glass facades with such metallic armatures are represented by homogeneous and 
flawless glass facades.  
 Glass horizontal sticks on metallic walls (such as for the metallic façade of Hall C of 
Toulouse Blagnac airport) characterized by a width of a few centimeters. Metallic 
facades with such glass parts are represented by homogeneous and flawless metallic 
facades. 
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- Simplification 2: Sub-meter level concrete details on concrete walls such as concrete 
overhangs and recesses on are not represented. 
This subsection analyzes the validity of simplifications 1 and 2 for the development of the 
GNSS stochastic multipath error models induced by multipath from the airport obstacles. In 
other words, this subsection assesses the validity of these simplifications to estimate the 
impact zone location and to estimate the statistical parameters         and      that 
characterize the GNSS stochastic multipath error models induced by multipath from the 
airport obstacles in the impact zone. The analysis does not aim to assess the validity of the 
simplifications on the estimation of the GNSS multipath error in the impact zone.  
This section is organized as follows. Previous works on the feasibility to simplify the 
representation of complex facades for the estimation of the GNSS multipath ranging errors 
are presented in Section B.1.1. Based on this review, the simplification 1 can be justified. 
Next, the simplification 2 is discussed in Section B.1.2. 
B.1.1. Previous work  
Among the previous works dealing with the simplification of the representation of complex 
facades, Ait Ighil in [Ait Ighil, 2013] identifies the required level of details for the estimation 
of GNSS multipath errors in urban environments and for the satellite navigation application. 
Using simplified façade representations is essential in urban environments due to the 
complexity and diversity of the façade architectures. In order to find the required level of 
details for the application, a given façade is represented with four levels of details: 
- In the null resolution representation, no details are present. The façade is represented as a 
homogeneous and flawless wall. 
- In the low resolution representation, details much larger than the wavelength, that is 
roughly 20cm in the satellite navigation application, are represented. At this level of 
details, only windows, recesses and overhangs of roughly one meter are represented. 
- In the medium resolution representation, details in the range of the wavelength are 
represented. As an example, metallic armatures on the glass walls characterized by a width 
of few decimeters are represented.  
- In the high resolution representation, sub-wavelength details, such as bricks, are 
considered.  
Ait Ighil in [Ait Ighil, 2013] uses the Method of Moment (MoM) to compute the scattered EM 
field. This method is valid even in the presence of details which size is small regarding the 
wavelength. The error is estimated by modelling the transmission channel by a narrowband 
and by a wideband model. Different required levels of details are established regarding the 
type of model that is used to represent the transmission channel. The GNSS multipath error 
simulator used in this Ph.D. thesis [Chen, 2010] uses the PO method to compute the scattered 
EM field. This method is not valid in the presence of details which size is small regarding the 
wavelength. The wideband transmission channel model is used. Hence, this subsection 
focuses on the required level of details for the estimation of GNSS multipath errors when this 
estimation is based on the wideband transmission channel model.  
The low resolution model can be used to estimate the GNSS code ranging errors when the 
error estimation is based on the wideband transmission channel model [Ait Ighil, 2013]. Note 
that this conclusion is valid under clear LOS conditions, that is to say when the direct signal 
power is not attenuated by shadowing effects. This is the case in this Ph.D. thesis, as 
discussed in Sections 5.2 and 6.2.2. 
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Based on this result, the simplification 1 can be made in this thesis to estimate the GNSS code 
multipath ranging errors. Hence, simplification 1 can be done to estimate the impact zone 
location and to estimate the statistical parameters         and      that characterize the GNSS 
stochastic multipath error models induced by multipath from the airport obstacles in the 
impact zone. 
B.1.2. Representation of facades with meter-level overhangs and recesses 
Concrete overhangs and recesses of the order of several decimeters, that is to say much larger 
than the wavelength, have not been represented on concrete facades in the 3D model of 
Blagnac airport. This section analyses the validity of this simplification to estimate the impact 
zone location and to estimate the statistical parameters         and      that characterize the 
GNSS stochastic multipath error models in the impact zone. For this analysis, the simulation 
scenario is firstly presented. After that, the power of the scattered EM field is analyzed in the 
presence of a façade with overhangs, and in the presence of a façade without overhangs. Next, 
the multipath errors on a given segment and the impact zone location are analyzed in the 
presence and absence of the concrete overhangs. Finally, the statistical parameters         and 
     are compared in the presence of a façade with overhangs, and in the presence of a façade 
without overhangs.  
B.1.2.1. Simulation scenario 
The airport scene is composed of a single façade which dimensions are detailed in Table B-1. 
The positions of the façade and of the GNSS airborne antenna are expressed in the direct and 
orthogonal reference frame (       ). The horizontal plane (     ) represents the airport 
surface. The   axis is the local vertical vector pointing upwards. The single façade is 
represented in Figure B-1. 
 
 
 
Figure B-1 : Representation of the single façade 
 
The façade is illuminated by a satellite which elevation and azimuth angles are indicated in 
Table B-1. Other simulation parameters are presented in Table B-1. 
 
 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite position Satellite elevation angle    20° 
Satellite azimuth angle       10° 
Façade dimensions  Height   16m 
Length   50m 
 
Table B-1 : Simulation parameters used for Figure B-3 to Figure B-5 and Table B-2 
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Two facades have been designed. 
- A concrete facade that has 50cm deep overhangs that are evenly distributed over the 
facade. The overhangs represent 93% of the total surface of the façade. This façade is 
called “low resolution concrete facade” in the following. Note that estimating the 
multipath errors in the impact zone of the low resolution façade by means of the PO model 
corresponds to the limit of validity of this PO model. Indeed, this model is not valid in the 
presence of details characterized by a size in the range or lower than the wavelength 
(approximately 20 centimeters).  
- A flawless and concrete facade. This façade is called “null resolution concrete facade” in 
the following. 
The dimensions of both facades are the same and are indicated in Table B-1. The dielectric 
permittivity and thickness of these concrete facades are indicated in Table 5-1. Both low and 
null resolution concrete façades are represented in Figure B-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure B-2: Representation of the null and low resolution concrete facades 
 
In this section, only concrete overhangs and recesses are simulated on concrete facades.  The 
main limitation of this analysis on the effects of concrete overhangs and recesses on the 
impact zone location and on the parameters         and      is that the conclusions of this 
analysis cannot be extended to non-concrete overhangs or recesses on concrete facades. This 
is explained as follows.  
Concrete overhangs on concrete facades influence the phase of the echo signals.  The 
amplitude of the echo signals scattered by the concrete facades with concrete overhangs is 
comparable with the amplitude of the echo signals scattered by the null resolution concrete 
façade. If non-concrete overhangs are represented on the concrete facades, both phase and 
amplitude of the echo signals scattered by the null resolution concrete façade will be different 
than the phase and amplitude of the echo signals scattered by the concrete façade with non-
concrete overhangs. In this situation, the conclusions proposed in this section on the effects of 
concrete overhangs and recesses on the impact zone location and on the parameters         and 
     may not be valid.  
Note finally that, in Sections B.1.2.3 and B.1.2.4., ground first-order reflections, obstacle 
first-order interactions, ground/obstacle second-order interactions, obstacle/ground second-
order interactions and obstacle/obstacle second-order interactions are taken into account. 
However, for the analysis of the scattered pattern in Section B.1.2.2, only obstacle first-order 
interactions and obstacle/obstacle second-order interactions are taken into account. Indeed, 
this analysis aims to underline the impact of the façade representation on the power of the 
field scattered by the façade. 
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B.1.2.2. Analysis of the scattered pattern 
Figure B-3 presents the power of the EM field scattered from both null resolution and low 
resolution concrete facades in the L1 frequency band. The power of the EM field is plotted in 
the horizontal plane at the height            above the ground to represent the height of 
the GNSS airborne antenna of A319 aircraft. The EM field has not been computed for points 
characterized by an   coordinate smaller than 5m. Indeed, when a facet size of 70cm is 
adopted to mesh the facade, the EM field computed by the GNSS error simulator is valid at a 
minimal distance of 4.9m from the façade. This is fully justified in [Chen, 2010]. 
 
 
 
Null resolution concrete facade 
 
 
 
Low resolution concrete facade 
 
Figure B-3: Power of the EM field scattered on the L1 frequency band  
 
From Figure B-3, the overhangs on the low resolution façade lead to spread the EM field 
power in the airport surface towards different directions. The EM field scattered by the null 
resolution facade is more directional and the energy of the scattered field is mainly focused 
around a single direction, which is the specular direction. The regular interference pattern 
observed in the specular zone with the null resolution façade is not present for the low 
resolution façade. The presence of recesses and overhangs has a strong impact on the 
scattering pattern. Hence, it is required to represent decimeter level overhangs and recesses on 
a façade for a suitable representation of the power scattered by this façade. 
B.1.2.3. Analysis of the GNSS multipath ranging errors and of the impact zone location 
Figure B-4 presents the GNSS ranging errors in the static configuration along segments [AB] 
and [AC] represented in Figure B-1. The coordinates of A, B, C in (       ) are indicated in 
Table B-1. [AB] is parallel to the   axis and thus to the façade. The angle between [AC] and 
the   axis is 20°.  
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Error along segment [AB] 
 
Error along segment [AC] 
 
Figure B-4 : GPSL1C+GPSL5 ranging error along segments [AB] and [CD] in the static 
configuration  
 
Figure B-5 presents the GNSS ranging errors in the dynamic configuration along segments 
[AB] and [CD]. 
 
 
Error along segment [AB] 
 
 
Error along segment [AC] 
 
Figure B-5 : GPSL1C+GPSL5 ranging error along segments [AB] and [CD] in the 
dynamic configuration  
 
From Figure B-4, the variations of the amplitude of the multipath errors along segment [AB] 
in the specular zone are stronger for the low resolution model than for the null resolution 
model. This is because the phase of the echo signals along the segment [AB], and thus the 
amplitude of the EM field along segment [AB], does not present high variations along [AB] in 
the presence of the null resolution concrete façade. In comparison, the phase of the echo 
signals along the low resolution façade presents higher variations due to the presence of the 
concrete overhangs, resulting in variations of the amplitude of the GNSS ranging error along 
segment [AB]. A similar observation can be made for the dynamic configuration along 
segment [AB] in Figure B-5.  
It can also be observed in Figure B-4 that the amplitude of the multipath errors outside the 
specular zone is stronger with the low resolution façade than with the low resolution façade 
along both segments [AB] and [AC]. This is because the EM field scattered by the null 
resolution façade is more directional than the EM field scattered by the low resolution façade. 
This results in an extension of the static impact zone for the low resolution façade. As an 
illustration, it is shown in Figure B-4 that the upper impact zone limit on segment [AC] and 
along the   axis is 62.1m for the null resolution façade and is 69.4m for the low resolution 
façade. Similarly, for the dynamic configuration, it can be observed in Figure B-5 that the 
multipath errors outside the specular zone are stronger with the low resolution façade than 
with the low resolution façade. 
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To conclude, the presence of decimeter level overhangs has a significant impact on the 
estimation of the GNSS multipath errors when the aircraft trajectory is parallel to the façade. 
When it is not the case, the errors in the impact zone of the façade with and without 
overhangs locally have significant differences. However, in this case, the errors induced by 
both facades have approximately the same order of magnitude and the same shape over the 
whole segment. In addition, the presence of concrete overhangs on a concrete façade leads to 
extend and enlarge the impact zone location of a few meters.  
B.1.2.3. Analysis of the GNSS stochastic multipath error models         and      
Derivation of GNSS multipath ranging error models 
Table B-2 presents the parameters         and      of the stochastic GNSS ranging error 
models along segments [AC] and [AB] in the area          of the impact zone. The area 
         is presented in Figure 5-16 and is depicted in Figure B-1 along segment [AC]. 
Simulation parameters are indicated in Table B-1. More details about the derivation of these 
parameters are provided in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. Note also that, in this Table, the impact zone 
locations related to the null and low resolution facades have been predetermined based on the 
methodology presented in Section 5.4.2.1. Next, the statistical parameters         and 
     have been estimated in both impact zones.  
 Facade              
Segment [AB] Null resolution concrete  51cm 2.77m 
Low resolution concrete 51cm 2.97m 
Segment [AC] Null resolution concrete 22cm 82.2cm 
Low resolution concrete 20cm 79.5cm 
 
Table B-2: Comparison of the static and dynamic model parameters for the null 
resolution and low resolution concrete facades 
 
From Table B-2, the maximal relative difference between the values of         estimated in the 
presence of the null and low resolution facades is 10%. The maximal relative difference 
between the values of      estimated in the presence of the null and low resolution facades is 
7.2%. 
B.1.2.4. Conclusions 
This section has analyzed the impact of the sub-meter concrete overhangs and recesses 
located on concrete facades on the impact zone location and on the statistical parameters 
        and      computed along the taxiway in the area          of the impact zone. 
Conclusions provided in this section may not be valid for non-concrete overhangs or recesses 
on concrete facades.  
It has been shown that, along a given segment that is not perfectly parallel to the façade (most 
frequency scenario), the multipath errors are locally significantly different in the presence and 
in the absence of overhangs. However, the errors induced by facades with and without 
overhangs have approximately the same order of magnitude and the same shape over the 
whole segment. The GNSS stochastic error model parameters         and      are estimated 
by computing the multipath errors in the area          located around the center line if the 
taxiway. Hence, errors are not computed locally to estimate both statistical parameters         
and     . When extracting the statistical parameters         and      in         , it is 
acceptable not to represent the decimeter level overhangs and recesses on a façade. Finally, 
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the presence of concrete overhangs on a concrete façade leads to extend and enlarge the 
impact zone location of a few meters. This extension is considered to be low regarding the 
building and impact zone size at Toulouse Blagnac airport that are few hundred of meters.  
B.2. Convergence test for the estimation of         
This section presents the convergence test implemented for the derivation of the over-
bounding Gaussian multipath ranging error model in the static configuration (see Figure 
5-15). 
Let’s note        ( ) the estimated standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution that over-
bounds the distribution of the multipath error in the impact zone at iteration p (or computed 
based on p values of multipath errors in the impact zone).        ( ) is computed based on 
DeCleene CDF algorithm, as explained in Section 5.4. After   iterations, the standard 
deviation estimate converges towards the true standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution 
that over-bound the distribution of the multipath errors in the impact zone. The simulation has 
converged at iteration   if [Chen, 2010]: 
 
    [    ]         ( )         (   )     Eq -  B-1 
 
where: 
    is the convergence criteria related to the standard deviation of the multipath errors.    
is set to 1cm in the thesis.  
    is the number of previous iterations used in the convergence test.   is set to 500 in 
the thesis.  
At each iteration     , the convergence test is performed and the simulation is stopped at 
the first iteration for which the convergence test is passed, that is for    . As an illustration, 
Figure B-6 shows the evolution of        ( ) for the simulation scenario described in Section 
5.4.2.4.1. 
 
 
Figure B-6: Estimated standard deviation of the Gaussian distribution that over-bounds 
     over the impact zone on segment 4 
 
Based on these parameters, the first iteration for which the convergence test is passed is 
       under the simulation scenario described in Section 5.4.2.4.1. 
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B.3. Impact of the GNSS signal on the estimation of         and 
     
This section shows that the modulation difference between GPSL1C and GalileoE1 signals 
does not significantly impact the values of the parameters         and      in the dual-
frequency mode. Hence this appendix shows that the model parameters         and 
     presented in this thesis for the dual-frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 mode are also valid for 
the dual-frequency GalileoE1+GalileoE5a mode. 
Figure 4-7 shows that the GPSL1C steady-state raw code multipath ranging error induced by 
a single echo signal may be slightly different from the GalileoE1 error induced by the same 
echo signal, especially when the relative code delay of the echo signal is above 
  
 
, where    
represents the chip period of the GPSL1C and GalileoE1 pilot spreading codes in this 
Appendix. For this reason, the over bounding Gaussian model parameters are analyzed in two 
scenarios: 
- In scenario 1, the model parameters are derived in zone 1 of the impact zone located closed 
to the obstacles, in a way that some echo signals reaching the GNSSS receiver antenna in 
this region are characterized by relative code delays in the interval [  
  
 
], 
- In scenario 2, the model parameters are derived in zone 2 of the impact zone located far 
from the obstacles, in a way that the echo signals reaching the GNSSS receiver antenna in 
this region are mainly characterized by relative code delays longer than  
  
 
. 
Figure B-7 shows that several multipath parameters are characterized by a relative code delay 
shorter than 
  
 
 under scenario 1 while all echo signals have a relative code delay longer than  
  
 
 under scenario 2, except the echo signal emitted by the satellite, reflected by the ground, 
and reaching the GNSS receiver antenna. These relative code delays have been obtained by 
simulating the multipath parameters over 100 true receiver antenna positions equally 
distributed in an inner grid in zones 1 and 2. Simulation parameters are provided in Table B-3.  
 
 
 
Figure B-7:  Histograms of the L1 relative code delays of the direct and echo signals  
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The dual-frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 and GalileoE1+GalileoE5a over-bounding Gaussian 
model parameters obtained in zones 1 and 2 are compared in Table B-4. The simulation 
parameters used for these simulations are recapped in Table B-3.  
 
 Parameter description Parameter value 
Satellite position 
Satellite elevation angle    20° 
Satellite azimuth angle       0° 
GNSS airborne antenna  
positions 
Scenario 1: antenna positions in 
zone 1 (closed to the airport 
buildings) 
  range: [         ] 
  range: [           ] 
       
Scenario 2: antenna positions in 
zone 2 (far from the airport 
buildings) 
  range: [           ] 
  range: [           ] 
       
 
Table B-3: Simulation parameters used for Figure B-7 and Table B-4 
 
              
Scenario 1 
GPSL1C+GPSL5:     
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a:      
GPSL1C+GPSL5:        
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a:        
Scenario 2 
GPSL1C+GPSL5:        
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a:        
GPSL1C+GPSL5:       
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a:       
 
Table B-4: Comparison of         between GPSL1C+GPSL5 and GalileoE1+GalileoE5a 
 
Regardless of the scenario, the deviation between the GPSL1C+GPSL5 model parameters and 
the GalileoE1+GalileoE5a model parameters is less than 14% of the value of the parameters. 
This deviation is considered as insignificant in the application. The values of          and 
     presented in this thesis for the dual-frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 mode are considered to 
be valid for the dual-frequency GalileoE1+GalileoE5a mode. Note finally that this conclusion 
has been obtained by using the same DLL integration time, the same early-late spacing, the 
same loop bandwidth, and the same front-end filter bandwidth (see Table 4-1) for GPSL5 and 
GalileoE5a and for GPSL1C and GalileoE1C. Further analysis are needed to investigate the 
difference between the GPSL1C+GPSL5 error model parameters (        and     ) and the 
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a error model parameters when different receiver and DLL settings are 
used for both L1 signals and both L5 signals.  
 
B.4. Comparison of the PSD of      along two distinct trajectories  
This subsection shows that the PSD functions of the components      over two distinct 
trajectories chosen randomly along a given segment in the impact zone are almost the same.  
Figure B-8 plots the PSD obtained along two trajectories chosen randomly along segment 4. 
Both trajectories are called trajectory 1 and trajectory 2. The angle between both trajectories is 
0.49°. The aircraft speed is         . The satellite elevation and azimuth angles are 
       and         , respectively. 
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Figure B-8 : Estimated PSD of      in the impact zone on segment 4  
 
Two reasons explain why the PSD functions  over two distinct trajectories are almost the 
same. Firstly, the maximal distance between two segments chosen randomly is relatively low 
regarding the spatial period of the oscillations of the amplitude of the echo signals in the 
scene that is described in Section 5.4.2.2. This maximal distance is      , that is 2.8m for the 
taxi on taxi lane sub-phase (segment 4), 3.7m for the taxi on apron taxiway sub-phase 
(segment 3) and 6.06m for the taxi on taxiway sub-phase. Hence, the amplitude of the 
variations of the errors       is similar along two distinct segments. Secondly, two distinct 
trajectories chosen randomly in the impact zone have roughly the same orientation in the 
scene. As an example, over segment 4, it can be easily demonstrated that the maximal angular 
difference between the orientations of two trajectories is 1.38°. Hence, the time period of the 
errors      is similar along two distinct segments. Both reasons explain why the errors over 
two distinct trajectories along a given segment have approximately the same spectral 
characteristics.  
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  APPENDIX C 
C. Navigation sensor review 
 
 
This Appendix presents the main advantages and drawbacks of several sensors and signals of 
opportunity that can be hybridized with GNSS pseudo range measurements. 
 
Sensor or 
signal of 
opportunity  
Advantage(s) Drawback(s) 
Distance 
Measure-
ment 
Equipment 
(DME) 
- Onboard equipment installed 
in Airbus aircraft 
- Usable in the coverage of a DME 
ground equipment  
- Low accuracy: few hundreds of 
meters (DME/N) to few dozens of 
meters (DME/P) at 95% [ICAO, 
2006]  
Instrument 
Landing 
System (ILS) 
- Onboard equipment installed 
in Airbus aircraft 
- Usable in the coverage of ILS: on the 
runway only 
 
Secondary 
surveillance 
radar 
- Usable in the coverage of the 
equipped airport 
- Low accuracy: few meters (7.5m) at 
95% on taxiways and apron taxiways 
and few dozens of meters (20m) at 
95% of a parked aircraft at the gate 
[ED117, 2003] 
Wheel Speed 
Sensor 
(WSS) and 
odometer 
- Usable anywhere in the airport 
- Wholly self-contained within 
the aircraft 
 
- Onboard equipment installed in 
Airbus aircraft on the main landing 
gear 
- Requires equipment installation on the 
nose landing gear 
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Sensor or 
signal of 
opportunity  
Advantage(s) Drawback(s) 
Wi-Fi or 
Worldwide 
Interoperabili
ty for 
Microwave 
Access 
(WiMAX) 
- Airport surface wireless 
communication networks are 
under development [Byrne, 
2013] 
- Techniques based on existing 
network infrastructure  
- Low accuracy: few dozens of meters 
in the positioning domain for Wi-Fi 
cell identification methods [Evennou 
et al., 2006] 
- And /or sensitive to topologic changes 
for fingerprinting methods  [Bahl et 
al., 2000] 
Ultra Wide 
Band (UWB) 
- Accuracy on the ranging 
measurement: few decimeters 
up to few centimeters [TDC, 
2011] [Zebra, 2008] 
[MacGougan et al., 2009] 
- Requires requester and responder 
installation 
- Not adapted to large scale 
environments (maximal distance 
receptor/transmitter: few dozens of 
meters) 
Light 
Detection and 
Ranging 
(LIDAR) 
- Accuracy on the ranging 
measurement: few centimeters 
at 95% [Lemmens, 2009] 
- Sensitive to weather conditions, such 
as fog, rain, temperature [Clipp, 
2006], [Campbell et al., 2003] 
- LIDAR-based PVT algorithms require 
high-resolution/expensive terrain data 
base (decimeter resolution) 
[Lemmens, 2009] [Lohani] [Campbell 
et al, 2003] [Lee et al., 2008] 
 
Radio-
Frequency 
Identifi-
cation 
(RFID) 
 
 
- Requires tag installation on the airport 
surface with a small scale spacing 
(decimeter level) [Park et al., 2009] 
- Requires reader installation onboard 
- Technology not mature for large-scale 
environments 
- Accuracy relatively unknown 
 
Ultrasound 
sensors and 
infrared 
sensors 
 
 
 
- Accuracy level not available 
- Sensitive to weather conditions such 
as temperature, fog, rain 
- Sensitive to luminosity for infrared 
sensors 
Video camera  
- Sensitive to weather conditions such 
as fog, rain 
- Accuracy / failure modes not available 
 
Figure C-1 : Advantages and drawbacks of navigation sensors and signals of 
opportunity  
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  APPENDIX D 
D. GPS and Galileo link budget 
 
 
The C/N0 ratio [dB-Hz] at the output of the GNSS receiver antenna is computed as follows: 
 
 
                           
 
Eq -  D-1 
 
where: 
    is the power of the signal at the amplifier output of the satellite [dBW], 
    is the satellite antenna gain [dBi], 
    is the receiver antenna gain [dBi], 
    is the total loss introduced by the satellite filters and by the payload components 
imperfections [dB], 
    represents the atmospheric and polarization losses [dB], 
     represents the free-space losses [dB], 
                 is the constant noise power spectral density of the thermal noise. 
 
D.1. Satellite component losses    
Table D-1 provides the assumed values of the total loss introduced by the satellite filters and 
by the payload components imperfections. 
 
 GalileoE1 GalileoE5a GPSL1C GPSL5 
Loss due to payload filters and 
component imperfections     
[dB] 
0.6  
[ICD, 
2010] 
0.6  
[ICD, 2010] 
0.2 
[GPS Wing, 
2008] 
0.6  
[GPS Wing, 
2010] 
 
Table D-1 : Power losses introduced by the satellite filters and by the payload 
components imperfections 
D.2. Atmospheric and polarization losses     
Table D-2 provides the assumed values of the atmospheric and polarization losses. 
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 GalileoE1 GalileoE5a GPSL1C GPSL5 
Atmospheric loss 
[dB] 
0.3 
[Parkinson et 
al., 1996] 
0.3 
[Parkinson et 
al., 1996] 
0.5 
[GPS Wing, 
2008] 
0.3 
[Parkinson et al., 
1996] 
Polarization loss 
[dB] [Parkinson 
et al., 1996] 
1 1 1 1 
Atmospheric and 
polarization losses 
    [dB] 
1.3 1.3 1.5 1.3 
 
Table D-2: Atmospheric and polarization losses 
 
D.3. Satellite amplifier output power    
The complete methodology to compute    is provided in [Rebeyrol, 2007].    is evaluated as 
follows: 
 
                               Eq -  D-2 
 
where: 
       [dBW] is the minimum power of the received signal at the receiver input assuming a 
receiver antenna gain of         , 
      is the satellite antenna gain [dBi] assumed in the computation of   , 
      is the receiver antenna gain [dBi] assumed in the computation of   , 
       represents the free-space losses [dB] assumed in the computation of   . The free-
space losses calculation is fully developed in [Rebeyrol, 2007] and depends on the satellite 
elevation angle. In this document,  the worst case satellite elevation angle are considered in 
the computation of        (5° elevation angle for GPS and 10° elevation angle for Galileo). 
 
Table D-3 provides the values of                           used for the computation of   . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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 GalileoE1 GalileoE5a GPSL1C GPSL5 
Total 
received 
minimum 
power       
[dBW] 
GalileoE1: 
-157 [ICD, 2010] 
GalileoE5a: 
-155 [ICD, 2010] 
GPSL1C: 
-157 [GPS Wing, 
2008] 
GPSL5: 
-154 assuming 
the GPS block 
III [GPS Wing, 
2010] 
GalileoE1C: 
-157dBW-3dB= 
-160 
(50/50% 
E1B/E1C power 
sharing) 
GalileoE5a/Q: 
-155dBW-3dB= 
-158 
(50/50% I/Q 
power sharing) 
GPSL1C/Pilot: 
-158.25 
 (75%/25% 
Pilot/Data power 
sharing) 
GPSL5/Pilot: 
-157 
 (50%/50% 
Pilot/Data 
power sharing) 
Receiver 
antenna gain  
     (dBi) 
0 [ICD, 2010] 0 [ICD, 2010] 
3  [GPS Wing, 
2008] 
3  [GPS Wing, 
2010] 
Free-space 
loss       
[dB] 
185.4 182.87 184.4 181.9 
Satellite 
antenna gain 
     [dBi]  
[Czopek et 
al., 1993] 
 
15 
 
15 15 15 
Power at the 
amplifier 
output    
[dBW] 
 
15.30 for E1 
 
 
14.77 for E5a 
 
11.1 for L1C 11.88 for L5 
12.30 for E1C 11.77 for E5a/Q 9.85 for L1C/Q 8.88 for L5/Q 
 
Table D-3: Computation of the minimum power of the signal at the satellite amplifier 
output 
D.4. Satellite antenna gain     
The satellite antenna gains are computed based on the relative positions of the satellite and of 
the receiver antenna and based on the RHCP satellite antenna gains of a GPS block II satellite 
on the L1 frequency band. It is recommended as future work to use antenna gains on the L5 
frequency band for GPSL5 and GalileoE5a signals.   
D.5. Free space losses      
The free-space loss is computed as follows: 
 
           [(
   
  
)
 
] 
 
Eq -  D-3 
where   is the distance between the center of the satellite antenna to the center of the receiver 
antenna [m]. 
D.6. Receiver antenna gain     
The RHCP receiver antenna gains are described in Section 5.1.2.3.  
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  APPENDIX E 
E. Impact of multipath on the 
GNSS-based position error 
 
 
E.1. Impact of multipath on the Kalman filter state vector 
estimate error 
This paragraph analyses the theoretical impact of multipath on the state vector estimate error 
at time      (  )    ̂
 (  ). Let’s state the following hypotheses (*): 
- At any time   , the GNSS measurement error vectors   (  )  (  )   (  ) and the process 
noise vector   (  ) are independent each other. This assumption is considered to be valid. 
Indeed, the process noise and the GNSS measurement errors can be considered as 
independent since they are due to error sources that are independent.  
- The initial prediction of the state vector    ̂ (  ) is independent on the multipath ranging 
error vectors   (  )   (  ). 
- The initial prediction of the covariance matrix   (  ) of the state vector    ̂
 (  ) is 
independent on the multipath ranging error vectors   (  )   (  ). 
- The state vector    is estimated by a linearized Kalman filter, meaning that the Kalman 
filter matrices     are independent of the GNSS measurements. In addition, it is assumed 
that the Kalman filter contains the exact models of the transition state matrix   and of the 
design matrix  . The potential non-linearities in the propagation model (matrix  ) are not 
accounted for.  
- The Kalman filter matrice    is independent of the GNSS multipath measurement errors. 
Let’s demonstrate that, under the hypotheses (*) stated above, the error in the state vector 
estimated in the presence of multipath   (  )    ̂
 (  ) and the error in the state vector that 
would have been estimated in the absence of multipath (  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )) can be 
related by: 
 
  (  )    ̂
 (  )  (  (  )    ̂
 
     (  ))   (  ) Eq -  E-1 
 
where: 
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   (  ),   ̂
 
     (  ),   ̂
 (  ) are defined in Chapter 7, 
  (  ) represents the impact of the multipath on the error in the state vector estimate at time 
   and can be expressed as: 
 
 (  )  (   (  ) (  ))( (    ) (    ))   (  )( (  )   (  )) Eq -  E-2 
 
where: 
  (  )   . 
 
Proof: 
The state vector at time    is given by the state propagation equation: 
 
  (  )   (    )  (    )    (    ) 
 
Eq -  E-3 
 
The updated state vector is obtained in the Kalman filter as follows: 
 
  ̂ (  )    ̂
 (  )   (  )(  (  )   (  )  ̂
 (  )) 
 
Eq -  E-4 
 
The measurement vector at time    is given by the observation model: 
 
  (  )   (  )  (  )    (  ) 
 
Eq -  E-5 
 
Note that, since it is assumed that the Kalman filter contains the exact models of the transition 
state matrix   and of the design matrix  , the matrices   and   used in Eq -  E-4 are the same 
as the matrices used in Eq -  E-3 and Eq -  E-5. The a priori state vector   ̂ (  ) estimated by 
the Kalman filter at time    is obtained in the Kalman filter as: 
 
  ̂ (  )   (    )  ̂
 (    ) 
 
Eq -  E-6 
Subtracting Eq -  E-3 to Eq -  E-4 leads to: 
 
  (  )    ̂
 (  )
  (    )  (  )    (    )    ̂
 (  )
  (  )(  (  )   (  )  ̂
 (  )) 
Eq -  E-7 
 
 
Eq -  E-6 in Eq -  E-7 leads to: 
 
  (  )    ̂
 (  )
  (    )  (  )    (    )   (    )  ̂
 (    )
  (  )(  (  )   (  ) (    )  ̂
 (    )) 
Eq -  E-8 
 
 
Eq -  E-5 in Eq -  E-8 leads to: 
 
  (  )    ̂
 (  )
  (    )  (    )    (    )   (    )  ̂
 (    )
  (  )( (  )  (  )    (  )   (  ) (    )  ̂
 (    )) 
Eq -  E-9 
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Eq -  E-3 in Eq -  E-9 leads to: 
  (  )    ̂
 (  )
  (    )  (    )    (    )   (    )  ̂
 (    )
  (  )( (  ) (    )  (    )   (  )  (    )    (  )
  (  ) (    )  ̂
 (    )) 
 
 
Eq -  E-10 
 
Rearranging Eq -  E-10 leads to: 
 
  (  )    ̂
 (  )
 (   (  ) (  )) ( (    )(  (    )    ̂
 (    ))
   (    ))   (  )  (  ) 
 
Eq -  E-11 
 
From the hypotheses (*) stated above,  (  ) and  (  ) do not depend on the presence of 
multipath in the GNSS pseudo-range measurement error vector. In addition,  (  ) does not 
depend on the presence of multipath in the GNSS pseudo-range measurement error vector. 
Finally,   (  )   
 
     (  ) since the initial prediction of the covariance matrix of the 
state vector is independent on the multipath ranging errors. Hence,  (  ) does not depend on 
the presence of multipath in the GNSS pseudo-range measurement error vector. Hence, the 
state vector estimate error that would have been estimated by the Kalman filter if the GNSS 
pseudo-range measurement vector at time    were not affected by multipath is: 
 
  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )
 (   (  ) (  )) ( (    ) (  (    )    ̂
 
     (    ))
   (    ))   (  )       (  ) 
 
 
Eq -  E-12 
 
Subtracting Eq -  E-12 to Eq -  E-11 leads to: 
 
  ̂ (  )    ̂
 
     (  )
 (   (  ) (  )) ( (    ) (  ̂
 (    )    ̂
 
     (    )))
  (  ) ( (  )         (  )) 
 
Eq -  E-13 
 
 
Equivalently: 
 
  ̂ (  )    ̂
 
     (  )
 (   (  ) (  )) ( (    ) (  ̂
 (    )    ̂
 
     (    )))
  (  )( (  )   (  )) 
 
Eq -  E-14 
 
 
The error in the state vector estimated in the presence of multipath can be expressed as: 
 
  (  )    ̂
 (  )  (  (  )    ̂
 
     (  ))  (  ̂
 
     (  )    ̂
 (  )) Eq -  E-15 
 
 
Using Eq -  E-14, Eq -  E-15 can be written as: 
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  (  )    ̂
 (  )  (  (  )    ̂
 
     (  ))   (  ) Eq -  E-16 
where:  
 
 (  )  (   (  ) (  )) ( (    ) (  ̂
 
     (    )    ̂
 (    )))
  (  )( (  )   (  )) 
 
Eq -  E-17 
 
Hence: 
 
 (  )  (   (  ) (  ))( (    ) (    ))   (  )( (  )   (  )) 
 
Eq -  E-18 
 
where: 
  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )    ̂
 (  ) . From the hypotheses (*) stated above, the initial 
predictions of the state vectors    ̂ (  ) is independent on the multipath ranging error 
vectors   (  ) and  (  ). Hence,   ̂
 
     (  )    ̂
 (  ). Hence,  (  )   .  
 
E.2. Expectation of the horizontal position error 
Let’s derive the expectation of the horizontal position error under the following hypothesis. 
The GNSS measurement error vectors  (  )  (  ) and the process noise vector   (  ) are 
zero-mean stochastic error vectors.  
The horizontal position error at the output of Kalman filter and at time    can be expressed as: 
 
  (  )  [  (  )    ̂
 (  )]    Eq -  E-19 
 
From Eq -  E-16, we get: 
 
  (  )  [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )   (  )]    
Eq -  E-20 
 
Hence: 
 
 [  (  )]  [ [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )]   [ (  )]]
   
 Eq -  E-21 
 
From Eq -  E-12, we get 
 
 [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )]
  [(   (  ) (  )) ( (    ) (  (    )    ̂
 
     (    ))
   (    ))   (  )       (  )] 
 
 
Eq -  E-22 
 
Assuming that the process noise vector   (  ) is unbiased and the GNSS pseudo-range 
measurement vector        (  )   (  ) is a zero-mean stochastic vector: 
 
 [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )]    
 
Eq -  E-23 
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Hence: 
 [  (  )]  [ [ (  )]]    
 
Eq -  E-24 
Assuming that the GNSS pseudo-range measurement vector  (  ) is a zero-mean stochastic 
vector, and from Eq -  E-18, we get: 
 
 [  (  )]  [(   (  ) (  )) (    ) [ (    )]   (  ) (  )]    
Eq -  E-25 
 
where  [ (  )]   [ ]   . 
 
E.3. Covariance matrix of the horizontal position error 
Let’s derive the covariance of the horizontal position error under the following hypothesis. 
The correlated multipath error process   can be modeled as zero-mean first-order Gauss-
Markov process. The horizontal position error at the output of Kalman filter and at time    can 
be expressed as: 
 
  (  )  [  (  )    ̂
 (  )]    Eq -  E-26 
 
Let’s compute    [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )   (  )]. 
Assuming that the multipath error vector  (  )   (  ) is independent of the process noise 
vector  (  ) and of the GNSS pseudo-range measurement vector  (  ), we get: 
 
   [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )   (  )]
    [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )]     [ (  )] 
 
Eq -  E-27 
where:    [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )]        is denoted as        (  ) and is analyzed in 
Section E.4 of this appendix. 
 
Computation of    [ (  )]: 
 
   [ (  )]   [( (  )   [ (  )])( (  )   [ (  )])
 ] Eq -  E-28 
 
Let’s compute  (  )   [ (  )]. Using Eq -  E-18 and Eq -  E-25, we get: 
 
 (  )   [ (  )]
 (   (  ) (  )) (    ) (    )   (  )( (  )   (  ))
 (   (  ) (  )) (    ) [ (    )]   (  ) (  ) 
Eq -  E-29 
 
By rearranging Eq – 29, we get: 
 
 (  )   [ (  )]  (   (  ) (  )) (    )( (    )   [ (    )])   (  ) (  ) Eq -  E-30 
 
Let’s note: 
 
APPENDIX E: Impact of multipath on the GNSS-based position error 
 
254 
 
 (  )  (   (  ) (  )) (    ) Eq -  E-31 
 
Using this notation, Eq -  E-30 is equivalent to: 
 
 (  )   [ (  )]   (  )( (    )   [ (    )])   (  ) (  ) Eq -  E-32 
 
Hence, Eq -  E-28 can be written as: 
 
   [ (  )]   [( (  )( (    )   [ (    )])
  (  ) (  ))( (  )( (    )   [ (    )])   (  ) (  ))
 
] 
Eq -  E-33 
 
Rearranging Eq -  E-33 leads to: 
 
   [ (  )]   
[
 
 
 
 
 (  )( (    )   [ (    )])( (    )   [ (    )])
   (  )
  (  ) (  ) 
 (  ) 
 (  )
  (  )( (    )   [ (    )]) 
 (  ) 
 (  )
  (  ) (  )( (    )   [ (    )])
   (  ) ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eq -  E-34 
 
Let’s remark that: 
 
 (  ) [( (    )   [ (    )])( (    )   [ (    )])
 ]  (  )
  (  )   [ (    )] 
 (  ) 
 
 (  ) [ (  ) 
 (  )] 
 (  )   (  )   (  ) 
 (  ) 
 
 
Eq -  E-35 
 
In Eq -  E-35, the covariance matrix of  (  ) is denoted as    (  ): 
 
   (  )  [
      (  )
   
   
       (  )
 
] 
Eq -  E-36 
 
By using Eq -  E-35, Eq -  E-34 is equivalent to: 
 
   [ (  )]  
 (  )   [ (    )] 
 (  )
  (  )   (  ) 
 (  )
  (  ) [( (    )   [ (    )]) 
 (  )] 
 (  )
 ( (  ) [( (    )   [ (    )]) 
 (  )] 
 (  ))
 
 
 
 
Eq -  E-37 
 
Computation of  [( (    )   [ (    )]) 
 (  )]: 
Let’s compute  [( (    )   [ (    )]) 
 (  )]: 
 
 [( (    )   [ (    )]) 
 (  )]   [ (    ) 
 (  )]   [ [ (    )] 
 (  )] Eq -  E-38 
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Since  (  ) is assumed to be a zero-mean stochastic error vector, we get: 
 
 [ [ (    )] 
 (  )]   [ (    )] [ 
 (  )]    
 
Eq -  E-39 
Let’s compute  [ (    ) 
 (  )]. Since the stochastic multipath ranging error vector   is 
modelled as a zero-mean, first order Gauss-Markov process vector,  (  ) can be written as: 
 
 (  )   (  ) (    )   (  ) 
 
Eq -  E-40 
where: 
 The vector  (  ) and the matrix  (  ) are detailed as follows: 
 (  )  [
       (  )
 
      (  )
]  
[
 
 
  
  
  
      (  )   
   
   
  
  
     (  )]
 
 
 
⏟            
 (  )
[
       (    )
 
      (    )
]
⏟  
 (    )
 [
   (  )
 
   (  )
]
⏟
 (  )
 
 The vector  (  ) is a zero-mean white-noise Gauss process.  
Hence: 
 
 [ (    ) 
 (  )]   [ (    )( 
 (    ) 
 (  )   
 (  ))] 
 
 [ (    ) 
 (  )]   [ (    ) 
 (    )] 
 (  )   [ (    ) 
 (  )] 
 
 
Eq -  E-41 
Since  (  ) is independent of   (    ) and is a zero-mean stochastic error vector, we get: 
 
 [ (    ) 
 (  )]   [ (    ) 
 (    )] 
 (  ) 
 
Eq -  E-42 
 
Let’s compute  [ (    ) 
 (    )]. From Eq -  E-18 and Eq -  E-40: 
 
 (    ) (    )
 
  (    ) (    )( (    )
  (    )
   (    )
 )
  (    )( (    )   (    )) (    )
  
 
 
Eq -  E-43 
 
Since  (    ) and  (    ) are assumed to be independent and since  (    ) is assumed to be a 
zero-mean stochastic error vector, we get:  
 
 [ (    ) (    )
 ]
  (    ) [ (    ) (    )
 ] (    )
 
  (    ) [ (    ) (    )
 ] 
 
Eq -  E-44 
 
Using Eq -  E-35, we get: 
 
 [ (    ) (    )
 ]   (    ) [ (    ) (    )
 ] (    )
   (    )   (    ) Eq -  E-45 
 
Hence,  [ (    ) (    )
 ] can be computed by recurrence. Let’s compute the initial 
condition: 
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 [ (  ) (  )
 ]    [ (  ) (  )
 ] 
 
Eq -  E-46 
Since  (  ) is considered to be a white Gaussian noise that is independent of  (  ), we get: 
 
 [ (  ) (  )
 ]    [ (  )] [ (  )
 ]    
 
Eq -  E-47 
Hence,  [ (    ) (    )
 ] can be computed by recurrence: 
 
 [ (    ) (    )
 ]
  (    ) [ (    ) (    )
 ] (    )
   (    )   (    ) 
 
Eq -  E-48 
where  [ (  ) (  )
 ]   . 
 
Conclusion: 
 
   [  (  )]  [   [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )   (  )]]
       
 
 
Eq -  E-49 
   [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )   (  )] can be decomposed as follows: 
 
   [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )   (  )]
    [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )]     [ (  )] 
 
 
Eq -  E-50 
where: 
    [  (  )    ̂
 
     (  )] represents the covariance matrix of the state vector estimate 
error at time    that would have been obtained if no multipath would affect the GNSS 
pseudo-range measurements, 
    [ (  )] represents the covariance term due to multipath. 
 
   [ (  )] is given by: 
   [ (  )]   (  )   [ (    )] (  )
  
  (  )   (  ) (  )
  
  (  ) [ (    ) 
 (    )] 
 (  ) 
 (  ) 
 ( (  ) [ (    ) 
 (    )] 
 (  ) 
 (  ))
 
 
 
 
 
Eq -  E-51 
  [ (    ) (    )
 ] can be computed by recurrence: 
 
 [ (    ) (    )
 ]
  (    ) [ (    ) (    )
 ] (    )
   (    )   (    ) 
 
Eq -  E-52 
E.4. Analysis of         
This subsection presents the technique that has been used to estimate the covariance matrix 
        of the GNSS/IRS horizontal position error along a given segment in a specific 
airport. This subsection is organized as follows. Firstly, the methodology to evaluate 
        is presented and the reasons of this choice of methodology are detailed. This 
technique requires estimating the correlation times of the position errors in the East and North 
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components. Secondly, the methodology used to quantify these correlation times is presented 
and these correlation times are evaluated by simulations.  
 
E.4.1. Evaluation of the covariance matrix         
E.4.1.1. Technique based on the predicted covariance matrix  
The state vector covariance matrix denoted as   (  ) in Section 6.2.5.3 is an estimator of the 
covariance of the error made in the estimation of the state vector   (  ) at time   . 
         (  ) consists of the first two lines and of the first two columns of  
 (  ).  
         (  ) is an estimator of the covariance of the horizontal position error at the output of 
the Kalman filter at time epoch   . It can be easily proven that  
 
       (  ) is the true 
covariance of the horizontal position error at time    if the following constraints are met: 
 
- The implemented Kalman filter is an optimal Kalman filter, meaning that : 
 The filter contains the exact models of the system dynamics and of the GNSS 
measurement process, 
 The filter contains the exact model of the covariance matrix of the process noise and of 
the measurement errors, 
 The filter contains the exact initial estimate of covariance of the state vector error. 
- The implemented Kalman gain is the gain expressed in Section 6.2.5.3. 
- The process noise vector and the measurement noise vector are zero-mean Gaussian white 
noise processes, meaning that their components are not correlated in the time domain. 
In this thesis, the implemented Kalman filter is not an optimal Kalman filter. This is due to 
the fact that the predicted the covariance matrix of the process noise and of the measurement 
errors are not the exact process noise and measurement noise covariance matrices, as 
explained in Section 6.2.5. In addition, the measurement errors are time correlated. Even if 
the long term ranging errors induced by the satellite clock and ephemeris inaccuracies are 
partially removed from the innovation vector (see Section 6.2.5.2), other ranging errors, such 
as the troposphere errors, are time correlated and still affect the innovation vector. Since the 
Kalman filter is suboptimal and since the ranging errors are time correlated,          (  ) is 
not an accurate estimator the covariance of the horizontal position error. As an illustration, 
under the simulation scenario fully described in Section 7.2.1.1., a Monte Carl simulation has 
shown that the standard deviations of the North and East error components over the LVP 
procedure path are roughly constant throughout the trajectory and are equal to 21.7cm and 
19.2cm respectively. In comparison, the estimated standard deviations of the North and East 
components from          (  ) are 54.4cm and 48.3cm, respectively, when the Kalman filter 
has converged. To conclude, in the application, the covariance matrix of the GNSS/IRS 
position error cannot be estimated by means of the predicted covariance matrix          .  
E.4.1.2. Technique based on Monte Carlo simulations  
The covariance matrix         over a segment of a procedure path in a given airport has 
been estimated by means of Monte Carlo simulations. This section details the simulation 
scenario that has been used to estimate the covariance matrix         over a segment of the 
LVP procedure path at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France and given a specific satellite 
geometry. The satellite geometry is indicated by the index    in the rest of this section. 
Let’s firstly recall that, from Section 7.3.2.3, the covariance matrix        (  )  of the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM horizontal position error given the satellite geometry    can be considered as 
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constant in the (NED) reference frame over the whole LVP procedure path. The procedure 
path consists of four segments.        (  ) is considered to be independent of the segment. 
Based on this remark, the covariance matrix          (  ) throughout the LVP procedure 
path for the satellite geometry    has been obtained using the methodology sketched in Figure 
E-1.   
 
 
 
Figure E-1: Methodology to estimate the covariance matrix         
 
As described in Figure E-1, only North and East position errors that are uncorrelated in the 
time domain are used to estimate the covariance matrix throughout the LVP procedure. 
Indeed, the North and East position errors are correlated in the time domain. There are two 
reasons for this.  The GNSS measurements are affected by errors that are modelled in the time 
domain by first order Gauss-Markov processes characterized by relatively long correlation 
times (few hundred of seconds for the troposphere error). In addition, the Kalman filter itself 
induces a temporal correlation on the GNSS/IRS/DEM position errors. 
The convergence test described in Appendix B, Section B.2, is performed on the standard 
deviation of the uncorrelated position errors in both North and East direction. The simulation 
is stopped when the convergence tests on both North and East errors are passed. It is shown in 
the next section that a correlation time of            can be used to extract uncorrelated 
data over the trajectory. Table E-1 provides the number of position errors used to estimate 
       (  ). 
 
 
Number of trajectories          
Number of position errors per trajectory 5247 
Upper bound of the correlation time            
Number of uncorrelated position errors per trajectory        
Number of position errors to estimate        (  )               
 
Table E-1: Number of GNSS/IRS position errors used in the estimation of          
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E.4.2. Correlation time of the GNSS/IRS/DEM position errors 
For this analysis, let’s consider the following simulation scenario. An aircraft performs a 
uniform and rectilinear trajectory at Blagnac, France, for a given constellation configuration. 
The elevation mask angle is set to 15° for both GPS and Galileo constellations. The trajectory 
length is 6 kilometers. The minimal trajectory duration is obtained for an aircraft speed of 
10m/s and is 10 minutes. Note that this simulation scenario is relatively long compared to the 
exposure times related to taxi operations that are few hundred of seconds [Schuster et al., 
2011]. However, in this simulation, the exposure time has been artificially increased in order 
to analyze the autocorrelation of the GNSS/IRS position errors over a wide time interval. The 
position error simulator presented in Chapter 6 has been used to compute the GNSS/IRS 
horizontal position   . The GNSS pseudo-range measurements are affected by the nominal 
errors induced by the troposphere, the ionosphere, the satellite clock and ephemeris 
inaccuracies, and the receiver noise. The autocorrelations of the North and East position errors 
are depicted in Figure E-2 for a constant aircraft speed throughout the trajectory of 1m/s. 
 
 
 
Figure E-2: Normalized autocorrelation functions of the GNSS/IRS horizontal position 
errors  
 
Simulation results from Figure E-2 show that the correlation time of the position errors in the 
North and East directions is several dozens of seconds. Correlation times of roughly     
seconds have been obtained in the North and East directions. This simulation has been 
reiterated for different aircraft speeds. Indeed, the dynamic of the aircraft is expected to 
modify the correlation time of the position error since it will modify the Kalman gain. Table 
E-2 presents the estimated correlation times obtained for different aircraft speeds throughout 
the trajectory. in this thesis, it is considered that an upper bound of the correlation time of 
           can be adopted. 
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Aircraft 
speed 
Estimated correlation time 
North East 
1m/s 130s 130s 
5m/s 205s 205s 
10m/s 170s 210s 
 
Table E-2: Estimated correlation times of the GNSS/IRS position errors  
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  APPENDIX F 
F. Reference frames 
 
 
F.1. Inertial reference frame – (I)  
It is a reference frame for which its orientation is fixed relative to stars. Its origin is at the 
Earth’s center of mass( ). It consists in 3 axes (        ).   axis is along the earth’s spin 
axis. At a given initial time (t=0),    axis is perpendicular to    in the Equator plane in the 
direction of Greenwich meridian.    axis is defined to complete the right-handed coordinate 
system such as (        ) is an orthogonal coordinate system. 
F.2. Earth-Centered Earth-Fixed (ECEF) reference frame  
Its origin is fixed at the center of the Earth. It is deduced from inertial frame by rotation of 
    radians about the earth’s spin axis during interval [   ].    is the Earth’s angular rate 
detailed in [Groves, 2008]. The ECEF refrence frame consists in 3 axes (        ).    axis 
is in the Greenwich meridian plane. Earth’s shape and gravity models are defined by geodetic 
datum. The datum that is globally most used is the World Geodetic System 84. 
F.3. NED Navigation reference frame – (NED)  
It is the North, East, Down rectangular coordinate frame whose origin is at the position of the 
central IMU of the aircraft. North (  ) and East (  ) axes point to true North and East 
respectively, such as (     ) plane is tangent to the surface of the earth on the position of the 
central IMU of the aircraft.    is normal to the plane (     )  and down-oriented. 
F.4. Wander Azimuth Navigation reference frame – (w)  
It is a coordinate frame whose origin is at the position of the central IMU of the aircraft.      
and     axes are located in the (     ) plane that is tangent to the surface of the earth on the 
position of the central IMU of the aircraft. They deviate from the North and East directions of 
an angle (the azimuth angle    detailed in [Diesel, 1995]).       is normal to the plane 
(       ) and down-oriented. The (NED), (w) and ECEF reference frames are represented 
in Figure F-1. In this figure, P represents the the position of the central IMU of the aircraft. 
Transformation matrices from the (NED) reference frame to the (w) reference frame are 
provided in [Diesel, 1995]. 
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Figure F-1 : ECEF and NED and wander azimuth reference frames 
 
F.5. Aircraft body reference frame – (b)  
The aircraft body frame is rigidly attached to the central     of the aircraft.      axis is 
pointing in the forward direction,      axis is pointing to the bottom of the mobile. The       
axis is defined to complete the right-handed coordinate system such as (    ,     ,     ) is an 
orthogonal coordinate system.     ,     ,      axes are depicted in Figure F-2. 
 
 
Figure F-2 : Aircraft body reference frame 
 
(b) - frame is deduced from (NED) - frame with rotations   about    ,   about     and   
about     where       are roll, pitch, yaw angles, respectively. Assuming that both roll and 
pitch angles are null during the taxi operations, the transformation matrix from the navigation 
reference frame (NED) to the aircraft body reference frame (b)       (  ) at time    is given 
by: 
 
      (  )  [
     
      
   
] 
 
Eq -  F-1 
 
where    is the cosine of the yaw angle and    is the sine of the yaw angle at time   .
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  APPENDIX G 
G. GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS 
positioning algorithm 
 
 
The goals of this Appendix are: 
- To propose a GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS hybridization positioning algorithm for airport 
surface operations. 
- To present the GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS position error simulator that has been implemented 
to assess the accuracy performance of the proposed GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS algorithm. 
- To assess the accuracy performance of this algorithm in the absence of multipath from 
airport buildings and airport gates and during the taxi on apron taxiway and the taxi on taxi 
lane sub-phases along the LVP procedure path at Toulouse Blagnac airport. The LVP 
procedure path is presented in Section 7.2.1.1.  
- To compare these performances to the performances obtained with the GNSS/IRS/DEM 
hybridization positioning algorithm presented in Chapter 6. 
The WSS is a device used for reading the speed of the aircraft wheel rotation rate which can be 
used to calculate the wheel speed. More details about the operation of WSS are provided in [Gao, 
2007] [Li, 2009]. The main landing gear of an A319 aircraft consists of four wheels. Each wheel 
of the main landing gear is equipped with a WSS.   
 
G.1. GNSS/IRS/WSS positioning error computation  
In this Appendix, a GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS tight coupling hybridization positioning algorithm 
is presented. The choice of this hybridization algorithm is further detailed in Chapter 6. Note 
that more details about the use of WSS in ultra-tight coupling and in loose coupling 
algorithms are provided in [Gao, 2007] [Li, 2009].  
G.1.1. GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS positioning error simulator architecture 
The general architecture of the software that computes the positioning error at the output of 
the GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS coupling algorithm is provided in Figure G-1.  
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Figure G-1 : Architecture of the GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS positioning error simulator 
 
As depicted in the last Figure, five main modules are implemented in the software, namely the 
trajectory simulator module, the GNSS module, the inertial module, the WSS module and the 
Kalman filter module. The GNSS module and the inertial module are presented in Chapter 6. 
The trajectory module, the WSS module and the Kalman filter modules are briefly presented 
below. 
G.1.2. Trajectory simulator module 
A trajectory simulator is implemented so as to compute: 
- The true IMU position and the true IMU velocity vector in (NED), 
- The true aircraft attitude angles, 
- The true GNSS receiver antenna position in LLA, 
- The true longitudinal velocity at the center of each wheel of the main landing gear. 
Further details concerning the computation of the true IMU positions and velocity vectors, of 
the true aircraft attitude angles, and of the true GNSS antenna positions throughout the 
trajectory are provided in Chapter 6. The main landing gear of A319 aircraft consists of four 
wheels. In this thesis, it is assumed that the angular velocity of each wheel of the main 
landing gear is measured by a WSS. By denoting     
 (  ) the true IMU velocity vector in 
NED at time   , the true velocity vector of the aircraft at the center of the wheel     expressed 
in the body reference frame (b) can be calculated as [Farrell et al., 1999]: 
 
   
 (  )      (  )    
 (  )     
 (  )       
  Eq -  G-1 
 
where: 
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     (  ) is the transformation matrix from the navigation reference frame (NED) to the 
aircraft body reference frame (b). Note that both reference frames are defined in Appendix 
F. 
    
 (  ) is the skew-symmetric matrix of the angular rate vector    
 (  ) at time 
  .    
 (  ) is the rate of rotation of the (b) frame axes with respect to the (NED) frame 
axes resolved about the (b) frame axes. 
        
  is the lever arm between the center of the IMU and the center of the of the wheel  
   expressed in the aircraft body reference frame (b). The lever arms IMU/landing gear 
wheels cannot be published in the context of this thesis.  
From the definition of the aircraft body reference frame provided in Appendix F, the true 
longitudinal velocity at the center of the wheel   can be computed as follows: 
 
   
     
(  )  [   
 (  )]
   
 Eq -  G-2 
 
The true IMU and GNSS receiver antenna positions, the true IMU velocity vector, the true 
yaw angle and the longitudinal velocities at the center of each wheel    are computed with a 
sampling frequency of    , that is a typical sampling frequency used in the GNSS/IRS tight 
coupling Kalman filters in commercial aircraft.  
G.1.3. WSS module 
A WSS module is implemented so as to compute the longitudinal velocity measurements at 
the center of the four wheels of the main landing gear. Note that a WSS measures the rotation 
rate of each wheel and converts the measured angular velocities in longitudinal velocity 
measurements. The Kalman filter presented in this Appendix only uses the longitudinal 
velocity measurements as additional aiding information.  For this reason, only longitudinal 
velocity measurements are generated in this module.  
The final longitudinal velocity measurements are affected by two sources of errors. Firstly 
there are the errors in the estimation of the rotation rates of the wheels by the WSS. These 
errors essentially come from the acquisition, quantification and digitalization processes used 
by the WSS and described in [Li, 2009]. Secondly, there are the errors on the model of the tire 
radius used to convert the estimated rotation rates in longitudinal velocity measurements.  
The angular velocity measurement of the rotation of the wheel    can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
 ̂  (  )     (  )     (  ) 
 
Eq -  G-3 
where: 
    (  ) represents the true rotation rate of the wheel    at time   , 
    (  ) is modelled as a zero-mean Gaussian white noise [Li, 2009] characterized by a 
standard deviation     . In this thesis,    is considered to be independent of the wheel.    
depends on the characteristics of the WSS mounted on the wheels of the aircraft. The value 
of      for A319 aircraft cannot be publically published in the context of this PhD thesis. 
The longitudinal velocity obtained from a WSS can be represented as: 
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 ̂  
     
(  )     (   (  )     (  )) 
 
Eq -  G-4 
where:     is the nominal tire radius that is used by the WSS to convert the measured rotation 
rate of the wheel to the longitudinal velocity at the center of the wheel. It is assumed that no 
measurement unit is used to estimate the value of the tire radius throughout the trajectory in 
real-time.     is set to a constant value of 57cm. This value corresponds to the mean radius of 
the wheels of an A319 aircraft.  
Let’s note         (  ) the true tire radius    at time   . The tire radius is changing over a 
given trajectory due to variations in the taxiway conditions and due to the variations in the tire 
pressure [Gao, 2007].         (  ) is given as: 
 
        (  )          (  ) 
 
Eq -  G-5 
where:     (  ) represents the variations of the tire radius with respect to the nominal tire 
radius     throughout the trajectory. An analysis detailed in [Vézinet, 2013] shows that the 
term     (  ) depends on the true longitudinal velocity at the center of the wheel    at time 
  . More specifically, it is shown in this publication that, in the context of airport surface 
operations,     (  ) can be modelled as: 
 
    (  )             
     
(  ) 
 
Eq -  G-6 
where :   and   have been obtained in an empirical way and cannot be published in the 
context of this PhD thesis. Eq -  G-4 and Eq -  G-5 lead to: 
 
 ̂  
     
(  )  (     (  ))        (  )   (  )        (  ) 
 
Eq -  G-7 
where:    (  )  
    
(  )
        
(  )
 . The true longitudinal velocity at the center of the wheel    at 
time    is as follows: 
 
   
     
(  )          (  )   (  ) 
 
Eq -  G-8 
From Eq -  G-7 and Eq -  G-8, the measured longitudinal velocities can be generated as 
follows [Li, 2009]: 
 ̂  
     (  )  (     (  ))    
     ( )      (  ) 
Eq -  G-9 
 
where      (  )        (  ) is a zero-mean white noise Gaussian error characterized by a 
standard deviation           . 
G.1.4. Kalman filter module 
A Kalman filter module is implemented so as to estimate the slowly varying inertial 
estimation errors. The GNSS raw code pseudo range measurements and the WSS longitudinal 
velocity measurements are used to estimate the inertial estimation errors. The coupling 
technique is a tight coupling, wherein INS outputs are integrated with GNSS measurements 
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and the WSS measurements in a linearized Kalman filter. This section presents the Kalman 
filter architecture used to estimate the inertial estimation errors. Remark also that other tight 
coupling GNSS/IRS/WSS implementations exist in the literature. Particularly, one 
methodology consists in using the lateral and vertical velocities at the center of each wheel as 
extra measurements to aid the estimation of the state vector. These velocities are set to 0m/s. 
This is generally true since, most of the time, the vehicle does not jump and does not slide 
during the trajectory. This technique is known as the “3D velocity update technique” or “non-
holonomic technique” in the literature [Gao, 2007]. However, such techniques have not been 
tested in the context of this PhD thesis. It is also assumed in this thesis that the noise terms 
that affect the WSS measurements is a white Gaussian noise and that the WSS measurement 
noises on the four wheels are independent each other. The identification of the WSS 
correlation modes in the time domain and between the wheels have not been investigated. 
This analysis can be done based on real data and remains a future work. 
The state vector used in the GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS implementation is detailed in Section 
6.2.5 and is unchanged compared to the state vector used for the GNSS/IRS/DEM 
hybridization algorithm. Hence, the state transition matrix and the predicted state noise 
covariance matrix are the same for both GNSS/IRS/DEM and GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS 
implementations.  
Design matrix 
The linearized measurement model can be written as follows: 
 
[
      (  )
     (  )
]  [
     (  )
    (  )
]   (  )  [
      (  )
     (  )
] 
 
Eq -  G-10 
where: 
       (  ) is the GNSS observation vector defined as the difference between the GNSS 
pseudo-range measurements and ranges calculated between the reference trajectory 
position and the tracked satellites position. 
      (  ) is the WSS observation vector defined as the difference between the WSS 
longitudinal velocity measurements and longitudinal velocities calculated from the velocity 
of the IMU estimated by the inertial module.      (  ) is presented below.  
       (  ) is the GNSS observation noise vector. 
      (  ) is the WSS observation noise vector. 
   (  ) is the state vector. 
      (  ) is the GNSS design matrix. 
     (  ) is the WSS design matrix presented below. 
The linearized WSS measurement model can be written as: 
 
     (  )      (  )  (  )       (  ) 
 
Eq -  G-11 
 
Since four WSS are installed onboard to measure the rotation rates of the four wheels of the 
main landing gear, Eq -  G-11 can be developed as: 
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Eq -  G-12 
where: 
  ̂  
     (  ) is the WSS longitudinal velocity measurement on the wheel    at time   , 
  ̂     
     
( ) is the longitudinal velocity at the center of the wheel    calculated from the 
inertial estimate of the IMU velocity vector at time   . 
In order to compute the linearized design matrix       , let’s state the WSS measurement 
model. Based on Eq -  G-1 and on Eq -  G-9, the WSS longitudinal velocity measurement 
 ̂  
     (  ) on the wheel    and the true IMU velocity vector     
 (  ) expressed in the wander 
azimuth reference frame at time    are linked by the following equation: 
 
 ̂  
     (  )  (     (  )) ([    (  )]         
 (  )  [   
 (  )]            
 )
     (  ) 
 
Eq -  G-13 
 
Where: 
     (  ) is the transformation matrix from the wander azimuth navigation reference 
frame (w) to the aircraft body reference frame (b). Note that both reference frames are 
defined in Appendix F. 
    
 (  ) is the skew-symmetric matrix of the angular rate vector    
 (  ) at time   .   
 (  ) 
is the rate of rotation of the (b) frame axes with respect to the (w) frame axes resolved 
about the (b) frame axes. 
Eq -  G-13 can be rewritten as: 
 
 ̂  
     (  )        (    
 (  ))      (  ) 
 
Eq -  G-14 
 
From Chapter 6, the linearized design matrix       (  ) can be written as: 
 
      (  )  
       
  
|
 (  )  ̅(  )
 
 
Eq -  G-15 
where  ̅ is the reference trajectory around which the design matrix is linearized. As explained 
in Chapter 6, the design matrix is linearized around the IMU position, the IMU velocity 
vector and the aircraft attitude angles estimated by the inertial module. By differentiating the 
right hand side of Eq -  G-14 and by neglecting the second-order differential terms, we get: 
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 (  ))   ([   
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Eq -  G-16 
where: 
  ̂   (  ) is calculated based on the and aircraft attitude angles estimated by the inertial 
module.  
  ̂       
 (  ) is the IMU velocity vector the wander azimuth reference frame (w) estimated 
by the inertial module. 
The perturbations of the terms [    (  )]      and [   
 (  )]      can be calculated as follows 
[Farrell et al., 1999]: 
 
 ([    (  )]     ) ̂       
 (  )   [ ̂       
 (  )]       
(  ) 
 ([   
 (  )]     )        
   [       
 ]
     
  (  ) 
 
 
Eq -  G-17 
where: 
  ̂       
 (  ) is the skew-symmetric matrix of ̂    (  ) ̂       
 (  ). 
        
  is the skew-symmetric matrix of        
 .  
By neglecting the second-order differential terms (such as    (  )[ ̂       
 (  )]       
(  )), 
and since the vertical velocity error is not part of the state vector, Eq -  G-16 can be written as: 
       
  
|
 (  )  ̅(  )
  (  )
 ( [ ̂       
 (  )]       
(  )  [ ̂   (  )]       
( )  [       
 ]
     
  (  ))
 
 
 
Eq -  G-18 
Hence, we get: 
 
      (  )
 [    [ ̂   (  )]      [ ̂       
 (  )]      [       
 ]
     
          ] 
 
Eq -  G-19 
 
where N is the number of GNSS measurements used in the Kalman filter at time   . 
Measurement noise covariance matrix  
The measurement noise covariance matrix at time    is implemented by assuming that GNSS 
and WSS measurement noises are independent each other at time     
 
 (  )  
[
 
 
 
 
 
     (  )     
     
    
      
   
       
  
        
 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Eq -  G-20 
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where: 
      is the standard deviation of WSS longitudinal velocity measurement noise error. It is 
assumed that the Kalman filter perfectly knows the standard deviation of the noise errors 
affecting the WSS longitudinal velocity measurement. 
      (  ) is the GNSS measurement noise covariance matrix at time   . 
 
G.2. Analysis of the GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS positioning error 
This section analyses the GNSS/IRS/WSS positioning error over a given trajectory and 
compares the positioning error to the GNSS/IRS positioning error. In this section, the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS positioning errors are obtained by means of the simulator presented in 
Section G.2 of this Appendix. The GNSS/IRS/DEM positioning errors are obtained by means 
of the simulator presented in Chapter 6.  
G.2.1. Simulation scenario 
Both GNSS/IRS/DEM and GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS position errors have been calculated 
following the simulation scenario indicated in Table G-1. 
Trajectory description  
The procedure path is depicted by a red line in Figure 
G-2. 
Aircraft speed on the runway 14R: 10m/s 
Aircraft speed on the taxiways M2 and N2 : 5m/s 
Number of satellites in the 
constellation 
GPS 24 satellites 
Galileo 27 satellites 
Elevation mask angle 
GPS 15° 
Galileo 15° 
GNSS signals 
GPS 
Dual frequency 
GPSL1C+GPSL5 
Galileo 
Dual frequency 
GalileoE1+GalileoE5a 
GNSS receiver settings As described in Section 4.2.4 
GNSS measurement error 
models 
Error source Error model 
 troposphere 
 ionosphere  
 satellite clock and 
ephemeris inaccuracies 
 receiver thermal noise  
Stochastic error models 
described in Chapter 3 
Inertial sensor error models Stochastic error models described in  Section 6.2.3 
WSS error models Error models described in  Section G.2 of this Appendix  
 
Table G-1 : Simulation settings for Figure 3  
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Figure G-2: Representation of the procedure path for Figure G-3 
 
G.2.2. Simulation results 
The GNSS/IRS and GNSS/IRS/WSS position errors throughout the trajectory described in the 
previous section are plotted in Figure G-3 as a function of time in the aircraft body (b) 
reference frame (left side) and in the (NED) reference frame (right side).  
  
Longitudinal and lateral error components North and East error components 
 
 
Figure G-3: Horizontal position errors with and without WSS aiding  
 
It can be observed in Figure G-3, left part, that the WSS longitudinal velocity measurements 
used in the Kalman filter allows reducing the standard deviation of the longitudinal position 
error throughout the trajectory. The standard deviation of the longitudinal error predicted by 
the state vector covariance matrix    is roughly two times lower with the GNSS/IRS/WSS 
implementation than with the GNSS/IRS implementation. The lateral position error is not 
strongly reduced by the use of WSS. The standard deviations of the lateral error predicted by 
the state vector covariance matrix    are roughly the same in both GNSS/IRS and 
GNSS/IRS/WSS implementations. 
It can be observed in Figure G-3, right part, that the predicted covariance matrix of the 
horizontal position errors in the North-East reference frame is constant throughout the 
trajectory with the GNSS/IRS implementation. An interpretation of this observation is 
provided in Section 7.3. However, since the WSS aids only the longitudinal position error, the 
covariance matrix of the horizontal position errors in the North-East reference frame is 
varying with the route of the aircraft in the GNSS/IRS/WSS implementation. The predicted 
standard deviations of the North and East errors are different along the runway (when the 
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simulation time is below 350s) and along the taxiway (when the simulation time is above 
350s).  
G.3. Accuracy assessment 
The objective of this section is to evaluate the accuracy of the horizontal position estimated 
by the tight coupling GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS Kalman filter during the taxi on taxiway 
(segment 1), taxi on apron taxiway, and taxi on taxi lane sub-phases related to the LVP 
procedure path at Toulouse Blagnac airport, France. The methodology used to estimate the 
accuracy performance of the algorithm along each sub-phase is fully described in Section 7.3 
and is re-used in this section. Since the covariance of the GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS position 
error depends on the segment route, the position error covariance matrices         have 
been estimated by simulating position errors on each segment. Since the covariance matrix 
        is not constant over the LVP trajectory, the GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS position errors 
simulated on different segments cannot be merged to estimate the matrix         on each 
segment of the LVP trajectory.  
The percentage of satellite geometries for which  |  |             with the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS algorithm is quantified in Table G-2. Table G-2 also presents the 
mean  |  |        computed over the            satellite geometries simulated over three 
days. Finally, this Table compares these results with the results obtained with the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM tight coupling algorithm.  
 
        
Percentage of satellite 
geometries for which 
 |  |             
Mean probability  |  |        
calculated over three days 
GNSS/IRS/ 
DEM 
GNSS/IRS/ 
DEM/WSS 
GNSS/IRS/ 
DEM 
GNSS/IRS/ 
DEM/WSS 
Taxi on 
taxiway 
(segment 1) 
               100  100  
Taxi on apron 
taxiway 
                   98.41  98.74  
Taxi on taxi 
lane             
67.40  70.13  
 
Table G-2 : Accuracy performance of the GNSS/IRS/DEM/WSS algorithm and of the 
GNSS/IRS/DEM algorithm – Elevation mask angle 15° for GPS and Galileo 
 
The availability of the accuracy function remains constant in the absence or in the presence of 
the WSS measurement aid. The use of the WSS measurements in the positioning algorithm 
leads to improve the mean probability that the horizontal position error exceeds the 95% 
accuracy confidence bounds computed over three days. However, this improvement is not 
significant for the apron sub-phase. Concerning the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase, the mean 
probability is of the order of 70.13  with the WSS aid.  The accuracy requirement is not met 
with the WSS measurements and along the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase, regardless of the 
satellite geometry. It is concluded that the use of WSS measurements does not significantly 
improve the accuracy of the horizontal position error during the apron sub-phase and does not 
allow meeting the accuracy performance requirement during the taxi on taxi lane sub-phase.  
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 Résumé  
Les systèmes GNSS sont actuellement utilisés en aviation civile pour estimer la position et la vitesse 
de l’avion pendant les phases de route jusqu’aux approches de précision. Etendre l’utilisation de 
GNSS aux opérations de surface en environnement aéroportuaire et sous de faibles conditions de 
visibilité reste un challenge pour la communauté aviation civile. En effet, durant ces opérations, les 
mesures GNSS peuvent être affectées par des évènements singuliers tels que les multi-trajet ou les 
anomalies ionosphériques. Ces évènements peuvent engendrer des erreurs de position jugées 
inacceptables en termes de précision et d’intégrité pour assurer le guidage de l’avion. Les algorithmes 
de surveillance d’intégrité GNSS actuellement utilisés ne sont pas conçus pour prendre totalement en 
compte les effets de tels évènements. Il est essentiel de développer des algorithmes de surveillance 
conçus pour protéger les utilisateurs des effets de tels évènements afin de pouvoir utiliser GNSS pour 
le guidage de l’avion en milieu aéroportuaire et sous de faibles conditions de visibilité.  
Afin de concevoir de tels algorithmes de surveillance d’intégrité, il est nécessaire de développer des 
modèles d’erreurs de mesures GNSS et des modèles de pannes GNSS. La thèse a été principalement 
orientée vers la conception de modèles d’erreurs de mesures GNSS dues aux multi-trajets et vers le 
développement de modèles de pannes GNSS dues aux multi-trajets.  
Pour ce faire, un modèle d’erreurs multi-trajets GNSS sur les mesures bi-fréquence GPSL1C+GPSL5 
et GalileoE1+GalileoE5a a d’abord été proposé. Ensuite, l’impact des multi-trajets sur l’erreur de 
position a été étudié. Pour cette étude, un algorithme de couplage serré GPS+Galileo/IRS a été 
considéré. Cet algorithme est basé sur un filtre de Kalman linéarisé. Une analyse théorique et 
quantitative a été conduite pour étudier l’impact des erreurs de mesures GNSS dues aux multi-trajets 
sur le biais et sur la matrice de covariance de l’erreur de position horizontale en sortie de l’algorithme 
de positionnement considéré. Finalement, un modèle de pannes GNSS dues aux multi-trajets a été 
proposé. Ce modèle décrit la signature des pannes multi-trajets, les facteurs influençant cette signature, 
le modèle d’occurrence des pannes multi-trajets ainsi que les conditions d’occurrence de telles pannes.  
Mots-clés: GNSS, multitrajet, aviation civile, intégrité 
 
Abstract 
GNSSs are currently used in civil aviation to provide aircraft with position and velocity estimates from 
en-route to precision approach operations. Extending the use of GNSS to the guidance function during 
airport surface operations and under zero-visibility conditions remains a challenge. Indeed, during 
these operations, GNSS measurements may be affected by GNSS singular events, such as multipath or 
ionosphere anomalies. GNSS singular events may lead to unacceptable position errors in terms of 
accuracy and integrity for the zero-visibility guidance function. Current GNSS integrity monitoring 
systems are not designed to totally account for the GNSS singular event effects. The development of 
GNSS integrity monitoring systems designed to properly protect users from the singular event effects 
is essential to use GNSS for the guidance function under zero-visibility conditions.  
GNSS measurement error and integrity failure models are key inputs in the design of GNSS integrity 
monitoring systems. In this thesis, work has been mainly focused on the development of GNSS 
multipath measurement errors, on the assessment of the multipath impact on the GNSS-based position 
error, and on the development of GNSS multipath integrity failure models.  
For this matter, the dual frequency GPSL1C+GPSL5 and GalileoE1+GalileoE5a multipath pseudo-
range error model adapted to airport navigation has been firstly proposed. Next, the impact of 
multipath on the GNSS-based position error has been assessed. To do so, a double constellation 
GPS+Galileo/IRS tight coupling algorithm based on a linearized Kalman filter has been selected. The 
theoretical and quantitative analysis of the impact of the GNSS multipath ranging errors on the 
horizontal position bias and on the covariance matrix of the horizontal position error have been 
proposed. Finally, a GNSS multipath integrity failure model has been proposed. The model describes 
the signature of the GNSS single multipath ranging failures, the factors influencing the signature as 
well as the occurrence model of these failures and their conditions of occurrence.  
Keywords: GNSS, multipath, civil aviation, integrity 
 
